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Abstract 
The book includes four chapters related to studies on African and Latin American migration, at 
different and similar scales regarding some countries of Europe. The documents were presented by 
their authors at the workshop “Strengthening national capacities to deal with international 
migration: Maximizing development benefits and minimizing negative impacts”, jointly organized 
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA). The studies addressed African and Latin American migration to 
Europe; international migration in Africa and institutional frameworks; and recent African 
migration to South America and institutional frameworks. They are accompanied by a report on the 
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Introduction 
This book contains four studies prepared and presented at the inter-regional workshop on International 
Migration, held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on September 22nd and 23rd 2011. This workshop 
was an activity of the interregional project ‘Strengthening national capacities to deal with 
international migration: Maximizing development benefits and minimizing negative impacts’, jointly 
organized by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 
The project has been jointly implemented since 2009 by the five United Nations Regional 
Commissions in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA), under the coordination and the leadership of ECLAC through CELADE - Population Division.  
The book includes four chapters related to studies on African and Latin American migration, 
at different and similar scales regarding some countries of Europe, accompanied by a report on the 
workshop they were presented by their authors. The main objective of the workshop was to contribute 
toward strengthening capacities of countries to design national migration policies, maximizing 
benefits and minimizing negative aspects for the origin, transit and destination countries and the 
migrants. The meeting aimed at promoting the exchange of national and regional experiences and 
good practices. It allowed participants to hold discussions on the emerging aspects of migration 
dynamics between the three regions, highlighting those with impact on development, and analyzing 
innovative, institutional, and regulatory aspects of interregional migration.   
The meeting was attended by government delegates from selected countries of the three 
regions, experts on diverse migration issues and representatives from the civil society and 
international agencies (see annex with the report and list of participants). The topics addressed in the 
workshop were within the thematic framework of the project and the sessions were organized based 
on two main interrelated thematic areas:  
New and emerging aspects of migration dynamics between Africa, Europe and Latin America 
and the Caribbean and its relation to human rights and development, taking into consideration aspects 
such as: gender relations; the role of remittances; changes in labor insertion of migrants; migration of 
children and older persons; integration, entailment and rights of migrants; socio-economic and health 
conditions among migrant people; as well as an evaluation of the effects of the global crisis on 
interregional migration, including return migration and migrants’ socio-economic conditions.  
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Institutional and regulatory agreements in the field of development and international 
migration in selected countries from Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, including 
topics such as social integration; anti-discrimination; regularization programs; transnational 
communities; the fight against trafficking and smuggling of persons and other relevant aspects within 
the framework of the obligations assumed by states that could be considered as good practices in terms 
of handling migration issues on the basis of the principles for human dignity and respect.   
The workshop consisted of six work sessions and two round tables. The sessions included the 
presentations and discussions of the four background documents elaborated by the experts. A number 
of country delegates and civil society representatives presented and shared their ideas and experience. 
The roundtables provided additional opportunities for a wider debate and exchange of ideas.   
The first two sessions addressed African and Latin American migration to Europe; the 
following two addressed international migration in Africa and institutional frameworks; and the last 
ones focused on recent African migration to South America and institutional frameworks.  
Finally, the roundtables brought together representatives from international organizations and 
civil society, delegates from governments and one representative of a regional commission, to discuss 
about migration between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean: challenges and 
opportunities —the first one—, and advances and gaps in institutional arrangements —the second one. 
This document, which summarizes the main results and outputs of the workshop consists of 
four sections. They correspond to the reference documents discussed at the workshop and presented 
by their authors: 
African and Latin American people in the Southern European Countries: Italy, Spain and 
Portugal by Andreu Domingo (Universidad Autónoma, Barcelona, Spain) and Daniela Vono 
(Institute for Longitudinal Educational Research —INBIL—, Bamberg University, Germany).  
 
Migration patterns and immigrant characteristics in North-western Europe, by Helga A. G. 
de Valk (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute - NIDI). 
 
African International Migration: trends and institutional framework from the perspective of 
selected countries, by John O. Oucho (African Migration and Development Policy Centre – 
AMADPOC, Nairobi). 
 
Recent African Immigration to South America: The cases of Argentina and Brasil in Regional 
Context, by Pedro F. Marcelino (York University, Toronto, Canada) and Marcela Cerrutti 
(CENEP and CONICET, Argentina). 
A report on the presentations, discussions and reflections that took place during the sessions 
and the roundtables are included in an annex. The report was prepared by the rapporteur of the 
workshop, Jérôme Elie (Programme for the Study of Global Migration at the Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies, Geneva).  
The need to respect and promote the human rights of migrants, providing the right to legal 
protection and access to justice for migrants regardless of status, was one of the main conclusions of 
the workshop. In this sense, the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the obligations assumed by States and 
the increasing realization of the potential of international human rights instruments to advocate for the 
rights of migrants was one of the most emphatic requests for countries from participants.  
The overall conclusion was that the effort to jointly reflect, debate and work on pending 
migration issues between Regional Commissions was exemplary to jointly work on common 
migration issues. It was very fruitful and should be encouraged and strengthened in the future. It 
allowed the exchange of experiences and good practices among different stakeholders, countries and 
regions, and allowed reflecting on existing knowledge and resources.  
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For ECLAC, this book is a unique opportunity for spreading their ideas about international 
migration, human rights and development in the context of the work with regional commissions. The 
issues about migration must be understood as a matter of rights, freedom and cooperation in a world 
with a future of increasing mobility and eroding restrictions.  
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I. Africans in the Southern European countries:  
Italy, Spain and Portugal 
Andreu Domingo i Valls and Daniela Vono de Vilhena1 
A. Introduction: The particularities of the African  
migration in the Southern Europe 
The spectacular immigration growth experienced by the Southern European countries has by itself a 
special interest, both in the context of international migration, as for the singular role that Latin-
American and African flows have had in the revolutionary transformation from senders to receivers 
of these countries. If this growth has been impressive, so have been the impact of the economic 
crisis and the consequent decrease of the flows, and even the return of some of the migrants who 
have arrived in recent years. Moreover, as we will try to explain, the experience of these three 
countries contains three vital lessons: firstly, the two faces of the integration of the immigrant 
population, in which the differences between Africans and Americans become even more evident. 
Secondly, they are good examples of the complex relationship between law and immigration. 
Thirdly, their migration history can be used as a good example to the currently emigration countries 
like the Latin-American and African countries, especially in the current days when the North 
African region is shaken by political changes that will undoubtedly have a significant impact on 
migration between these continental regions.  
As in other European countries, the colonial past of the Mediterranean countries has played a 
substantial role in the generation of migration flows, policies that respond to the existence of these 
flows, and social spaces reserved for migrants. The comparison between Italy, Spain and Portugal 
enriches our understanding of the migratory phenomenon precisely because of the difference in each 
of them related to the colonial history and its impact on the immigration. For instance, in Italy 
although there is a presence of Libyans, Ethiopians and Eritreans, their participation among all 
Africans is very small. In Spain, the colonial relationship with Morocco, the major African country 
represented among immigrations has been reflected particularly in its negative side. It is observable in 
                                                        
1  Consultants from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of 
ECLAC. 
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the maintenance of prejudices and sensitivities between the two governments at the time to address the 
issue of immigration and between the immigrants and the Spanish population. This fact has indirectly 
benefited the better integration of the Latino immigrant population, even considering that the 
Moroccan population has arrived before (Izquierdo, 2004). In turn, the small size of the population 
from the Equatorial Guinea, independent since 1968, shows a limited potential for migration of this 
former Spanish colony in Africa.  
At the other end, and to understand the ambiguity of the colonial past, in the Latin-American 
case the colonial past has resulted in a de facto affirmative action in the Spanish law (mainly in 
accessing the Spanish nationality). This fact, together with the experienced Spanish emigration during 
the last two centuries (similarly to the Italian case), explain both the unusual growth of these flows as 
its successful integration if it is measured in terms of upward social mobility (Vono, 2010). Last but 
not least, the role of immigration from Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Angola 
and Mozambique in the Portuguese immigration growth shows two particularities: firstly, in 
comparison to Spain the territories were decolonized relatively late in 1975 and, secondly, the role of 
the racial factor in the integration of the immigrant population.  
The analysis of the evolution of migration from the African continent to the European 
Mediterranean countries is a fascinating exercise for understanding the relationship between legal and 
migration dynamics. In the same way, the demographic challenges are no less interesting, particularly 
the discussion on the importance of the population structure in the different countries involved as a 
determinant of migration between them. Was the relative scarcity of young people entering in the 
labor market in the three European countries the factor that has precipitated the migration boom? 
Secondly and clearly connected with the population structure, it appears as an explanatory variable 
both the drastic decline in fertility and the dramatic lengthening of life expectancy that preceded the 
transformation of emigration to immigration countries. From this perspective, we should question if 
the African migratory flows are a consequence of these changes or not. Can we talk about replacement 
migration in this context? Thirdly, the current economic situation in the southern European countries 
lead to the question whether the recent wave of immigration was an extraordinary closed parenthesis 
in history that has ended with the crisis, or if, in turn, it is a structural change and we can expect a 
future growth of the flows when the economic scenario improves. 
Beyond the strictly demographic aspects, African immigration that has already occurred in the 
three countries will have undoubtedly an impact on both the European and African sides. 
Consequences of it are not deeply discussed here but are worthwhile to being mentioned. Among 
them, we highlight the change in the composition by origin of the migration flows, their contribution 
to the host society and the impact of the crisis in transnational networks and transnational marriage 
markets. Neither demographics nor the economic or cultural elements of both receiving and sending 
countries may be interpreted in the future without taking these consequences into account. 
Considering the previous mentioned lines, this report will highlight the characteristics of the 
African immigration in Italy, Spain and Portugal. The analysis is limited by the scarcity of comparable 
statistical data in the three countries but for this same reason, it is an important contribution to the 
Southern European region. The report is organized in three chapters: the first one focuses on the 
comparison of immigrants in the three countries, its labor characteristics and its territorial distribution. 
The second chapter specifically examines the case of African immigration in Spain, the country with 
the higher volume of Africans and with the most detailed available data. Finally, some conclusions are 
presented. In addition to summarizing the main characteristics of African immigration in these three 
Mediterranean countries, they also offer some prospective reflections. 
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B. Africans in Italy, Portugal and Spain 
1. Mediterranean fracture or something else? 
The relatively low, disperse and heterogeneous statistical information on the Mediterranean countries 
results in its peripheral position and its political fragmentation. Information on aggregated data tends 
to be analyzed in different geo-political aggregations: the European Union, the countries of Maghreb 
and of Makhreb, sometimes studied as an African sub-region, sometimes as part of a Pan-Arabic 
region from Morocco to Iraq and the Gulf countries, sometimes as part of the Muslim world, with a 
geography that moves away from the Mediterranean. The same thing has happened with the 
Mediterranean European countries when they were not integrated into the European Union, and were 
considered within the diverse group of countries of Eastern Europe. The view towards the 
Mediterranean from an academic view point has been mostly a nostalgic approach of a displaced 
center, at least since the reference work of Ferdinand Braudel (1949). The volunteerism to create or to 
recreate a Mediterranean entity, clings to the framework of cooperation and development, part of the 
radical imbalance between the large blocks in which the uneven development divides the globe: North 
and South (Balta, 1992). 
Nothing new so far, the Mediterranean geography and its political and demographic trends 
has been an area of conflicts and splits, more generally from the perspective of “security” and 
consequently “population planning” (Teitelbaum, 2001). The comparison between the border of 
Mexico and the United States has quickly become a model to study the Mediterranean as a frontier 
between North and South (Coleman, 2005). In our view, although we consider the specificity of the 
redefinition of boundaries such as in the Spanish case (and its symbolism given by history), on one 
hand, and the supra-national European Union (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008), on the other, this comparison 
misused, driven by the prominence of migration on the international agenda, united more than ever by 
the discourse of security after September 11, 2001. Consequently, it can be affirmed that it would be a 
disruptive paradigm for understanding the demographic reality of the whole Mediterranean, and the 
particular issue of the international migration.  
In the specific field of demography, the topics that have been highlighted as an image of the 
Mediterranean region are mostly based on stereotypes. Differentials in fertility behavior, the structure 
of population or population density have been presented as causes of the international migration flows. 
Ironically, demographer Joaquin Arango has called it the “hydraulic theory of population” (Arango, 
1994). Unfortunately, and against all scientific evidence, these approaches seem to prevail after the 
popularization of the concept of “Replacement Migration” (United Nations, 2001). The structural 
deficit of young population as a product of the intensive and accelerated decline in fertility 
experienced in the Northern countries of the Mediterranean has become a kind of adaptation of the 
neoclassical theory of migration as a compensator wage differentials between regions to explain the 
migration from the other side.  
From an academic perspective, demographers have strongly challenged the theoretical 
principle of this demographic osmosis (Coleman, 2001). Some authors have sought in the historical 
example to refuse the approach by making it clear that international migration is currently occurring 
between countries with similar fertility levels and population age structures. In this sense, most of the 
African regional migration in the Gulf of Guinea and Southern African countries is between high 
fertility and youth age structures countries. At the opposite pole, indicators of fertility in Eastern 
Europe, one of the main origins of the migration flows towards the European Union countries, also 
include values even lower than those of recipient countries and notably aged population pyramids 
(Weiner and Teitelbaum, 2001). Even more evident is the Spanish case: the country has become in the 
last years the first recipient of flows at the European Union. Spain has moved from the last to the first 
place in both relative and absolute numbers in the classification of foreign resident population (Map 
I.1). While it is true that Spain holds, along with Italy, Greece or Portugal, the smallest fertility rates 
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and the highest life expectancy in Europe, the immigration boom has occurred when the baby boom 
Spanish generation was entering into the labor market (Domingo and Gil, 2007a).  
The comparison of international flows received by Spain and Italy during the new millennium 
is very enlightening: Italy, that began their fertility decline earlier and reached lower levels faster than 
Spain, has received less immigration flows than Spain. But most important is the fact that in both 
countries the period of immigration and the age structure of immigrants was the same, showing that it 
has depended more on economic conditions rather than on population structure (Domingo and Gil, 
2007b). The dramatic effects of the economic crisis since the second semester of 2008 are the best 
evidence on the prevalence of the importance of the economic context instead of the population 
demographic structure in order to explain the behaviors of the migration flows. 
 
MAP I.1 
EUROPEAN UNION, 2010: POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP  
                 
Source: Eurostat: Population by sex, age group and citizenship (migr_pop1ctz: extracted on 
08.09.11). 
Note: No data for 2010: Bulgaria, Austria and Romania (2009); Malta (2008); France (2005); 
United Kingdom (2004); Lithuania and Luxembourg (2001); Estonia (2000); Greece (1998); 
and Cyprus (not available). Latin-America includes North American data: Malta, France, 
United Kingdom, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Estonia and Greece. EU-27 includes Total 
European data: United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Estonia and Greece. 
 
 
So why, despite of all the scientific evidence, this explanation has become so popular? The 
siren song of those who appeal to the replacement migration as an engine of migration in the 
Mediterranean region have found ears on both Mediterranean sides. In the north, mostly by NGO’s 
that expect to legitimize their supposedly humanitarian discourse about the southern region. In the 
south, by political and intellectual circles that have used the argument to claim the importance and the 
contribution of these citizens to create wealth in the north in order to make migration a source of 
political negotiation (Domingo and Esteve, 2009).  
Definitely, it seems that for both Southern and Northern Mediterranean countries it is more 
convenient to move the discourse towards the demography than to assume that the problem is caused 
by the economy. Specifically, it is caused by the economic structural adjustments in the Southern 
countries, by the unequal distribution of wealth in these countries and their political responsibilities. 






Rest of the World
15,000 3,500,000 7,000,000
ECLAC – Project Document collection Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration… 
19 
migration, demography is still listed as one of the phenomena that underlie the inequalities, in the 
form of “uncontrolled population boom” or “migration fever” in the south (Naïr, 2008).  
Nobody doubts that human movements in the Mediterranean area are important (Fargues, 
2005), both in volume and characteristics, in the same way that the evolution of other demographic 
phenomena that occur in these countries are. However, the interconnection between them is much more 
complex and richer than it has been suggested, especially due to the amazing speed at which changes are 
occurring on both sides of the Mediterranean coast. It is important to note that there is much we do not 
know, but also much more than we do might know, demographically speaking, because data already 
exist. The construction and analysis of statistics offered in this document is a necessary previous step in 
order to develop and maintain sustainable dialogue and the elaboration of policies.  
Beyond the Mediterranean region itself, to understand the African migration to these 
countries we have to take into account the political framework of the European Union of which Spain, 
Italy and Portugal are part, and the migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa, which —except for 
Portugal— have brought their own complexity to the migration framework although they are not as 
significant as the North African countries in terms of volume. Ex-colonial relations in the case of 
Portugal and the establishment of transnational migrant networks that transcend the three are some of 
the most important features of these flows. Finally, it is necessary to mention the impact of economic 
crisis, on the one hand, and political changes that are happening in North Africa, on the other: not only 
the political landscape, but also migration have changed radically. 
2. How many immigrants? Quantifying the African immigration 
The estimation of the number of Africans in the Southern European countries is not as accurate as it 
would be expected, mainly due to specific constrains of the available population registers. Besides 
that, it can be affirmed that the data available allows a good approximation to the reality by the end of 
2009. The first limitation is that for Italy and Portugal, it is just possible to access the foreign 
population according to their nationality and not the country of birth or the last country residence. 
Secondly, the data for these two countries just considers the legal residents, being excluded all the 
undocumented immigrants. In the Spanish case, these constrains does not exists: it is possible to study 
the immigrants according to their country of birth and the data from the population register (in 
Spanish: Padrón Continuo) considers the entire population, independently of their residence status. 
In this sense, and according to the most recent data available, there were more than 2 million 
African citizens living in Italy, Portugal and Spain by the beginning of 20102 (see table I.1). Italy and 
Spain are the main destination countries of these inflows, with 931,793 African residents (22% of the 
total 4,235,059 foreign population) and 1,059,164 (18% of the total 5,747,734 foreign population) 
respectively. Portugal is the country with the smallest number of Africans —121,852 inhabitants—, 
nonetheless this population represents the highest proportion of the total 454,191 foreigners in 
comparison to the other two destinations, a 27%.3 Spain shows the highest proportion of men among 
the African immigrants, 175 men for every 100 women. This proportion in Italy is 148 men for every 
100 women. Again, Portugal shows a different pattern and the number of men is very similar to the 
number of women (108 men for every 100 women).  
While the highest number of African immigrants in Italy (93%) and Spain (97%) come from 
West and North African countries, in Portugal the highest inflows have their origins in West, Southern 
and Central Africa, more specifically in the Portuguese-speaking countries that were its ex colonies. In 
this case, foreigners from Angola, Cape-Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe account 
for 90% of all Africans in the country. Despite the proximity, immigrants from North African 
                                                        
2  For the Spanish case the data on country of birth is available and will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. 
Nonetheless, for comparative concerns, in this section only the immigrants with foreign citizenship in Spain will be 
considered. 
3  Nonetheless, Africans represent much less of the country’s total foreign population in comparison to ten years ago 
(Carrilho and Patricio, 2010). 
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countries represent a small proportion of the total Africans, 2%. However, in Italy and Spain they are 
the most represented ones, particularly Moroccans (see Map I.2). 
 
MAP I.2 
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES, 2010 
 
 
Source: Eurostat: Population by sex, age group and citizenship (migr_pop1ctz: extracted on 08.09.11). 
Note: No data for 2010: Bulgaria, Austria and Romania (2009); Malta (2008); France (2005); United 




What explains the dominant presence of immigrants from ex-colonies in Portugal? Joppke 
(2005) uses the concept of luso-tropicalism developed by Freyre (1940) to refer to the colonial 
relations in this country based on racial mixing between colonizers and the colonized. Although the 
supposed unity and cultural similarity between Portugal and its colonies have been challenged by 
various scholars, the idea has been constantly present in the discourse, goals and political actions in 
the country. Much of this is due to the high number of the emigrated Portuguese population in those 
countries, which was and remains well above the importance of immigrants.  
Moreover, the country explicitly privileges citizens of Portuguese-speaking countries in its 
immigration law. For instance, the acquisition of Portuguese nationality is easier to children of 
immigrants from the former colonies. Portugal has increased the length of residence required for 
both parents and their children to acquire the Portuguese nationality from 6 to 10 years, except in 
the case of children of immigrants from Portuguese-speaking former colonies, who continue with 
the requirement of 6 years. Apart from the Nationality Law, Portugal has signed various bilateral 
preferential agreements with the Portuguese-speaking countries and in the regularization processes 
for undocumented immigrants this collective has been explicitly favored.  
Portugal received the first significant immigration flow from Africa in the mid-sixties, most 
of them from Cape-Verde and until the end of the 1990’s they ere the most represented foreign group 
(39,600 immigrants in 1996). Nonetheless, it was from the mid-nineties on that the number of 
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on, it can be stated that African immigration in Portugal has been a quite historical and moderate 
process in comparison to other groups, especially Brazilians and the foreigners from the Eastern and 
South-Eastern European countries (Abecasis, 2008) (see figure I.1). 
 
FIGURE I.1 
PORTUGAL 1980-2006: EVOLUTION OF THE FOREIGN POPULATION HOLDING  
A VALID RESIDENCE PERMIT, BY MAIN NATIONALITY GROUPS 
(In thousands) 
 
Source: Abecasis (2008), based on data provided by the National Statistical Institute (INE). 
Note: Figures include all foreigners who hold a valid residence title (residence permits, stay permits and long-
term visas (prolongations of long-term visas included after 2004)). PALOP countries are all the Portuguese-
speaking countries (except Cape Verde and Brazil that have their own representation in this graph). 
 
 
The importance of immigration from the ex-colonies in Italy is not relevant. Foreigners 
from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Somalia represent only a 3% of the African 
foreign population. Here, the geographical proximity seems to be much more relevant. Immigrants 
from Morocco (431,529 inhabitants, the third immigrant group in the country after Rumanians and 
Albanians), Tunisia (103,678) and Egypt (82,064) are the three principal African groups. West African 
nationals from Senegal (72,618), Nigeria (48,674) and Ghana (44,353) are the following most 
represented immigrants. With the exception of Nigerians, where the presence of women is higher than 
the presence of men (82 men for every 100 women), in all the groups the number of men is higher than 
that of women. The increase of the African population during the decade of 2000 was very moderate 
compared to other groups like Ukrainians, Romanians, and Albanians (Caruso and Venditto, 2008). 
Spain is the destination of the majority of African immigration in Southern Europe and the 
country with best data regarding the phenomenon. For this reason, the next chapter is devoted to a 
deeper analysis of its particularities. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight some aspects in this 
chapter in order to stress some similarities and differences among the three countries. The first aspect 
to highlight is the importance of the migration from Morocco. Although the country has always been a 
source of international migrants in Spain, it is from the 1980's on when the presence of Moroccan 
immigration in Spain begins to be notorious. According to the latest data available, in the beginning of 
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African immigrants in Spain were the most represented group until mid-2000. The flows 
declined between 2000 and 2003, coinciding with the migratory boom in the country lead by Latin-
Americans. Previously, these flows were the most numerous and were almost monopolized by 
Moroccan population. The experienced growth during the last years and until 2008 has been due to the 
recovery of the Moroccan flows, as well as the increase in the sub-Saharan countries flow, despite the 
Spanish economic crisis that has affected other groups like the Latin-American and the Eastern 
European. Nonetheless, data from 2009 show a decrease in the number of entries for all origins. Since 
2000 the African migration has represented 15.4% (951,854 persons) of the total flow (see figure I.2). 
 
FIGURE I.2 
SPAIN 1998-2009: FOREIGN POPULATION FLOWS, BY REGION OF NATIONALITY 
 
Source: INE, Residence Variation Statistics. 
 
 
As in the Italian case, Moroccan is the most important African immigration to Spain. 
During the 1990’s there was a certain feminization of the group, mostly due to family reunification. 
Thus, it was possible to observ an increase in the participation of single, divorced and widowed 
women among those flows (Ramírez, 2004). Results from a survey conducted by Aparicio (2004) 
give us a clue about the stereotypical image of the Moroccan community. According to her findings, 
this is actually a very heterogeneous group in the country. Firstly, because of the stage of the 
migration process among the population that is very wide, ranging from those that are long-
established until the recently arrived ones. Secondly, because of the cultural and demographic 
diversity that exists within the community. The second most represented African group is the 
Senegalese with 61,970 nationals in 2010. Following are the Algerians (58,743), Nigerians (44,176) 
and Gambians (22,168). In all of these cases, the presence of men is much higher than the presence 
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ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, 2009: AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY AND SEX  
Nationality 
Italy Portugal Spain 
Total Men Women Sex Ratio Total Men Women Sex Ratio Total Men Women Sex Ratio 
Total Foreigners 4 235 059 2 063 407 2 171 652 95.0 454 191 234 412 219 779 106.7 5 747 734 3 017 935 2 729 799 110.6 
 Total Africa 931 793 554 659 377 134 147.1 121 852 63 142 58 707 107.6 1 059 164 673 730 385 434 174.8
  Central Africa 13 575 7 139 6 436 110.9 11 718 5 331 6 387 83.5 24 200 11 108 13 092 84.8
   Cameroon 9 175 4 875 4 300 113.4 84 54 30 180.0 5 919 3 734 2 185 170.9
   Chad 177 114 63 181.0 2 1 1 100.0 59 45 14 321.4
   Congo 3 758 1 907 1 851 103.0 120 50 70 71.4 2 240 1 406 834 168.6
   Gabon 179 89 90 98.9 13 7 6 116.7 152 68 84 81.0
   Equatorial Guinea 109 59 50 118.0 10 5 5 100.0 15 595 5 726 9 869 58.0
   Central African Republic 136 80 56 142.9 5 4 1 400.0 72 44 28 157.1
   Sao Tome and Principe 41 15 26 57.7 11 484 5 210 6 274 83.0 163 85 78 109.0
  Eastern Africa 38 540 19 022 19 518 97.5 382 208 174 119.5 4 063 2 026 2 037 99.5
   Burundi 569 253 316 80.1 2 2 0 0.0 59 33 26 126.9
   Comoros 9 6 3 200.0 1 0 1 0.0 8 5 3 166.7
   Dem. Rep. of Congo 3 679 1 832 1 847 99.2 184 102 82 124.4 1 255 769 486 158.2
   Djibouti 59 36 23 156.5 2 1 1 100.0 7 4 3 133.3
   Ethiopia 8 350 3 342 5 008 66.7 27 14 13 107.7 980 504 476 105.9
   Eritrea 12 967 7 244 5 723 126.6 4 4 0 0.0 109 62 47 131.9
   Kenya 1 578 627 951 65.9 50 26 24 108.3 873 227 646 35.1
   Madagascar 1 139 308 831 37.1 15 9 6 150.0 111 23 88 26.1
   Rwanda 517 271 246 110.2 25 17 8 212.5 154 83 71 116.9
   Seychelles 617 209 408 51.2 4 2 2 100.0 21 12 9 133.3
   Somalia 7 728 4 293 3 435 125.0 … … … … 237 156 81 192.6
   Tanzania 891 405 486 83.3 57 27 30 90.0 158 98 60 163.3
   Uganda 437 196 241 81.3 11 4 7 57.1 91 50 41 122.0
  North Africa 647 226 388 347 258 879 150.0 2 750 1 863 887 210.0 830 467 508 496 321 971 157.9
   Algeria 25 449 16 810 8 639 194.6 231 170 61 278.7 58 743 40 304 18 439 218.6
   Egypt 82 064 56 834 25 230 225.3 394 331 63 525.4 3 142 2 273 869 261.6
   Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1 468 894 574 155.7 10 8 2 400.0 375 248 127 195.3
   Mauritania 602 426 176 242.0 39 31 8 387.5 11 803 9 369 2 434 384.9
   Morocco 431 529 245 198 186 331 131.6 1 933 1 222 711 171.9 754 080 454 752 299 328 151.9
   Sudan 2 436 2 032 404 503.0 7 4 3 133.3 347 225 122 184.4
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Table I.1 (concluded) 
Nationality 
Italy Portugal Spain 
Total Men Women Sex Ratio Total Men Women Sex Ratio Total Men Women Sex Ratio 
Southern Africa 12 484 5 872 6 612 88.8 30 562 14 903 15 659 95.2 3 714 2 044 1 670 122.4 
  Angola 1 704 890 814 109.3 26 557 13 196 13 361 98.8 2 183 1 221 962 126.9
  Botswana 13 6 7 85.7 5 3 2 150.0 7 2 5 40.0
  Lesotho 15 8 7 114.3 2 2 0 0.0 9 5 4 0.0
  Malawi 54 21 33 63.6 9 2 7 28.6 21 11 10 110.0
  Mauritius 9 413 4 363 5 050 86.4 6 2 4 50.0 90 45 45 100.0
  Mozambique 301 123 178 69.1 3 328 1 435 1 893 75.8 361 166 195 85.1
  Namibia 16 3 13 23.1 12 6 6 100.0 50 20 30 66.7
  South Africa 612 281 331 84.9 589 239 350 68.3 875 515 360 143.1
  Swaziland 18 11 7 157.1 9 2 7 28.6 2 0 2 0.0
  Zambia 199 101 98 103.1 8 3 5 60.0 32 19 13 146.2
  Zimbabwe 139 65 74 87.8 37 13 24 54.2 84 40 44 90.9
West Africa 219 968 134 279 85 689 156.7 76 440 40 837 35 600 114.7 196 720 150 056 46 664 321.6
  Burkina Faso 11 784 7 589 4 195 180.9 16 12 4 300.0 1 131 859 272 315.8
  Benin 2 387 1 414 973 145.3 33 31 2 1550.0 378 274 104 263.5
  Cape-Verde 4 624 1 328 3 296 40.3 48 845 23 227 25 618 90.7 3 428 1 483 1 945 76.2
  Côte d'Ivoire 21 222 11 787 9 435 124.9 120 93 27 344.4 2 969 2 315 654 354.0
  Gambia 912 683 229 298.3 116 93 23 404.3 22 168 16 935 5 233 323.6
  Ghana 44 353 25 092 19 261 130.3 197 141 56 251.8 15 692 12 999 2 693 482.7
  Guinea 2 991 1 878 1 113 168.7 1 848 1 499 349 429.5 12 553 8 987 3 566 252.0
  Guinea-Bissau 410 243 167 145.5 22 945 13 924 9 018 154.4 5 875 4 568 1 307 349.5
  Liberia 2 210 1 900 310 612.9 20 20 0 0.0 492 379 113 335.4
  Mali 1 090 676 414 163.3 95 87 8 1087.5 24 228 22 112 2 116 1045.0
  Niger 1 208 592 616 96.1 2 1 1 100.0 252 196 56 350.0
  Nigeria 48 674 21 900 26 774 81.8 299 184 115 160.0 44 176 26 714 17 462 153.0
  Senegal 72 618 55 693 16 925 329.1 1 778 1 428 350 408.0 61 970 51 230 10 740 477.0
  Sierra Leone 1 294 774 520 148.8 59 49 10 490.0 962 679 283 239.9
  Togo 4 191 2 730 1 461 186.9 67 48 19 252.6 446 326 120 271.7
Source: For Italy, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica - ISTAT (December 31th, 2009), for Portugal Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (2009) and for Spain Padrón Continuo, 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INE (January 1st, 2010). 
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3. Educational and labor characteristics 
The socio-demographic complementarity between the flows of immigrants and the national population 
has been, along with the economic expansion, the main reason for the immigration boom of the early 
XXI century. Improvements in the educational profile of the most recent generations of Portuguese, 
Italians and Spaniards, especially the female generations, and their expectations regarding the 
participation in a dual labor market are at the root of this unprecedented growth. Human capital 
investments made by the generations born in the last quarter of the last century in the three countries 
largely explain the attraction toward immigration. The immigrant population operates, in this context, 
as an offer that supplies the need of no qualified working force in a labor market relatively inflexible 
(Piore, 1979). This fact highlights the importance of the socio-demographic complementarity between 
generations of nationals and foreigners. Finally, we must also consider that the massive influx of 
migrants occurred during the first years of the century, will increase even more the duality in the labor 
market. Therefore, it is important to understand the educational and occupational profiles that the 
African population has in each of these countries. 
Regarding African labor and educational characteristics in Portugal, data from the Portuguese 
2001 Census has shown that this population occupies the lowest non-qualified job categories and has a 
very low level of education in most of the cases, fact that is confirmed by the literature using different 
data sources (Barganha et al., 2002; OECD, 2007; Peixoto, 2008). Moreover, the number of Africans 
working in the informal labor market is very high, although it is a strong characteristic of the 
Portuguese labor market in general (Peixoto, 2008), and the upward labor mobility is very limited 
(Oliveira, 2006, for the Cabo Verde immigrants). Peixoto (2008) highlights that there are very few 
studies that deeply analyze the labor trajectories of immigrants from the PALOP countries in Portugal, 
nonetheless, the available data give us some clue about it. 
Although the employment rates among African immigrants are very high, for men the value is 
smaller than the average of the total population and very similar to the natives’ values. In the case of 
women, Cape Verdeans show a high participation in the labor market but the percentage of women 
from other PALOP countries is much lower and the unemployment rates much higher in comparison 
to other origins (see table I.2). More than 90% of the women from Cape-Verde and almost 80% of 
women from the PALOP countries are working in elementary occupations or as service workers. Men 
are more represented in elementary and construction-related occupations —more than 90% of Cape-
Verdeans and more than 80% of other immigrants from the PALOP countries. On the educational 
profile, Cape-Verdeans show a very low profile with more than 80% of the population holding a very 
low level of education. Other PALOP countries have a more heterogeneous profile, although almost 
75% of the population holds a very low or a low level of education (see table I.3).  
Data from the Istituto Nazionale per L’Assicurazione Contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (Inail) is 
the most updated available data on immigrants in the Italian labor market, although it just considers 
regular workers.4 According to it, the participation of Africans in the regular working force has 
decreased since the beginning of the decade of 2000. If in 2002 they represented 28.2% of the foreign 
workers, the value for 2006 was a 20.7% and for 2008 a 17.6%. This decrease could be related mainly 
to the increase of other non-African nationalities but also to the migration to the informal labor 
market, to unemployment or to emigration. The participation of women is very low with the exception 
of the Cape Verdeans (72.6% are registered in the working force). Nanni (2010) attributes it both to 
the importance of informal work among women and to family decisions regarding the gender role. 
Considering the different activity areas, Africans are over-represented in the industry sector in 
comparison to the value for the total number of immigrants. The agriculture sector is particularly 
important in the case of Tunisians working as fishermen and peasants in the region of Sicilia. In the 
service sector, domestic service and hotels and restaurant sectors are important niches (see table I.4). 
                                                        
4  Data from the Labour Force Survey is much more complete, nonetheless the microdata is not available to explore 
detailed information on immigrants. 
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TABLE I.2 
PORTUGAL, 2001: IMMIGRANTS’ EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT  
RATES, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND SEX 
Country of birth  
Employment rate Unemployment rate 
Men Women Men Women 
Cape Verde 77.3 67.3 7.0 9.3 
Other PALOP 74.4 57.1 9.7 17.4 
Brazil 87.9 65.5 4.2 12.3 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe 95.5 77.4 2.4 9.3 
EU-15 69.4 49.4 4.3 9.7 
Total foreign-born foreigners 79.4 58.2 5.9 12.8 
Native-born 73.0 55.3 5.3 8.8 
Source: Abecasis (2008), based on the Portuguese 2001 Census data. 
 
TABLE I.3 
PORTUGAL, 2001: IMMIGRANTS’ QUALIFICATION LEVEL,  
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND SEX 
Country of birth 
Very low 
Of which ulliterate 
Low Medium High 
(ISCED 0-1) (ISCED 2) (ISCED 3-4) (ISCED>=5) 
Cape Verde 80.0 14.8 11.6 6.4 2.1 
Other PALOP 46.9 4.4 25.3 21.1 6.8 
Brazil 30.8 0.7 18.6 30.1 20.6 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe 22.9 2.2 17.4 30.5 29.2 
EU-15 23.0 0.6 14.8 28.2 34.1 
Native-born 60.1 2.3 14.5 14.5 11.0 
Source: Abecasis (2008), based on the Portuguese 2001 Census data. 
Note: ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education, UNESCO. 
 
 
Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009) have compared educational and labor characteristics of the 
Maghreb immigrants in Italy and Spain. Education levels of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian 
immigrants in Spain and Italy are similar to those of the rest of the population in their countries of 
origin. Table I.5 shows that most immigrants have low education levels. However, it should be also 
stated that those with a university degree are over-represented, possibly because they are the most 
prepared to leave if they do not find job opportunities in their own country, and try luck in other ones 
where their preparation might possibly be better valued (Fergany, 2009). Maghreb immigrants in Italy, 
except Tunisians, also seem to have a better education level than in Spain, though differences are not 
that large. In fact, very few Tunisians live in Spain, and some of them probably have a particular 
profile (are students or senior managers or skilled workers). Generally speaking, Moroccan 
immigrants, and particularly those living in Spain (the majority of Maghrebi immigrants in this 
country), have the lowest education level out of those analysed, reflecting, therefore, their country’s 
situation in this field. Algerian and Tunisian immigrants, on their hand, it is somewhat higher. 
However, the lowest levels are found among Algerians living in Spain and Tunisians living in Italy. 
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TABLE I.4 
ITALY, DECEMBER 31TH, 2008: AFRICAN WORKERS  
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND ACTIVITY SECTOR 
Country of birth Total workers 
Sector of activity (%) 
Agriculture Industry Services Others 
Total immigrants 2 998 462 7.7 33.6 54.4 4.2 
Total Africa 528.709 6.3 41.7 49.1 2.8 
Morocco 213 926 7.6 46.2 43.9 2.4 
Tunisia 61 681 13.6 45.6 38.1 2.8 
Senegal 48 883 5.1 47.0 46.2 1.7 
Egypt 48 251 1.7 41.3 54.1 2.9 
Ghana 26 969 2.5 46.0 49.6 1.9 
Nigeria 24 945 3.3 30.4 63.1 3.2 
Algeria 14 125 7.2 42.7 47.4 2.6 
Côte d'Ivoire 12 774 3.5 35.2 59.1 2.2 
Ethiopia 12 348 1.7 20.5 72.4 5.4 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 9 271 1.7 27.4 65.8 5.2 
Eritrea 6 229 3.1 17.7 72.4 6.7 
Burkina Faso 5 783 8.8 51.9 38.1 1.2 
Mauritius 5 159 1.8 12.1 75.1 10.9 
Cameroon 5 095 2.5 20.5 74.2 2.8 
Somalia 3 837 4.7 18.8 69.9 6.6 
Cape-Verde 3 056 2.2 12.4 73.0 12.4 
Source: Nanni (2010), Dossier Statistico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes, based on data from the 
Istituto Nazionale per L’Assicurazione Contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro. 
 
TABLE I.5 
SPAIN AND ITALY, 2006-2007: PERCENTAGES OF ALGERIANS,  
MOROCCANS, AND TUNISIANS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
Country of residence Educational level 
Nationality 
Algerian Moroccan Tunisian 
Spain Low 68 78 47 
Medium 14 10 28 
High 18 12 26 
Italy Low 60 77 77 
Medium 12 5 5 
High 28 18 19 
Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), based on data from CARIM Mediterranean 
Migration Report 2006-2007. 
Note: Low education level (ISCED 0-2); medium education level (ISCED 3-4); high 
education level (ISCED 5-6). 
 
 
2008 data from The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) allow to compare 
characteristics from Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian immigrants with those of the Spanish and 
Italian populations, and those of foreigners and non EU citizens. It also permits to observe differences 
by sex. There is no data for Tunisians living in Spain because very few were included in the sample 
(see table I.6). The novelty here in comparison to the previous table is the high percentage of Algerian 
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women holding a university degree and living in Spain and Italy. Though they are small populations 
which probably have a different profile from that of the rest of the Maghreb migrants (students and 
professionals would be overrepresented), it is worth underlining their existence, as this migration 
could be fed by the high educated female unemployment rates in their own countries as well as for the 
troubled recent history of the country of origin. 
As for the comparison between the three nationalities analyzed and the local population, all 
foreigners and non EU citizens, it has also given interesting results. Foreigners in general, particularly 
non EU citizens, have a lower education level than Italian and Spanish nationals, except for women of 
the latter nationality, as more Spanish women than foreign ones have only attained primary education, 
but it should also be taken into account that most of them belong to elderly cohorts. However, the 
main point we would like to underline here is that, despite the above mentioned very specific and not 
very numerous exceptions of Algerian women in Spain and Italy both male and female immigrants 
from the Maghreb, but particularly the latter, have a lower education level than non EU citizens and 
foreigners in general. 
 
TABLE I.6 
SPAIN AND ITALY, 2008: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL  




Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Natives Males 50.6 21.5 27.9 48.6 39.8 11.6 
Females 48.2 21.8 30.0 46.6 39.3 14.0 
Both sexes 49.4 21.7 28.9 47.6 39.6 12.8 
Foreigners Males 45.6 35.3 19.1 55.7 36.9 7.5 
Females 44.0 36.7 19.3 46.6 40.0 13.4 
Both sexes 44.8 36.0 19.2 51.0 38.5 10.5 
Non EU27 Males 53.1 32.4 14.5 62.2 31.1 6.7 
Females 49.9 34.2 15.9 54.7 33.1 12.1 
Both sexes 51.5 33.3 15.2 58.6 32.1 9.3 
Algeria  Males 67.5 32.5 0.0 61.1 33.5 5.4 
Females 45.1 25.1 29.8 60.8 11.9 27.3 
Both sexes 56.6 28.6 14.8 61.0 28.5 10.5 
Morocco  Males 76.4 18.1 5.5 72.2 22.0 5.8 
Females 78.4 17.7 3.9 75.9 20.3 3.8 
Both sexes 77.2 17.9 4.8 73.7 21.3 5.0 
Tunisia Males - - - 73.6 20.2 6.2 
Females - - - 70.8 22.8 6.5 
Both sexes - - - 72.8 21.0 6.3 
Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 2008 
annual data. 
Note: Education level defined as “highest level of education or training successfully completed” 
has been simplified as a three level variable HATLEV1D to improve comparability: Low - lower 
secondary (ISCED 0-2); Medium – upper secondary (ISCED 3-4); High – Third level (ISCED 5-6). 
 
 
Regarding labor insertion in Italy and Spain, the authors presented the most detailed 
comparative analysis available (Gil et al., 2009). According to the EU-LFS annual data for 2008, 
Maghreb immigrants living in Spain and Italy have, in comparison to other immigrants, low female 
labor market integration, lower employment and much higher unemployment rates. While male 
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immigrants from the analyzed countries have similar or even higher participation rates than local male 
workers and other foreigners (except for Moroccan men living in Spain who have exceptionally low 
rates), women tend to have very low activity rates; much lower than local women and, of course, than 
other foreign women, who have the highest participation rates in Italy and Spain (see table I.7). 
 
TABLE I.7 
SPAIN AND ITALY, 2008: LABOR PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT  















Natives Males 73.5 8.9 80.7 69.5 5.6 73.6 
Females 54.3 12.2 61.8 46.8 8.3 51.0 
Both sexes 64.0 10.3 71.4 58.1 6.7 62.3 
Foreigners Males 72.3 17.0 87.1 81.9 6.0 87.1 
Females 57.0 18.0 69.5 52.8 11.9 59.9 
Both sexes 64.5 17.5 78.2 67.1 8.5 73.3 
}}
Non EU27 Males 71.0 18.5 87.1 81.5 6.4 87.2 
Females 58.3 18.7 71.7 49.8 2.7 57.1 
Both sexes 64.5 18.6 79.2 66.2 8.8 72.6 
Algeria Males 57.7 21.8 73.9 79.2 11.5 89.5 
Females 30.1 0.0 30.1 0.0 100.0 19.1 
Both sexes 45.5 26.5 61.8 60.9 16.8 73.2 
Morocco Males 66.0 25.1 88.2 79.3 7.8 86.0 
Females 26.1 34.2 39.7 27.8 21.7 35.5 
Both sexes 49.9 27.2 68.5 69.1 10.7 66.2 
Tunisia Males - - - 76.3 13.1 87.8 
Females - - - 24.4 19.7 30.4 
Both sexes - - - 60.5 14.0 70.3 
Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), based on data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 
2008 annual data. 
 
 
Maghreb women living in Italy have had the lowest participation rates, while Moroccan women 
in Spain have had the highest ones, though only around 40%. Men, on the other hand, have had higher 
employment rates. Even though their activity rates were similar to those of local men, their employment 
rates are visibly lower, even lower than those of other foreigners in general, and than those of non EU 
citizens. Italy would be the exception, as Tunisians, Moroccans and Algerians have even higher 
employment rates than Italians themselves, although not higher than all foreigners together. However, 
the situation in Spain is worse for them, as only between one half and three quarters of Maghreb 
immigrants living there are employed. This obviously results in very high unemployment rates, much 
higher than those of local men and all foreigners. This is presently even more so if we keep in mind that 
LFS from 2008 data did not yet fully take into account the present global economic crisis. As female 
unemployment rates are higher than male ones, Moroccans have higher rates than the rest of 
nationalities, and Spain has the highest rates among the destination countries. 
As we have observed, Maghreb immigrants are not well integrated in Spanish or Italian 
labour markets. However, the analysis by sector is even worse, as can be observed in Table I.8. This 
table combines the three Maghreb nationalities together to avoid reliability and confidentiality 
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problems.5 As it has been able to observe in the former tables, Tunisians, Moroccans and Algerians 
have similar labour characteristics and they are quite different from those of other immigrants, 
therefore we consider that we have not lost any basic information by carrying out this aggregation. 
However, even then, some cells continue to be blank. 
TABLE I.8 
SPAIN AND ITALY, 2008: PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED  
BY ACTIVITY SECTOR, NATIONALITY AND SEX 
Country Activity sector 
Natives  Foreigners  Non EU-27  Maghreb 
Males Females  Males Females  Males Female  Males Female
Spain Agriculture and fishing 4.9 2.6  8.8 2.9  8.8 2.6  19.7 0.0 
Construction 16.6 1.9  35.1 0.9  35.7 0.6  35.5 0.0 
Public admin., education and 
h lth
13.8 29.5  2.2 6.6  1.2 4.9  0.7 3.7 
Industry, transport and mining 29.3 13.6  22.0 8.2  21.1 6.2  20.3 14.4 
Financial and real estate 12.1 16.2  6.5 13.1  5.2 13.1  1.4 15.6 
Hotels, rest. And whol. And 
t il t d
19.5 26.7  20.1 32.6  22.6 32.5  21.0 30.3 
Private home and personal 
i
3.8 9.6  5.3 35.6  5.3 40.0  1.3 36.1 
Italy Agriculture and fishing 4.2 2.9  4.6 1.4  4.6 1.0  5.8 0.0 
Construction 12.2 1.2  27.0 0.5  22.8 0.6  24.7 0.0 
Public admin., education and 
h lth
14.5 32.1  1.1 9.9  0.8 8.7  0.0 4.2 
Industry, transport and mining 32.6 18.5  36.8 14.0  37.6 13.7  42.3 23.3 
Financial and real estate 13.4 15.9  6.7 10.1  7.3 9.5  5.0 14.8 
Hotels, rest. And whol. And 
t il t d
19.3 21.6  17.1 19.7  19.2 18.9  19.1 22.6 
Private home and personal 
i
3.8 7.8  6.7 44.3  7.7 47.7  3.1 35.1 
Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), based on data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 
2008 annual data. 
 
Generally speaking, immigrants from the Maghreb are under-represented in the sectors with 
higher salaries and better working conditions like the public services (education, health) and the public 
administration. Their absence from the latter is relatively logical as some of its posts are reserved for 
nationals. However, Maghreb immigrants are over-represented in the hardest, more unstable, less 
prestigious, and generally worse paid jobs. Maghreb men are particularly working in the construction, 
the industrial sector, and in the low capital intensive but high labor intensive service sector such as 
hotels, restaurants, or trade. However, there are some specific characyeristics of the destination 
countries, like the weight of construction in the Spanish economy or industry in the Italian one, which 
should also be taken into account. Although Maghreb immigrants share these characteristics with 
other immigrants, particularly non EU citizens, their excessive weight in the industrial sector in Italy 
or, as Cohen (1995: 293) already underlined more than a decade ago, in the Spanish agricultural 
sector, would indicate that they are in an inferior position than other immigrants.  
Women, on their side, follow the same general trend. More than a third Maghreb female 
immigrants working in Spain and Italy do it in the domestic service while hotels, the trade sector, 
industry, and the financial-real estate sector would be, at a great distance, the next main employers. 
However, it should be reminded that only a very low percentage of them are economically active. 
The last element of analysis related to labor market characteristics is the distribution of 
occupations by nationalities (Table I.9). In the two countries, Maghreb immigrant men basically work 
in elementary occupations or as craftworkers. In Spain they also work in trade and in Italy as plant and 
machine operators. However, very few of them work as managers, professionals, clerks or as 
technicians and researchers, even though foreigners as a whole and, obviously, local workers have a 
certain weight in these jobs.  
                                                        
5  When the sample is reduced to those employed and it is further de-composed by nationality, activity sector and sex, 
some nationality sub-samples end containing very few individuals. Therefore results are neither representative nor 
reliable or they are simply not published by Eurostat when they are under confidentiality limits.  
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TABLE I.9 
SPAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY, 2008: PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED  
BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS, BY NATIONALITY AND SEX 
Country Occupation  Natives  Foreigners  Non EU-27  Maghreb 
Mal Female  Male Femal  Male Femal  Male Femal
Spain Clerks 5.9 15.6  1.9 7.1  1.6 6.2  0.0 0.0 
Craft and related trade workers 23. 2.2  36.4 1.6  36.9 1.4  34.4 0.0 
Elementary occupations 8.6 14.7  22.7 47.9  26.8 52.7  38.2 66.4 
Legislators, senior officers and 9.7 6.6  5.1 3.2  3.4 2.6  3.5 0.0 
Plant and machine operators 14. 3.0  10.6 2.2  10.5 1.6  9.0 0.0 
Professionals 10. 18.5  4.0 4.2  1.8 2.2  0.0 0.0 
Service workers and shop and sales 
k
9.6 22.8  10.6 29.3  11.2 30.9  10.8 33.6 
Skilled agriculture/fishery workers 3.4 1.5  2.4 0.0  2.1 0.0  4.2 0.0 
Technicians and assoc. Professionals 13. 15.0  6.0 4.5  5.2 2.4  0.0 0.0 
Italy Clerks 8.1 18.6  3.4 3.4  3.4 2.4  3.5 1.3 
Craft and related trade workers 22. 5.4  41.4 8.0  38.1 7.9  40.3 17.9 
Elementary occupations 7.1 8.2  21.9 48.9  24.9 53.1  27.0 41.4 
Legislators, senior officers and 9.2 6.9  3.3 3.0  3.5 3.2  1.1 2.0 
Plant and machine operators 11. 3.8  16.3 5.2  17.0 6.1  18.3 7.6 
Professionals 9.8 12.6  1.5 2.5  0.8 1.2  0.0 0.0 
Service workers and shop and sales 
k
8.3 16.1  6.4 21.5  7.2 21.4  4.9 28.0 
Skilled agriculture/fishery workers 2.5 1.3  2.8 0.4  2.5 0.3  2.4 0.0 
Technicians and assoc. Professionals 19. 27.0  3.0 7.2  2.5 4.5  2.5 1.8 
Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), based on data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 
2008 annual data. 
 
Segregation is even stronger among women as they are concentrated in only two types of 
jobs: elementary occupations, which have, by far, the first position in both countries, and service 
workers and shop and sales workers. Yet, here again, certain differences between countries should be 
underlined. More of these women work as artisans or plant and machine operators in Italy than in 
Spain due to the weight of the manufacturing sector in the Italian economy. 
In sum, Maghreb workers usually occupy low category jobs in sectors like domestic service, 
intensive agriculture, construction or tourism, with a considerable amount of insecure, precarious 
or/and temporary, low skilled and badly paid jobs. These high numbers of workers in elementary 
occupations undoubtedly have to do with their low average education level, particularly in women. 
Many of them do not even enter the labor market or present very high unemployment rates. Moreover, 
Maghreb immigrants in general endure really bad working conditions in their work, live in places that 
are in poor conditions and suffer discrimination (Awad, 2009). Although these factors are difficult to 
measure, they also affect (lack of) integration in the destination countries. 
4. Territorial distribution 
In Italy, Portugal and Spain African Immigrants are mostly concentrated in the more economically 
developed areas. Spain is the country where the population from Africa is more dispersed along the 
territory due to the importance and the old presence of Moroccans. Nonetheless, the regional distribution 
of this population follows the same pattern of the Africans in general. Barcelona (182,706 African 
residents) and Madrid (126,681) are the main receiving provinces, followed by Murcia (80,496), Gerona 
(56,166) and Almeria (55,915) (see map I.3). In most of the provinces, the number of Moroccan men is 
higher than women. The sex ratio for the whole country is around 1.4. The coastal provinces show 
values a little bit higher due to the concentration of men in the agricultural sector, especially in Almeria, 
Murcia and Alicante. Barcelona and Madrid, the provinces with the largest number of Moroccans have a 
sex ratio close to the national total, with a more diversified labor market offer. 
The territorial distribution of immigrants in Italy shows that the majority of immigrants reside 
in the northern and central regions, particularly in the most economically dynamic and industrial 
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districts. Milano is the Italian district with the highest number of immigrants (90,301 African legal 
residents) followed by its neighbor Brescia (49,923) and Bergamo (42,298). In the Central region the 
most important district is Rome (43,479) and in the Northwest part, the district of Torino (43,946). 
However, Caruso and Venditto (2008) draw the attention to the fact that African immigrants are 
among the most represented groups in regions with small numbers of immigrants. For instance, in 
Calabria (13,362 African residents in the 5 Calabrian districts), Moroccans represent a quarter of all 
foreigner residents (see map I.4). In this sense, the labor market participation would be the main 
reason for this geographical distribution. 
 
MAP I.3 
SPAIN, 2009: TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICANS,  
BY DISTRICT OF RESIDENCE 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Spain. 
 
MAP I.4 
ITALY, 2009: TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICANS,  
BY DISTRICT OF RESIDENCE 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Instituto 
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MAP I.5 
PORTUGAL, 2009: TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICANS,  
BY DISTRICT OF RESIDENCE 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Serviço de 
Estrangeiros e Fronteiras. 
 
Finally, the territorial distribution of Africans in Portugal is very similar to the territorial 
distribution of all the foreigners: most of them are concentrated in the southern region: the district of 
the capital Lisbon (77,809), and in Setubal (19,528) and Faro (7,839), which are the three areas with 
the highest economic activity in the country (see map I.5). 
C. African population in Spain 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter we will focus the analysis on the African population in Spain, this population’s main 
receiving country among all Southern European countries. As it will be shown, the volume and 
characteristics of this population varies enormously according to the origins. For this reason, we will 
describe separately the characteristics of North African populations - Moroccans, the principal 
immigrant group from this region and Algerians, the second North Africans residents in Spain, and the 
sub-Saharan population that includes some relatively old flows as the Gambians and Senegalese and 
emerging new flows from other countries of the region. Nonetheless, in order to analyze their labor 
profile in Spain in comparison to other immigrant groups and with the Spaniards, we will study the 
group as a whole. This decision is due to two main reasons: firstly, labor insertion and labor 
characteristics of Africans are very similar regardless of the origins; secondly, because the sample size 
of the data source —the Labour Force Survey— is very small for most of the sub-Saharan groups.  
The evolution of the African population in Spain is paradoxical for several reasons. Firstly, 
even if the first nationality on the Continuous Register until January 1st 2007 was the Moroccan 
(surpassed by the Romanians in 2008) and the generalized idea in the rest of the European countries of 
the overwhelming growth of the African flows due to the continent’s proximity, the empirical 
evidence of the migratory boom shows that Latin-American and Eastern European nationalities are the 
ones that have increased their participation in the Spanish population against the Africans, as it has 
been already shown. Several authors have pointed out the possibility of a positive discrimination to 
Latin-American and Eastern-European flows, in order to develop an ethnic substitution in Spanish 
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Martínez, 2006; Vono, Domingo and Bedoya, 2008). This, more or less undercover, policy has 
received the support of the Spanish public opinion, that keeps a conflictive relationship with their 
Moroccan neighbors, not based on their cultural distance, but on a traumatic shared history that has 
determined the construction of both identities (Stallaert, 1998).  
The second paradox could rely on the fact that this difficult relation with the Moroccan 
immigration could have partially benefited the sub-Saharan’s image, even through applying racist 
stereotypes based on certain paternalism. In any case, and against the dramatic image of the arrival of 
ships from the African coast, irregular migration was concentrated on the Latin-American population, 
and not on the African one. On the third place, and even when the weight and growth of the sub-
Saharan population has been relatively scarce compared to other groups, we must point out the 
number and maturity of some of the still relevant flows, as well as the incorporation of new origins 
during the first years of the 21st century.   
This process has coincided with the aggravation of the Gulf of Guinea countries’ regional 
crisis basically, as well as the application of restrictive measures on the immigration flows by the 
Spanish government. 
2. Demographic characteristics of the North African  
flows and population 
As seen in the previous chapter, immigrants from North Africa were the most represented non-EU 
flow until the beginning of the century, when Latin Americans first, and Eastern Europeans later, 
starred in the boom of international immigration in Spain. Among Africans, Moroccans were both the 
pioneers and the most represented ones. Along with the flows from Morocco, the only North African 
flow that has reached a significant volume is the one from Algeria. Although in absolute terms these 
flows are incomparably lower, entries of Algerians in Spain have been also important. 
Between 1998 and 2009 there have been 985,342 entries from Africa, representing a 15.8% of 
the entire flow from abroad. Among them, Moroccans totalled 655,227 entries, a 66.5% of the entire 
African group of foreigners, and Algerians totalled 60,240 entries, a 6.1% of this group. Nonetheless, 
the primacy of Moroccans hides the emergence of sub-Saharan flows in recent years. Thus Moroccans 
monopolized the 80% of African flows in 1998; in 2009 this percentage had dropped to 62%. This 
decline in relative terms has been overwhelmingly in favor of sub-Saharan flows, but also for other 
North African countries, especially Algeria. 
As a consequence, Moroccan immigrants are one of the most numerous immigrant groups in 
Spain and represented 1.6% of the total population stock in January of 2010. Although it is a historical 
flow, the strongest increase happened in the beginning of the new century: if in 2000 there were 236 
thousand immigrants who had been born in Morocco living in the country, by the year 2010 the value 
was 760 thousand. Figure I.5 shows the evolution of Moroccan and Algerian flows according to sex 
composition. As it can be seen, during the 1990’s the arrival of men was slightly higher than the 
arrival of women in both cases. The increase of the flows from the beginning of the 2000’s was 
accompanied by a change in the sex distribution of them. The vicissitudes of the Spanish immigration 
policies have marked the evolution of these flows, especially from Morocco.  
Thus, while the regularization processes from 2000 and 2001 meant for Latin Americans an 
opportunity, the announcement of the demand for Schengen visa had an obvious effect in attracting 
more immigrants, for the Moroccan migration it meant a period of stagnation. This stagnation was 
clear for the flows of men. In turn, it was observed a slight increase in female flows due to family 
reunification. The leap in 2004 had an effect on the improvement of data collection but also on the 
2005 regularization process. A strong increase of men in comparison to women can be seen in this 
period until the year 2008, when the flows started to decrease due to the economic crisis. In just one 
year entries fell from 93,623 in 2008 to 61,766 in 2009, 34% less affecting men to a greater extent 
than women in the Moroccan example. For Algerians, the drop was less important from 8,014 to 6,376 
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entries, a 20% less (see figure I.3). It is relevant to mention an important increase in Algerian flows in 
the years 2000 and 2001. This fact could be related both to the regularization processes in Spain and 
the political situation in Algeria. Data on return migration indicates that, so far, there is no important 
return flows towards Morocco and Algeria (Colectivo IOÉ, 2010). 
 
FIGURE I.3 





Source: INE, Residence Variation Statistic 1988-2009. 
 
 
The age and sex structure (see figure I.4) of the flows made evident, once more, the 
importance of young adult men migration among this population. The mean age of Moroccan men is 
27 years old and for the women the value is 26.6. In the case of Algerians, men’s average age is 30.5 
years old and women’s is 28.7. It is worthwhile to note the important participation of minors in the 
flows, particularly in the Moroccan case. Minors represented a 20.4% of all Moroccan inflow between 
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young adult ages and the total women inflow represents a 36.6% and a 28.8% of the total immigrant 
flow for Moroccans and Algerians respectively.  
 
FIGURE I.4 





Source: INE, Residence Variation Statistic 1998-2009. 
 
 
The results of the characteristics of these flows can be observed both in the Moroccan and 
Algerian population pyramids: although there is a prevalence of men among the stocks, much more 
accentuated in the Algerian case, the participation of women is also considerable as well as the 
presence of minors (see figure I.5). For instance, among the Moroccan group 61.8% are men and 
38.2% of the population are women. The 181,613 Moroccan minors represent a 25.3% of all 
immigrants, a significant value that also indicates the importance of families among this group. In the 
Algerian case data show a profile that is closer to what has been classically identified as a worker 
migration pattern: the percentage of men is much higher than in the previous case, a 70.3%. In the 
same way, the population under 17 years is less represented in the group: in 2009 they were 11,108 
and represented a 21% of all Algerian immigrants in Spain. Moroccans’mean age is 28.8 for men and 
25.8 for women. Algerian immigrants show a relatively older population structure for men: the mean 
age of this population is 32.4 years old. In the case of women, there are no differences in comparison 
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SPAIN, 2009: POPULATION PYRAMID OF THE MOROCCAN AND ALGERIAN CITIZENS 
 
 
Source: INE, Continuous Register 2009. 
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3. Demographic characteristics of the sub-Saharan immigrants 
Although the flows from sub-Saharan Africa are much lower than the North African ones and did not 
grown until the second half of the 2000’s, we find among them relatively old flows and flows with a 
very recent and rapid growth. Immigrants from the former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea have 
a historical presence in the country. In the same direction, migration of Gambian and Senegalese 
workers is relevant since the nineties. Much later flows from other sub-Saharan countries became 
significant, mainly from West African countries. 
In this sense, among the 240,847 registered resident persons with a sub-Saharan nationality in 
January of 2010, we can find the resulting population of historic flows like the Equatoguinean (15,595 
persons in 2010), or the Gambian (22,168) and the Senegalese (61,970 persons) in extremely different 
conditions and migratory trajectories. For instance, Equatorial Guinea was a former colony and is 
legislatively positively discriminated, while Gambia and Senegal are not historically related. Between 
the new emergent nationalities that have arrived to Spain in the last years, whom can be truncated or 
definitely transformed by even more restrictive immigration policies, we can point out Nigerians 
(44,176 persons), Malians (24,228 persons) or Ghanaians (15,692 persons). 
If the Eastern-European migration flows in Spain —specifically those from Romania- have 
been related to circularity; those from the principal sub-Saharan nationalities have been related to 
the transnationalism concept taking into account the previous paces of the migratory flows in other 
EU countries. In this case, we must emphasize Senegal, Gambia or Nigeria as sending countries, 
and France or the UK as receiving countries. The different economic, social and cultural structure of 
the Spanish context increases the specific interest referred to the socio-demographic characteristics 
of the sub-Saharan migration not only for the sending countries but also for the flows and the 
already settled immigrants.  
The demographic literature about sub-Saharan population in Spain is scarce. However, the 
different descriptive approximations that have been developed in fields like anthropology, sociology 
or geography, have characterized the general socio-demographic profile of the most representative 
nationalities, frequently grouped or related to the African population, as a whole. Some pioneering 
works pretend to describe trajectories and profiles without taking demography into account. This is the 
case with the essays by Vi-Makomé (1990), Sepa (1993) for Catalonia, or the pioneering study on 
African women’s living conditions by Sipi (1997). We must point out that most of these studies were 
developed by immigrants from the studied region, but outside the academic field. 
In relation to the scientific research framework, during the first years studies referred to sub-
Saharan population as a set of the African population as a whole, considering only the main 
nationalities while including demography as a subsidiary instrument. We can find comparative or 
monographic studies related to the principal nationalities in Gonzálvez (1995) for Senegalese or 
Cebrián and Bihina (1998) for the sub-Saharan population as a whole. In this same field, we can find 
the 1995 qualitative study for the Barcelona’s Metropolitan Area directed by Andreu Domingo 
(Domingo et al., 1995). 
Nevertheless, as we have mentioned before, the reproductive health and the family 
formation process —even in nuptiality as in fertility- are the demographic behaviors of the sub-
Saharan population that have attracted the attention of the scientific community. In this sense, we 
can find an anthropologic approximation of the Senegambian population in Kaplan (1998) or  
—specifically referring to nuptiality— in Rodríguez (2004). The distinctive status of the sub-
Saharan women has also been treated in Ribas (1999) and Sow (2004). From the demographic field, 
few works have studied the reproductive behavior on one hand, (Solsona et al., 2003) and, on the 
other, the family formation process (Bledsoe, 2006; Bledsoe et al., 2007 and Bledsoe y Sow, 2008). 
Recently, and specifically for the Senegalese population, there have been some interesting studies 
ECLAC – Project Document collection Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration… 
39 
based on data from the MAFE project6 for Spain (González-Ferrer and Baizán, 2010; González-
Ferrer et al., 2010). Even though doctoral thesis about specific nationalities or the sub-Saharan 
population as a whole set are not new (see Wabgou, 2000, directed by Lorenzo Chacón), there is 
none from a demographic perspective. Therefore, the first aim of this analysis is to give a 
panoramic evolution of the migratory flows of the sub-Saharan citizens, and at the second, to 
analyze their demographic characteristics in Spain. 
As we have mentioned before, in the last years the sub-Saharan population in Spain has 
experienced a change in its composition, specifically in relation to the distribution of the most 
represented nationalities. Figure I.6 shows the increase of the Malian and the Nigerian population 
since 1999, being in some cases more numerous than some more settled nationalities. We must take 
into account that the peak between 2003 and 2004 is due to the flow increase but also to the inclusion 
of the “omitted registers” in the data source. 
 
FIGURE I.6 
SPAIN, 1999-2009: SUB-SAHARAN POPULATION FLOWS 
 
Source: INE, Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales 1999-2009. 
 
 
Sub-Saharan population in Spain has a high masculine component —a 75% of the flows 
between 1998 and 2009 has been of men (see figure I.7)— and as the rest of origins it has experienced 
a notorious growth since the end of the nineties. This increase could be directly related to the positive 
effect on migration incentives generated by the economic growth and the increase in labor demand. 
Related to the distribution by age during the period 1988-2009 (see figure I.8), the sub-Saharan male 
population is concentrated at working ages, specifically between 15 and 45 years old (a 90.5% of all 
men). This can support the theory about economic migration for this specific group, as Cebrián and 
Cebrián, J. and S. Bihina (1998) suggested in their paper. In the female case, the concentration is even 
higher for ages between 17 and 37 (70% of all women). Even if those are also working ages that could 
suggest an economic motivation, it could also prove the existence of a differential migration project 
taking into account not only the age but also the gender perspective. 
                                                        
6  The MAFE Project (Migrations between Africa and Europe) is conducted by the Institut National d’Etudes 
Demographiques (INED-Paris) and focuses on migration flows between Europe (Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, The 
Netherlands and the UK) and Africa (Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana) which together 
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FIGURE I.7 
SPAIN, 1998-2009: SUB-SAHARAN POPULATION FLOWS BY SEX 
 




SPAIN, 1988-2009: SUB-SAHARAN POPULATION FLOWS BY SEX AND AGE 
 
Source: INE, Residence Variation Statistic 1988-2009. 
 
4. Demographic characteristics of sub-Saharan population 
The 240,847 sub-Saharan residents in Spain on 1 January 2010 represented a 4% of the total foreign 
population and a 7% of non-EU immigrants. The distribution by nationalities and their characteristics 
by sex and age are substantially different; the fifteen most represented nationalities account for 96.6% 
of the total sub-Saharan population. Just the top four, composed by Senegal, Nigeria, Mali and 
Gambia, concentrate more than a half of them with 63.3% (see Table I.10). Senegal, with almost 62 
thousand citizens is the second African nationality in Spain although far from the Moroccan, the first 
African and the second of the total foreign population. This concentration is correspondent with an 
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TABLE I.10 
SPAIN, 2010: SUB-SAHARAN NATIONALITIES WITH MORE  
THAN 1,000 CITIZENS IN THE SPANISH TERRITORY 
Nationality Total Men Women 
Senegal 61 970 51 230 10 740 
Nigeria 44 176 26 714 17 462 
Mali 24 228 22 112 2 116 
Gambia 22 168 16 935 5 233 
Ghana 15 692 12 999 2 693 
Equatorial Guinea 15 595 5 726 9 869 
Guinea 12 553 8 987 3 566 
Mauritania 11 803 9 369 2 434 
Cameroon 5 919 3 734 2 185 
Guinea-Bissau 5 875 4 568 1 307 
Cape-Verde 3 428 1 483 1 945 
Côte d'Ivoire 2 969 2 315 654 
Congo 2 240 1 406 834 
Angola 2 183 1 221 962 
Dem. Rep. of Congo 1 255 769 486 




SPAIN, 2010: SUB-SAHARAN NATIONALITIES WITH MORE  
THAN 1,000 CITIZENS IN THE SPANISH TERRITORY 
 
Source: INE, Continuous Register 2010. 
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FIGURE I.10 
SPAIN, 2009: POPULATION PYRAMIDS OF THE MAIN SUB-SAHARAN CITIZENS 
 
(continued) 
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Figure I.10 (concluded) 
Source: INE, Continuous Register 2009. 
 
If we analyze the age and sex structure of the main 15 sub-Saharan nationalities in Spain, we 
will soon find out the heterogeneous distribution behind them. Even if the majority is characterized by 
a strong sex ratio imbalance in favor of males and their youth, just as expected in economic migrant 
flows, the contrasts between them are quite remarkable. Just to mention the first two nationalities, 
male proportion varies between the 83.4% of the Senegalese and the 61.4% of the Nigerians. We must 
point out how this structure reflects different migratory processes in these two cases, specifically in 
relation to the women’s role: basically subordinated to family reunion in the Senegalese case, but 
independent from family ties for Nigerians. The high presence of men is present not only in those 
populations formed by the older flows like the Senegalese but also in the new ones, like the Malians 
(92.5% masculine effectives).  
However, we can also find the opposite case in the Equatoguinean and Cape Verdean 
pyramids, which are characterized by a female majority with 36.5 and 44.2% male population 
respectively. Sex imbalance proves the existence of clearly differentiated migratory strategies. The 
exceptional situation of Equatorial Guinea is influenced by its former colony condition and the 
previous existence of highly differentiated migratory chains according to the ethnic group, Fang or 
Bubi, but with a strong female component that arrived as students (Sepa, 1993). Cape Verdean 
migration from its origins —mainly from Portugal- has counted with a strong feminine presence and 
independent migratory circuits with respect to the masculine (Domingo et al., 2008). This 
segregation has also arrived to the spatial distribution of Cape Verdeans: women are house workers 
in Madrid, while men were originally concentrated in Leon mining region but were later attracted to 
the Galician fishing industry (Prieto and López, 1993; López, 1996). Something similar could have 
happened to Angolans —former Portuguese colony— whose migratory flows are very evenly 
distributed, with 57.4% men.  
Differences in sex structure indicate the diversity in sub-Saharan migratory flows for each 
considered nationality. As we have mentioned before, all of them are characterized by their youth with 
an average age between 25 years for Gambians and 33 years for Cape Verdeans. In this case, the 
Gambian population pyramid is more than eloquent: the weight of the population under 18 (maximum 
age for family reunion in the case of children) reaches 29% of the total, showing both the antiquity of 
the flows and the familiar settlement of their population. If we compare it against the Senegalese, 
minors only reach 12% of their population but we must take into account that 53% of them were born 
in Spain. The contrast between the Senegalese and the Gambian pyramids is quite significant in order 
to establish the necessary hypotheses related to the future behavior of the newest flows like Malians, 
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Ghanaians, Guineans, Mauritanians or Cameroonians. In that sense, the increased presence of women 
and minors in Guineans and Cameroonians may indicate a family strategy similar to the one of 
Gambians, clearly opposed to the rest of the nationalities whose profile is similar to the Senegalese. 
5. When the crisis came: African population  
in the Spanish labor market 
The evolution of employment of Africans in Spain that we present in this final section is a good 
example of the impact of the economic crisis on the African population in the Southern European 
countries. In order to analyze the data, we return to the aggregated data due to the lack of significant 
data on sub-Saharan population from the Labor Force Survey, and focus only on the evolution of 
employment to avoid repeating what has been said in the previous section in terms of distribution in 
sectors of activity. The African group was defined according to their country of birth, and considering 
men and women separately because of their specificities in the labor market. 
It is necessary to consider the evolution of the labor characteristics over time in order to 
identify two main patterns. Firstly, apart from the volume and length of settlement, Africans show a 
very low percentage of employed population among all workers in the country, particularly among 
women. By the end of 2010, African men represented 2.7% of the total employed population in Spain. 
For women, the value is 1.2%. For instance, the participation of Latin-Americans among workers in 
Spain has grown in a much more pronounced way in comparison to all other immigrant groups. This 
extraordinary acceleration of Latin-Americans is due to an increase in the total volume of these 
inflows but also to the participation of women that is far more significant than among the rest of 
immigrants in the Spanish labor market.  
Moreover, as it can be observed in figure I.11, the percentage of employed Africans over time 
is quite stable for both sexes, although in absolute numbers there was a significant evolution during 
these 10 years: if in 1999 there were 24 thousands occupied men from Africa, in the year 2010 the 
value was 278 thousands. For women the value was 24 thousand and 102 thousand respectively. In 
comparison to other immigrant groups, the number of African women in the labor market is relatively 
small when we look at the numbers: for instance, in the year 2010 there were 859 thousand Latin-
Americans and 301 thousand non-EU Europeans occupied. In the case of men the difference is 
smaller, although still significant (see tables I.11 and I.12). 
Secondly, Africans are the most affected by unemployment, particularly during the economic 
crisis (figure I.12). For men, unemployed Africans varied from 16.2% (17,343 individuals) in 1999 to 
44% of the population in 2010 (218,010 individuals). For women, the variation was from 33% (11,906 
women) to 51% (110,660 women) respectively. Eastern Europeans, the second most affected group 
had in 2010 unemployment rates much lower: 31.7% for men and 26.8% for women. 
Regarding the distribution of Africans according to occupation categories, no substantial 
changes can be observed over the same period: the group is still concentrated in the lower 
occupational categories (Vono, 2010). Nonetheless, important changes have happened: it was 
observed between 2007 and 2010 a decrease in the number of temporary workers among Africans, 
especially in the agriculture sector. In turn, there was an important increase in the number of indefinite 
working contracts, most of them part-time jobs for African women in precarious working conditions. 
There is evidence that the participation of Moroccan women in the labor market has increased in the 
last years as a response from the households to the crisis: the activity rate has increased from 41% in 
2007 to 50% in 2010 (Colectivo IOÉ, 2010 based on data from the Labour Force Survey). In this 
sense, the traditional role of these women as housewives has to be questioned and relativized. 
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FIGURE I.11 
SPAIN, 1999-2009: PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED POPULATION BY REGION  
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FIGURE I.12 
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TABLE I.11 
SPAIN, 1999-2010: MALE IMMIGRANTS BY REGION OF BIRTH, EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND YEAR OF THE SURVEY 
Region of birth Employment status 
Year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
Unemployed 1 126 936 1 019 465 802 857 876 851 944 973 971 328 889 054 793 864 779 037 1 168 446 2 270 229 2 537 910 
Employed 9 333 820 9 704 080 10 054 328 10 287 213 10 562 533 10 808 154 11226 282 11 596 047 11 914 951 11 730 097 10 588 977 10 333 930 
EAPª 10 460 755 10 723 544 10 857 185 11 164 064 11 507 505 11 779 482 12115 335 12 389 911 12 693 988 12 898 543 12 859 206 12 871 840 
Spain 
Unemployed 1 085 905 964 927 736 572 793 263 826 014 820 873 745 496 630 260 576 125  842 523 1 579 950 1 802 520 
Employed 9 023 232 9 288 828 9 477 844 9 571 207 9 636 632 9 673 919 9859 430 9 986 267 10 072 232 9 818 233 8 919 305 8 722 750 
EAPª 10 109 137 10 253 755 10 214 416 10 364 470 10 462 646 10 494 793 10604 926 10 616 528 10 648 357 10 660 756 10 499 256 10 525 270 
Total foreigners 
Unemployed 41 031 54 538 66 285 83 588 118 959 150 455 143 558 163 604 202 912 325 923  690 279 735 390 
Employed 310 587 415 252 576 484 716 006 925 900 1 134 234 1366 852 1 609 780 1 842 719 1 911 863 1 669 672 1 611 180 
EAPª 351 618 469 790 642 770 799 594 1 044 859 1 284 690 1510 410 1 773 383 2 045 631 2 237 786 2 359 951 2 346 570 
Africa 
Unemployed 17 343 22 159 25 210 31 604 36 867 46 079 49 588 56 955 57 905 108 240 190 404 218 010 
Employed 89 792 103 649 131 347 150 283 211 137 227 522 273 858 357 427 385 916 371 250 285 643 278 350 
EAPª 107 135 125 808 156 556 181 887 248 004 273 601 323446 414 382 443 821 479 490 476 046 496 360 
Asia 
Unemployed 3 124 1 862   2 419 3 250 1 501 2384 1 380 4 957 8 663 14 653 16 640 
Employed 18 215 25 265 36 226 24 331 24 210 43 904 42074 48 644 57 068 84 637 86 445 94 770 
EAPª 21 338 27 127 36 226 26 750 27 460 45 405 44457 50 024 62 024 93 301 101 097 111 410 
European Union 
Unemployed 10286 13 657 9 721 13 330 12 936 21 065 17579 16 018 23 975 21 447 46 145 67 910 
Employed 110982 145 052 163 334 181 647 186 021 206 086 197591 216 236 259 203 261 266 243 985 259 910 
EAPª 121269 158 709 173 055 194 977 198 957 227 150 215170 232 254 283 177 282 714 290 130 327 820 
Latin-America 
Unemployed 8 421 12 530 28 397 27 725 52 327 57 223 54996 61 882 75 126 130 371 311 015 296 770 
Employed 75 959 111 731 181 629 269 454 342 513 470 549 596762 710 302 789 835 844 816 732 604 680 860 
EAPª 84 380 124 261 210 027 297 180 394 840 527 773 651758 772 184 864 962 975 187 1 043 618 977 630 
Others Europe 
Unemployed 1 190 3 352 2 845 8 365 13 053 23 993 19012 26 773 39 078 68 849 127 556 135 080 
Employed 11 128 24 184 60 957 79 537 150 456 181 684 251963 271 386 340 649 369 971 314 796 291 160 
EAPª 12 318 27 536 63 802 87 902 163 510 205 677 270974 298 160 379 728 438 820 442 352 426 240 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 1999-2009, INE Spain. 











ent, institutional and policy aspects of international m
igration…
TABLE I.12 
SPAIN, 1999-2010: FEMALE IMMIGRANTS BY REGION OF BIRTH, EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND YEAR OF THE SURVEY 
Region of birth Employment status 
Year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
Unemployed 1 531 032 1 437 931 1 051 205 1 213 370 1 243 250 1 253 858 1 052 555 1 040 117 978 413 1 189 298 1 840 778 2105 950 
Employed 5 177 018 5 626 455 5 909 449 6 202 829 6 564 015 6 936 602 7 524 222 7 935 647 8 312 831 8 496 717 8 166 788 8136 800 
EAPª 13 218 344 13 904 979 13 664 731 14 506 265 15 201 828 15 878 538 16 432 499 17 132 094 17 635 441 18 288 962 19 001 377 10 242 750 
Spain 
Unemployed 1 467 429 1 371 732 982 404 1 100 798 1 104 752 1 093 852 883 594 836 543 759 028 888 057 1 381 037  1 569 250 
Employed 4 956 997 5 361 815 5 539 141 5 670 503 5 919 093 6 147 491 6 452 925 6 667 512 6 885 050 6 975 880 6 694 615 6 638 420 
EAPª 6 424 426 6 733 547 6 521 545 6 771 301 7 023 845 7 241 343 7 336 518 7 504 055 7 644 079 7 863 937 8 075 652 8 207 670 
Total foreigners 
Unemployed 63 603 66 199 68 801 112 572 138 498 160 006 168 961 203 574 219 385 301 241 459 741 536 700 
Employed 220 021 264 640 370 308 532 326 644 922 789 111 1 071 297 1 268 136 1 427 780 1 520 837 1 472 174 1 498 380 
EAPª 6 793 918 7 171 432 7 143 186 7 734 964 8 177 983 8 637 195 9 095 981 9 628 040 9 991 363 10 425 025 10 925 725 2 035 080 
Africa 
Unemployed 11 906 19 032 14 674 18 995 31 439 28 793 29 882 29 405 32 014 46 951 80 020 110 660 
Employed 24 181 30 471 36 036 38 947 51 708 55 027 74 645 95 421 99 652 109 293 85 175 102 420 
EAPª 192 813 222 306 311 418 485 557 560 490 679 457 860 092 1 017 342 1 123 347 1 198 276 1 281 644 213 080 
Asia  
Unemployed 1 701 2 671 … 1 052 122 2 856 1 559 3 318 7 820 4 834 7 037 6 590 
Employed 12 755 13 179 14 719 13 872 14 183 15 294 28 716 25 816 40 470 44 293 47 317 43 390 
EAPª 26 362 34 882 29 393 33 920 45 744 46 943 60 158 58 539 80 304 96 078 134 374 49 980 
European Union 
Unemployed 26 684 20 226 14 141 22 221 19 531 24 037 21 086 21 920 18 091 24 814 43 531 40 830 
Employed 86 857 90 145 98 262 135 592 140 313 148 198 180 905 180 288 199 548 183 748 177 798 192 470 
EAPª 1 491 610 1 402 203 1 018 439 1 139 746 1 156 460 1 148 879 958 239 931 964 858 680 997 350 1 466 212 233 300 
Latin-America 
Unemployed 20 180 18 064 31 639 55 274  76 019 83 165 85 379 115 628 120 183 142 912 245 034 268 320 
Employed 85 777 114 097 181 517 294 692 344 159 448 095 593 808 721 427 803 617 871 616 858 812 858 800 
EAPª 105 957 132 161 213 156 349 965 420 177 531 260 679 188 837 055 923 799 1 014 529 1 103 846 1 127 120 
Others Europe 
Unemployed 3 133 6 206 8 347 15 030 11 388 21 155 31 053 33 304 41 277 81 729 84 119 110 300 
Employed 10 452 16 748 39 775 49 223 94 559 122 497 193 223 245 183 284 495 311 887 303 072 301 300 
EAPª 4 977 177 5 379 879 5 570 780 5 725 776 5 995 111 6 230 656 6 538 304 6 783 139 7 005 233 7 118 792 6 939 649 411 600 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 1999-2010, INE Spain. 
Note: North-America and Oceania is not mentioned for women due to the non representativeness of the sample size. 
ª Economically Active Population. 
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6. Final considerations: Demographic enigmas  
of the sub-Saharan migration in Spain 
From the description of the African flows to Spain since 1988, the reasons behind their stagnation 
during the migratory boom remain unexplained. In that sense, the first question that raises the sub-
Saharan migration refers to the direction and the effectiveness of the flow’s control and selection 
under the Spanish —but also the EU— and the African migration relationship. As we have mentioned 
before, our hypothesis is that African flows have experienced a higher control than the rest, especially 
those from Eastern Europe and Latin America. But if that is true, we should also explain the 
reactivation and the increase of the African flows since 2003. 
The demographic approach to the migratory process and the settlement of sub-Saharan 
population in Spain has two clear limitations. On the first place, the statistical filter that provides the 
raw material for the demographic analysis is not sensitive to the reality beyond the national 
definitions. We specifically refer to the ethnic diversity that is not considered in official statistics and 
—as in the case of Gambians or Senegalese— are grouped under the same label. Their migration 
process, territorial distribution, economic activity or demographic behavior could significantly vary 
between them but we can just analyze the aggregated perspective. On the second place, the 
accumulation of bias generated due to population statistical coverage, demographic events or the 
report by itself, makes the interpretation of results extremely difficult. In that sense, a 
multidisciplinary approach that combines different methods and techniques with other qualitative 
disciplines like anthropology could be the best tool to understand the sub-Saharans reality in Spain. 
D. Conclusions 
African immigration in Italy, Spain and Portugal has responded to the same economic and 
demographic factors: a labor demand caused by an economic growth during the first years of the new 
millennium that has been abruptly cut due to the economic crisis. The roots of the special intensity 
that it has acquired are to be found in the improvements in educational attainment of the nationals of 
these countries, especially among younger generations, particularly among female generations. Such 
promotion due to human capital investments explains the specific demand for foreign low-skilled 
labor force. If we add to this the relative weakness of the Welfare State system in those countries 
(compared to their partners in the North and Centre of the EU), and the increase in life expectancy, it 
is also possible to understand the increase of the demand for low-skilled workers in a strongly dual 
labor market, evident in specific sectors as the domestic service to the extent that some authors have 
talked of the internationalization of the domestic work. This situation is at the basis of the growing 
presence of women in the international flows.  
The African population present low levels of female participation in the labor market, except 
for the various sub-Saharan nationalities in Portugal. Generally, the population from Latin-America 
and the Eastern European countries has covered most of the demand in Spain and Italy. In any case, 
the more profound the changes between generations in the host countries, the more intense the arrival 
of migrants in general and Africans in particular. It can be added to this scenario the relative scarcity 
of labor force due to structural population deficits caused by the sudden and severe drop in fertility 
rates from the mid-seventies until the mid-nineties, although it was not the cause itself that has helped 
the rapid and massive labor integration of the newcomers. 
Legislation has also had a role in the evolution of the flows from Africa and the settlement 
and living conditions of this population in each of the three countries. In this respect, the differences 
between the Africans in Portugal on the one hand, and in Spain and Italy, on the other, are 
paradigmatic. Similarly to what has happened in Spain with the Latin-American immigration, the 
belonging to a recognized historical community through the language, enhanced by the nationalist 
rhetoric during dictatorship periods (Franco in the Spanish case and Salazar in the Portuguese), 
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favored a pro-immigration legislation towards the ex colonies, when both Spain and Portugal 
remained as countries of emigration. This positive discrimination has been particularly important in 
order to access the local nationality. Furthermore, we should also consider the oportunities given to 
the descendants of former Portuguese, Spanish or Italian emigrants. If we add to this the social capital 
that language proficiency represents for these immigrants and the favorable prejudice by the native 
population, it is possible to understand the differing status of the Africans in Portugal on the one hand, 
and in Spain (and to a lesser extent in Italy), on the other. 
Thus, sub-Saharan immigration in Portugal is much more numerous, with the specific 
presence of a few represented nationalities in Italy and Spain such as the nationals from Angola, 
Mozambique, Cape Verde and Sao Tome. The demographic profile of this population does not show 
the gender imbalance that appears between the Senegalese and Gambian population in the other two 
host countries. Regarding the North Africans in Spain, it is necessary to consider the political context 
in order to understand their characteristics. Although Moroccans have been one of the oldest non-EU 
group in the country, they show worse characteristics in comparison to other foreigners who arrived 
later. In this sense it is particularly relevant to mention the Latin-American immigrants who have 
shifted and limited the upward social mobility of the Maghreb population in general and Moroccans in 
particular. To the negative discriminatory law (especially regarding the access to the Spanish 
nationality) we should add discrimination among the natives towards Africans, derived from a shared 
history rather than cultural differences (Stallaert, 1998), and what some authors believe to be a 
deliberate policy of replacement according to the origin of immigrants, favoring the Latin American 
and Eastern European nationals in detriment of Africans (Izquierdo et al., 2002; Domingo, 2005). 
The spatial distribution of African immigration in the three countries highlights the role of 
labor supply in each of them above the characteristics of migrants themselves. The low level of 
education among the African population put them closer to the real requirements of the job offer in 
these countries, a low skill profile in agriculture, services and construction sectors in comparison to 
other immigrants. This factor could be interpreted as a comparative advantage in the integration of 
African population in the destination countries. Nonetheless, with the economic crisis this 
characteristic constitutes a hazard, both in short and long terms. In this sense, the improvement in the 
levels of education of the immigrant population is one of the biggest challenges for Africans today. 
Although the data available so far for the three countries does not allow us to observe the 
facts, we could expect that the economic crisis may cause a significant shift in the landscape of 
African immigration. There are three main factors to be considered: (i) the depth of the crisis in each 
of the receiving countries; (ii) the characteristics of the African population settled in them; and, (iii) 
the political and socio-economic impact of the crisis in the African sending countries (see also box 
I.1). In the first case, the economic crisis in Portugal, which involves the rescue by its EU partners, 
implies a severe rise in unemployment and job insecurity that seriously affects African immigrants. 
The same is true of the other two countries in a greater or lesser extent. In the Spanish case, the 
country is under a strong restructuration process that is also characterized by the destruction of many 
jobs. This situation is more serious for men than for women, since labor demand in the domestic 
sector has not fallen with the same intensity in men-related occupations. 
Although the available data for each of the countries in study does not allow us to estimate 
the impact of the crisis on the households considering the different nationalities, we cannot forget 
that one of the darkest sides of the economic crisis is precisely the deterioration of living conditions 
for both nationals and immigrants. In the three countries the number of home-owners is much 
higher than in other EU countries. The access to property among the immigrant population, 
especially from Africa has been associated to social status and upward mobility. With the crisis, the 
previous access to mortgages added to unemployment has led to many cases of insolvency, and an 
increasing space segregation. 
As it has been shown, a significant number of the African immigrants work in the 
construction, agriculture and industrial sectors, the most affected economic sectors of the economy 
and where a higher competition among foreign groups and also with natives can be observed. 
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However, the economic impact of the crisis in the households may increase the participation of 
women in the labor market among those who have not opted for a return migration. Among the 
immigrant youth and the second generations looking for employment, the effect of the crisis can 
frustrate their expectations and have an impact on their integration process in general. Although the 
situation for each African nationality, despite everything, is also very heterogeneous in each of the 
countries we have studied, they have in common the challenge of improving their educational levels. 
Finally we must consider the impact of the crisis on the countries of origin. Despite geographical 
proximity, in the short-term return migration can be frustrated because of both the situation of 
uncertainty and insecurity in the countries of destination and the impact of the crisis itself and the 
social and political uncertainty generated in the sending countries. 
 
BOX I.1 
THE EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POLICY TOWARDS EXTRA-UE  
LABOUR MOBILITY FLOWS: THE LATEST NEWS 
The legal bases established by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 should be considered as the first 
specific effort to adopt a common EU policy for managing workers immigration. In a policy-oriented 
labor market scenario, difficulties to elaborate a unified immigration policy just highlight the lack of a 
unified European labor market, either in its legal definition, or in the demographic and economic 
conditions. Nonetheless some important agreements have been elaborated on the issue. The last 
provisions that affect the policy on the admission of migrants for work are the following: 1) on 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate 
transfer (COM 2010 378 of July 13), 2) the conditions of entry of temporary workers (COM 2010 379, 
July 13), 3) the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly 
qualified employment (following the North American model of “blue card” (Directive 2009/50/EC of 
the Council of May 25, 2009) and 4) specific procedures for admitting third-country nationals for the 
purposes of scientific research (Directive 2005/71/EC of October 12, 2005).  
The migration crisis that has followed the riots in North Africa has apparently finished with the policy of 
no borders control inside the EU (Schengen Treaty). However, the reintroduction in exceptional 
circumstances of border controls is not due to labor flows. Instead, it is caused by an over-dimensioned 
perception of the arrival of refugees, combined with the impact of the economic recession in the political 
balance within the EU itself. Actually, the number of refugees who have turned to the Community 
borders is minimal in comparison to the total flows generated by the political instability that have been 
distributed mainly inside the North African region. In the first three months it was estimated around 30 
thousand among the total of 700 thousand people mobilized in the various conflicts had been adopted by 
the EU member States (Fargues, 2011).  
So far, it seems that despite the crisis raised by the North African political instability the direction of the 
EU immigration policy will stay in the same orientation as the previously mentioned normative, that is, 
restrictive towards the flows of unskilled workers from outside the EU, making them temporary. The 
tendency towards the adoption of bilateral agreements to promote specific flows and the parallel 
decision to encourage the flow of highly qualified personnel will be maintained in a context of 
increasing intra-European Union mobility. 
The challenges facing African migration also remain, and unfortunately, the same as before the 
economic and political crisis. In fact, the crisis has only highlighted the deficit in the European policy 
regarding immigration and development cooperation with Africa. So far, there is no sign that the 
economies of North Africa are able to improve their economic situation or to absorb more youth in their 
own production system. In the context of an European Union also threatened by crisis in some of its 
members, substantial support for African countries seems as a more distant future than it would be 
desirable. 
Sources: Illamola Dausa, Mariona (2011), “Acciones de la Unión Europea en relación con la movilidad laboral de 
los nacionales de terceros países”, in II Conferencia Económica de la Mediterrània Nord-Occidental “La cooperació 
Territorial a la Mediterrània Occidental, mimeo; Fargues, P. (2011), Voice after Exit: Revolution and Migration in 
the Arab World, Migration Policy Institute, May. 
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As Spanish demographer Fernández Cordón (2009) indicated, the times of demographic 
bomb have ended. Population aging is now the determinant demographic scenario in both 
Mediterranean shores. Consequences of fertility on the population structure and maximum differences 
between the two western Mediterranean shores in this field will be wiped up in the next fifteen years. 
The future development of this area will continue mostly to depend on whether the productive 
economy is capable of adapting to ageing and, more specifically, to how the number of elderly 
dependants grows and the age of cohorts entering the labour market decreases. However, the future 
will also depend on how wealth is redistributed in these Mediterranean societies, and on how much 
human capital, particularly in young female generations, improve.  
Decreasing Spanish and Italian generations are reaching working age while economic 
recession is settling in. However, instead of there being an avalanche of immigrants to replace or 
complete the unborn individuals due to fertility decline, economic recession is reducing the numbers 
of immigrants entering these two countries (Domingo et al., 2009). In turn, and demographically 
speaking, the sub-Saharan region shows a different profile. The inertia of the young population 
structure in these countries will, for a long time, provide young potential emigrants if their labor 
markets are unable to absorb them. These candidates will encourage the diasporas from the sub-
Saharan Africa to regions with a demand in the labor market and with previous migration networks, 
including the countries of North Africa. 
The economic crisis has opened a disturbing uncertainty about the future evolution of 
international immigrant flows between African countries and the EU Mediterranean countries, but also 
about the living conditions of African people settled in these countries (see box I.2 for the Italian 
example). In the short term the severity of the crisis in the three countries, as we quoted in the 
introduction, opens the question if the high immigration period will become an exceptional 
parentheses in history or if the involution of the flows during the years marked by the crisis will be the 
exception. By now, it sounds reasonable to expect that in Portugal and Spain the migration balance 
will become null or even negative during the next five years. It is also expected that a significant 
amount of return migration and re-emigration to third countries of the foreigners arrived during the 
first decade of XXI century. But, at the same time and taking into account the political and economic 
scenario of the countries of origin, African migrants could have fewer propensities to return than other 
immigrants as the Latin-Americans and Eastern Europeans. In this scenario, it would not be out of 
context to expect an increase in the emigration flows of young Portuguese and Spaniards. 
That gloomy economic future that could reverse the migration cycle does not act in the same 
way among the different groups of immigrant population. Africans seem to return to their home 
countries in a lesser extent than other continental origins. Different factors contribute to it: (i) The 
length of settlement for some nationalities, as seen with Moroccans, Gambians and Senegalese in 
Spain, Moroccans and Senegalese in Italy, or nationals of African ex-colonies in Portugal;  
(ii) Paradoxically, the undocumented status of many immigrants has an effect of retention, even 
during economic crisis; and (iii) The economic and social panorama in the countries of origin. 
In this way, it could be argued that just as with the oil crisis of the mid-seventies, policies 
encouraging the return of the immigrant population adopted by the major immigrant destination 
countries in Europe (Germany, France, Switzerland and Belgium for example) were relatively 
successful in sending Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese back home. Nonetheless, it had a non-
expected effect in attracting new inflows like the Turks, Moroccans and Algerians. In other words, 
immigrants who returned had a social space for it, they had savings that allowed the return, even in 
times of crisis, to a country where social conditions and economic policies had changed in a radical 
and positive way that made it possible a future project there. Instead, nationals of countries without 
economic growth stayed in the developed countries and increased the processes of family 
reunification, changing the composition of the stocks by sex and age, even with deteriorated living 
conditions due to the economic crisis. In the case of Italy and Spain family reunification processes are 
expected to be more frequent among families that were formed after the migratory movement. This 
would be true if in the next five years signs of economic recovery appear. 
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The current movements for democracy in the countries of North Africa have had an effect of 
population expulsion that is very clear in the African flows to Italy but in the mid term the scenario is 
not clear. Changes will depend on both the timing of democratization in each country and the 
evolution of the crisis in the region which, in contrast to what happens in Latin America, is not 
expected to have an immediate improvement. In any way, what can be stated is that the future of the 
EU Mediterranean countries and the African countries is strongly linked by the migration flows and 
by the transnational networks that immigrants are a part of. 
 
BOX I.2 
ITALIAN MIGRATION POLICY - TOWARDS A SECURITY - ORIENTED MODEL? 
In Italy, as in Spain, the first immigration law was elaborated during the decade of 1980´s as an answer 
to the first arrival of labor immigrants, specifically in 1986. Since then, an increasingly articulated set of 
norms and principles on the regulation of new flows and on the integration of residents has been 
adopted. This set of norms is based on the principle of economic legitimation of immigrants: immigrants 
are seen primarily as economic subjects and with relatively little regard for social and humanitarian 
considerations.  
This functional model, also known as the Italian guestworker system was consolidated in the year 2002 
with the Bossi Fini Law (n.189/2002). In short, the Law regulated immigration in order to supply a 
demand for workers during specific peaks of productivity in the lowest paid economic sectors of a 
highly segmented labor market. It was characterized by giving immigrants a very fragile residence status 
through flexible working contracts not directly connected to social rights that reduce the possibilities of 
permanent settlement. According to the Bossi Fini Law, admission depends on the availability of a job 
proposal and the residence permit is linked to the duration of the contract. If the worker becomes 
unemployed, a period of six months is allowed for further job search (previously it was one year). 
Admissions are based on annual quotas and jobseeker residence permit was eliminated. In this sense, the 
link of the residence permit to the work contract satisfied the need for flexible labor while avoiding the 
social costs of immigrants´ unemployment. Regarding integration issues, the Bossi Fini Law introduced 
restrictions to family reunion processes. It also limited long-term residents and those holding a two-year 
minimum stay permit the right of accessing public housing. 
In the year 2009 a new immigration law entered into force (Law n. 94/2009, adopted in July also known 
as the pacchetto sicurezza) and was specifically devoted to security issues, consolidating the link 
between migration and security in Italy. The most important innovations introduced by the law were 
related to irregular migration, access to residence permit and to citizenship, and labour recruitment and 
admission. Firstly, it criminalizes the irregular entrance in the country with a series of punishments that 
include the payment of fines, prison and expulsion. In the field of Italian nationality, restrictions on 
acquisition via marriage have been introduced. For long-term residence permits it was introduced the 
need of subscribing an integration agreement and to approve an Italian language test. On the other hand, 
the law simplified the hiring procedures from abroad for high-skilled immigrants and extended the job 
seeking permit for one year for foreign students who have obtained a Master or Ph.D. degree in Italy.  
In sum, the recent Italian migration policy shows a selective evolution with differential integration 
possibilities that favour the high-skilled and specific low-skilled workers such as domestic helpers and 
caregivers (this last category through extraordinary amnesty processes).The access to citizenship 
through naturalization is extremely restricted and the access to social rights is uncertain for both 
irregular or regular immigrants. 
Source: Caponio, T. and Graziano, P. (2011), “Towards a security-oriented migration policy model? Evidence from 
the Italian case”, in: Carmel, E., Cerami, A. and Papadopoulos, T. (eds.), Migration and welfare in the new Europe, 
Bristol, Policy Press, 105-120. 
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The demographic consequences of the so called Second Demographic Transition theoretical 
framework, as well as the role of migrations in the 21st century demographic transformations, should 
be rethought in the Spanish and Italian immigration context. The Second Demographic Transition 
theory classical formulation was right in stating that the key element to understanding changes in 
fertility, marriages and families are the transformations in female cohorts (Van de Kaa, 1987). 
However, its attempts to explain regional differences did not really reach the right conclusions, as they 
abused of supposedly weberian interpretations, giving a key role to cultural norms and particularly 
religious ones (Lesthaeghe, 1991). These changes will not be understood if cultural aspects in general 
and the weight of Protestantism or Catholicism in particular become the focus of attention instead of 
economic trends.  
The delay in Spanish and Italian fertility decline and the record low fertility levels which both 
these countries finally reached cannot be explained by the fact that the first two are catholic countries. 
Neither can couple formation changes be understood from this perspective. Instead major 
determinants have been an increase in Italian and Spanish young female generations’ education, their 
incorporation to the labor market and the pace of economic cycles. We should not forget that part of 
the 1970s and 1980s “delay” and “intensification” of demographic changes in Italy and Spain were 
due to economic crisis structural effects, basically huge unemployment levels. We should not commit 
the same mistake when interpreting present and future socio-demographic changes in the North 
African region. 
Concerning the role of migrations in the 21st century demographic transformations Van de 
Kaa (1994) himself warned that migrations were ignored when building the Second Demographic 
Transition theory, but changes in developed counties since the 1960s cannot be understood without 
them. Unexpected immigration growth during this century in traditionally emigrant Mediterranean 
countries like Spain, Italy and Portugal can only, once again, be explained by focusing on women’s 
position and not on the relative labor market shortages due to changes in demographic structure 
(Domingo and Gil, 2007a). Demographer Anna Cabré calls “Complex reproduction systems” those 
societies in which immigration is no longer a basic part of demographic growth but a structural 
endogenous factor in their demographic evolution. And this is exactly what has happened during the 
first years of the 21st century.  
It will not be long before the North African countries experience similar changes too. In fact, 
Spain and Italy received international immigration from the mid 1970s, as Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia are now doing, even though they are only receiving it because they are being used by sub-
Saharan and Asian migrants to cross to Europe (Khachani, 2006). However, it should not be forgotten 
that emigration continues to be their main characteristic, as it was for Spain and Italy several decades 
ago. The high unemployment rates among those with the highest education level in Maghreb 
countries, especially women, would indicate that these countries’ economies are scarcely prepared to 
absorb education improvements and therefore it introduces doubts on whether they can really take 
advantage of the so called “demographic window of opportunity”, that is to say, of having high 
percentages of working age population due to fertility decline and a still scarce aging process. 
Emigration will paradoxically condemn part of these young Maghreb men and women to have 
unskilled jobs in their destination countries (Domingo and Bayona, 2009). Even though specific 
analyses on Maghreb workers’ social mobility in the north Mediterranean countries have not been 
elaborated here, there seems to be a first phase in the migratory process in which workers would 
descend in the labor scale (Cachón, 2009). 
The main lesson to be drawn from North Mediterranean experiences by South Mediterranean 
countries is not establishing a demographic development model linked to the “modernization” process 
for each country, but rather showing the major role of the economic cycle in intensifying demographic 
change. Indeed, the pace of socio-demographic transformations in each North African country will be 
determined by the economic situation and its impact on the labor market, combined with an increase 
in education levels in younger cohorts, particularly among women.  
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II. Migration patterns and immigrants characteristics  
in North-Western Europe 
Helga A. G. de Valk, Corina Huisman and Kris R. Noam7 
A. Introduction: migration and migrants  
in North-Western Europe 
Migration to many countries in north-western Europe is not a new phenomenon. Although migration 
history and its characteristics differ between destination countries in the area, migration has a rather long 
tradition. Despite this, still relatively limited knowledge is available about certain origin groups. More 
comparative data on migration and migrants are also still missing from the literature to a large extent. 
This report aims to provide insight on migration and migrants in four north-western European countries: 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. These countries are chosen as they host a 
substantial share of all immigrants in this part of the European Union. Furthermore the respective 
countries have different migration histories and clearly diverse immigrant populations. Whereas colonial 
links have been crucial elements of migration to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom this was less 
the case for the other two countries. Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands recruited migrants to carry 
out unskilled labor migration in the 60s. At the same time all four countries have received migrants 
seeking for refuge, mainly from the 1990s onwards. Given this diversity it is interesting to compare 
migration and migrant characteristics in these four countries in north-western Europe. 
This report provides an overview of recent immigration and settlement patterns for the four 
study countries. The most recent available statistics are used and patterns over the past decade are 
described. Characteristics of the immigration flows (among other origin, age, and gender), as well as, 
other issues related to settlement (for example nationality and citizenship) are discussed. Different 
immigration flows, including asylum seekers and refugees, are presented. This part provides as much 
detail and comparability as possible by using different data sources. Special emphasis is put on 
migrants coming from Africa and Latin America. We make use of existing data and complement it 
with material specifically gathered and analyzed for the purpose of this study. 
                                                        
7  Consultants from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of 
ECLAC.  
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To get a better understanding of the situation of different immigrant groups in the study 
countries it is of importance to include a background on relevant policies and laws that affect 
migration and immigrants. Furthermore, it is relevant to pay attention to demographic behavior, 
including union formation and family formation, among immigrant groups as they are important 
indicators for their position in the four countries. This is covered by drawing from existing studies in 
these areas. 
The migrant population in this part of Europe is nowadays not only determined by 
immigration but just as well by the children of immigrants. Although some children migrate alone or 
together with their parents, a substantial share is born in Europe to parents with a migration history. 
These children and young adults of the second generation are an increasingly important group in 
absolute and relative terms (Coleman, 2006). In the different countries around a fifth to a quarter of 
the school aged population is of immigrant origin. These levels vary by area of residence, nowadays in 
many European cities around half of the children in schools are of immigrant origin. The position and 
the demographic behavior of the second generation will be increasingly important for Europe’s 
population developments. It is therefore relevant to know more about children of immigrants within 
the frame of this study. In the subsequent section of the study we provide this overview again with a 
focus on children coming from African and Latin American immigrants. Existing data and studies on 
children of immigrants are used in this part. 
The fact that children of immigrants are an increasingly important group in the population of 
many north-western European countries is very much related to the fact that ageing is one of the main 
challenges ahead for these countries. This refers to ageing of the native majority group now and in the 
near future. At the same time ageing of immigrant groups is still largely overlooked. Given the fact 
that immigration to many European countries started already in the 1960s, ageing of immigrant 
populations is increasingly important. Another section of the study will focus particularly on elderly 
immigrants, their characteristics, the role of transnational ties, health consequences, and 
intergenerational relations. 
One final remark should be made on data and terminology. Hardly any subject is so difficult 
to study as migration and migrants and this complication is even larger when aiming at a comparison 
between countries. Migration statistics suffer first of all from a lack in completeness and coverage 
(Poulain and Perrin, 2008). In addition, migration as such is not so easily defined. The 
recommendation of the United Nations for the definition of an international long-term migrant is often 
taken as a starting point. The way this definition is, however, translated into registration rules at the 
national and local level differs substantially. Also at the European level comparative data or datasets 
are still relatively limited and despite efforts of harmonization, many statistics still mainly reflect the 
national view. Differences in data throughout Europe are the result of diverse legislation, levels of 
efficiency in registration and processing of gathered data (Kupiszewska and Nowok, 2008). Not only 
flow data (movements of people) but also stock data (residing migrants) are prone to this 
shortcomings in data availability and comparability (Fassmann, 2009). Different views exist on who is 
and should be counted as an immigrant. In some cases it includes only those who are foreign born 
(first generation), or those who have at least one foreign born parent (second generation) in other cases 
it covers all those with a nationality different from the country of residence. The latter criterion is also 
affected by different policies in citizenship acquisition and naturalization. Each of these different 
definitions used, clearly impacts the number of immigrants reported. For this study we had to draw 
from a range of data sources in order to get the information we needed. This also implies that different 
definitions can potentially be used. These data issues sometimes restrict the preferred level of detail 
and comparability or the recentness of available information. We will provide, however, as much 
detail as possible by using the latest data from different sources. 
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B. Immigration to North-Western Europe  
1. Brief migration history 
Contrary to the view often dominant in the public discourse migration to Europe is far from a new 
phenomenon (Lucassen and Lucassen, 2011). Nevertheless the size, type and distance of moves might well 
have changed over the decades (Fassmann, 2009). When looking at the past century we also find that in the 
first part of the century many people actually left Europe to settle in for example north-America or 
Australia. This emigration dominated the international migration from countries like the Netherlands and 
the UK shortly after the Second World War. The post-war migration in Europe was furthermore 
characterized by flight and expulsion of, among others, Germans and Poles (Fassmann, 2009). 
Starting from the 1950s a new period of migration is emerging due to changes in colonial 
relations followed by independence of several countries previously colonialized by the UK (e.g. 
India), the Netherlands (e.g. Suriname) and Belgium (e.g. Congo). Very often citizens of the former 
colonized countries were free to enter the colonizing country and in some cases also held citizenship. 
In the case of the UK many immigrants from the New Commonwealth started arriving in the United 
Kingdom in the late 1950s. Of this Commonwealth migration, different groups arrived at different 
times: In the late 1950s and early 1960s mostly Black Caribbeans whereas in the 1970s they were 
mainly Indians, African Asians, Pakistanis and eventually Bangladeshis arriving (Dustmann and 
Fabbri, 2003). The migration history of the Netherlands is also characterized by colonial migration 
particularly from Indonesia, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles in the Caribbean. 
Historically, three major types of migration to the four countries in this study can thus be 
distinguished: migration from former colonies, labor migration (e.g., Turks and Moroccans), and asylum 
migration. Regarding labor migration the UK differs from the others as this country never had an active 
labor recruitment policy like was the case in the other three countries; labor migrants arrived to the UK 
from the overseas colonies without any specific policy (Gemenne, 2009). Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands, however, all had bi-lateral agreements with Southern European countries (like Spain and 
Italy) that were later extended to mainly Morocco and Turkey. The German government had for example 
different agreements with a range of countries in the 1955 to 1968 period; starting with Italy in 1955, 
Spain in 1960 and Turkey and Morocco in 1961 and 1963 respectively (Rühl, 2009). These 
(predominantly male) migrant workers were recruited to carry out unskilled labor in the European 
industries. Many migrants from Turkey and Morocco came from the rural areas within these countries 
(e.g., the Rif region). Although their stay was originally expected to be temporary, most of them 
eventually settled permanently. Family members who were left behind initially joined their partners and 
parents later on. Recruitment of labor migrants stopped mainly with the recession in the early 1970s. 
Nevertheless, due to family reunification and formation immigration from the countries of former labor 
migrants continued into the 1980s. Also today, many Turks and Moroccans still find a partner in their 
countries of origin (De Valk, Liefbroer, Esveldt, and Henkens, 2004; Huschek, De Valk and Liefbroer, 
2011). Because of their recruitment as unskilled laborers, first-generation Turks and Moroccans for 
example are predominantly low educated, often have limited proficiency in the host country language 
and they find themselves in lower socio-economic positions. Although the position of the second 
generation is improving, they are still reported to be disadvantaged compared to the native majority 
group (Heath et al., 2008). This is reflected both in their educational position and achievement, the labor 
market and occupational attainment. Disadvantage is most pronounced for children of immigrants from 
less-developed regions. The study by Heath et al. (2008) shows that the moment and level of 
disadvantage differs between countries in Europe: within some countries cumulative disadvantage is in 
the school career, from school to work whereas in others disadvantage is concentrated in entering the 
labor market. Young adults of the second generation are more prone to unemployment and this is 
particularly the case for those of Turkish (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands), North African (Belgium, 
France, Netherlands), Caribbean and Pakistani (Netherlands, UK) descent. Other studies also indicate the 
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disadvantaged position in family income and housing as well as health for the families in which these 
children of immigrants are growing up (Hernandez et al., 2009). 
Asylum is often referred to as the third main phase in migration history of the north-western 
European countries. In the early 1990s asylum migration sharply increased due to conflicts in several 
parts of the world. Peaks were highest around the mid-1990s related also to conflicts in the European 
region like the war in Yugoslavia. In Germany the asylum migration peaked in 1992 with 1.1 million 
people seeking asylum. In the subsequent years their number decreased: In 2003 around 50 thousand 
people applied for asylum and this fell to 27 thousand in 2009 with asylum applicants mainly coming 
from Turkey, Serbia/Montenegro, Iraq, and the Russian Federation (Oezcan, 2004; BMI, 2011). Since 
then the number of asylum seekers has never been as high and during the past decade fell even further. 
Also in the UK the number of asylum applications sharply decreased from around 85 thousand in 
2002 to 25 thousand in 2008. Nevertheless, in the latter figure 40 percent of asylum applicants were of 
African origin (ONS, 2008). Similar patterns are observed in Belgium and the Netherlands: number of 
applications clearly decreased over the past decade with only a small and moderate increase in 
numbers again for the Netherlands and Belgium respectively in the most recent year for which data 
are available (2009). Contrary to the other migrant flows that were often from few particular countries, 
refugees have a wide variety of backgrounds. Despite the importance of asylum in the recent 
migration history, refugees still constitute a relatively small proportion of residing migrants in each of 
the studied countries.  
For Germany we should mention the special position of the so called Aussiedler. As a result 
of the resettlement shortly after the war, many ethnic Germans were located mainly in Poland and the 
former Soviet Union. Many of them started to return to Germany in the 1990s as also special policies 
were developed for them (BMI, 2011). These Aussiedler, were not always considered migrants or 
foreigners because of their heritage and German citizenship (Oezcan, 2004). Because these migrants 
often are considered German they obtain citizenship rights based on the jus sanguinis principle. This 
implies that they have different rights than those with foreign nationality as they can for example 
migrate freely and have immediate access to the labor market and social benefits (Brubaker, 1989; 
Joppke, 1999). The immigration of these Aussiedler peaked in the mid-1990s, and although falling to 
lower levels afterwards it remained relatively high until around 2001 (around 98 thousand persons). In 
more recent years this number has dropped significantly and in 2009 only slightly over 3 thousand 
Aussiedler immigrated to Germany. In the public debate the position of the Aussiedler is still 
discussed as a substantial share of them were reported to have only limited German knowledge. And 
even though many have achieved their position in Germany, studies also show that Aussiedler still 
experience disadvantage both in school and on the labor market compared to the native majority group 
(Kogan et al., 2011).  
2. Recent immigration patterns 
Immigration to the four studied countries is analyzed for the past decade using the most recent 
available data up to 2009 (only for Belgium most recent detailed data are for 2007). For each of the 
countries we make use of the national available statistics and aim to define origin groups as similarly 
as possible for all countries. This is not always evident as, for example, the registration in the UK 
follows a totally different pattern and categories than is used by the countries in continental Europe. 
Nevertheless, Figures II.1-II.4 provide an overview of absolute numbers of immigration (a) and the 
share of different regional origins in the total immigrant flow (b) for the four study countries. Please 
note that colors do not refer to the same categories of origin in the figures. 
The figures show clearly different immigration patterns in each of the countries. Absolute 
numbers of immigration are higher in Germany, followed by the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Of course these absolute numbers are hard to compare given the different country and population 
sizes. The development over time can be more easily compared and shows a small decrease in 
immigration to Germany from almost 900 thousand in 2001 to 700 thousand in 2009. Immigration to 
the UK and particularly to Belgium, on the contrary, continued to increase over the studied decade and 
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the eight year period respectively. In the Netherlands a U-shape pattern is observed with a steep 
decline in the mid-2000s and an increase after 2005 resulting in immigration levels in 2009 that were 
almost the same as in 2001. The increase in immigration to the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands is, 
as can be seen from part b of Figures II.1-II.4, mainly due to an increase in European migration. This 
relates to the fact that with the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 immigration 
from several Central-Eastern European countries (like Poland and Bulgaria, Romania) has clearly 
risen. Since Brussels is the capital of Europe and the EU is having many offices in this city, the EU 
extension has had a clear impact on the immigration from these new member states resulting in even 
larger increase over time in Belgium than observed in the other countries. Also the most recent data 
for 2010 on the Netherlands indicate that immigration is still rising primarily as a result of increased 
European immigration (Nicolaas, 2011). 
The importance of African migration to the different settlement countries is quite diverse. 
African migration refers in recent years to about 4% in the total immigration to Germany, around 6% 
in the UK and around 10% in the Netherlands. Belgium clearly has the largest share of African 
migrants in recent years as well as during the full period studied (Figures II.1-II.4b). African 
immigration to Belgium was and is an important share of the immigration ranging from 16 to 21 of the 
yearly arriving immigrants. This can on the one hand be related to the links between Belgium and 
several African countries. Congo and Morocco are the most numerous single countries of origin of 
immigrants. On the other hand the African migration is also related to language: The French speaking 
Walloon region of Belgium as well as the predominantly French speaking area of Brussels attracts 
many Francophone migrants from Africa. 
The share of migrants from Africa to Germany has remained relatively stable and limited over 
time. For the Netherlands a slight decrease is observed over the study period and this pattern seems to 
continue also afterwards as suggested by the 2010 data (Nicolaas, 2011). This is mainly related to a 
decrease in asylum migration to the Netherlands combined with fewer marriage migrants arriving 
from Morocco. In the UK, African origin groups are partially captured under African commonwealth 
which refers to all countries that were part of the Commonwealth whereas other African origins are 
included in the group ‘other. The share of African Commonwealth has decreased over the past decade 
but since the group ‘other’ is not further specified it cannot be assessed to what extend this is 
compensated by immigration from other African origins to the UK. 
Of course we should be aware that we only focus on immigration here. The net migration in 
each of the countries is positive and this in particular the case for the UK. Nevertheless the migration 
surplus is decreasing and in the Netherlands is found to be negative in some of the recent years. Also 
in Germany the migration surplus is no longer as large as it used to be in previous years: In 2001 the 
net migration was around 188 thousand persons whereas in 2008 this was only 10 thousand persons 
arriving more than leaving Germany (BMI, 2011). 
Overall we thus find a small increase in immigration in three of the four countries, where 
Germany is the exception. European migration is the most important with around 50% or higher in the 
most recent years of the continental north-western European countries. European migration is still less 
important in the UK. African immigration to the study countries is again clearly related to colonial 
links and continuous immigration from the former labour recruitment countries like Morocco. Asylum 
migration seems to be a relatively small share in the immigration from the African continent but we 
will explore it further in the next section. 
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FIGURE II.1 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2000-2009: IMMIGRATION BY REGION  
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FIGURE II.2  
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FIGURE II.3 
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FIGURE II.4 




B. Relative share in total immigration by origin 
 
 
Source: Based on ADSEI, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en 
racismebestrijding 2010, pp.26-27. 
 
 
3. Characteristics of immigrants: Age, gender and origin 
Beside general levels of immigration by origin it is relevant to know more about the characteristics of 
the immigrants. Further analyses of the age and gender structure of the immigrants are crucial to get a 
more advanced idea of their background. Figures II.5 and II.6 provide this information for the UK and 
in more detail for the Netherlands. As shown in Figure II.5 for the UK, migrants are mainly young 
adults in the working ages as it is often suggested in the migration literature (Castles and Miller, 2009) 
and empirically found. Overall men outnumber women in immigration to the UK. Nevertheless, the 
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migration (Castles and Miller, 2009). In particular for the 15-24 year age category there is gender 
balance. Recent data on Belgium also show that immigration is no longer determined by men only. In 
recent years the gender balance has become more equal among those arriving in that country (CGKR, 
2011). Similar patterns in immigration structure are found also in the other countries of study and are 
therefore not presented here. It is more useful to have a close look at the differences in age and sex 
composition between groups of different origin.  
 
FIGURE II.5 
UNITED KINGDOM, 2009: AGE AND SEX STRUCTURE OF ALL IMMIGRANTS ARRIVING 
 
Source: Own calculations based on UK, International Passenger Survey. 
 
 
Figures II.6a to II.6d show the age and sex structure of all immigrants arriving in the 
Netherlands. A similar pattern is found as in the UK: immigrants are in general young and are only 
slightly more often men. In the age group 15 to 20 years and in particular for those between 20 and 24 
we see that women outnumbered men among immigrants to the Netherlands in 2009. Looking at the 
different age and sex compositions of selected regions of origin we find quite different patterns 
particularly regarding the gender balance. African migrants to the Netherlands are mainly between the 
ages of 25 and 30 and include overall more men among all age groups (except children) than women. 
For Belgium, however, it is recently shown that between 1990/1991 and 2006/2007 a clear 
feminization was observed for the African origin countries. From countries like Congo, Morocco and 
Rwanda mainly women migrated to Belgium in the recent years (CGKR, 2011). 
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FIGURE II.6 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2009: AGE AND SEX STRUCTURE OF ALL, ASIAN, AFRICAN  
AND LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS ARRIVING 
A. All inmigrants B. Asian inmigrants 
  
C. African inmigrants D. Latin American inmigrants 
  
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands. 
 
 
Considering Latin American immigrants to the Netherlands a different pattern is found: here 
the majority of immigrants are female. Although again immigrants from this region are mainly 
concentrated in the ages between 20 and 30 years it is also clear that compared to African immigrants 
they are much more likely to be already older upon arrival in the Netherlands. This can be partially 
explained by the different reasons for migration to the Netherlands: many immigrants from Latin 
America come from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. Given the historic colonial links with these 
countries immigration is not restricted to young people in search of job opportunities or fleeing their 
countries of origin as is the case of several groups of African origin. In addition, the Latin American 
countries of origin also include migrants, mainly females, coming to the Netherlands to marry a Dutch 
partner (see section on migration motives).  
Up to now we have mainly made a distinction by region of origin. When going beyond this 
information on origin and focusing on African and Latin American migrants it is clear that migration 
histories as well as existing links between countries of origin and settlement are reflected in the 
migration numbers from selected individual countries. In Germany no African or Latin American 
countries of origin appear in the top 20 of immigrant origins. Over the past decade immigration from 
Africa to Germany reached its peak in 2003, with about 39 thousand people and dropped to 27 
thousand in 2009. Eight origin countries dominate in the statistics on immigration over this period: 
Egypt, Algeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia. Each of these origin 
countries are about equally important in immigration (around 1.7 to 2.4 thousand in 2009) only 












































ECLAC – Project Document collection Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration… 
72 
Morocco is numerically substantially larger (3.8 thousand, 2009). The reduction in number of 
immigrants from Africa is mainly due to a fall in migrants from Morocco which reduced by half 
between 2003 and 2009. Immigration from all other African origin groups remains rather stable with a 
small increase in numbers for Egyptians only (BMI, 2011). Interestingly enough emigration from 
Germany to the mentioned African countries is about as large as immigration (resulting in a net 
migration balance for African migration). This seems to imply that African migrants return to their 
home countries although information on emigrants by origin is not available to prove this. Latin 
American immigrants to Germany are mainly from Brazil (on average 7.5 thousand per year over the 
past decade). Whereas more men than women from Morocco came to Germany in 2009 (60 versus 
40%) for Brazilian migrants the opposite pattern is found with more women than men (55 versus 
45%) arriving (BMI, 2011). 
For the Netherlands the absolute numbers of immigration are of course much smaller given 
the country size. In 2009 almost 15 thousand immigrants from Africa entered the Netherlands. The top 
five nationalities were (in numerical order from most to least important) Somalia, Morocco, South 
Africa, Ghana and Egypt. African immigration is dominated by men (55%). The gender balance is 
rather equal for Moroccan immigrants and are most skewed towards men for those coming from Egypt 
(62% men) and towards women from South Africa (58% women) (Statline, Statistics Netherlands). In 
Belgium, 15 thousand persons immigrated from Africa in 2007 with Morocco, followed (at a distance) 
by Congo, Algeria and Cameroon as the most numerous single countries in African migration. As 
already mentioned before, the gender balance in recent years shows more women than men 
immigrating. Migration from Latin America in Belgium is relatively unimportant with about 3 
thousand immigrants in 2007. Brazil is the most important country of origin (around 1 thousand) from 
this continent and Brazilian immigration has clearly increased over the past decade (CGKR, 2010).  
4. Reasons for acquiring residence 
Economic theories of migration have often stressed that job opportunities in certain regions combined 
with a labor surplus in some other areas will result in migration (Castles and Miller 2009). The push 
and pull theory of Lee (1966) assumes that an evaluation of the push factors in the countries of origin 
combined with the pull factors in the potential country of settlement combined with an evaluation of 
potential obstacles, makes a person to decide to migrate or not. Although other reasons for migration 
(family related, or due to political circumstances) as well as the role of networks is emphasized in the 
academic discourse, in the public debate migration is often dominated by economic reasons. In the 
context of this study it is relevant to study the reasons for migration using the issued residence permits 
as proxies. This information shows the ways in which migrants from different origins acquire legal 
entry into a country. In addition it can show the differences in legal options for migrants in the 
settlement countries as different residence permits relate to diverse rights. 
We studied the reasons for residence by region of origin and gender based on residence 
permits that were issued starting with recent data for the Netherlands. Overall the patterns for the 
period 2005-2009 show that immigration for reasons of labor is the largest single category, followed 
by family reasons. Study was the third most common reason for migration to the Netherlands, 
although in 2009 for the first time in the analyzed five year period, asylum migration was 
outnumbering study related migration to the Netherlands. Table II.1 gives more detailed insight in 
reasons for settlement in the Netherlands in 2009 for different regions of origin and by gender. It is 
obvious from this Table (II.1) that reasons for migration are clearly gendered. This conclusion, 
however, not only holds for African migrants but for all immigrant groups. Overall we find that men 
are more likely to enter the Netherlands to find work than women; although the absolute figures vary 
for different origin groups, the pattern is the same throughout. Women outnumber men in family 
related migration in all origin groups.  
Looking at the differences between origin groups there is a striking difference for immigrants 
from Africa and all other groups in particular for African men: the latter are the only origin group for 
which labour related migration is not the first most common reason for migration to the Netherlands 
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(for all other immigrant men it is). Men from Africa are most likely to have arrived to seek asylum in 
the Netherlands or to join their families. For African women family related migration is also the most 
common reason for migration but this is not different from the other origin groups. Whereas for all 
other origins study reasons rank second in reasons for acquiring residence for African women it is 
asylum what brings them to the Netherlands. This clearly shows the current African migration to the 
Netherlands which is largely determined by people fleeing conflict regions in Africa to search a safe 
place. Of course this is also partially driven by immigration policies making this often the only option 
for migration. Immigration policies in many north-western European countries provided very limited 
options to enter the countries for work related reasons after the recruitment stop in 1973. This resulted 
in the fact that in these countries legal access was often primarily granted based on family 
reunification and —formation and asylum. In the past decade however, the issue of recruiting highly 
skilled migrants from outside the EU was raised in the debate about immigration. In light of the 
ageing societies in Europe and the shrinking labor force among native populations due to fewer young 
people, many perceived it as necessary to open the economic opportunities for migration. And 
although different countries in the meantime have created possibilities for highly skilled workers to 
gain more easily access to the labour market, it is still highly debated. Also Germany and The 
Netherlands for example now eased access to its labour market mainly to other EU citizens as well as 
high skilled knowledge workers from outside the EU. The immigration from Asian countries in this 
sense is more disperse as men migrate in almost equal shares for the different reasons.  
 
TABLE II.1 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2009: MOTIVES FOR IMMIGRATION,  
BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND GENDER 
  Labour Asylum Family Study Au Pair / Stage Other 
All immigrants Men 23 238 6 490 13 755 6 909 248 2 986 
Women 14 519 3 111 20 104 7 161 1 795 4 107 
Africa Men 526 3 059 3 095 754 19 402 
Women 189 1 635 3 102 511 325 323 
America Men 1 044 51 1 437 999 53 363 
Women 485 29 2 743 972 378 532 
Asia Men 3 024 2 816 2 185 2 670 115 344 
Women 621 1 119 4 890 2 529 695 528 
Europe Men 18 483 563 6 964 2 448 59 1 646 
Women 13 155 327 9 253 3 083 376 2 468 
European Union Men 17 481 46 5 108 1 883 21 1 423 
Women 12 793 19 6 848 2 257 204 2 217 
Non EU Men 1002 517 1 856 565 38 223 
Women 362 308 2 405 826 172 251 
Oceania Men 161 1 74 38 2 231 
Women 69 1 116 66 21 256 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands. 
 
 
The regional level still hides much of the diversity within each of the regions.Table II.2 
therefore goes beyond this regional division and focuses on the five largest African and four largest Latin 
American countries of origin among all immigrants to the Netherlands in 2009 (for which this 
information is available). For the Latin American countries of origin we find that there is not much 
diversity among each of the different origins: family reunification/formation is the most common reason 
for immigration. Among those from Brazil and Colombia study and work for men and study and au-pair 
for women rank second in reasons for the move though they are far less important than family reasons. 
For those from the different African origins there is one big difference: immigrants from Somalia are by 
far the most likely to have come to the Netherlands to seek asylum. All other groups again are 
predominantly arriving in the Netherlands because of family reasons. This situation is again partially 
related to earlier migration histories as in the 1990s and early 2000s the main reason for immigration 
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from diverse African countries to the Netherlands was asylum. This is the case of Angolese and 
Congolese immigrants and still applies to Somalians (Ministry of Justice, 2006). In the meantime many 
of them have reunited with their families in the Netherlands. For other (north) African groups like the 
Moroccans, the majority of migrants arrived as labour migrants to the Netherlands in the 1960s and early 
70s. Many of them had their partners and children joining them in the Netherlands afterwards. But still 
many young adults of the Moroccan second generation find their partner in their parent’s country of 
origin resulting in family related immigration to the Netherlands (Huschek et al., 2010).  
 
TABLE II.2 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2009: MOTIVES FOR IMMIGRATION, BY SELECTED COUNTRIES  
OF AFRICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN ORIGIN AND GENDER 
    Labour Asylum Family Study Au-pair/Stage Other 
Brazil Men 98 1 212 125 28 14 
Women 60 - 597 82 89 30 
Colombia Men 23 10 78 77 10 21 
Women 24 5 173 81 57 18 
Dominican Republic Men 6 2 74 2 -  9 
Women 10 8 111 2 1 11 
Surinam Men 10 11 301 23 1 84 
Women 11 8 462 52 9 178 
Ghana Men 73 33 374 84 1 139 
Women 47 6 304 35 5 110 
Morocco Men 69 43 777 38 4 33 
Women 12 9 823 18 23 35 
Nigeria Men 35 85 156 82 2 38 
Women 18 46 120 46 3 42 
Somalia Men 2 2037 798 - - 4 
Women 2 1108 867 1 - 1 
South-Africa 
Men 156 - 97 34 5 11 
Women 37 - 144 45 266 11 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands. 
 
 
As mentioned before these data are a reflection of migration policy in the Netherlands as well 
as political situations in the countries of origin. What can be done however is to compare these data to 
for example those of Belgium and Germany. By far the most common reason to acquire residence in 
Belgium is family: 48% of all residence permits issued in 2009 were for this purpose, the majority 
(70%) of them for family reunification. Asylum and humanitarian permits cover about 30% and study 
and work with 12 and 9% are rather limited. Interestingly enough we again find clear differences in 
reasons for migration between origin groups: where 85% of the Moroccan immigrants entered 
Belgium for family reasons, this applied for about 40% of those from Congo and Cameroon. Among 
the latter groups humanitarian (40% for Congo) and study (35% for those from Cameroon) were the 
reasons for their move to Belgium (CGKR, 2011). The two Latin American groups for which 
information is available show that family reasons dominate among Brazilian migrants followed by 
study, work and humanitarian reasons. 60% of the Ecuadorian immigrants on the other hand were 
issued a permit based on humanitarian grounds followed by a fifth for family reasons and only small 
shares for labor and study reasons. Unfortunately these data are not available by gender as it might 
partially cover the different migration reasons for men and women.  
For Germany only few data are available and comparable on this issue. Table II.3 provides 
the data for similar categories as analyzed for the Netherlands; note that rows do not sum to the total 
provided in the last column as German law also has other categories than those known for the 
Netherlands. Data are not available by gender only the total number of females over all categories is 
known and provided in Table II.3. In line with the findings for Belgium and the Netherlands, the 
Moroccan migrants to Germany predominantly came for family related reasons. Contrary to the 
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Belgian situation we found that Brazilian immigrants in Germany mainly acquire residence for study 
purposes with family reasons ranking second. With all these data, one should bear in mind that only 
documented migration is captured. The extent to which irregular migration has different patterns or 
involves persons with different characteristics is hard to assess. 
 
TABLE II.3 
GERMANY, 2009: SELECTED MAIN REASONS FOR ACQUIRING LEGAL ENTRY,  
FOR BRAZILIAN AND MOROCCAN IMMIGRANTS 
    Labour Asylum Family Study Other Total 
Brazil Total  621 14 1,021 2,018 101 5 201 
Women      2 899 
Morocco Total 17 34 1,281 479 5 3 063 
Women      1 322 
Source: BMI, 2011: 35. 
 
C. Settlement in North-Western Europe  
1. Migrants: origin and characteristics 
In addition, to the flows of immigrants and their origin it is important to study stock of residing 
migrants. Up to now we have mainly looked at immigration patterns in the different countries with a 
particular focus on African and Latin American immigrants. Of course this gives insight only in recent 
immigration and does not provide information on residing immigrants, which can be based on 
previous immigration flows including different groups and origins. We therefore continue with an 
overview of the immigrants residing in each of the four study countries. When aiming at comparing 
the number of residing migrants in each of these countries we may draw upon data collected by the 
OECD based on information from the census of around 2001 in all countries. Two definitions in this 
respect can be used: the population which is foreign born and the population that has foreign 
nationality. These two definitions do not necessarily refer to the same group of people. Overall the 
percentage of people who are born outside of the country where they currently live is higher than 
those holding a foreign nationality (Table II.4). This is due to the well known fact that some migrants 
already had the nationality of the country they moved to, like for example commonwealth citizens in 
the UK, colonial migrants in the Netherlands and Aussiedler in Germany. In addition, naturalization 
policies determine who is eligible to acquire citizenship. As it is obvious, also from Table II.4, 
naturalization is less common in Belgium and Germany compared to the other countries (column two 
and three). At the same time policy changes did have an effect on the naturalization levels in both 
countries. A new naturalization law came into effect in Germany in 2000 providing more options to 
acquire German nationality which was extremely difficult before due to the jus sanguinis principle 
(Rühl, 2009). Also by that time Belgium made changes in options to acquire Belgian citizenship 
which resulted in an increase of naturalizations (e.g. 1993 and early 2000s). In particular the 
Moroccan, followed by Turkish migrants used these options for naturalization (Gemenne, 2009). 
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TABLE II.4 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2008: SHARE OF POPULATION WHICH IS FOREIGN BORN  
OR HAS A FOREIGN NATIONALITY, PER COUNTRY OF SETTLEMENT  
(In percentage) 
 
Foreign born (%) Foreign nationality (%) Foreign born with citizenship  of country of residence (%) 
Belgium 10.7 8.2 40.8 
Germany  12.5 8.9 n.a. 
The Netherlands  10.1 4.2 65.0 
United Kingdom 8.3 4.5 n.a. 
Source: Dumont and Lemaitre, 2008: 16. 
 
 
In each of the countries about a tenth of the total population is foreign born (lowest in UK, 
highest in Germany). More recent figures also indicate that in each of the countries between 10 and 
13% are foreign born (ONS, 2008; BMI, 2011; Statistics Netherlands, 2011). For comparative reasons 
we decided to present and compare the data from the OECD database (2008). When we, however, 
analyze the data based on nationality we find that around 8-9% has a different nationality in Belgium 
and Germany contrasted with around 4% in the Netherlands and the UK. In addition, to these figures 
we should realize that the second generation is not included in these data.  
Table II.5 provides an overview on the absolute numbers of immigrants over 15 years of age 
by region of birth. As we want to have the most comparable data for the four countries these data are 
based on the 2001 census (drawn from the OECD database on immigrants). The upper part of Table 
II.5 refers to the Netherlands and Belgium whose populations are substantially smaller than the 
populations of the UK and Germany. This is also reflected in the number of immigrants in the country. 
In all studied countries, immigrants from other European countries are the largest group of residing 
migrants. Turning to the origins of residing immigrants in the Netherlands it is clear that the ranking 
of main regions of origin is Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean followed by Africa. For Belgium, 
however, the ranking is totally different: Africa is the largest region of origin, followed by Asia. 
Migrants from Latin America are only a rather small group in Belgium. This immediately reflects part 
of the migration histories of both countries: the ties with Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
Netherlands are linked to the colonial past in Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. For Belgium, the 
colonial ties were mainly with African countries. In addition, as French is one of the official languages 
of the country, ties with the French speaking countries in Africa are stronger than with the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, Belgium also recruited labor migrants from Morocco in the past to work in 
the industrial sector resulting in a still relatively large Moroccan community in the country. 
The second part of Table II.5 presents the number of immigrants residing in the UK and 
Germany. For the UK the data show that Asia ranks first as region of origin of immigrants residing in 
the country, followed by Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Again this order is no surprise 
given the historical links between the UK and some Asian (most obviously India) and African (for 
example South Africa) countries. These long established relations are still reflected in the number of 
residing migrants. For Germany it is clear that Turks are by far the largest immigrant origin group in 
the country. In recent years the number of Asian migrants has increased (due to refugees as well as 
high skilled labor migrants) but still they are clearly outnumbered by the Turkish group. Overall still 
few immigrants in Germany come from African and Latin American countries.  
 The gender balance of the residing immigrants is indicated by the sex ratio which is reported 
for all regions of origin and per country (Table II.5). The calculated sex ratio indicates that African 
immigrants in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany are predominantly men. It is most pronounced 
for Germany where male almost double residents from Africa. So where recent immigration to, for 
example, Belgium includes many more women from Africa, we still find this gender imbalance 
towards men for the residing population. In the UK the sex ratio for African origin migrants is rather 
balanced and women slightly outnumber men. One of the explanations can be that due to the larger 
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established migration links with many African countries, gender distribution became more balanced 
over time. It is often assumed that when immigration starts the gender imbalance is large and skewed, 
but that this will reduce with constant migration to a specific country (Schoorl, 1995). The fact that we 
find less skewed gender balances for the UK is of course also related to the immigrants’ country of 
origin, where South Africa is one of the main areas of origin for African migrants in the UK, while in 
the German case most African migrants were those recently fleeing for violence in different parts of 
Africa. The balance in the Dutch and Belgian case is largely attributable to the fact that a large share 
of African migrants came from Morocco; again a more than 50 years of migration history make this 
group more gender balanced.  
Contrary to the male dominance among African origin migrants, females are outnumbering 
males among migrants coming from Latin America and the Caribbean. Again the level of gender 
imbalance is the largest in the two countries with the least links and history with this region: Belgium 
and Germany. Nevertheless, also in the Netherlands and the UK there are many more women born in 
this region than men. Although women from Latin American countries are acquiring residence for 
work related reasons more often than is the case for women from other origins, family reasons are still 
by far the most important ones. The gender imbalance thus partially reflects migration from some 
Latin American countries which is characterized by a relatively high level of female intermarriage 
with a native partner in the European settlement country (De Valk et al., 2004).  
Once more the largest regions of origin of residing migrants do not reveal national differences 
and diversity within these broader regions. We want to shed more detailed light, particularly on 
African migrants and thus include an overview of all countries from which African migrants residing 
in the Netherlands originate (Table II.6). These are very recent data based on the population register 
(January 2011; Statistics Netherlands Statline) including all origins with at least 200 people (of any 
age) residing in the country covering both first and second generation migrants. Of the total 577 
thousand African migrants in the Netherlands in 2011, 52 percent are men. Morocco is by far the 
largest single country of origin for African migrants in the Netherlands with currently almost 356 
thousand people. Somalia (31 thousand), Egypt, Ghana and Cape Verde (all around 21 thousand) 
follow at a long distance. 
Despite the difference in absolute numbers of residing migrants, the population size in each of 
the mentioned groups has increased over the past decade (not in Table). This is partially due to new 
immigrants arriving but just as well as the result of the children born to these migrants in the 
Netherlands (second generation). Ghana, Cape Verde, and Kenya are origin groups in which females 
outnumber men, in almost all other groups we find more men than women. In several origin groups 
that are dominated by asylum migration to the Netherlands, like Sudan, Sierra Leone and Somalia, the 
sex ratios is most skewed towards larger shares of men.  
Currently about 19% of the population of the Netherlands is born abroad themselves or has 
at least one parent born in another country. The age structure of immigrants is overall relatively 
young as we have seen in the previous section. As described before many immigrants arriving in the 
1960s stayed in north-western Europe and return migration of these migrants is overall relatively 
low. For example, only Spanish and Portuguese in the Netherlands have been reported to have 
returned to their home countries to a larger extent. Of course this is facilitated by the fact that they 
are EU citizens, facing fewer restrictions regarding residence permits, rights and entitlements. 
Nevertheless, emigration figures have been rising in some of the north-western European countries 
like the Netherlands. Natives were more likely to leave the country in recent years. But also second 
generation young adults, for example from Turkish origin, are found to return to their parents’ 
country of origin due to, among other reasons, the more negative climate towards immigration and 
immigrants in the Netherlands. 
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TABLE II.5 
THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 2001: POPULATION  
(15 YEARS AND OVER) BY REGION OF BIRTH AND GENDER 
Netherlands  
Region of Country of birth Men Women Total Sex Ratio 
Unknown 3 9478 39 823 79 301 0.99 
Africa 118 985 94 959 213 944 1.25 
Asia 161 079 162 273 323 352 0.99 
Europe 5 817 378 5 985 275 11 802 653 0.97 
- of which host country  5 570 569 5 702 605 11 273 174 0.98 
North America 7 068 7 054 14 122 1.00 
Oceania 3 600 5 061 8 661 0.71 
Latin America and the Caribbean 133 822 157 550 291 372 0.85 
Total  6 281 410 6 451 995 12 733 405 0.97 
Belgium   
Region of Country of birth Men Women Total Sex Ratio 
Unknown 211 327 538 0.65 
Africa 123 595 108 839 232 434 1.14 
Asia 29 666 32 614 62 280 0.91 
Europe 3 944 242 4 216 643 8 160 885 0.94 
- of which host country  3 622 801 3 848 901 7 471 702 0.94 
North America 6 581 7 560 14 141 0.87 
Oceania 622 637 1 259 0.98 
Latin America and the Caribbean 8 008 11 984 19 992 0.67 
Total  4 112 925 4 378 604 8 491 529 0.94 
Great Britain   
Region of Country of birth Men Women Total Sex Ratio 
Unknown 18 655 2 0621 39 276 0.90 
Africa 374 619 387 956 762 575 0.97 
Asia 722 485 752 890 1 475 375 0.96 
Europe 21 472 993 23 260 030 44 733 023 0.92 
- of which host country B 20 789 477 22 391 541 43 181 018 0.93 
North America 88 235 105 100 193 335 0.84 
Oceania 71 193 85 611 156 804 0.83 
Latin America and the Caribbean 143 802 180 294 324 096 0.80 
Total  22 891 982 24 792 502 47 684 484 0.92 
Germany   
Region of Country of birth Men Women Total Sex Ratio 
Unknown 3 175 591 3 323 239 6 498 830 0.96 
Africa 115 470 62 090 177 560 1.86 
Asia 489 670 476 188 965 858 1.03 
Europe 29 207 613 31 171 898 60 379 511 0.94 
- of which host country  26 527 578 28 481 713 55 009 291 0.93 
North America 24 270 14 810 39 080 1.64 
Oceania - - - - 
Latin America and the Caribbean 17 890 34 870 52 760 0.51 
Total 33 030 504 35 083 095 68 113 599 0.94 
Source: OECD database on immigrants. 
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TABLE II.6 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2011: ORIGINS OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS BY GENDER 
(Only groups with at least 200 residents) 
  Men Women Total 
Algeria 4 407 3 428 7 835 
Angola 4 870 3 979 8 849 
Benin 227 145 372 
Burkina Faso 297 225 522 
Burundi 1 736 1 696 3 432 
Congo 843 776 1 619 
Congo (Democratic Republic) 4 091 3 954 8 045 
Egypt 12 983 8 090 21 073 
Eritrea 831 797 1 628 
Ethiopia 6 077 5 470 11 547 
Gambia 559 368 927 
Ghana 10 620 10 756 21 376 
Guinea 2 319 1 393 3 712 
Guinea-Bissau 205 162 367 
Ivory Coast 948 710 1 658 
Cape Verde 10 262 10 956 21 218 
Cameroon 1 306 1 368 2 674 
Kenya 1 516 1 812 3 328 
Liberia 1 820 1 308 3 128 
Libya 732 364 1 096 
Madagascar 104 142 246 
Malawi 192 172 364 
Mali 133 140 273 
Morocco 183 349 172 534 355 883 
Mauritania 344 79 423 
Mauritius 266 322 588 
Mozambique 434 428 862 
Namibia 142 172 314 
Niger 294 113 407 
Nigeria 5 793 4 883 10 676 
Ruanda 741 745 1 486 
Sao Tomé en Principe 128 139 267 
Senegal 947 666 1 613 
Sierra Leone 3 875 2 155 6 030 
Sudan 3 855 2 353 6 208 
Somalia 17 033 14 204 31 237 
Tanzania 1 011 1 023 2 034 
Togo 1 066 696 1 762 
Tunisia 5 049 3 641 8 690 
Uganda 805 819 1 624 
Zambia 587 649 1 236 
Zimbabwe 926 965 1 891 
South Africa 8 419 9 108 17 527 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands. 
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FIGURE II.7 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2011: AGE AND GENDER PYRAMID FOR THE NATIVE  
DUTCH POPULATION OF THE TOTAL COUNTRY, FIRST GENERATION,  
AND SECOND GENERATION MIGRANTS 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands; based on country of birth of the 
person and both parents. 
 
 
Figure II.7 provides the age and gender pyramid for the Dutch population as well as first and 
second generation migrants in the Netherlands (2011). This allows for a comparison between the 
groups. It is clear that residing migrants have a much younger structure than that of the total Dutch 
population. First generation migrants are mainly represented in the ages between 35 and 50 whereas 
second generation migrants belong primarily to the youngest age groups. For the Dutch population 
there is hardly any pyramid shape in the population structure whereas this is clearly the case for the 
second generation. The Dutch population is ageing and this will even increase in the future. However, 
also first generation migrants have entered older ages already and many more will follow over the 
next two decades. The current elderly of immigrant origin primarily belong to those from former 
colonies (Indonesia and Suriname). The future elderly population will however also include many of 
the former labor migrants.  
The young age structure is once again found when we zoom in on migrants of African origin 
(Figure II.8 left): many are still in their childhood or young adulthood and elderly are not very 
commonly found among this group yet. A slightly different picture is shown for the Latin American 
group of migrants in the Netherlands (Figure II.8 right). Although the share of elderly above 65 is still 
relatively limited many among this group are at least middle-aged or over. Women are more represented 
in all age groups than men and a substantial share of them is between 40 and 60 years of age. The basis 
of the pyramid is relatively small with a limited number of young adults in the younger age categories. 
The fact that those coming from Suriname are included in this group can explain the fact that we find a 
somewhat older age composition. A second explanation is that an important number of migrants, 
particularly women, arrive here to marry a native (e.g. Brazilians, Dominicans) resulting both in gender 
skewedness and a somewhat older age structure. All the data presented here are based on country of birth 
of the person and both parents. This implies that a person born in the Netherlands with one parent born 
in e.g. Suriname is included in the statistics as a second generation Surinamese and this appears in 
pyramid 8b as well as in the light blue line of Figure II.7. Many of these people, however, hold the 
Dutch citizenship and would appear in the statistics when they were based on the latter criterion. 
  












              Dutch population               First generation                 Second generation 
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FIGURE II.8 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2011: AGE AND GENDER PYRAMID FOR AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS 
  
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands; based on country of birth of the person and both parents. 
 
 
When analyzing the age structure of the migrant population in the UK we should bear this 
definition issue in mind. Figures II.9 left and II.9 right provide information on the age and gender 
structure of respectively the African and the Latin American migrant populations in the UK. The 
African population in the UK is mainly concentrated in the active ages in the labour force. There are 
relatively few young and even less elderly among this group. As these data are provided by 
citizenship, however, we should be careful about drawing far reaching conclusions. As many young 
people of African origin are born in the UK they acquire British citizenship and thus disappear as 
Africans from this type of statistic. The same applies to the older people from Africa several of whom 
had British citizenship upon arrival due to the fact that they belonged to the Commonwealth. 
Regarding the population composition of those from Latin American countries we find a 
similar pattern as just outlined for the African group. In particular since the majority of the Latin 
American residing population is original from the Caribbean again many of them had and have British 
nationality. In this respect figure II.9 primarily represents new migrants from this region to the UK. In 
any case it is clear that women dominate among this group and although they are mainly between 25 
and 50 years of age, there are also some older migrants from this origin area residing in the UK. 
 
FIGURE II.9 
UNITED KINGDOM, 2003: AGE AND GENDER PYRAMID FOR AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS 
  
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat; based on citizenship. 
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2. Settlement patterns of selected origin groups 
Migrants do not settle in a new country randomly. Very often migrants arrive in the larger urban areas 
where housing and work are more readily available (Zorlu and Mulder, 2008; De Valk et al., 2004). 
Networks of migrants from the same origin established at initial settlement may be continued over 
years where newly arrived immigrants are supported by those already in the country for example by 
providing housing for free (Castles and Miller, 2009). Settlement into certain areas in the country or to 
specific parts in cities can reinforce segregation between origin groups and is thus often perceived to 
be negative for social cohesion. Segregation is furthermore often reinforced due to native populations 
moving out of the areas. Recent work on Belgium however shows that beside ethnic compositions also 
the evaluation of the neighborhood is an important predictor for internal mobility of natives and 
migrant groups alike (De Valk and Willaert forthcoming). Although segregation is more and more a 
topic of debate in European cities, levels of segregation are still more limited than in the US. 
In addition, those who arrive as asylum seekers face rather different housing rules than 
those arriving for other reasons. Policies regarding settlement and housing for asylum seekers are 
divergent between countries. In the Netherlands the state provides housing in reception centers and 
only after obtaining a permit the person can settle anywhere in the country. As a result those coming 
for asylum reasons to the Netherlands were originally much more dispersed over the country than is 
the case for other immigrants (De Valk et al., 2004). In Belgium, on the other hand, this is not the 
case: due to the overburden of the system many asylum seekers are supposed to find their own 
accommodation resulting in clustering in specific areas as well as in the cheapest housing strata 
(CGKR, 2011). Often in the same areas, in particular in the capital Brussels, many immigrants live 
there with reinforcing segregation. 
The places where migrants predominantly live in a country can be easily represented by maps 
in which their concentration is indicated. We focus here on the regional level and start from a general 
overview before going into more detail with regard to African and Latin American migrants. The map 
for Germany (Map II.1) shows that the largest shares of foreigners live in the former western part of 
the country (the darker the color the higher the percentage of foreigners in the population). In 
particular the former mining and industrial regions in the west like Nordrhein-Westfalen en Baden-
Württemberg have a quarter or more foreigners among their populations. Also the cities of Bremen, 
Hamburg and Berlin include substantial shares of foreigners. However the Länder around them and in 
particular close to Berlin only have few foreigners in their residing population. By far the majority of 
foreigners in these regions are of Turkish origin (the largest migrant group in Germany) and to a lesser 
extent of Italian origin.  
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MAP II.1 
GERMANY, 2009: SHARE OF FOREIGNERS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION PER REGION 
(In percentages) 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010: 17. 
 
 
In order to get a more detailed insight into the distribution of the African and Latin American 
origin groups in the total population we have produced two sets of maps for the Netherlands and 
Belgium (Maps II.2 and II.3) respectively. For the Netherlands we used data at the municipality level 
to indicate the share of African (II.2 left) and Latin American migrants (II.2 right). The percentages 
indicate the share these origin groups have in the total population in the specific municipality; the 
darker the color the larger their share is in the total population. African migrants are clearly more 
dispersed over the country than is the case for the Latin American population. This is due to the fact 
that a large share of African migrants comes from Morocco. These immigrants primarily settled in the 
western part of the country and in the largest cities of that region: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague 
and Utrecht (the latter is more in the centre of the country). Many are still found there and also 
mobility among the second generation is still relatively limited (Zorlu and Mulder, 2008 and 2010). 
Other Africans came to the Netherlands for asylum reasons and were therefore assigned a place in the 
Netherlands where asylum seekers are hosted in housing provided by the government. Some of these 
places can be easily retrieved by the darker blue areas in the southern part of the country. 
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MAP II.2 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2011: SHARE OF AFRICAN AND SOUTH AMERICAN  
IMMIGRANTS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION 
 
African inmigrants South American inmigrants 




Also Latin American migrants mainly find a home in the cities in the western part of the 
country (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague). By far the majority of these migrants are of 
Surinamese descent; many of them originally came for study related reasons and were attending 
higher education in these cities. More recently we find a higher level of social mobility among this 
group of Surinamese migrants resulting also in mobility out of the largest cities (Zorlu and Mulder, 
2008). This is most clearly illustrated by the case of Amsterdam where many Surinamese left the inner 
city to move to residential areas close to, but outside of Amsterdam (for example Almere, Lelystad). 
This has resulted in a larger share of Latin American migrants in the areas around Amsterdam. 
The same map is produced for African migrants in Belgium (Map II.3); since Latin American 
migrants are not a very numerous group of legal migrants in Belgium we did not produce the maps for 
this group here. This is not to say that no immigrants from Latin America are present, but as it has 
been suggested by work on this origin group many of them reside in Belgium undocumented and 
therefore do not show in the statistics (Seghers, 2009). First of all Map II.3 presents the share of all 
African immigrants in the total population of Belgium. Be aware that the colors here do not 
correspond to the same percentages as was the case for the Netherlands. Overall, it seems that African 
migrants are more likely to live in the southern (Walloon) part of the country than in the northern 
(Flemish) part. As it is clear from the map, African migrants in the northern (Flemish) part of Belgium 
mainly live in the larger cities of Antwerp, Mechelen and Leuven. A large concentration of African 
migrants is furthermore found in the capital Brussels (Circle in the middle of the map).  
ECLAC – Project Document collection Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration… 
85 
MAP II.3 
BELGIUM, 2001: SHARE OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION 
 
Source: ADSEI; graph produced by Didier Willaert, Interface Demography Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 
 
 
Maps II.4 top and II.4 bottom separately distinguish the African migrants in two regional 
origin groups. First, those from North Africa including Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, 
Western Sahara and Mauretania) and from Egypt and Sudan. Second, those coming from countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa; numbers do not allow a more detailed distinction. Making this regional division 
of origin provides an additional level of detail which cannot be observed when just having the total 
Figure for the country. North Africans (Map II.3 left) mainly live in the larger cities of Flanders 
(Antwerp, Mechelen, Ghent, Leuven) as well as in the former mining industry areas in the southern 
Walloon part of the country. This clearly illustrates the settlement of the Moroccan labour migrants 
who were recruited in particular for the industries in these areas. Brussels clearly shows as an area of 
concentration; the city has some neighborhoods in particular in the west and north-west where large 
shares of Moroccan migrants have settled. 
Sub-Saharan African migrants (Map II.3 right), on the contrary, mainly settled in Wallonia 
and in the capital Brussels. A substantial share of these migrants come from Congo and initially came 
to Belgium (in particular Brussels) for study purposes. These students settled in different parts of the 
city which still clearly show the presence of the community and attract migrants from the country as 
well as from other African origins. Recently some migrants from both north and sub-Saharan Africa 
migrated out of the city. Like in the Netherlands this seems to be related both to an improvement inthe 
quality of housing as well as to the fact that inner city areas are no longer the places where cheap 
housing is found (de Valk and Willaert forthcoming). Complementary to the arguments given before 
settlement in the French speaking Walloon part of the country was also easier for many African 
migrants who already spoke French before migration. All in all these data show the relevance of of 
initial settlement places for the places where migrants and their descendents continue to live.  
 
Total share in Belgium 3.3 
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MAP II.4 
BELGIUM, 2001: SHARE OF NORTH AFRICAN AND SUB-SAHARAN 
IMMIGRANTS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION 
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D. Children of immigrant origin 
Children of migrant origin are an increasing share of European populations. Many of them are young not 
only due to the fact that many of them migrate at young ages with their parents but also because many of 
them are born after migration of their parents. Some migrants come from regions with higher fertility 
levels than the north-western European settlement countries, although in general this applies more to 
those from different African origins than for those from Latin America where fertility levels have 
dropped significantly. Some recent studies have shown that fertility behavior will be adapted to levels of 
the country of settlement rather rapidly (Milewski, 2010; Garssen and Nicolaas, 2008; De Valk, 2011). 
However, as a result of the young age of migration, many migrants will start their family formation 
either shortly before or after migration. This results in larger shares of children below the age of 18 in the 
migrant groups than in the native populations in north-western Europe where fertility levels in general 
are clearly below replacement. An already substantial, but growing share of children, have an immigrant 
background given the context of ageing societies and lower fertility levels in many European countries 
(Coleman, 2006). This is already more pronounced in the larger cities where many migrants settle. 
In this part we pay special attention to migrant children and specific emphasis will be put on 
the background and position of the children of immigrant origin in north-western Europe. The position 
and the demographic behavior of the second generation will be increasingly important for Europe’s 
population development. It is therefore relevant to know more about children of immigrants within the 
frame of this study. The information for this part of the paper comes from a research project carried 
out by the first author for the UNICEF Innocenti Centre in Florence. In this unique project individual 
country experts collected detailed information on all kinds of indicators related to children of 
immigrants, their families as well as their position in society (see Hernandez et al., 2009; De Valk, 
2010). The data gathered for the project were primarily derived from the latest census or population 
register data. Starting point of all data are the children between 0 and 18 years of age. As Belgium was 
not part of the study we restrict this part to the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. 
1. Age and generation 
Migrants in general are young populations. For the Netherlands for example 797 thousand children are 
of immigrant origin which is about 22 percent of the total under-18 population in the country. In 
Germany a quarter of the children have an immigrant origin and the same holds for 16 percent of all 
children in the UK (Hernandez et al., 2009). When looking at the origins of these children we find no 
African or Latin American country in the top ten largest origins in Germany. For the Netherlands the 
figures for the children reflect those of the total population with Morocco (123 thousand) as the only 
African country of origin and Suriname (89.5 thousand) and the Dutch Antilles (41 thousand) as the only 
Caribbean and Latin American countries of origin in the top ten. And although Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh are the top three origins in the UK in the top ten of migrant children’s origin we also find 
Kenya (68 thousand), Nigeria (55 thousand), Jamaica (48 thousand) and South Africa (48 thousand). 
By far the majority of children with an immigrant origin belong to the second generation; 
meaning that these children were born in the country of residence with at least one of their parents 
born elsewhere. The respective figures of the share of second generation in the total group of 
immigrant children for Germany, the Netherlands and the UK are 86, 84 and 79 per cent. This implies 
that many of the young with an immigrant origin did not have a migration experience themselves. The 
shares of second generation are relatively similar among the different origin groups in the 
Netherlands. Only for South Asia we found that 51% belongs to the second generation meaning that 
quite a substantial part of cgildren from this region migrated to the Netherlands at a young age (either 
alone or with their parents). Also for the UK shares of second generation are high (not below two 
thirds) for all areas of origin. It shows that many immigrant groups are more established in the 
meantime: for example 94 percent of all children of Moroccan origin in the Netherlands belong to the 
second generation. 
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2. Characteristics of parents and parental home 
The family situations in which children of immigrant origin grow up are very diverse. When for 
example looking at the extent to which these children are living with both parents we find a very 
mixed situation (Table II.7). Children of immigrants in Germany and the UK are more likely to live 
with two parents compared to the native population: the opposite is true for the Netherlands where 75 
and 89 percent of native and immigrant children respectively live with both parents. When we look at 
the regions of origin of these children, it is clear that these lower percentages in the Netherlands are 
due to the specific situation among those of Latin American and Caribbean origin as well as for those 
coming from sub-Saharan Africa: among these groups just slightly over half of all children live with 
two parents. Although percentages are slightly higher in the UK we find similar patterns there for 
these two regions of origin. In the vast majority of cases these children live with their mother only. 
Thus, data presented do not reveal potential differences by migrant generation. For the 
Netherlands we can make this distinction and it is relevant to mention it here. In some cases, among 
first generation children of migrant origin substantial shares do not live with at least one of their 
parents and this applies mainly for some African origin countries. For example, only 59 percent of 
first generation children from Angola lived with at least one of their parents in the Netherlands and 
also for first generation children from Ethiopia, Ghana, Congo, and Somalia about a fifth of them do 
not live with one of the parents. Among second generation children this is much less common: many 
more of them live with one of the parents irrespective of origin. This suggests that the figures we 
found are related to the migration process which is reinforced by still ongoing and unfinished 
migration. Nevertheless for the affected children this might have important consequences for their 
position in the host society as well as their individual well being. 
Data in Table II.7 indirectly suggest that the percentages of single motherhood are particularly 
high among children from Latin America and the Caribbean with 58 and 34 percent respectively living 
with their mother only. Again this is in particular the case for some specific countries within these 
regions, like the Antilles and the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean. Overall these levels are lower 
for other origin groups but also for some African countries, like Angola, Cape Verde, Ghana and 
Somalia substantial shares are living in a single mother family. Again, part of this might be explained 
by unfinished migration processes of the family and (temporary) return of fathers to the countries of 
origin. However, since the patterns observed for the first and second generation are highly 
comparable, one may assume that certain prevailing traditions like the Caribbean family system 
(Shaw, 2003) are important also for family structures after migration (De Valk, 2010).  
 
TABLE II.7 
CHILDREN LIVING IN TWO PARENT FAMILIES, BY COUNTRY  
OF SETTLEMENT AND REGION OF ORIGIN  
(In percentages) 
 Germany Netherlands United Kingdom 
Native born families 78.6 89.4 75.3 
Immigrant families 86.9 75.0 83.6 
    
East Asia and pacific - 80.9 83.8 
Europe and central Asia 82.7 81.0 85.0 
Latin America and Caribbean - 57.8 71.7 
Middle east and north Africa 82.5 83.8 87.8 
South Asia - 82.6 88.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa - 53.0 76.5 
Source: Hernandez et al., 2009: 26. 
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It is very often suggested in the literature that intermarriage between different ethnic groups 
would diminish boundaries between those groups and enhance assimilation (Gordon 1964; Alba 2005; 
Kalmijn 1998). Looking at the percentage of children who have at least one native parent we find that 
this applies to only nine percent of all children of immigrants in the Netherlands in 2006. 
Nevertheless, there exist major differences between origin regions as well as between the migrant 
generations of the child (Figure II.10). Children coming from other EU countries relatively often have 
one Dutch parent, but this is much less the case for children from, for example, Africa (like Angola, 
Congo, and Morocco) or Asia (like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq). However, for some countries 
intermarriage with natives are rather common but this applies to few African origins (only Nigeria and 
South Africa) and some Latin American countries (like Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico) only.  
The overall levels of interethnic parentage are much higher for second generation than for 
first generation children: 42 versus 15 percent respectively. The reported country differences 
nevertheless remain similar for the second generation. Only for some origin groups we find very 
marked differences between the first and second generation children: in particular for children from 
Latin America the chances of having one native Dutch parent are much higher among the second than 
the first generation similar to some Asian countries. Of course one needs to realize that the extent to 
which parents came when they were young and single could potentially influence these findings as 
starting union and family formation in the Netherlands may increase the chances of an interethnic 
union. In addition, for some parents of the second generation children in our study, the migration 
move to the Netherlands is potentially motivated by the presence of the Dutch partner.  
 
FIGURE II.10 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2006: INTERMARRIAGES WITH A NATIVE DUTCH SPOUSE FOR 
THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS OF DIFFERENT ORIGIN AND GENERATION 
(In percentages)  
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, De Valk (2010). 
 
 
The socio-economic position in which children of immigrants from non-western origins grow 
up, is in many cases disadvantaged compared to the total population in the study countries (Heath et 
al., 2008). Most parents have no or limited education and those who did attend higher education in 
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their countries of origin are often having problems with getting their degrees acknowledged in the 
country of settlement. Also legal restrictions on entering the labor market for some groups of migrants 
hamper their economic position in the short and longer run. Table II.8 presents the labor market 
situation of the fathers of second generation children living in the Netherlands. Overall we find that 
around 17 percent of all fathers of children of immigrants in the case of the Netherlands is 
unemployed. Around 80 percent of fathers are working, patterns which are highly comparable with the 
levels in Germany and the United Kingdom (Hernandez et al., 2009). In all countries unemployment 
levels are much higher for the fathers of immigrant children than for the native population. This 
reflects again the overall disadvantaged position of migrant populations in the labor market. In the 
Dutch case recent data show that between early 2009 and 2010 the unemployment levels of the non-
western immigrants rose from 10 to 14% whereas the respective figures for the natives were 3.6 and 
5.1%. Whereas men seem to be hit first by the economic crisis, the figures for 2010 reveal that the 
unemployment levels for women have also increased considerably and are now the same as those for 
men. In particular young adults entering the labour market are prone to the recession; a quarter of 
young adults of migrant origin aged 15 to 25 are unemployed early 2010 compared to 19% early 2009. 
The effects of the economic crisis seem thus to be reflected in the labour market figures for 2010 
much more than was the case in 2009 and hit non-western migrants more than others. 
The presented labour force figures again cover remarkable differences by origin: at least a 
third of fathers of first-generation immigrant children from several African and Asian countries 
(including, among others, Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, and Sudan) are without work (not in 
table). This level is peaking with sometimes more than two thirds of the fathers of the first-generation 
children in some of the immigrant groups coming from the African and Asian countries mentioned 
above (not in figure). Among the fathers of second-generation children, the shares without work are 
generally smaller than the corresponding shares among fathers of children in the first generation, this 
seems to point to a positive effect of period of residence on the acquired labour force position. 
However, the results are persistent among fathers of children in both the first and second generations 
for those countries with the largest shares of unemployed fathers (De Valk, 2010). 
 
TABLE II.8 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2006: LABOR MARKET POSITION OF FATHERS  





 Working, employee  Self-
employed 
No father 
  Works Works  
Total  Total <36 hours >36 hours  Total 
Total population 282 875 2 492 640 30 69 341 475 453 375 
Second generation 
children 
119 640 356 315 32 67 45 380 150 580 
Europe 41 230 147 710 30 69 19 975 40 865 
EU-25 9 650 70 480 31 69 9 265 15 900 
Other 31 580 77 230 30 69 10 710 24 965 
Africa 48 900 78 400 33 66 7 780 37 635 
Caribbean 2 320 14 550 32 68 1 115 14 880 
North America 985 8 920 36 64 1 205 1 815 
Latin America 8 265 47 725 35 65 4 390 38 495 
Asia 17 445 53 225 35 64 10 065 15 715 
Oceania 495 5 785 29 71 850 1 175 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, De Valk (2010).  
Note: No father refers to having the father not living in the same household making it impossible to derive data on 
the labor market position. 
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3. Mobility 
Finally we studied mobility among children of immigrants (Table II.9). In the previous section we 
showed the settlement patterns over the country. It is relevant to study mobility in more detail given 
that the effects of a move might relate to an improvement in housing status but can just as well be very 
disruptive, e.g. for educational careers of children. We just have data for the Netherlands at hand. The 
figures of mobility among the first generation children of immigrants show that more than three 
quarters have moved in the past five years. The highest percentage of movers are found among some 
African origins (Angola, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan) as well as for those from Brazil and Colombia 
(not in Table). Although these percentages partially reflect the high number of newly arriving first 
generation immigrant children, it cannot be fully accounted for by the newcomers. It also points to the 
rather high level of mobility after migration, partially related to relocation for those seeking asylum.  
 
TABLE II.9 
THE NETHERLANDS, 2006: MOBILITY OF SECOND GENERATION  
CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS  
(In percentages) 
 One parent in country 
less than 5 years 
Children 5-17 year who have 
moved in the past 5 years 
Total child population 3.4 30.4 
Native born children 0.7 27.1 
Second generation children 8.5 36.2 
Europe (excl. NL) 8.5 36.5 
EU-15 6.2 33.3 
EU-10 (selection) 15.9 33.7 
Other Europe (incl. Russia and Turkey) 9.4 38.7 
Africa 10.6 32.7 
Central America and the Caribbean 5.6 41.3 
North America 6.8 32.4 
Latin America 4.4 41.5 
Asia 10.8 35.1 
Oceania 3.5 31.4 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, De Valk (2010). 
 
 
As the second generation is born in the country their moves will predominantly relate to 
internal mobility. In order to single out the effects of international migration moves it thus makes 
sense to study their pattern of mobility in more detail. However, levels of mobility among second-
generation children remain high when compared to native children. This is especially the case of 
children with origins in the Caribbean and Latin America. At the same time this regional grouping 
covers part of the diversity, as in the five years prior to 2006 at least half of those from Angola, Sudan, 
the former Soviet Union and the Dominican Republic had moved (not in Table). Unfortunately our 
data do not reveal the reasons for these moves. Part of this resettlement might be related to the fact 
that in the Netherlands asylum seekers are housed in central housing and after receiving a refugee 
status have to move elsewhere into the regular housing market. In the meantime, children born in the 
Netherlands will then also have to resettle. In other cases it might be the result of the fact that many 
immigrant parents are in a vulnerable position on the labor market, and this may also result in an 
uncertainty on the housing market leading to more internal moves in the Netherlands.  
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E. Ageing immigrant populations 
Ageing is one of the main challenges that north-western Europe is facing now and in the near future. 
Given the fact that immigration to many of these countries already started in the 1950s, ageing of 
immigrant populations is becoming increasingly relevant in these countries with a longer migration 
history. As mentioned before migrants mainly came from former colonies, as labor migrants to work 
in the growing industrial economies or as refugees. The first two groups of immigrants are now 
entering older ages whereas asylum migrants are still relatively young. For example a labor migrant 
coming to the Netherlands in 1965 at age 23 will soon be 70. The origins of the elderly are diverse as 
we have seen before (given the different recruitment areas and colonial links), but many of them come 
from Africa and Latin America as well. Substantial shares of migrants originally arriving to north-
western Europe on a temporary basis have settled longer in the host country. The ageing process in the 
settlement country might thus have important consequences for these societies, the individual person 
and their families (both in the settlement and origin country). Besides these immigrants ageing in the 
host country some migrants also arrive at retirement age. This is of course most notable for the retirees 
from northern Europe to the southern countries of Europe. In the countries we studied here the number 
of elderly immigrants with a foreign nationality or born elsewhere is rather small. Those who do 
migrate at these later ages mainly have a European origin and we thus do not study them in detail here 
(Green et al., 2009; Warnes and Williams, 2006; Statistics Netherlands Statline, 2011). 
Although ageing populations are highly debated in general in recent years, still limited and 
scattered information is available on immigrant elderly. Although the proportion of elderly of migrant 
origin is limited, in the UK already in 2000 a quarter of people from 60 years or over belonged to an 
ethnic minority group (Evandrou, 2000). And this share is going to increase substantially over the next 
decades. This part of the study provides an overview of elderly immigrants, their characteristics, the 
role of transnational ties, the consequences for health and intergenerational relations based on an 
extensive literature review. We make use of existing material for each of the study countries.  
1. Characteristics of immigrant elderly 
The age composition of the foreign born in each of the study countries is overall still younger than the 
native population. Despite the fact that the shares of 65+ are smaller among the foreign born than 
native born we also find that for the foreign born between 11% (the Netherlands) and 16.5% 
(Belgium) of the population over 15 belong to the oldest age category of 65 plus. Germany and the 
United Kingdom take an intermediate position with 12 and 16 % of the foreign born already belonging 
to this oldest category (OECD, 2008). We use the definition of foreign born here as this mainly refers 
to those of the first generation who are clearly older than the ones of the second generation in most 
cases (see previous section). In line with gender specific patterns found among the native groups in all 
countries, we also found for foreign born that women are more likely to belong to this elderly category 
than men. Larger gender gaps exist in the Netherlands and Belgium. Obviously when looking at the 
top five countries of origin among the elderly population it clearly reflects migration histories in each 
of the countries. The only northern African country appearing in the top five of largest elderly groups 
is Morocco: Around 7% in Belgium and 2% in the Netherlands of the population aged 15 and over 
belong to the 65+ age group. As these OECD comparative data do not include a further breakdown of 
the 25-64 year old, the fact that in the near future many immigrant elderly will become 65 (as they are 
currently between 55 and 64) is still hidden in these figures (OECD, 2008). 
Former colonizing countries (like the Netherlands and the UK) have the oldest age 
composition of their foreign born population, which can of course be expected from their longer 
migration histories of settlement. Most existing studies in the Netherlands include therefore 
Surinamese, and Antilleans (beside Moroccans and Turks) as combined these four groups constitute 
nearly 80% of the non-Western elderly population in the country. In addition, in the Dutch case, 35% 
of the Indonesian born population over 15 has already reached 65 years or over. For the UK, migration 
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history is also reflected in the composition of the elderly foreign born: a fifth of the Indian born 
population over 15 is already beyond 64. In Germany labor migrants who have not returned to their 
country of origin are now reaching old age. In addition, the specific migration history of the Ethnic 
Germans do not have the typical young age structure which is found among many labor migrant 
groups. Almost 10 percent of the Aussiedler are already over 65 and another 25 percent is between the 
ages of 45 and 65 (BMI, 2011:57). Consequently, elderly migrants in Germany are a mixture of 
mostly aged former-labor migrants and Aussiedler. At the same time Aussiedler are not always 
included in studies and statistics as migrant groups given the fact that they have German nationality. 
The future population of elderly with a migrant origin will also be partially determined by 
permanent settlement and return. In general, immigrants from lower income countries, those facing 
more stringent immigration policies, and arriving from countries with greater geographic distance, 
tend to stay longer (Rendall and Ball, 2004). Many of these elderly migrants will face the decision of 
returning with the chance of loosing for example a residence permit or the rights and social 
entitlements which they acquired in the host country in the meantime. Immigrants from richer and 
geographically closer countries that face easier immigration policies, such as immigrants from 
Australia or Ireland, are more likely to leave within five years of their arrival, and are thus much less 
likely to be found among the ageing migrant population in the north-western European countries 
(Rendall and Ball, 2004).  
2. Elderly migrants and health 
In the 1985 study by Blakemore it is already pointed out that the heterogeneous background of elderly 
migrants in Britain yields challenges for local social services and health authorities. The concentration 
of elderly migrants in large cities —nearly half of all aged persons live in London and surrounding 
districts— has both advantages and disadvantages for social services and health authorities. On the 
one hand it is problematic to provide “adequate, ethnically appropriate residential care and other 
services for the elderly”, while on the other hand the concentration of elderly migrants “has the 
advantage of facilitating special services” (Blakemore, 1985: 89). 
Most studies on immigrant elderly have focused on their socio-economic position, health, and 
usage of services (Bernard and Phillips, 2000). Ageing immigrants in the United Kingdom are, as 
ageing immigrants in other European nations, among one of the country’s most disadvantaged 
populations: They are underprivileged because of their ethnicity and because of their age (Cribier, 
1980; Warnes et al., 2004; Warnes and Williams, 2006). Moreover, as Alison Norman (1985) argues 
in her book Triple Jeopardy: growing old in a second homeland, they have one more jeopardy: 
cultural differences which for example result in limited access to and use of services intended for the 
old (Norman, 1985). This could potentially result in a poorer physical health situation (Ebrahim, 
1992b) which is intertwined with a number of other issues, such as mental health, family ties, and 
institutionalized care, and intergenerational solidarity. Limited language abilities and restricted 
knowledge of the health care system are put forward as the main reasons behind this (Ebrahim, 1992a; 
Ebrahim, 1992b; Johnson, 2004). All in all this suggests that the level of assimilation to the host 
country is an important determinant in the health situation of immigrant elderly. Interestingly, 
however, very little is known about the assimilation of elderly migrants in the UK and in other 
European countries. Whereas in the United States, scholars do focus on the assimilation of elderly 
immigrants (in particular those with Asian origins), such as their living arrangements (Kamo and 
Zhou, 1994; Koh and Bell, 1987; Wilmoth, 2001), psychological wellbeing (Casado and Leung, 2002; 
Kim, 1999; Lee et al., 1996), and social support and social welfare dependency (Hu 1998; Lee et al 
1996) this is hardly the case of the UK and continental Europe. In the latter country most studies on 
elderly immigrants primarily focus on their physical and mental wellbeing (Adelman et al., 2009; 
Donaldson, 1986; Driedger, 1987; Ebrahim, 1992b; Ebrahim and Hillier, 1991; Livingston and 
Sembhi, 2003; Norman, 1985; Warnes et al., 2004; Warnes and Williams, 2006; White, 2006). And 
those studies that do so hardly cover immigrants from African and only partially take those from 
Caribbean origin into account. 
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Earlier research by Evandrou (2000) in the UK nevertheless, shows that health status of 
elderly varies by origin; those of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin are more likely to have a poor health 
compared to other origin groups. This finding is also corroborated in recent work on newly arriving 
elderly migrants to the UK (Green et al., 2009). Research in mental illness shows a higher level of 
dementia among elderly migrants with e.g. African Caribbean origin (Livingston et al., 2001; 
Livingston and Sembhi, 2003). African-Caribbean migrants have a larger likelihood to dementia and 
have it diagnosed at a younger age. But whereas they go to see a general practitioner as often as the 
native-born population they receive less specialized care (Adelman et al., 2009; Shah, 2008). Different 
explanatory factors have been put forward ranging from language knowledge, socio-economic 
position, and educational level to more cultural explanations on the meaning of illness. Research is 
still inconclusive at this point. 
A recent study comparing health care use among immigrants and native-born populations in 
11 European countries showed that Germany had the largest proportion of immigrants that reported 
bad or very bad health (56%) (Solé-Auró et al., 2009).8 Given their high proportion of reported bad 
health it is not surprising that immigrant elderly in Germany more frequently visit physicians, general 
practitioners and even go to hospitals more often than native-born Germans. Elderly immigrants in 
Germany of the same gender and age as the native-born went 13% more often to see a GP; in the last 
12 months they visited 15% more physicians; and they had 12% more expected hospital stays. But 
these differences vanish in Germany when controlled for health conditions while for the other 
European countries the differences between native-born and immigrants remain the same.(Solé-Auró 
et al., 2009). Controlled for a number of demographic and health factors, immigrant elderly seem to 
use health care facilities at the same rate as native-born elderly in the other countries. 
These findings suggest that it is rather a composition effect and the result of worse socio-
economic conditions that make migrant elderly more prone to be in worse health. Policies aimed at 
tackling bad socio-economic problems might thus be more important than migrant specific actions. In 
some studies it is even suggested that immigrant elderly are in fact relatively healthy and some even 
argue that they are more healthy than native-born. Their relatively healthy situation is described as the 
‘healthy migrant effect’. As it is often put forward Razum et al. suggest that migrants are a selective 
group who are more likely to be in good physical shape at migration (Razum and Rohrmann, 2002; 
Razum et al., 1998; Razum et al., 2000). Whether this directly results in more healthy ageing is still 
subject to discussion. In particular many labor migrants, for example, had heavy jobs resulting in 
many physical problems. In addition it has been brought up that those who are healthy might return to 
their home countries when ageing whereas those encountering health issues might rely more on the 
facilities available in the country of settlement and make them additionally less mobile to return to 
their home country. When it comes to mortality, findings indicate diverse results for different origin 
groups in the UK: those from East- and West Africa, Bangladesh e.g. have higher all-cause mortality 
than the national averages whereas elderly from China and Hong Kong show lower all-cause mortality 
(Wild et al., 2007). Moreover, studies show that immigrants in Germany, as migrants elsewhere in 
Europe, also have a lower mortality rate than native-born Germans (Raymond et al., 1996; Razum and 
Twardella, 2002; Razum et al., 1998). For example, for breast cancer, Turkish and ethnic German 
(Aussiedler) migrant women have a lower incidence and mortality rate than native-born German 
women. Of course these findings still have to be tested with the coming generation of ageing adults of 
diverse origins as the level and type of health problems might be directly related to the reason for 
migration as well. At the same time it is clear that with ageing immigrant populations of diverse 
origins these questions will remain important in the decades to come. 
Despite the existence of ethnically oriented elderly associations and organizations and 
activities for the elderly in general, studies for the Netherlands suggest that there is a large number of 
elderly migrants who feel lonely (De Valk and Van Droogenbroeck, 2010). Again large differences 
are found between origin groups: Schellingerhout (2004) finds that elderly Turks report the lowest 
                                                        
8  [Online], ‹http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2009/200920.pdf›. 
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psychological wellbeing. These findings are echoed by Van der Wurf et al. (2004) who found that 
62% of the Turkish elderly in their survey had symptoms of depression while this applies to 15% of 
the native-born Dutch elderly. Surinamese Hindu elderly, on the other hand, report very positively 
about their mental wellbeing. Again it remains largely unclear whether this is a difference in reporting, 
whether the measurement of loneliness is applicable to the same extent to all groups and has the same 
meaning for different origin groups or that these levels indeed reflect diversity in loneliness and 
mental health among the groups. Policies aimed at the elderly should consider the vulnerability to 
loneliness in general and for migrants in particular.  
3. Intergenerational relations and social ties 
Health is seen as a leading element in determining quality of life (Walker and Martimo, 2000) 
although this might not mean the same for elderly of different ethnic origin (Brockman, 2002). Family 
ties are a potentially important factor in determining the quality of life as well, and even more so for 
migrant elderly coming from more collectivistic oriented societies. Data from the “National Survey of 
Ethic minorities of England and Wales” show that quality of life is influenced by both health and 
participation in networks. Nevertheless, for elderly migrants, especially those from Pakistan, 
subjective elements, such as family contacts were found to be more important than they are for the 
native majority population (Bajekal et al., 2004). Whereas there is not much known on this issue in 
Germany, research shows that former labor migrants that have reached old age prefer to have contact 
with co-ethnics “in their own cultural niches with their own religious institutions and migrant 
organizations” (Dietzel-Papakyriakou, 2005: 296). This is for example reflected in the fact that 
immigrants from Turkey have extensive ethnic social networks in many German cities. 
The position of elderly migrants in different domains of life is, however, not just determined 
by conditions at that point in life but is just as much related to the earlier life course. One of the issues 
that has been pointed out in literature is that the plans immigrants have regarding their post-retirement 
period are important for their position in old age. In particular how these plans are related to their 
decisions and participation in their younger years as well (Cassarino, 2004). And although many 
migrants originally intended to stay temporarily, yet a large part of them ends up staying in the 
literature also referred to as the ‘myth of return’ (Ebrahim, 1992a). The social, economic, and cultural 
position elderly migrants have in the UK vis-à-vis their country of origin determines, to a large extent, 
their decision to stay or return (Cassarino, 2004). In this regard more attention should be given to the 
impact of different life course decisions and the links with migration. 
The housing position of elderly migrants is related to both health and family issues. We have 
to draw mainly on studies from the UK where it is shown that elderly with an ethnic black origin are 
more likely to live in social rented housing. Homeownership is least common among this group 
compared to both native and other ethnic groups (like Asians and Chinese) (Green et al., 2009). 
Approximately 10% of the quarter of a million ethnic elderly in the UK live in a care home, a number 
that is expected to rise in the coming years (Mold et al., 2005). Care homes seem, however, not to be 
very popular among the aging migrants and both language and cultural barriers may separate migrant 
and native-born elderly. But more importantly, cultural differences can limit the service that is 
provided to elderly migrants (Askham, 1997; Milne and Chryssanthopoulou, 2005). In addition, given 
the importance attached to the family for care and support in more collectivistic oriented societies, 
handing over to professional services is found to be hard for elderly of migrant origins (Chiu and Yu, 
2001; Heathcote, 2000). 
The views elderly migrants have towards health, support and care are closely related to the 
predominant more collective values of their countries of origin. These emphasize the group as a whole, 
rather than the individual in which interdependence, sociability, and family integrity are central. This 
implies, for example, that children are expected to live with their parents until marriage and that parents 
move in with their children at old age (Triandis, 1994; Triandis, 2001; De Valk and Saad, 2008). The 
importance of family and family ties is found to be even more prominent for some groups of elderly 
migrants, as family resources are often used for care, counselling, and other practical help (Chen and 
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Silverstein, 2000; Harrison et al., 1994). Asian elderly immigrants in Britain rely on family support more 
than the native-born for example (Sin, 2006). A study by Chiu and Yu (2001) also shows that many 
Chinese adult immigrants in the UK believe that elderly Chinese should live with their son, a belief 
which is shared across older and younger generations. Nevertheless, adult children do not always have 
the means to take care of their parents. Despite intergenerational solidarity is stronger among these 
groups, Willis (2008) shows that African Caribbean migrants have a much lower sense of filial 
obligations and weaker family ties. Among this latter origin group, extended family households are 
rather uncommon (Barker, 1984) and over a third of the African Caribbean migrants live alone (Bhalla 
and Blakemore, 1981). Already in the 1980s, Fenton (1987) concluded that overall African Caribbean 
elderly migrants are relatively unsupported by other contiguous family members. One reason behind the 
differential level of family support is the disruptive effect the migration process itself has for families 
(Atkin and Rollings, 1992; Fenton, 1987). 
Among elderly migrants from different origins in the Netherlands strong family values remain 
important too. A recent study shows that 50% of the Turkish and Moroccan parents agree that children 
that live close by should visit their parents at least once a week, 36% of the Surinamese and only 16% 
of the Antillean parents think so too. Also regarding taking care of sick parents, more than half of the 
Turkish and Moroccan migrants agree that children should do so, while this is the case for only 11% 
of the native-born. The Surinamese and Antillean migrants fall in between, respectively 27% and 19% 
agree that children should take care of sick parents (De Valk and Schans, 2008). 
4. Ageing and return 
By definition the elderly migrants living in the studied north-western European countries is a selected 
group as they remained and did nor return to their country of origin. Whereas many migrants 
themselves, as well as the host societies, expected the migration move to Europe to be temporary, 
large variations exist in the levels of return migration. A study by the Office of National statistics in 
the UK shows that around half to two-thirds of the immigrants from the EU, North America and 
Oceania emigrate again within five years whereas of immigrants born in the Indian subcontinent only 
about 15 per cent moves back to the country of origin (Rendall and Ball, 2004). 
There are several reasons why immigrants decide to return or not. As noted above, family ties 
might be one reason. In that regard, as Cassarino (2004: 257) adequately points out “return is not only 
a personal issue, but above all a social and contextual one, affected by situational and structural 
factors”. It is a cost and benefit calculation between the opportunities that immigrants have in the host 
country and what they expect to find in their homeland. While these calculations can include elements 
such as human capital, income, and economic prospects, for elderly migrants they are more likely to 
encompass health benefits, care/support networks, and family ties in either place. Moreover, Byron 
(1999) shows that among Caribbean migrants return depends not only on wealth but also on time 
spent in the UK. Staying longer in the UK, he argues, dilutes the ties to the country of origin and thus 
chances for return decrease. A similar argument is made by Thomas-Hope (1999) with respect to the 
return of Jamaican migrants. She shows that return depends on a bond between the migrants and their 
home country, “especially at the level of the household and the family” (ibid: 183). But that it is 
mainly determined by “a combination of two factors the characteristics of the migrants who return in 
terms of their skills, experience and attitudes, and the conditions of the country itself” (ibid: 199) The 
elderly migrants that return to Jamaica are often still economically active after their return.  
In her analysis of the return migration of Southern European guest-workers Brecht (1994) 
also finds that family network plays a determinant role in decisions regarding returning. Having 
family in the country of origin, increases the chances for return. Whereas Brecht does not control for 
health, it may be that frail elderly are more likely to return to their country of origin because they have 
family there to take care of them. However, just as the decision to migrate is not made by individuals 
alone, neither are the choices to return. The role of family in one’s life is very important, especially for 
elderly migrants. Family characteristics have therefore an important impact on the decision to return at 
different stages in the life course. Where the family is located, i.e. the geographic location of spouses, 
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children and parents, is the most important aspect. It may determine whether elderly migrants choose 
to move back or stay (Constant and Massey, 2002). This does however not imply that all those who 
have their primary residence in one of the studied countries remained there all the time, some 
commute back and forth several times throughout their life for longer or shorter periods (Faist, 2000) 
and also during old ages some travel back and forth, between their country of origin and the country of 
settlement, several times a year. All these decisions are of course also determined by options shaped 
by policies on residence. When there are strict conditions related to residence permits and entitlements 
that can not be easily transferred, return migration will be difficult to realize. In particular migrants 
from outside the EU are prone to these policies which are much less affecting EU migrants who move 
within the common EU area.  
F. Conclusions 
Migration to north-western Europe is and has been diverse and changing over the past decades. The 
migration histories in each of the countries and links with different parts of the world have resulted in 
migrant populations with a variety of characteristics. Also for the African and Latin American 
migrants enormous diversity exists both between origin groups from the two continents as well as 
within each of the groups. Migration from Africa to this part of Europe reflects on the one hand the 
colonial links and on the other the labor recruitment in the 1960s (mainly northern Africa). In all 
countries these flows and resulting stocks of (African) immigrants are directly related to legislation 
with regard to entry and stay. These rules define the options for entry, the living conditions and 
welfare state entitlements for each of the groups. In this respect the difference between African 
immigrants in Belgium and the Netherlands versus those in the UK are exemplary. North African 
(mainly Moroccan) migrants, that are still the majority in the two continental countries, were recruited 
for unskilled work and even though asylum migrants arrived from other parts of the African continent, 
their share in the population is still substantially smaller. The socio economic characteristics of the 
North African migrants are given by the very selective labor recruitment in the sixties and their 
residence was directly based on their activity in the lowest segments of the labor market. Although 
their stay originally was seen as temporary and as an asset to the economic growth in this part of 
Europe, this has changed substantially over the years. Social and political right and entitlement only 
developed over time and are still not always the same as those for the native majority population. In 
this respect many of the African immigrants in the UK are characterized by a different history with 
many having the right to reside in the UK based on citizenship before migration and most of them 
originate from sub-Saharan Africa as well. African migrant to Germany is limited and and those who 
reside have a diverse origin. For comparison: the absolute numbers of residing migrants from Africa 
are almost the same in Germany and Belgium despite the huge difference in total population size of 
both countries (11 versus 82 million inhabitants). 
The spatial distribution of migrants in general reflects the role of the labor market and social 
networks in settlement patterns. This is also the case for the African immigrants in the studied 
countries although again language barriers are shaping boundaries too: despite worse economic 
conditions in the Walloon region more African migrants have settled in this part of Belgium. The 
overall lower level of education of some migrant origins, among many of African descent, make them 
more prone to economic fluctuations: they often have jobs in the lower strata of the labor market, less 
secure contracts, and higher probabilities of unemployment. Also for those who are more educated (as 
is the case among others for some refugee groups) finding a position which reflects their capacities is 
not a given due to both acknowledgements of educational credentials, entry problems to the labor 
market and discrimination. 
Furthermore, there are interesting differences between African migrants in the Netherlands 
and Belgium: Belgium having colonial relations with some sub-Saharan African countries as well as a 
joint language with many of the African countries in general resulted in a more favorable situation for 
these migrants compared to the Netherlands. The fact that both in the UK and Belgium many African 
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migrants already spoke the language before arriving to the country facilitated the first settlement. 
Language has been identified as a key element in participation in the host society in many studies and 
often is a prerequisite for naturalization. The level to which nationality is acquired in most countries 
also determines access to other social entitlements as well as political participation. 
The position of the North African migrants seems to be still largely determined by their 
migration history with Moroccans having in many cases a worse socio-economic position than other 
migrants (also partially from Africa) arriving as asylum seekers later in time. In addition, to the 
selective migrant characteristics, discrimination, the public discourse and perception may have an 
effect. Furthermore, religious background has been emphasized in many of the north-western 
European countries where Muslims in particular are perceived as a threat. Religion also plays a role in 
the relatively few intermarriages among some immigrant groups including the Moroccan and Turkish. 
In this respect the position of Latin American migrants both in education and the labor market as well 
as in housing seems to be better. Intermarriages are more common and interethnic relations in general 
are more often also facilitated by fewer language barriers as many migrants already knew Dutch or 
English before arriving to the Netherlands and the UK for example. Nevertheless, despite the rather 
long links and history their position very often is still not the same as for the native majority group. 
This more vulnerable position of migrants could be in times of economic crisis become even 
worse. The economic recession potentially affects both the immigration flows and the migrant stocks. 
Despite the economic crisis, however, the levels of immigration increased in three of the four studied 
countries and remained stable in the fourth (Germany) also in the most recent years. Of course it is 
possible that the effects of the crisis will only be reflected in more recent data (or even the years to 
come) which are not available yet. At the same time it is clear that migration includes not only those 
primarily seeking a job but also includes family related migration and asylum seekers. These latter 
two are important reasons for acquiring residence in the studied countries as it is shown. Both of them 
are potentially less prone to the economic crisis than is the case for labor migration (see also Beets and 
Willekens, 2009). In addition, in particular in the current situation of recession, many may search for 
other ways to acquire residence as labor migration is a more difficult option. The already existing 
links between countries of origin of migrants and receiving societies might very well increase further 
in importance. So although economic fluctuations have an impact on migration patterns, it does not 
imply immigration will stop in times of recession. Both policy and the situation in the origin countries 
of migrants are relevant (De Beer, 2011). The impact of the crisis in the origin countries is in this 
sense often overlooked. It is however relevant to know more about this latter impact in order to 
realistically assess the factors at play in decisions migrants take about remittances, return or migration 
of family members. The reduced economic prospect of migrant households can in this sense lead to 
fewer remittances send to the home countries and in this way affect the economic situation over and 
beyond their direct economic position. 
Of course one has to realize that migrants from among other African countries seeking 
employment will be undocumented and thus not appear in statistics. At the same time in all four 
countries the recent debates about undocumented labor are much more focused on the Eastern 
European countries, some of which recently joined the EU. As a result of the EU enlargement part of 
this labor migration is no longer undocumented but adds to the increase in EU migrants in the study 
countries. In each of the countries, the traditional sectors where many migrants find work, like 
agriculture and construction, are now to a large extent dominated by Eastern European migrants. In 
the care sector (both documented as well as undocumented private care) on the other hand both 
African as well as Latin American migrants are still found. 
Despite the fact that asylum migration is still one of the major reasons of migration for some 
origins as seen before, the figures generally dropped in north-western Europe since the mid-2000s and 
this is also clear from migration reasons to the different countries. We generally observe a downward 
trend in the studied countries not necessarily implying that asylum migration to Europe gets less 
important. It mainly suggests that as a result of policy changes as well as expansion of the European 
Union different countries in Europe are now preferred entry countries for higher numbers of asylum 
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migrants. The recent crisis and related refugee movements in northern Africa and the Middle East for 
example are mainly entering in the Southern EU countries. The extent to which this will have impacts on 
the north-western EU countries is still hard to assess also because reliable data are not available yet. 
The economic crisis is just as relevant for the position of immigrants. As many migrants work in 
labor market sectors that are mostly affected by business cycle fluctuations, the effects of the crisis are 
potentially stronger for them. In addition, many of the migrants do have less secure jobs making them 
more prone to the economic crisis. Data already showed that even in times of economic prospect (mid 
2000s) many migrants did not have a paid employment. This number can be expected to rise and recent 
figures indeed suggest this is the case. And although due to the crisis primarily the labor market changes, 
also policies and political sentiments may be changing: with anti immigrant feelings getting more public 
support. On the one hand this is potentially reflected in more strict immigration policies but on the other 
hand it can just as well affect immigrants entering the labor market in search for jobs. As figures for the 
Netherlands already showed potentially immigrant young adults from the second generation are 
confronted with reduced job opportunities. The difficulty they have with finding a job may impact the 
financial situation but also their outlooks for the future. Housing conditions may for example deteriorate 
as due to the crises banks are much stricter in providing loans for buying homes, resulting in less access 
to homeownership in particular for those who are vulnerable on the labor market. 
At the same time the welfare states in many countries of north-western Europe will depend 
more and more on migrants and their descendents. Although immigration has become a structural part in 
society, relatively little attention has been paid to the effects migration might have in the long run. The 
demographic composition in north-western Europe will radically change in the years to come. Two 
emerging issues in the changing demographic composition of north-western Europe have been pointed 
out in this report: the ethnic composition of both children/ young adults as well as the elderly population 
will be more ethnically diverse than was the case before. The second generation, who has no migration 
experience themselves, are in many respects still disadvantaged. Even when they reach much higher 
levels of education than their parents they are still mainly finding positions in the lower strata of the 
labor force which will have major implications. Among the first generation percentages of migrants out 
of the labor market are relatively high for specific groups. And although this is the case for both men and 
women, levels of female participation in the labor market are even lower than for men in some African 
origin groups. Latin-American and the Eastern European migrants have much higher levels of 
participation particularly for women. With increasing educational attainment, in which women 
outperform men also among those of immigrant origin, it is expected that young women of migrant 
origin will participate at much higher rates in the labor force. This has, however, many important 
consequences both for their families (support for children and elderly) but also for society at large. In 
times of recession welfare state provisions both for childcare and elderly care which are prone to budget 
cuts and make the informal care network often even more important. The economic crisis and expanded 
life expectancy have fuelled the discussion about the future of welfare state arrangements, with many 
entitlements already being reduced. Whether this will have the same impact on all ethnic groups is hard 
to say but one can expect migrants to be more hit by these changes. At household level the effects of the 
economic crisis can result in less labor market participation as governments no longer provide care 
facilities or reduce them. At the same time labor force participation of all household members is needed 
in order to supply sufficient income to the household. The economic crisis in this way directly impacts 
both the young and elderly of the family as well. 
Elderly migrants will be an increasingly important share of the population in north-western 
European societies. In addition to the ageing among the native majority group, a larger share of the 
elderly will have a migrant background. The decision whether or not to return to their home countries 
in old age is, however, at least partially dependent on policy and family. Given the fact that most 
entitlements gathered through labor market participation as well as welfare state arrangements are not 
directly transferable when living elsewhere combined with the fact that many of them have their 
children living in the country of settlement, makes it rather unlikely to expect that many of these 
elderly will return to their home country in the near future. 
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The group of elderly again is heterogeneous and with the exception of Moroccan migrants, the 
majority of African migrants in the study countries are still relatively young. Ageing is thus less 
pronounced for the African groups and much more important already for, among others, the Latin 
American origin groups. Up to now, however, return migration also among Latin-Americans is relatively 
limited. Again this is often linked to residence permits, rights, and welfare state entitlements. Eastern 
Europeans, for example, have been more inclined to return to their home countries. 
The economic crisis may have important consequences for those elderly who have had their 
working life in north-western Europe as pension rights are more and more discussed and not so secure 
in the current economic situation. This might imply that also in the future they will be in a vulnerable 
economic position, where their children can not necessarily support them. Co-residence is less 
common in this region of Europe also reflected in fewer family housing options. The care giving the 
children of these immigrants are expected to receive is thus not so easily facilitated. At the same time 
welfare state arrangements are likely to be reduced in line with already ongoing cost reductions. 
The effects of the current developments in the North African region for the north-western EU 
countries are uncertain. The asylum influx in the mid-1990s to northern European countries is now 
mainly hitting the southern European states which are already in a worse economic position. The 
future will depend on the extent to which common immigration and reception policies will be 
developed in the EU. 
Migration is and will be a factor of influence for each of the studied countries. Immigration 
flows and the demographic behavior of the residing immigrants will be important aspects of 
population change in the near future. In this sense it can be expected that the role of women will 
continue to change (both in immigration and position after migration). The future of migration to 
north-western Europe will further be determined by established links between different parts of the 
world as history has shown. At the same time the role of both legislation and economic development 
is clearly of importance for both immigration and residing immigrants. The challenge many north-
western European countries face for the near future is to provide equal opportunities to the children of 
immigrants. Only by creating prospects for the young, while paying sufficient attention to diversity in 
different life course stages, social cohesion in society can be maintained. 
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III. Recent African immigration to South America:  
The cases of Argentina and Brazil  
in the regional context 
Pedro F. Marcelino and Marcela Cerrutti9 
A. Introduction 
1. Brief presentation of the problem 
During the last years, the presence of recently arrived Africans to Argentina became more noticeable, 
particularly in Buenos Aires City. Even though, compared to any other immigrant community it is a 
small population, these immigrants are marked by their race. The sudden emergence of this new 
immigrant group raised all sorts of speculations. ¿Who are they? ¿What are they doing in Argentina? 
¿Why did they choose to come here? Local reactions to their presence varied, from more sympathetic 
and humanistic ones to less friendly and even racist. Yet there is no doubt that their presence has 
contributed to ‘visibilize’ Africa in Argentina in many respects, but particularly on two grounds, it has 
stimulated the debate on the African heritage and afro-descendants in Argentina, and on the human 
rights regard that is involved in international migration.  
It should be emphasized that Argentina is not the only country of destination for African 
immigrants in South America, since there is also a sizable population in Brazil and other countries. 
Irrespectively of their particularities, in both cases these flows constitute a marginal expression of a 
dreadful situation: the reality of people escaping from violence, persecution and hunger with no places 
to go. Some of them, in face of a developed world that has increasingly closed their doors and rejected 
their presence; and neighbor countries that have become more hostile to regional immigrants, have 
decided for alternative countries of destination. Consequently, recent African immigration to 
Argentina and Brazil are both expressions of a broader geopolitical situation. 
                                                        
9  Consultants from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of 
ECLAC. 
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Despite having initiated this decade amid a crippling financial crisis, Argentina has seen a 
steady, if residual migratory inflow of both regular and irregular migrants from the African continent. 
They are mostly young and male, predominantly West Africans, a minority of whom are asylum-seekers, 
while others might fall under the category of de facto refugees. Most come from Senegal, but the list 
includes Nigerians, Ghanaian, Liberian, Guinean, Malian, Cameroonian, and a score of other nationals.  
Existing studies (this one included) overwhelmingly mention Senegalese migrants —and, to a 
lesser extent, Nigerian— as the focus of attention. This is as perhaps virtue of their number. Yet, the 
common Argentinean might be constructing an “otherized” subject no more than the scholar or the 
policy analyst. By default, this study, as the academic publications that preceded it, constructs the 
subject primarily as Senegalese, male, and young, possibly accepting discrepancies between the reality 
on the ground and the reality articulated on paper. In the absence of extensive footwork it is important, 
thus, to perhaps recognize the academic bias that pervades any such analysis. 
In any case, this inflow that started in the late nineties, increased in the post-9/11 period, in 
which severe migratory policy shifts in consolidated destinations (EU, US) enhanced the risks and 
costs, and reduced the rewards of migrating there. Simultaneously, the externalization of migratory 
policies, particularly by the European Union, transferred migration pressure from the EU borders to a 
number of buffer nations in the immediate vicinity of the Union. 
The neighbors quickly became frontier destinations, transit and transhipment centers where 
informal incorporation has been normalized. In some cases, the legal limbo and the impossibility of 
leaving created a permanent state of transience, resulting in actual settlement and liminality. The 
difficulties along the African/European border are now severely compounded by an unprecedented 
political upheaval, leading to a situation of further uncertainty insofar as migrants are concerned. 
Although this crisis and the emergence of Argentina as a destination for African immigrants is not 
straightforward, it is relevant to question how EU immigration policies will emerge from the crisis, 
and how migrant networks might respond. 
Argentina’s relatively remote geographic position (far removed from Africa and from 
preferred destination countries) might insinuate it is an unlikely candidate to intervene in this process. 
Yet, a decade of sustained arrivals suggests otherwise. Motivational hypotheses put forward a variety 
of factors, possibly acting together to feed this flow: the growing impossibility to enter wealthier 
countries; Argentina’s relatively open migratory policy; a normative that currently recognizes the right 
to migrate as a basic human right; the extension and porosity of both maritime and land borders; the 
lack of state capacity to monitor irregular migrants and visa overstayers; and relatively receptive and 
fairly affluent communities that provide safe haven for the informal commercial activity in which 
many migrants eventually end up working. Argentina, and in particular the city of Buenos Aires, has 
thus become a likely destination for a very visible minority, which is for the time being regarded with 
more curiosity than concern. While an extensive study on this community and its motivations is yet to 
be done, this document characterizes the different dimensions of the migratory corridor, evaluating its 
sustainability nexus and suggesting a direct geopolitical link with extemporaneous events and global 
migratory policy trends. 
2. Objectives of the report 
This report intends to systematize the available information to date from a variety of sources about 
African migrants in Argentina. Given the lack of substantive and sufficient studies on the theme, it 
does not presume to be an extensive survey-based work, rather resorting to a smaller sample and re-
analyzing the conclusions reached in light of independent ethnographic field work, combined with 
previous studies, and measured against demographic, econometric and discursive data. 
It is the intention of the authors to contribute to the academic furthering of a subject that is 
only now surging as pertinent, in academia, institutions, the media, and public opinion. It is also 
intended to that institutional debate, possibly leading to policy intervention —where necessary— 
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might be forthcoming, particularly regarding the regularization of the migratory situation and the 
process of integration and participation in receiving countries.  
The report rehearses social, economic, and geopolitical hypotheses that might justify the 
appearance of this new migration corridor, utilizing a phenomenological approach combined with 
extensive historic and demographic overviews. It also proposes an aggregation and systematized 
analysis of past studies, thus conflating ethnographic observation, demographic data, and geopolitical 
analysis of the Argentinean case study. Where relevant, the Brazilian case study shall be used as a 
term of comparison. 
The different sections will shed light on —as far as it is known— who the migrants are; paint 
an up-to-date socio-demographic portrait; categorize Africans arriving in Argentina; consider how 
they may be impacting identity policies and, broadly speaking, migration policy making; establish ties 
between this particular migratory corridor and wider geopolitical concerns that condition it. The final 
two sections propose trends and policy recommendations for further analysis. 
B. Recent trends in African emigration 
1. Types of migrants, motivations for and methods of migration 
Setting out to determine the socio-demographic outfit of Argentina’s new African migration, a 
number of evident and fundamental questions require clarification. Where do these migrants come 
from? What type of migrants are they? Why do they leave Africa? Finally how do they pick, arrive 
in and enter Argentina? 
A significant number of Senegalese have been identified among African-born migrants across 
Argentina, most particularly in Greater Buenos Aires, but also in some of the other major cities, 
namely the key harbor city of Rosario, Córdoba, La Plata and, seasonally, the province’s beachfront 
towns. There are, however, migrants from many other Africa countries. Despite some coincidence, 
their regions of origin do not appear to directly correlate to areas that historically supplied slave labor 
to the Río de La Plata. The absence of such link immediately suggests the existence of a contemporary 
migratory corridor. The descriptor “African”, on the other hand, does not provide sufficient distinction 
to a community that is both regionally and typologically inchoate. Irrespective of the country of 
origin, important distinctions are necessary vis-à-vis the motivations for migration, and the methods 
used to enter the country, or the region. 
The principal point of entry categories appear to be economic migrants, asylum seekers, status 
refugees, and to a much lesser extent, transnationals/cosmopolitans.10 A further distinction should be 
made between documented and undocumented migrants —also known as irregular, illegal, 
unauthorized, or clandestine. These terms are interchangeably used at policy level, and framed as 
categories requiring special management, notably through immigration control instruments. The 
category of irregular migrant, however, often encapsulates individuals arriving for different reasons. 
Thus, an irregular migrant may simultaneously be an asylum seeker, or a de facto refugee, and still be 
categorized as an economic migrant. This overlap demonstrates the complexity and informality 
prevalent in this migratory corridor, as in others, and makes evident that what is at stake is what has 
been loosely defined as “mixed migratory flows”. It complicates access and, consequently, leads to 
attempts of bypassing overly bureaucratic immigration processes, which are often unequipped to 
interpret the full spectrum of migrant experiences and narratives. Thus, while irregular migrants 
constitute the “norm”, by no means do they paint a complete picture. 
                                                        
10  A category which includes diplomats, investors, business leaders, researchers and other high income, high mobility 
African citizens entering Argentina on specialty visas.   
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UNHCR reflected this complexity by operationalizing the category of “mixed” migrants, 
recognizing variable and often overlapping motives for migration (UNHCR, 2007). Yet, this category 
appears to obfuscate concrete aspirations under a blanket statement with limited administrative 
gravitas, sheltering countries where the existing legal instruments fail to fully address the real needs of 
migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, although, theoretically, it offers enhanced instruments for 
migrant protection. 
In fact, it is aspirations that better distinguish migrants leaving Africa, and why they choose 
Argentina, of all places. As many studies have shown, and continue to show, the motivations for 
migration are as diverse as the individuals who depart from or arrive in a specific country.11 Individual 
migratory projects may search a state offering political stability, economic and social opportunity 
(education, employment, healthcare, welfare), or a safe haven from gratuitous physical or 
psychological violence, including civil war and state warfare. Simply put: human security. 
Migration and mobility are thus, perhaps better conceptualized adopting Amartya Sen’s 
capabilities framework for human development. In Sen’s view, migration tends to be reactive, 
identifying socio-economic gaps, and responding to them (Sen, 2000). In much of Africa, Structural 
Adjustment Programs, deficient agricultural reform, and in some cases the sudden implementation of a 
market economy have left many stranded in the fight for resources. In other cases, political instability 
and weak democratic institutions —when not open conflict— embolden citizen disenchantment,12 
leading to what Clause Aké called “democracy of the disenfranchised” (Aké, 1995). Better access to 
telecommunications and information sources, better means of travel, and increased contact with 
tourists may also be contributing to an understanding about income disparities, altering aspirations 
across the continent, as it has around the world. Migration could, thus, be understood as a personal 
development strategy, “a reaction to relative, rather than absolute poverty” (De Haas, 2008:40).  
Sen’s statement points in the direction of what is a problematic concept: the image of the 
poor, destitute economic migrant looking for a better life for him/her and his/her family. Grappling 
with the financial capacity of migrants is stepping into a complex, and fairly uncharted territory. Many 
migrants depart from a position of “relative” poverty, having access to just about enough funds to 
initiate a migratory journey, whether it is through a legitimate process or using smuggling networks. 
Others struggled to accumulate the necessary funds to initiate and maintain journeys that are 
becoming longer and more expensive.13 Access to funds, in fact, would seem to growingly be the one 
main obstacle to migration from much of Africa, as the cost of the migratory journey shoots up in 
tandem with heightened border security and stringent immigration procedures. International evidence 
denounces an internal class dynamic within diasporic Africa, clearly reinstating Van Hear’s 
“considerations of class into analyses of forced migration” (Van Hear, 2004). It is becoming almost 
impossible for the poorest of the poor to leave Africa. An obvious consequence is that Africa is slowly 
being bled of its most valuable and most entrepreneurial individuals, often leaving behind largely 
feminine —thus distorted and incomplete— communities. 
                                                        
11  See, for example, the two following projects at IMI (Oxford) and PRIO (Oslo): ‘The Determinants of International 
Migration (DEMIG)’, International Migration Institute, Oxford University (ongoing, 2010-2014), directed by Hein 
de Haas (‹http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/demig/demig-the-determinants-of-international-migration›); or 
‘Security Threat: Migration-Based Threat’, Peace Research Institute of Oslo, directed Jørgen Carling, 
http://www.prio.no/Research-and-Publications/Project/?oid=64826. See also J Carling, Aspiration and Ability in 
International Migration: Cape Verdean Experiences of Mobility and Immobility, Dissertations / Theses No. 5/2001, 
Oslo: Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo. 
12  Rounds 1 through 5 of Afrobarometer’s surveys on democracy in Africa reveal worryingly dismissive attitudes 
toward democratic processes across much of the continent. See: ‹http://www.afrobarometer.org›. 
13  See for example: P. F. Marcelino and H. Farahi references, “Transitional African Spaces in Comparative Analysis: 
Inclusion, Exclusion, and Informality in Morocco and Cape Verde”, in Third World Quarterly – Special Issue, 
Oxford, Taylor and Francis, 2011 (forthcoming); H. de Haas, “The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of 
Migration From Africa to the European Union”, Third World Quarterly, 29(7), 2008, pp. 1305-1322; or P.F. 
Marcelino, Toward a Shift in the Migration Paradigm: Inclusion, Exclusion, Immigration and Development in the 
Cape Verde Islands, Saarbrücken, Germany, LAP – Lambert Academic Publishing, 2011 (forthcoming). 
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Differences can also be detected among those that manage to leave. Longer transit periods in 
frontier places (vis-à-vis the European Union) such as Cyprus, Malta, the Canaries or Sicily, or in 
“buffer” countries such as Turkey, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco or in the Cape Verde Islands are making 
the journey more expensive. Those with just about enough to get by are gradually forced to make 
lengthier stops, adding to the risk of an already risky endeavor. Most of these class dynamics of the 
migratory process were detected among Africans in Argentina, attesting to the heterogeneous nature 
of the phenomenon.  
This heterogeneity reflects the complex and multi-dimensional dynamics between migration 
and development. The liberal vision would have it that development has a long-term effect in 
decreasing the motivations for migration, seen in this context as a personal/societal response to 
absolute destitution. This stance has been adopted with varying degrees of commitment by institutions 
such as the European Union. However, it is important to note that alternate views suggest that not only 
higher mobility leads to development, but also that development results in higher mobility. The 
UNDP, among other institutions, postulates flexible mobility —including circular migration— as a 
possible solution for development (UNDP, 2009). On the ground, competing visions of migration-
development nexuses become politicized by events. One such example is the North African crisis of 
2010-2011, occurring just as this report is concluded, and in which a contrast between the UN’s 
position and that of the EU —Italy and France in particular— clashed. 
Hein De Haas has conducted a review of a range of studies, regional and global in scope, 
establishing that “the process of social and economic development in its broadest sense tends to be 
associated with generally higher levels of mobility and more migration at least in the short to 
medium term” (De Haas, 2007:18). In the case of Africa, it is crucial to remember an ancient 
tradition of mobility where political and economic considerations became obfuscating factors in the 
macro-migratory nexus that fail to register as dissuading factors at the level of the individual 
migration project. Migration as self-development, thus, follows macro-economic orientations, but 
does not entirely rely on them as an aspirational factor. As posited by the capability approach to 
migration, it is part of a phenomenological nexus in which migration is not only a response to 
poverty, but also a quest for personal growth, success, and overall happiness, challenging the 
sedentary bias prevalent in much of the literature (Bakewell, 2008), and certainly contrasting with 
the mobility of much of the continent. 
Other motivations may be more abstract. In many of the source communities across the 
African continent mobility has attained the highest social status. Such is true particularly in parts of 
Islamic West Africa, where the migratory journey often takes on the role of a pilgrimage of sorts, a 
vaguely spiritual path, or even a rite of passage into manhood. In these regions shaped by profound 
ideologies of migration, the experience of being in transit, and the network of pan-African solidarities 
developed during the journey represents a web of complex and multi-layered realities not best 
described by the fixed institutional categories listed above. Instead, African migrant narratives cite 
families as a primary reason for migrating, highlighting it as a response to family and community 
aspirations, status acquisition, and the fulfillment of social responsibilities. The importance of 
conforming to social expectation affects the image of the journey portrayed to the home community, 
in which migrants often maintain a positive narrative, despite the hardship most face.14 The 
perceptions of the risk entailed in a migratory project of this type are rarely articulated, ultimately 
promoting the dissemination of a migration ideology back home, which, combined with migration 
pressure increases aspiration and (perceived) capability. But these narratives also perpetuate hope, a 
more intangible trait found on the discourse of many migrants in the streets of Buenos Aires —if often 
disguised by the despair tacitly displayed by many, or inferred by the researchers, a despair that they 
dare not transmit to those who expect them to excel. 
                                                        
14  See for example: P. F. Marcelino and H. Farahi, “Transitional African Spaces”, op cit. 
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Understanding the internal dynamics of migration processes may also refer to Appadurai and 
Nederveen Pieterse’s concepts of modernity, multiculturalism and cultural globalization, implicitly 
influencing the motivations of potential migrants through the creation of personal ethnoscapes that 
mobilize individuals and social groups to dream beyond their traditional “imagined worlds” 
(Appadurai, 1996, and Pietersee, 2007). These new imagined communities, which overcome 
essentialist mores of old, imagined communities (Anderson, 1983), also bypass political structures and 
insert an element of utopia into the rationality behind the migration project equation. Social, 
economic, and political aspirations are highly intangible elements of this migrant narrative, and best 
described by it. Migrants’ ability to navigate through malleable structures, of being agents of change 
in their own lives, is a fundamental premise of the human development approach, which assumes 
personal aspirations as a strong enough motivation for migration. Migrants, however, do not exist in a 
political vacuum, and are subject to existing structures strongly influencing and constraining available 
means and modes of action (Marcelino and Farahi, 2010). In many African nations, the structural 
limitations on agency are often so severely limiting, that migrants’ option to depart may be a “bare 
life” strategy. According to de Haas, “the extents to which migrants are really capable of shaping 
their own lives (i.e. acting as free agents) is extremely contingent on the wider institutional and 
natural environment in which people live” (Collyer and De Haas, 2009:23).  
A final note on the methods of arrival is necessary (more on 2.4.). Although solid public data is 
largely absent, the Argentinean immigration authorities have implied that irregular African migrants may 
be entering the country as polizones (stowaways, or clandestine passengers in cargo ships), and perhaps 
subjected to people trafficking networks (redes de trata de personas).15 This requires two fundamental 
remarks. Firstly, considering the significant amount of Africans presumed to be either regularly or 
irregularly residing in Argentina, and the fact that this particular migration corridor did not open until 
after 9/11, it appears very unlikely that more than a few dozens might have actually entered in this 
manner. The contrary would be to assume that hundreds of migrants would have entered Argentina as 
stowaways in large cargo ships calling at the ports of Rosario and Ensenada, in less than a decade. 
Alternatively, they would have hypothetically arrived by boat to any given location along the extensive 
Argentinean coast. Both hypotheses seem highly doubtful. Secondly, it is important to carefully 
distinguish trafficking networks from smuggling networks. While it is possible that some trafficking 
networks might be exploiting African migrants (a thesis that requires factual verification), it is more 
likely that migrants might be resorting to smuggling networks (redes de tráfico). This could be the case 
for those who do indeed enter as stowaways, but also for those who enter through other means. Either 
way, this version attributes a degree of agency to migrants themselves, versus the victimhood narrative 
implied by the assumption of trafficking as a major path into Argentina. 
A rather more logical explanation —based on whatever scarce information there is, and on 
interviews to both migrants and academic/institutional specialists on Argentinean migration/refugee 
issues— is that migrants have for the last decade taken advantage of fairly sophisticated diasporic 
networks, using the loopholes in Argentinean border control and immigration law. Despite the difficulty 
in ascertaining the veracity of the data, preliminary information points toward a large inflow of migrants 
using two different methods: by cargo ship (either as stowaways, or with the crews’ knowledge and 
complicity) to the port of Santos, Brazil, the largest and busiest in Latin America, and a major port of 
call to many of Africa’s convenience flags; and, until recently, by airplane from Dakar to a number of 
major Brazilian airports, taking advantage of a special protocol between Brazil and Senegal. 
According to the current migrant narrative, from Brazil, and for reasons that are yet to be fully 
determined, many migrants typically continued by land toward Argentina, crossing the country by bus 
or train and arriving at one of the many remote border outposts between Brazil and Argentina, Brazil 
                                                        
15  Interview to Federico Augusti, Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, in “African Immigrants Turn to Argentina for 
Opportunity”, posted by The VJ Movement in YouTube, accessed 13 March 2011 ‹http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=xPh_iASSw30›. 
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and Bolivia, or Brazil and Paraguay.16 The extension and porosity of these borders make the crossing 
a fairly simple endeavor. It might be done by car, at regular border outposts where control is known to 
be scarcer or avoidable, in some days or times; it might also very likely be done in unmarked locations 
(e.g., anywhere in the Paraná/Misiones jungle). Both alternatives possibly require access and payment 
to local smuggling networks. One of the most common narratives, however, describes how entrance is 
done through the Triple Border (Triple Frontera), a location in which the cliffs along the Iguazú River 
are the only obstacle between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. Crossing attempts appear to be done 
by boat, possibly fast Zodiac units, very likely during the night, when border patrols are best avoided. 
There appears to have been, however, reinforcements on border patrolling in this area, from all sides.17 
In Argentina, random equipment advancements and random road check-points in the vicinity of the 
Uruguayana (Brazil), and La Quiaca (Bolivia) attempt to reduce the permeability of the region.18 
Some migrants have claimed to have been controlled much further south in National Road 9 (Ruta 9), 
in the provinces of Jujuy and Salta. Yet, it is unmistakable that the sheer extension and remoteness of 
these land borders makes it nearly impossible for authorities to fully patrol. Inherently, resources are 
being allocated in a reactive manner, leaving it to migrants to simply adapt and find new pathways to 
complete one more stage in their migratory project. 
What this reality reveals is Argentina’s (and Brazil’s) integration in a broader migratory 
nexus stretching all the way from across the Atlantic, but in which both countries are possibly only 
secondary/ultra-peripheral nodes, at least for the time being. Although this might be slowly changing, 
migrants seemed to consider either country as a pit stop in a project that envisaged the United States 
or Canada as final destinations. This forcibly assigned role of transit or transshipment country is, in 
and of itself, as problematic as talking about “transit migrants”. A variety of nations have been 
bundled up and qualified as “transit countries” in an inchoate class of countries branded as “transit 
states”, a label that encompasses nations with extreme differences. This terminology, which largely 
took hold in post 9/11 migratory nexus, reflects the consequences of European and U.S. borders’ 
securitization process. It has induced a funneling up of migration flows, and the accumulation of 
migrants in countries qualified, according to their role in the migration process, as “transshipment 
centers”, in other words migrant warehouses where the opportunity to migrate is awaited. While 
transit is admittedly —and growingly— a fixture of the migration process, the use of this term lacks in 
accuracy when describing the diversity, textures, and interconnectedness of today’s migratory 
experience. African migrants have become a common view in many of Argentina’s major urban areas 
and, if other “transit” countries are any example, they won’t be going anywhere anytime soon. They 
are part of a new and fluid ethnoscape facilitated by a changing geopolitical paradigm that 
encompasses Europe, North America, the Mediterranean basin, the Maghreb and West Africa, and in 
which Argentina plays second fiddle. 
                                                        
16  In numerous interviews conducted in Buenos Aires with scholars and professionals working with migrants 
(UNHCR Southern Cone, FCCAM, CAREF, among other institutions) there was solid agreement that this was the 
major point of entry in Argentina. From the interviews conducted personally by the authors with migrants, one 
admitted this route in vague terms, while others avoided responding. Informal statements by some migrants seem to 
confirm this understanding. See, for example: ‘Migration: From Africa to South America’, posted by France24 on 
YouTube, accessed 13 March 2011 ‹http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Vy68khUIpfw&feature=related›. Only a 
large-scale enquiry to migrants themselves, based on researcher-subject trust can confirm or deny what appears to 
be the going narrative.  
17  Widely reported in the Brazilian media, see for example: “Ministro anuncia reforço em fronteira com o Paraguai 
para aumentar combate ao tráfico de armas”, Zero Hora, 15 April 2011; “Governo amplia reforço policial na 
fronteira”, ParanáOnline, 29 April 2011; “Fronteira terá policiamento reforçado”, Diário dos Campos, 29 April 
2011. The border reinforcements appear to respond to a mixed basket of threats including people smuggling and 
trafficking, traffic of weapons, and traffic of counterfeit goods. 
18  Enhanced border controls in Argentina appear to be motivated primarily by illegal merchandise smuggling, but 
there is a strong coincidence between border crossings where this is a normal occurrence, and those reported to 
have been used by African migrants to cross from Esther Bolivia or Brazil. See for example: “Preocupa la debilidad 
de los controles en La Quiaca”, ElTribuno.com.ar, 21 January 2011. 
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Migrants and asylum seekers should not be rendered as “victims” by default. At one stage or 
another most require the services of smugglers for logistically challenging sections of their journeys, 
but “the vast majority migrate on their own initiative” (de Haas, 2008), and are far from being 
“scruffy, dirty victims”, rather being active agents in the attempted change of their own socio-
economic condition, even if those are limitations to their free agency (Rotschild, 2009).19 Most 
importantly, migrants are often (and increasingly) put in “transit” countries, a permanence that is 
perhaps one of the notable realities bypassed by the term “transit”. It is important, thus, to rescue back 
the migrants’ own experiences from the flat narratives conflating them, essentializing them, and 
depriving them of agency and free-will (of which the debate between victimhood in trafficking vs. 
agency in smuggling is a testament). As pointed out throughout this report, however, agency does not 
detract from a number of limitations to their choices and actions, as it does not from the overarching 
vulnerability that characterizes many migrant experiences, but in particular that of Africans. 
2. Preferred destinations: Africa, Europe, and beyond 
According to the UNDP’s Human Development Report 2009, and following its conservative figures, 
the largest portion of the world’s migrants is internal (within the same state). That would account for 
roughly 740 million people, or four times more than those who move outside of their countries. Out of 
those who moved internationally, only 70 million did so between a developing state and a developed 
state, whereas 200 million international migrants thickened the lines of south-south migrations 
(UNDP, 2009). Africans are no exception. Although most African migrants in 2000 went to Europe, 
the second largest chunk traveled within the continent. Those who left to North America, Asia and the 
Middle East each represent less than a sixth of the intra-African flow. South America did not even 
register. And then there was 9/11. 
For Africans, the traditional destination is Europe, and has always been Europe. It was thus 
during the slaving era, it remained thus prior to and during the waves of independences, and it 
continues to be thus today. It is the closest continent, with a few bottlenecks —Gibraltar, Lampedusa, 
Malta— technically keeping the two just a few kilometers apart. It is, for that reason, the cheapest to 
access, and was until recently perhaps the easiest way out of Africa. Additionally, strong historical, 
political, and geographical ties (as well as some legal exceptions) bind specific European countries to 
African nations: England to Egypt, Somalia, Madagascar, South Africa and the Commonwealth 
member states; France to much of the Maghreb, the Sudan, and the Sahel; Portugal to five Portuguese-
speaking states, including Angola and Mozambique; Spain the Equatorial Guinea; Italy to Libya, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea; Belgium to the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi; Germany to Tanzania and Namibia; 
and the Netherlands to South Africa. 
This cultural, political, historical, and linguistic familiarity justifies Africans’ migratory 
preferences, and explains the existence of important communities of each of these nationalities in the 
respective former colonial power. Such close relationships have lead to the maintenance and 
encouragement of close diaspora-homeland ties, often practiced as high intensity transnationalism 
(Góis, 2005). In some cases, the history of migration to the metropolis is so entangled that it is 
difficult to distinguish where Africa halts and Europe starts, or vice versa. A few countries  
—particularly Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands— also appear to 
have received cosmopolitan migrants and political refugees from around the African continent, 
creating yet another layer of inter-continental connectedness. Finally, with the advent of the European 
Union, the economic attraction of the single market and, subsequently, the Schengen Agreement, 
Africa-Europe migration gained a whole new dimension. And then there was 9/11. And yet again, 
there was a paradigm-shifting crisis that spread across the Maghreb, with results that are as 
unpredictable as they are volatile. 
As in Europe, North America’s history of migration dates back to the slaving era, with 
interesting episodes of return migrations (freed American slaves settled in Freetown, or Nova Scotia’s 
                                                        
19  Note: Victims of trafficking, clearly, should be understood in a completely different context. 
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former slaves settled in the same region). US immigration and racial laws prevented any significant 
migrant inflows from Africa for much of its history, with notable exceptions such as the Cape Verdean 
diaspora settled all over New England, constituting the earliest significant non-European migrant 
group in the US. Only much later did others arrive: South Africans, Nigerians, Senegalese, Ghanaian, 
and gradually a kaleidoscope of African identities, lost in the diversity of America, and diluted among 
a large Afro-American population. In Canada, humanist traditions meant that the first substantial 
contacts with blackness was through freed American slaves arriving through the Underground 
Railroad. Until recently, the country was receiving large numbers of migrants and asylum seekers 
from the continent, concentrating in Greater Toronto and in other large cities.20 However, asylum 
claims in Canada now tacitly require the applicant to seek to apply prior to arriving in Canada, a 
policy change that fails to recognize the increasingly blurry line between economic migrants and de 
facto refugees, while also not recognizing agency to individual applicants.21 Since the inception of the 
official policy of multiculturalism in the 1970s, Québec also received significant numbers of 
Francophone Africans, who can “integrate” locally. And then there was 9/11. 
3. The “Fear of the boat”: Geopolitical puzzles  
and recent changes in destination 
Signed in Luxembourg in 1985, and mainstreamed into the acquis communautaire —the main corpus 
of European law— by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the Schengen Agreement (now Schengen 
Acquis) and the ancillary Schengen Information System (SIS) were cornerstones of the European 
project. On a technical level, its ratification, while enforcing stricter rules along the external borders of 
the EU, namely by creating a mandate for joint patrols on vulnerable external borders, also obliged 
member states to restrict and control the entrance of non-EU nationals, and to consult with fellow 
members in cases that raised doubt. The strengthening of external borders strongly impacted Europe’s 
expansive and permeable hotspots in the Mediterranean coast and the vast territorial waters 
surrounding Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic possessions off the African coast. Under the banner of 
enhanced cooperation, the instruments later proposed and ratified by some of the EU members under 
Schengen II (2001) and III (2005) predicted the “continued harmonization on issues such as the 
management of visa policy [and] immigration policy (on both legal and irregular immigration)” 
(Gelatt, 2005) clearly defining a path to eventually be followed across the EU, particularly in the area 
of migration. These, however, would already be coated by a game-changing event: the September 11th 
bombings in New York. 
The security measures following the terrorist attacks impacted travel and migration around the 
globe in an unprecedented fashion. Within hours, North American borders were all closed. The 
following months and years would bring a crescendo of border and immigration control mechanisms 
implemented both in the US and in Canada. Across the Atlantic, 9/11 accelerated the implementation 
of already restrictive laws on immigration, inversely proportional to the deregulation of internal 
European borders. Never as then was the idea of “Fortress Europe” so clear. A complex legislative 
web took over European immigration policy, slowly “pushing back the link of the chain” —that is, 
gradually but effectively externalizing European immigration policies, attempting to solve migratory 
pressures in the source countries, both by discouraging and curtailing emigration, and by promoting 
local development. The assumption was that less poverty in Africa would inevitably result in less 
pressure along the European borders. Yet, this strategy was to be combined with stringent land, sea, 
                                                        
20  According to UNHCR’s fact sheet on Canada, currently a total of 230,604 refugees and asylum seekers reside in 
Canada. See UNHCR’s 2011 fact sheet on Canada (accessed 13 May 2011): ‹http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e491336›. 
21  While the overall numbers in the past five years present a modest increase, overall numbers since 1995 have 
decreased. The quota for asylum seekers applying for immigration settlement after their arrival to Canada 
decreased under the current government to 9,000 to 12,000, down from 22,500 to 28,800 under the previous Liberal 
government. According to Immigration Canada (‹http://www.cic.gc.ca›), the overall annual quota for migrants 
currently sits at 240,000 to 265,000. 
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and air controls in the borderlands of the EU, in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece, and Cyprus; and 
with bold EU proxy measures in “buffer” or “transit” countries in the immediate vicinity of the EU, 
such as Turkey, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, the Cape Verde Islands and other countries in West Africa. 
By and large, the virtual map of Europe appeared to soar, and the de facto Mediterranean border 
appeared to stretch all the way down to Dakar, where European navies nowadays patrol foreign 
territorial waters (Marcelino and Farahi, 2011).22 
The creation of Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, was followed by 
the joint operations HERA 2008 (to tackle illegal migration flows from West Africa to the Canaries) 
and NAUTILUS 2008 (border control reinforcements in the Central Mediterranean, to curtail 
undocumented migration to Italy and Malta); operation Hermes 2010 (an initiative to acquire a clear 
image of illegal migration and organized human trafficking in the EU); and Rabit 2010 (emergency 
control of Greece’s external borders with Turkey, the FYROM and Albania, by then the most 
vulnerable in the EU). On occasion, NATO was also partly co-opted into this new geopolitical outfit. 
Closer military and immigration cooperation following special agreements between several 
European countries and neighboring states intended to neutralize the growing human disaster of 
precarious boats taking off the African continent’s northern and western shores to attempt what were 
becoming suicidal crossings. When the boats did arrive, dozens, sometimes hundreds of 
undocumented migrants swarmed the shores of Lampedusa, Malta, Sicily, the Canaries and, more 
recently, the Cape Verde islands, an outpost for Europe’s externalization strategies. 
Libya’s cooperation in particular, following its bilateral agreement with Italy, seemed to have 
resulted “in a partial westward shift of Trans-Saharan migration routes” towards the Maghreb, 
particularly to Morocco (De Haas, 2008), and in an eastward shift toward the Greek border, and toward 
Cyprus.23 This was, however, done at the expense of migrants’ rights, some of which found themselves 
trapped in Libya and used by al-Qaddafi as geopolitical leverage. In any case, the arrival of more 
migrants to the western coasts of Africa demonstrated that migrant networks across the continent were 
reasonably aware of, up-to-date on, and reactive toward fast-changing immigration policies.  
The Northern African case is all the more relevant when considered as a conceptual conduit to 
what is going on elsewhere around the world, particularly in Latin America. Recent studies compare 
Morocco with an unlikely country, Mexico, by virtue of newly imposed statuses as buffer countries, 
but admitting also that both share migrant narratives revealing heavy-handed authorities and the 
absence of legal codes or practices.24 Other studies have established that constructing cushions around 
key borders in the North (EU, US) is part of a wider nexus in which migration became a political 
instrument, and weaker states accept dubious intermediary roles (Marcelino and Farahi, 2011; 
Kabunda, 2011). 
Undeniably, the key patterns of African migration were affected by radical immigration 
policy changes imposed from remote decision centers in Europe and North America, particularly since 
9/11. In Europe, this required active and passive collaboration of states in pivotal geographical 
locations to control some of the most sensitive border crossings in the continent. This new doctrine 
gradually resulted in the dislocation of migration pressure back to North Africa and other peripheral 
regions, with the tacit consent of local authorities. But all across the continent, the crackdown on 
                                                        
22  Similar claims on the ‘bufferization’ of frontier states such as Argentina, Mexico, or Morocco, have recently been 
presented in Buenos Aires by Dr. Mbuyi Kabunda (2011).  
23  Up-to-date information on HERMES extension is regularly posted on Frontex’s homepage 
‹http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ hermes_2011_extended/background_information›. See also Migration News Sheet: 
“Worsening Security in Libya, Tunisia forces Malta to renew FRONTEX participation in the Med” 
(‹http://www.migrationnewssheet.eu/?page_id=2431›). 
24  See for example the comparison of two of the main buffers to Europe and the US; H. de Haas and S Vezzoli, “Time 
to Temper the Faith: Comparing the Migration and Development Experiences of Mexico and Morocco”, in 
Migration Information Source, Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2010 
(‹http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=791›). 
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irregular migration was accompanied by aggressive measures challenged by many human right 
advocates: the tentative practice of forced returns (which Italy is now threatening to fully implement, 
in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis), following a variety of models (not all of which successful);25 the 
increasing habit of turning back vessels in territorial waters, practiced by Italian border patrols in the 
Central Mediterranean; the return of circular migration agreements; and the increasingly common 
occurrence of detention centers delocalized to peripheral regions of the EU, and to buffer zones in its 
vicinity, where migrants were forced to live in transit limbos and legal voids, undocumented and 
unacknowledged, for years at length (Morice and Rodier, 2010). This latter strategy, however, 
eventually backfired, in light of the severe North African crisis of early 2011. 
The political crisis in across the Maghreb and parts of the Middle East poses unheard 
challenges to regional stability, at a moment when Europe faces a variety of other challenged, both 
financial and political. It cannot be said, however, that this crisis was a surprise. Not only were there 
plentiful indicators showing that social tensions were simmering in many of the region’s countries, but 
also the migrant situation had reached untenable levels. Too little, too late. The cacophony of voices in 
EU foreign policy sadly slowed down action, partially causing the unspeakable migrant crisis 
currently underway.26 
In late September 2005, Europe woke up to unsettling nocturnal images of its furthest 
frontier, with “black people hanging from barbed wire, laying down with broken arms and legs, 
bleeding and desperately asking for help” (Galdon Clavell, 2005; Drago, 2005), following a hopeless 
run for the militarized border of Melilla, a strategic Spanish enclave in northern Morocco. Over 
several weeks, thousands of distressed sub-Saharan and North African migrants ran for the 3-6 m high 
fence in successive waves. On several occasions, Spanish authorities are rumored to have opened fire. 
Witness reports and documental evidence speak at least of mass police brutality. The days that 
followed, when Spain demanded that Morocco accepted the migrants back, as per a 1992 bilateral 
agreement, shocked the world: Morocco was found to have abandoned dozens of undocumented 
migrants to their luck in the confines of the Sahara, close to the Algerian border, without food or 
water, until denounced by international advocacy groups. Political opportunism quickly grabbed the 
headlines, utilizing the rhetoric of “invasion” to describe this humanitarian disaster. 
A couple of other minor episodes should have ringed alarm bells in the Frontex Situation 
Room in Warsaw, and across the European capitals. The temporary arrest of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s 
son by Swiss authorities (2008) and the referendum eventually resulting on the ban of minarets in the 
country (2009) conducted Switzerland to a serious —if anecdotal— falling out with Libya, with al-
Qaddafi going as far as pledging an anti-Swiss jihad, and threatening to sever ties with all Schengen 
Space member states. Italy’s Premier Silvio Berlusconi, concerned with maintaining close ties, 
sizeable investments, and invaluable immigration cooperation agreements that had managed to reduce 
the bleeding of African migrants from the Libyan coasts to Italy, further added to the baroque set of 
circumstances by publicly chastising Switzerland, getting involved in a three-way war of words.27 
Although mostly inconsequential, the episodes denounced the degree of European vulnerability and 
nervousness regarding its neighbors, as was made widely apparent at the beginning of the 2011 crisis. 
At this juncture, once again Silvio Berlusconi repeatedly intervened, first confessing he was unable to 
                                                        
25  As implied by P. F. Marcelino and H. Farahi, op cit; M. Kabunda, op cit; H. de Haas, “Time to Temper the Faith”, 
op cit. 
26  Since the inception of the war in Libya, too many tragic incidents occurred. However, the authors close this report a mere 
two days after an overcrowded ship with African migrants (and de facto refugees) desperate to leave Libya sunk off shore, 
with an estimated 600 victims. Following on the tragic incident, UNHCR ramped up fundraising to supply rescue 
equipment to the coastal regions between Libya/Tunisia and Italy/Malta. See for example: Associated Press, “Witnesses: 
Ship with 600 migrants sinks off Libya”, 9 May 2011, ‹http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iHiFZ-
kQ3VEffvCuPB7EIk0bno Ow?docId=d73f403483a6434d8cde95640b8916b4›. 
27  See for example: H. Bachmann, “Libya Flips Over Swiss Detention”, Time, (New York), 24 July 2008, 
‹http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1826237,00.html›; or S. Kettmann, “Switzerland Goes Rogue”, 
Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC), 19 March 2010, ‹http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/19/ 
switzerland_goes_rogue?page=0,0›. 
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actively join his European partners in the bombing of al-Qaddafi’s positions in Libya,28 then 
demanding that the EU (in particular France) accepted part of the burden caused by African refugees 
escaping the conflict,29 and finally by symbolically “liberating” the island of Lampedusa, where the 
migrant crisis reached its highest point.30  
Commonly, the view towards migration has been one of ambivalence in the context of the 
interventionist development approaches commonly applied across the African continent (Bakewell, 
2008), and as a “problem” needing to be “managed” by policymakers (De Haas, 2008). According to 
many European leaders and media reports, the ways to stop the influx of “unwanted” migrant 
populations reported to be increasingly gathering at the shores of North African “transit” countries 
waiting for an opportunity to enter Europe, is to tackle the “root causes” of migration, while also 
increasing border controls.31 With Tunisia and Libya’s cooperation, Italy had introduced aggressive 
interception-at-sea tactics, systematically turning away precarious boats with dozens —asylum seekers 
and economic migrants alike— aboard, in direct contravention of asylum processing guidelines and 
laws of the sea. The Spanish-Moroccan repatriation agreement, as it was implemented, also appeared 
to be in contravention of asylum guidelines, by doing collectively what should be done on a case by 
case basis, that is, enforcing group expulsions which deny asylum claimants rights to have their claims 
independently evaluated through due process.32 
European policy is achieving a degree of control of its external borders, but not without 
consequence: in blindly applying aggressive methodologies, Europe has been feeding a time bomb in 
its own doorstep, as overwhelmed Malta and Italy presently attest. In fact, in the height of the crisis, 
the UN appealed to EU leaders to open its arms to asylum seekers first and process them later, in 
precisely the same day Italy’s Foreign Minister Franco Fratini alerted Europeans of the looming 
invasion of a quarter of a million Africans stranded across the Mediterranean, while a few days later 
the country’s Interior Minister, Roberto Maroni, wondered “if it makes sense to stay in the European 
Union [if the EU does not collectively react against the perceived threat to Italy].”33 It is perhaps 
because of these extreme events and extreme positions that the terms “asylum seeker” and “refugee” 
are losing currency in Europe. Requests to stop repatriation processes are being overruled, and de 
facto refugees are being sent back to “safe” places like Iraq, even as EU delegations wear bullet proof 
vests and surround themselves with armed convoys in their visits to the country.34 
                                                        
28  Although he has since changed Italy’s stance, Berlusconi’s government resisted as long as possible to an 
intervention in Libya, a country with which Italy spent years strengthening a relationship. See for example C. 
Abadi, “A Regime We Can Trust: How did the West get Qaddafi so wrong?”, Foreign Policy, 22 February, 2011 
‹http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2011/02/22/a_regime_we_can_trust?page=0,0›. 
29  See, for example: The Economist, “Take my migrantes, please: An influx of North Africans causes a headache for 
the government”, 14 April 2011 (‹http://www.economist.com/node/18561247?story_id=18561247&fsrc=rss›); R. 
Maroni, “France blocks train from Italy in dispute over North African migrants”, The Economic Times, 18 April 
2011 (‹http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-04-18/news/29443719_1_joint-sea-and-air-patrols-north-
african-migrants-tunisian-immigrants›); or “France temporarily shuts its border to prevent the entry of Tunisian 
immigrants, fleeing from uprisings in North Africa”, The Australian, 18 April 2011 
(‹http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/france-temporarily-shut-its-border-to-prevent-the-entry-of-tunisian-
immigrants-fleeing-from-uprisings-in-north-africa/story-e6frg6so-1226040870002?from=public_rss›). 
30  See for example: E. Joszef, “Berlusconi veut ‘libérer’ Lampedusa de ses refugiés”, Libération, 31 March 2011 
(‹http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012328954-berlusconi-veut-liberer-lampedusa-de-ses-refugies›). 
31  The North African crisis is 2011 suggests it might be too late for this. 
32  “Acuerdo de 13 de Febrero de 1992 entre el Reino de España y el Reino de Marruecos relativo a la circulación de 
personas, el tránsito y la readmission de extranjeros entrados ilegalmente, firmado en Madrid. Aplicación 
provisional” (BOE núm. 100, 25 April 1992, and BOE Núm. 130, 30 May 1992 (also available online: 
‹http://www.mir.es/SGACAVT/derecho/ ac/ac13021992.html›). The agreement refers to ‘foreigners’ without 
determination of their status. During the crisis, thus, many of the foreigners who were de facto refugees appear to 
have been regarded as irregular migrants. 
33  See for example: R. Donadio, “Fears about immigrants deepen divisions in Europe”, The New York Times, 12 
April 2011 (‹http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/world/europe/13europe.html?_r=1&ref=global-home›). 
34  See Migration News Sheet: “ECHR: ‘Alarming rise’ in number of requests to suspend deportation”, [online] 
‹http://www.migrationnewssheet.eu/?page_id=2435›. 
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The difficulties of crossing African/European borders, now compounded by the political and 
military crisis, resulted in new, semi-permanent livelihood strategies of elongated liminality among 
migrant populations in these geographic transit nodes —somewhat like the strategies of “invisibility” 
found in Argentina. The situation in North Africa, of course, is of a different degree of severity and it 
remains to be seen where it will lead. What will happen to EU immigration policy in the aftermath of 
this crisis? And how will migrant networks respond? What consequences, if any, will be felt across 
the Atlantic in Argentina and Brazil? These questions will remain unanswered for some time. 
4. The emergence of Argentina and Brazil as potential destinations 
The geopolitical causal shifts described above demonstrate not only the versatility but also the 
interconnectedness and reactive immediacy of migratory dynamics in the region. Although a complete 
change in patterns and routes of migration possibly takes years to accomplish, the effects of policy 
shifts may indeed start to trickle down fairly soon after implementation. There is, thus, a quasi-
permanent disconnection between policy-making and the reactions among migrant networks, which 
adapt as quickly as possible but may require time and repeated experience to ascertain the extent to 
which the changes affect them (Marcelino, 2010). 
It should be unsurprising, then, that African migrants started to appear in considerable 
numbers at the Argentinean coasts (as in other receptive countries) right after 9/11, and particularly 
after 2006. At that moment, a combination of a lenient immigration law in Argentina, and a stringent 
regime in the EU compounded push and pull factors into a window of opportunity that thousands of 
migrants knew to take advantage of. In spite of the difficulty in getting to and making a living in 
Argentina, migrants appear convinced that the immigration legislation and a more accepting public 
opinion still makes it worthwhile. 
But how do Argentina and Brazil fit in the global migratory flows of Africans, and how are 
the two countries co-opting —or distorting— a migratory corridor so far away? Ostensibly, as ultra-
peripheral geographical nodes with diffuse/frontier interest to at least some migrants, offering up an 
alternative to saturated and more challenging, if preferable, destinations. The attractiveness of 
Argentina is inversely proportional to the heightened security measures in the European continent. 
African citizens have entered the country using different strategies and constitute presently a 
diverse and complex legal situation. Some of the processes identified are indicative of strategies 
encapsulated in a nexus of migration by stages. In that context, the Triple Border with Paraguay and 
Brazil would be one of the earliest phases of the migratory journey, possibly using irregular access 
methods. The present study has allowed the preliminary conclusions that the selection of Argentina as 
a destination in African migratory projects is part of a wider Atlantic geopolitical context in which 
Argentina is likely currently an outpost. Although further in-depth studies of the motivations for 
migration at the source are necessary,35 it is suggested here that the strengthening, tightening up and 
closure of borders in the EU and in the United States, as well as the systematic persecution of African 
migrants within their borders (racial profiling; enhanced land controls, such as those currently 
practiced by France along its border with Italy) might be pushing migrants to furthest, but as of yet 
supposedly “amicable” countries such as Argentina. 
In this wider geographical nexus, Brazil and Argentina, despite the distance, can be 
configured as major transit options and, perhaps final destinations, due to their symbolic capital, their 
socio-economic stability, the perception of economic opportunity, and the perception of a migratory 
normative that is less aggressive (and less active) than in other countries. In reality, the dire situations 
faced daily by migrants in Argentina do not necessarily confirm these findings. In many cases, 
migrants from outside South America end up in a legal vacuum, forced to accept a de facto status of 
“permanently temporary”. It is, nonetheless, possible to preview the signs of a growing transnational 
activity amidst the immigrated African community, pointing toward a consolidation process of this 
                                                        
35  Studies such as those directed by Carling or De Haas. 
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specific migratory corridor. Perhaps this is an indication that —barring stringent measures in the 
national immigration normative— Africans are staying, as they did in other transit nodes. 
There are hard reasons and soft reasons for the choice of either country. Firstly, both are 
traditionally receptive to immigration, from the legislative and the societal point of view. The 
immigration normative also allows migrants some room to seek temporary or permanent settlement (see 
4.1.). The principle of non-refoulement is followed in both countries, and Argentina in particular does 
not practice repatriations (even when they are sometimes ordered). Secondly, there are strong symbolic 
elements that may be easy to dismiss but could be attractive for migrants (at least in their own 
narratives): both Argentina and Brazil have a long history of humanism, independence, and defiance. 
Both countries have famous football teams, a fact that should not be underestimated in a football-
obsessed continent, particularly when most of the migrants correspond to the football-crazy demographic 
group. Finally, Argentina has a reputation of being a rather cultured, “European-style” country. For 
migrants locked out of Europe, it might prove to be one of those tiny coins that tip the scale. As to 
Brazil, with 65-million afro-descendants, it is, after Nigeria, the largest African nation. Surely, this can 
constitute an incentive. Interestingly, the labor market does not appear to bear particular influence in the 
choice of destination, in stark contrast with comparable contexts. Instead, informality seems to dominate 
this particular migratory flow, itself creating the trope with which African migrants came to be 
associated in Buenos Aires: that of trinket sellers (vendedor de baratillas).36 
But are Argentina and Brazil nothing but transit nodes, in a route that migrants expect will 
take them north to the United States? The answer is, “maybe”. Yet, past evidence demonstrates that 
the migratory project often changes after departure. Despite the difficulties found in Argentina and 
Brazil, there is some likelihood that the respective governments will eventually fill in the gaps and 
address the needs of African migrants —at least those already there— in a way that European and 
North American governments could not or would not do. 
The slow development in Argentina of a legal corpus addressing the novel realities of 
migration suggests a hesitation to tackle the current challenges head on. In other transit countries, 
typically African frontier nations, which were themselves until recently net senders of migrants, 
legislation approval has been haphazard, ad hoc and mostly reactive. Legislative voids have often 
been tacitly co-opted by European policies that respond to the EU’s own interests. As a historically 
significant net receiver of migrants, however, Argentina is in a completely different situation, being 
well equipped with legal instruments, doctrine and plentiful precedents. And yet, the process of 
legislative updating is surprisingly slow, as is the creation of regulations to supplement and monitor 
existing laws. Although this is clearly rooted in the state’s limited capacity, it can also partially be 
explained by a deficit in national identity tropes. 
While Argentina has a consolidated identity, it does not fully recognize and embrace the 
different ethnic elements that compose it. Thus, the arrival of a small group of “exotic” migrants 
assumes a disproportionate weight in the imaginary of a “white nation”, a national identity that is 
“is always in the state of becoming”, in the words of Cecil Foster. He further suggests that “[e]ach 
time an immigrant arrives […] [s]he seeks to re-open and even restructure the compact that is the 
                                                        
36  Differently from many other cases, the labor market appears to be in focus for its irrelevance in this case. 
Interviews with MyRAR representatives, for instance, reveal that only a minimal number of African migrants 
achieve a job placement through the institution every year, despite its best efforts. On several instances, 
Argentinean informants noted that support to migrants was always carefully monitored and balanced against the 
realities of the country’s own vulnerable populations. Brazilian researcher Andrea Pacheco Pacifico posited the 
same for Brazil (see: A Pacheco Pacífico and PF Marcelino ‘The Quest for Refugee Integration in Multicultural 
Brazil’, paper presented at the XXIX Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Toronto, October 6-9, 
2010). Informality and invisibility are strong markers of this type of vulnerable migration. In this particular 
corridor, invisibility appears to be part of a strategy of survival. The downside, of course, goes beyond issues of 
race: selling trinkets in the street launches the migrants into a vicious cycle from which they can hardly find an 
autonomous exit.  
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existing social order,’ so that ‘[c]onsensus, no matter how long it had taken to achieve, is 
threatened” (Foster, 2010).  
5. Transit, invisibility and liminality 
Some African informants have remarked during unstructured interviews that they have, on occasion, 
been mistaken for or presumed to be other black residents —most frequently Haitian, but also Afro 
migrants from neighboring countries. While this anecdotal evidence does little more than confusing 
the subjects, it also provides a degree of invisibility to this community by masking its numbers. 
Strangely, despite Brazil’s recent economic and political approximation to Africa, and despite it being 
easier to “disappear” there, many migrants surprisingly still opt for Argentina. This appears to be the 
case, notably, of Senegalese —the largest African group in the country— ignoring a bilateral 
agreement between Senegal and Brazil that gave them tourist-visa access to the latter.37 
It is necessary to illuminate aspects of “invisibility” (Polzer and Hammond, 2008) and 
“liminality” in migrant life. This approach zooms in on the everyday experience of the subject, as 
opposed to the prevalent discourse in most inherently policy-oriented studies. The study of the 
experiential and relational “process” of migrant “illegality”, incorporating broader “processes of 
social transformation”, allows for the elaboration of life-worlds, intimate understandings, and gets 
closer to the heart of what anthropologist Clifford Geertz referred to as “thick-description” (Geertz, 
1973). Phenomenological studies of migrant illegality must necessarily include the recognition of 
the effects of juridical status —as a socio-political condition of being “illegal”— where the lack of a 
legal status evidently results in social exclusion, ostracizing, invisibility, and suffering. Invisibility 
may, however, extend beyond being merely a relational concept, to be utilized by migrants as an 
adaptive strategy. 
To be or not to be recognized, categorized, identified and/or accounted for, through formal 
means, institutions, or institutional actors, becomes a rational choice informed by something akin to 
Scott’s “weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1985). In this case, referring to ways in which vulnerable 
individuals attempt to stay invisible to the “powers that be” by hiding and obscuring identities and 
activities that the state or other powerful institutions prohibit (Kibreab, 1999). Invisibility is therefore 
a survival resource, and refers to the utilization of informal sectors for sustenance. The informal 
incorporation in society becomes a survivalist strategy of interaction with local populations as well as 
authorities, taking place in a social context largely autonomous of laws and policies of the state, 
although agents of the state may be involved in the process. So, while Africans are highly visible in a 
largely white Argentinean society, they can also rely on the existence of other “Afro” elements to be 
utilized as identity vehicles. This liminality results in a variety of “in-betwixt and in-between” states, 
where the notion of “embodied liminality” as a phenomenological lived–experience of the everyday 
life is coupled with the in-betweenness of being in transit, that is, neither here nor there, neither home 
nor a guest. 
The term “transit” migration, finally, does not fully recognize the dynamic nature of the 
migration experience, nor the change and adaptation processes that permeate it. While recognizing 
liminality as part of the process, it also attempts to understand migration as fixed aspirations, choices, 
and decisions, ignoring the fact that some migrants change their goal of further migration. 
There is today a continuum of mobility whereby not every migrant is —either voluntarily or 
involuntarily— just passing by; many are indeed staying “in transit” for increasing periods of time, 
laying bare the multiple realities of sending countries, “transit” countries, and destination countries, as 
well as the “imagined worlds” (Appadurai, 1996) of migrants themselves —their borderless lives in an 
increasingly bordered world— that characterize contemporary migration flows in Africa. How this is 
                                                        
37  Evidence of this is limited to multiple statements made during the authors’ interviews with professionals working 
with African migrants and refugees in Buenos Aires, who claim to have had hints from migrants in this respect. 
This particular case was also specifically articulated by the leader of a migrant advocacy group with significant 
reach. Direct migrant narratives are absent in our sample. 
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affecting conceptions about migration and processes of integration and exclusion is as yet undefined. 
Geopolitical changes have altered the focus of migration pressures, by limiting the prospective 
migrant’s access to traditional, geographically closer, and easier destination countries as a 
consequence of stricter immigration policies. African migrants are crossing permeable borders, one by 
one, testing different frontiers, and ostensibly attempting to reach farther. The conflict between their 
aspirations and the political and economic realities of a fenced up world creates a social vacuum and a 
geopolitical challenge of unprecedented might, and with unforeseen consequences.  
C. Africans in Argentina 
The recent arrival of Africans in Argentina takes place in a particular context: that of a society that has 
historically denied the significant presence of Africans and Afro-descendants in its territory, and 
consequently their cultural influence. Mirroring the exiguous role given to the African population in 
Argentina, foreign relations with African nations have traditionally been marginal. In contrast to the 
policies followed by neighboring Brazil, Argentina’s bilateral relations with Africa —particularly sub-
Saharan countries— have been erratic and unpredictable. 
However, the recent arrival of black immigrants from that continent coincides with a renewed 
interest in Africa from several groups fighting to promote its visibility and heritage not only in 
academic terms but also from a socio-political point of view. In this context, the purpose of this 
section is twofold: on the one hand, to briefly depict the study of Africans and Afro-descendants in 
Argentina, both from a historical point of view and based on the current situation; and, on the other 
hand, a political perspective depicting relations between Argentina and African countries. 
1. Africans in Argentina in colonial times and beyond 
The presence of black Africans in Argentina has been historically neglected by an unfortunate 
numeric argument, its low incidence in Argentina’s population. The fact that the number of slaves in 
Argentina was much smaller than in other Latin American regions (such as Brazil, Peru, or the 
Caribbean), on the one hand, and that the population was severely downsized as a result of both wars 
and epidemics, as well as miscegenation (mestizage), were often provided as arguments for the little 
relevance given by the Argentinean official discourse in the past. However, as many authors point out, 
despite the fact that these are real causes, they are not adequate reasons to explain the seeming 
disappearance of Africans from the territory. These reasons should be found in the influence of 
“civilizing” models of thought that have purposefully denied their presence (Piccotti, 2001). 
The arrival of Africans started just a few years after the second foundation of Buenos Aires 
and extended first to the most developed and commercially relevant region of Tucumán. Florencia 
Guzman points that the relationships with Africa were not direct and that very little is known about the 
places of origin of the slaves brought over to Argentina. The period of most intense slave trade was 
circa 1792, continuing on till the abolition of traffic in 1813 (Guzmán, 2006).  
Gladys Perri clearly states that several myths crosscut Argentinean historiography, and have 
unfortunately been extended to education. “The idea that in Buenos Aires there were no black people 
—and much less slaves— has endured in national history” (Perri, 2006).  
Marta Goldberg, in 1976, and years later Reid Andrews, in 1989, put in evidence and 
quantified the presence of black Africans in Argentinean territory. In Buenos Aires in 1810, black and 
mulatto population constituted 29.5 per cent of the population and in 1838 23.7 per cent. Perri, using 
findings from José Luis Moreno and Carlo Mayo, shows that the presence of blacks in the countryside 
was also significant (Perri, 2006). In 1744 they were about 15.4 per cent of the population and in 1815 
about 7.8 per cent (although in absolute numbers the registered slave population increased from 303 
(in 1744) to 3346 (in 1815). 
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Florencia Guzman also shows that the presence of black population was even more intense in 
the northeast region: the 1778 General Census indicated that the number of black, mulattos, brown, 
and zambos represented 44.5 per cent of the total population, while the indigenous people were 35.5% 
and whites 19%) (Guzmán, 2006). 
However, in later counts, the percentages significantly decreased, stimulating controversies 
regarding the actual evolution of the population and the way it was portrayed. Alejandro Frigerio 
considers that the dominant narrative emphasizing the whiteness of the Nation has conditioned the 
way we have explained the evolution and the role of Afroamericans (Frigerio, 2008). In contrast to 
many other Latin American countries, Argentina does not glorify its “mestizage”, but it does its 
“whiteness”. An ideal image of how Argentina is and how it should have been works as a structure 
that strongly conditions the way studies have been carried out. This dominant narrative characterizes 
Argentina’s society as white, European, modern, rational and Catholic. This narrative oversees 
processes of racial and ethnic mixture and cultural hybridization and emphasizes on the early 
disappearance and the irrelevance of Afro-Argentines to the local culture. He also considers that there 
is another contextual factor that has contributed to the disappearance of black population in 
Argentinean society: the system of racial classification. Using one of Reid Andrews’s findings, 
Frigerio illustrates how a change from a three category to a two category (white and black) system of 
racial classification had a significant effect on the percentage of black population in Buenos Aires: 
whereas that percentage was 23.7 per cent in 1838, it decreased to 1.8 per cent in 1887. 
Since the mid-1980s, studies of Africa, Africans and Afro-argentines, particularly regarding 
Africans in the XIX and XX centuries, have gained significant impulse.  
2. African immigrants and Afro-descendents  
at the turn of the 20th century 
The recent arrival of Africans to Argentina has been studied mainly by anthropologists. According to 
Frigerio the intense social and cultural militancy carried out by immigrants and increasingly numerous 
local followers drew the attention of anthropologists. “The new black presence in the city stimulated 
the production of papers for congresses and masters thesis not only on every modality (of African 
participation) but also on their interactions, synergies and conflicts among them” (Frigerio, 
2008:134). This impulse was mounted on a growing interest in the historical, anthropological and 
cultural studies on Afro-Argentines that resulted from both changes in theoretical point of view (the 
emergence of a multicultural narrative) and the upsurge of a new social movement (Afro-Argentine 
militant groups, cultural activism, participation in transnational black movements) (Lecchini, 2008). 
The academic production on these immigrations from Africa points out that one of the main 
limitations is the lack of representative information. As it will be further argued, data on African 
population from the 2001 census is outdated and the only additional quantitative, but incomplete, 
sources of data come from the immigrants requests for any type of residency (including refugee) 
status. Due to this important limitation, most of the research has to rely on data of this kind, completed 
by ethnographic information collected from interviews with migrants themselves, and/or public 
officials and NGOs’ staff. 
Argentina received an inflow of sub-Saharan Africans, particularly from Cape Verde and 
South Africa, at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century. Marta Maffia 
consistently studied the Cape Verdean immigration which first was linked to the whale hunting 
industry in the southern seas, and later gained relevance, particularly from the 1920s onwards, when 
one of the worst famines devastated that country. A third flow entered Argentina in 1946, when two 
other famines hit the islands, but around the 1960s this flow decreased, coinciding with the beginning 
of Cape Verdean migration to Europe (Maffia, 2010a). 
Research carried out by Maffia showed that Cape Verdeans in Argentina, unlike their 
counterparts in the United States and in Portugal, did not form closed groups, and refused to maintain 
traditional practices. She found that this was partly due to the fact that many have traumatic memories 
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of their places of origin and did not want to remember; others denied their African, black, Cape 
Verdean origin (calling themselves Portuguese); and a third group who experienced upward social 
mobility and did not want to have contact with those from lower statuses. The Argentinization of Cape 
Verdeans is interpreted as part of the imperative of the Argentinean state to nationalize and civilize 
immigrants and their children. “At this point, we can conceptualize invisibleness as a strategy born 
partly from the historical process in Cape Verde, linked to African and black denial” (Maffia, 
2010a:172-173). 
According to Frigerio, the high invisibility of Afro-Argentines during the 20th Century started 
to crack at the turn of this new millennium, with the constitution of some black Afro-descendant 
militant groups (Frigerio, 2008). He states, for example, that two black activists arrived in 1996, both 
international consultants for the Inter American Development Bank, both women —one a slave 
descendant and the other a first generation Argentine-Cape Verdean— and founded Africa Vive. This 
NGO had the purpose to put an end to the invisibility of the black population in Argentina, helping to 
promote their congeners and, generally speaking, reclaiming the role of black people in history and in 
Argentina´s society. 
Regarding the context in which sub-Saharan immigration to Argentina occurs, Marta Maffia 
points out that this late arrival of black African immigrants originates in a historical and political 
milieu significantly different from those of previous migrations (Maffia, 2010b). 
She points out that recent sub-Saharan immigration is heterogeneous in many regards, such as 
countries of origin, religion, migratory status, educational profiles, social networks, access to 
information, or access to communication and transportation. Even though violence and political unrest 
in their countries of origin may have triggered migration, the main migratory reason for immigrants 
from Senegal, Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali, Ghana, and Ivory Coast to come to Argentina is economic, 
particularly the lack of labor opportunities at home. Most migrants can be found in densely populated 
areas where informal labor opportunities abound: primarily Buenos Aires, but increasingly also La 
Plata, Morón, Avellaneda, or Villa Gesell. 
a)  The Senegalese population: `Little Dakkar´ in Buenos Aires 
The single most studied group of recently arrived Africans in Argentina is the Senegalese 
community. These immigrants have lower levels of education compared to other groups, but also present 
various particularities. Traoré, in his ethnographic study identifies two ethnic groups residing in 
Argentina: Wolof and Diola, one from the North of Senegal, principally from Diourbel, and the other 
from the province of Ziguinchor (Traoré, 2006). They came from rural areas, have low levels of 
education, and live in different neighborhoods in Buenos Aires. Members of one group work mainly in 
street vending, whereas members of the other group work as wage workers in small scale enterprises.  
According to Zubrzycki and Angelli nowadays they are mainly coming from the regions of 
Thies, Diourbel, and Dakar, and are all Muslims (Zubrzycki and Afgnelli, 2009). These authors 
conducted a series of interviews and found that they arrived over the last two years, traveling alone 
and entering Argentina through Brazil. The most common trip detected has been Dakar-Fortaleza 
(Brazil), or alternatively Dakar-Cape Verde-Fortaleza, by air, then on to Sao Paulo by bus, 
continuing to Argentina crossing the Uruguayan border. Most of them have friends or relatives in 
Argentina and make use of migratory networks both to leave their country of origin and to get 
established once they are in Argentina. According to their interviewees, there is an organized 
network in Senegal facilitating migrants’ access to visas to enter Brazil, and providing contacts at 
arrival, and at the border crossing. Once they arrive, kin lend them merchandize to sell and provide 
company during their first street experiences. 
Cicogna explains the political and economic reasons that triggered immigration from Senegal 
and the recent increase in the number of asylum seekers (Cicognia, 2009). She points out that since the 
attenuation of the conflict in Casamance, in 2006, there seems to have been a shift in the motivations 
of asylum seekers. Afterwards, only isolated cases should be coming as asylum seekers from that 
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region, but on the contrary, the number of petitions grew significantly. The fact that many of these 
petitioners were using exactly the same argument in their applications called the attention of the 
National Migration Office. Nowadays, it is presumed that most recent applicants are part of a 
movement of human smuggling. 
Many others arrived in a less organized, more chaotic way, fleeing from violence or war, 
some of them even without knowing their destination. Blanco, in his article “Contingency, catastrophe 
and subjectivity in the African stowaways arriving to Argentina”, points out that many people from 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, among other countries, who had to flee from their countries did not 
know very much about the conflicts, and never intervened in direct combat but needed to escape at 
any cost, sometimes even taking boats with unkown destinations (Blanco, 2007). 
3. Africans in numbers: What statistics say on African  
immigration to Argentina 
Currently, the number of African born people in Argentina is unknown. There are several data sources 
to partially account for this population: census data; migration related registries; data on refugees and 
asylum seekers; and data from African consulates or Embassies. Even though the vast majority of 
immigrants from Africa need to get a visa in order to enter Argentina38 this type of data is not a good 
indicator of the presence of a particular immigrant group in a receiving country. In this section we 
compile all the available data in order to describe their countries of origin, their socio-demographic 
profiles and their geographical distribution. Despite the fact that these sources present some 
limitations (particularly regarding coverage or because data has been collected several years ago) they 
are the only ones that allow an empirical depiction of this migrant group. 
a)  African population in Argentina by the 2001 National Population Census  
According to the 2001 census data, the African born population in Argentina was small, 
about 1883 people. Even though they came from a variety of countries, four origins concentrate 
almost sixty percent of the African population in Argentina: Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and 
Algeria (Table III.1).  
Immigrants from Africa are predominately male (Figure III.1), although the percentage of 
women varies significantly by country of origin, ranging from 22 per cent in the case of the 
Senegalese population to 52 per cent in the case of Moroccan and Angolan populations.  
At the beginning of the millennium, immigrants from Northern Africa were more numerous 
that those coming from sub-Saharan countries (Figure III.2). It should be emphasized that among sub-
Saharan Africans, the proportion of women is significantly smaller (42 % vs. 48 %). 
Age profiles of this population, particularly the incidence of an older population, can be a 
proxy of time of arrival. There are five groups with a significant proportion of people who are 65 and 
older, indicating that they are old migrations: Cape Verde (59%), Tunisia (38%), Egypt (36%), 
Morocco (32%), and Algeria (31%). In contrast, groups with a large proportion of young population 
are those from Senegal, Nigeria, Congo, Angola, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. 
 
                                                        
38  The only countries that are exempted from this requirement are Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria.   
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TABLE III.1 
ARGENTINA, 2001: AFRICAN FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION  
CLASSIFIED BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH 









Egypt 328 17.4 17.4 52.1 
Morocco 287 15.2 32.7 47.7 
South Africa 213 11.3 44.0 49.3 
Argelia 160 8.5 52.5 40.0 
Tunisia 77 4.1 56.6 48.1 
Lybia 71 3.8 60.3 42.3 
Cape Verde 71 3.8 64.1 50.7 
Senegal 63 3.3 67.4 22.2 
Nigeria 49 2.6 70.0 38.8 
Ethiopia 46 2.4 72.5 41.3 
Congo 37 2.0 74.5 51.4 
Angola 36 1.9 76.4 52.8 
Ghana 31 1.6 78.0 19.4 
Sierra Leone 27 1.4 79.4 3.7 
Other countries 208 11.0 90.5 44.2 
Country not specified 179 9.5 100.0 48.0 
Total 1 883 100.0     
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FIGURE III.2 
ARGENTINA, 2001: FOREIGN - BORN AFRICAN POPULATION BY REGION OF ORIGIN 
 
Source: INDEC, REDATAM, 2001 National Population Census. 
 
 
Largely coinciding with this portrait, the presence of a high proportion of young immigrants 
is indicative of their recent arrival. The percentage of recent migrants —that is, those who lived in a 
different country five years prior the Census— is significantly high among those from Nigeria 
(100%), Sierra Leone (93%), Congo (59%), and Senegal (56%). Despite the fact that immigrants from 
Ghana and Angola are young, the percentage of those who arrived recently is much lower. In the case 
of Angolans, that might be explained by a parallel corridor from Angola to Brazil, already in the 
1990s, in the height of the civil war. It is possible that part of that migrant flow might have spilled 
over to Argentina (Pacheco Pacifico, 2010; Pacheco Pacifico and Marcelino, 2010). 
Regarding their current place of residence, most of the immigrants from Africa (three out of 
four) live either in Buenos Aires City or in the province of Buenos Aires (Figure III.3). The vast 
majority of those who live elsewhere reside in other large urban areas such as Córdoba, Mendoza, 
or Santa Fe.  
Another trait of the African immigrant population in Argentina is their high educational 
attainment, significantly higher than Argentina´s population (and clearly higher than any African 
country). About four out of ten African immigrants aged 18 and older have attained some tertiary or 
university education.39 There are no significant differences between immigrants from sub-Saharan 
countries and those from other countries in Africa (mainly from North Africa). 
Still, some specific groups, particularly those that have arrived more recently have 
significantly lower educational attainment. That is the case of the Senegalese population: only 35 per 
cent have a high school or higher education diploma, compared to 69 per cent of sub-Saharan as a 
whole. Others immigrant groups with low levels of education are those from Guinea-Conakry, Sierra 
Leone, and Tunisia. Cape Verdeans share the same profile, but mainly because it is an old population 
that arrived in Argentina many decades ago. 
 
                                                        
39  In 2001, and also according to census data, only 9.5 per cent of Argentina’s population aged 18 and older have a 
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FIGURE III.3 
ARGENTINA, 2001: FOREIGN - BORN AFRICAN POPULATION  
BY PROVINCE OF RESIDENCE 
 




ARGENTINA, 2001: AFRICAN FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AGED 18 AND OLDER, 
CLASSIFIED BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
Level of Education Sub- Saharan countries Rest of Africa 
Less than complete Primary Education 9.0 6.5 
Complete Primary or Incomplete High School 24.7 24.2 
High School Degree 23.8 27.5 
Terciary or University Incomplete 15.4 11.2 
Terciary or University Degree 27.1 30.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: INDEC, REDATAM, 2001 National Population Census. 
 
 
A note on African foreign born population in Brazil by the 2000 Census 
Even though Brazil was in the past an immigration country, nowadays the proportion of 
foreign born population is relatively small, reaching close to 700,000 in 2005 (Milessi, 2010), that is 
about 0.4% of the country’s total population. Among the foreign born population, more than half of 
them arrived several decades ago from countries such as Portugal, Japan, Italy, and Spain. At the turn 
of the millennium, immigrants from Africa were a minority, although in absolute numbers they 
represent a significantly larger population than in Argentina (15.679). 
Roughly 40 per cent of African immigrants in Brazil are nationals from Angola; 22 per cent 
from Egypt and 9 per cent from Mozambique. Most Egyptians arrived during the first half of the XX 
century and one out of two immigrants from Angola arrived between 1960 and 1979 (one third arrived 
since 1990). The arrival of Angolans to Brazil since the 1960´s coincides with independence wars. 
Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s guerrilla groups actively engaged against the colonial power, 
although different factions were also fighting among each other. Anti-colonial war was, thus, 
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the climate of war and violence fueled out-migration, and many people fled to Brazil, where their 
adaptation was not overly difficult given the cultural and linguistic commonalities. 
Regarding other traits of the African immigrants in Brazil as portrayed by the 2000 census, 
they are predominately men, with the only exception of Egyptians. Similarly to what has been showed 
for Argentina, only 43 per cent of African immigrants in Brazil are women. 
b)  Applications for permanent and temporary residency in Argentina  
Another source of data on African immigrant population in Argentina comes from the National 
Office of Migration, Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, Ministerio del 
Interior). A report published by this office presents the number of requests for permanent and temporary 
residency by country of origin. This data shows that even though the number of African applications is 
relatively small (in comparison to other origins, particularly from South America), it is large on account 
of the size of the African population counted by the 2001 Census. 
Table III.3 shows that between 2004 and 2009, 356 applications for temporary residency and 
296 for permanent residency were filled by Africans. Since it is not known how many people have 
applied for both during this period, it would be wrong to add up both numbers. However, the lowest 
estimate of the number of Africans who have applied is 353 (about 20 per cent of the African 
population in 2001) and the largest is 652 (about 35 per cent). 
These applicants come from 35 countries, but a handful concentrate almost 80 per cent of 
all applications for permanent residency (Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, 
Cameroon, Egypt, and Sierra Leone). On the other hand, the same proportion of temporary 
applications was filled by people from Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Cameroon, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. 
c)  Asylum seekers and refugees 
According to data from UNHCR, by July 2010, there were in Argentina 3,233 refugees, 
whereas the number of asylum seekers was 329. The acceptance rate by December 2009 (tasa de 
reconocimiento) was 14 per cent. Data provided by Fundación Comisión Católica Argentina de 
Migraciones —the agency acting on behalf of UNHCR with the mission of assisting and providing 
support services for refugees and asylum seekers— shows that the number of refugees reached a peak 
in 2008, decreasing sharply in 2009. The countries of origin of petitioners were mainly Senegal (28%) 
and Colombia (22%), followed, among others, by Peru (9%), Cuba (5%), Haiti (5%), the Dominican 
Republic (4%), and Nigeria (3%). 
The presence of Africans was much more considerable among those petitioners younger than 
21 years old. Petitions made by children and very young people account for less than 10 per cent of 
the total number of petitions. However, almost half of these were by youngsters from Senegal (16%), 
Nigeria (10%), Ivory Coast (10%), Guinea-Conakry (6%), and Ghana (6%).   
The number of petitioners from Senegal and Sierra Leone has increased overtime. The 2004 
and 2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks show that petitions from Senegalese increased from zero in 
1996 to nine in 1997, to twenty in 2001, and to 59 in 2005. In the case of people from Sierra Leone, it 
started with one in 1998 and reached 71 in 2004. 
According to Zubrzycki and Angelli (2009), using official data from CEPARE, between 2000 
and 2006, 501 petitions for refugee status by sub-Saharan Africans were filled: 18 from Guinea, 23 
from Ghana, 23 from Cameroon, 26 from Liberia, 29 from the Democratic Republic of Congo, 58 de 
Nigeria, 87 de Sierra Leone and 182 from Senegal. This number increased significantly in the 
following years; between 2006 and mid 2008 petitions increased to 594 (438 from Senegalese). 
Several informants interviewed for this report, as well as Cicogna (2009), have stated that the 
significant increase in refuge petitions by Senegalese coincides with the adoption of a strategy to 
obtain a regular residency in Argentina. 
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TABLE III.3 
ARGENTINA, 2004-2009: NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS FOR PERMANENT  
AND/OR TEMPORARY RESIDENCY BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
Country of Origin Permanent Temporary 
Senegal 83 81 
Nigeria 27 46 
South-Africa 26 25 
Morocco 25 6 
Algeria 19  
Cameroon 19 25 
Egypt 19 15 
Sierra Leone 15 25 
Burkina 9  
Angola 6  
Kenia 6  
Ghana 5 36 
Tunisia 5 4 
Guinea 4 17 
Ivory Coast 4 21 
Mozambique 4 2 
Ruanda 3  
Tanzania 3  
Cabo Verde 2 1 
Congo 2 6 
Nigerina 2 2 
Uganda 2 1 
Zimbawe 2  
Guineana Bissau 1 1 
Lesotho 1  
Libia 1 1 
Togo 1 2 
Liberia  22 
Kenia  6 
Burundi  3 
Ethiopy  3 
Central Africa  2 
Botswana  1 
Guinea Ec.  1 
Zambia   1 
Number of requested residence permits 2004-
2009: 296 356 
Source: Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, ‹http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/ 
accesible/?estadisticas›, (April 2011). 
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To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that have analyzed the reasons given in the 
petitions. It has been suggested, however, that conflicts in West Africa —particularly the Casamance 
conflict, involving Senegal, The Gambia, and at times Guinea-Bissau— were a common reason given 




ARGENTINA, 2005-2009: TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF REFUGEE STATUS PETITIONERS, 
TOTAL NUMBER AND BY PEOPLE UNDER 21 YEARS OLD 
 
Source: Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, ‹http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/accesible/?estadisticas› 
(April 2011). 
 
A note on African refugees in Brazil 
As will be further described, Brazilian legislation broadens the 1951 Geneva Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol definition of “refugee” to the individuals whose human rights have been seriously 
violated forcing him/her to leave his/her country of citizenship to look for refuge in another country. 
According to Milessi (2010) Brazil is known as having one the largest approval rates of refuge petitions. 
In her report, she shows that according to CONARE, the total number of refugees in Brazil by December 
2009 was 4,261. For the vast majority —that is nine out of ten— Brazil is the first country of asylum. 
About 65 per cent of refugees in Brazil (that is 2,760 individuals) are from Africa. 
Regarding the country of origin of these refugees, the vast majority of them (39.6%, that is 1688 
refugees) are Angolan, followed by Colombian (14.2%), and Liberian (9.4%), Iraqi (4.6%), from Sierra 
Leone (3.2%) and Cuban (3.0%). Pacheco Pacífico and Marcelino point out that in 1992, in the height of 
the Angolan civil war, about 1200 refugees arrived in Brazil and claimed refuge. “This is the moment 
when Brazil widens the net and extends the definition of refugee to meet guidelines set forth by the 
declaration of Cartagena of 1984. As of then, also those escaping credible widespread violations of 
human rights are eligible to seek refuge in Brazil” (Pacheco Pacifico and Marcelino, 2010).  
 
                                                        
40  The peak of asylum claimants was registered in 2006, as the conflict in Casamance wind down and then exploded 
again in several minor army clashes. The Argentinean government appears to have reacted with growing skepticism 
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d)  Africans portrayal by the media 
A few years ago, the most important newspapers in Argentina started publishing articles on 
Africans in Buenos Aires. If this population was already noticeable on the streets, they became more 
visible with the attention paid by the media. Investigative reports described why they were coming, their 
modes of entry, their demographics, countries of origin, and legal statuses. They showed concern with 
their situation from a humanitarian point of view, particularly for those petitioning for refugee status. 
A few headlines illustrate how they portray the new immigrants: 
• A new immigration: one African and one Asian arrive in Argentina every day (Clarín, 1 
November, 2006). 
• The number of children who arrive to the country petitioning for asylum and refuge 
grows. They are already 13 and 900 more applicants are expected. Many are Africans. 
They run away from miseries. They travel by themselves, are younger than 19, and seek 
to adapt rapidly (Clarín, 26 November, 2008). 
• Africa in Buenos Aires. Every year hundreds of young men from the black continent 
arrive in Argentina escaping from wars and misery: Where do they come from? What are 
their dreams? What do the bijou street vendors that took over downtown think about 
Argentina? (La Nación, 25 April, 2009). 
• Buenos Aires: A destiny for Africans. In the last two years the number of asylum petitioners 
grew 142%; most of them come from Senegal (La Nación, 7 September, 2009). 
• Once [a Buenos Aires neighborhood]: The Little Dakar of new African immigrants. In the 
neighborhood there is a numerous Senegalese community. They come to escape from 
poverty in their country (La Nación, 21 October, 2009). 
African immigrants were depicted by the media as mostly refugees or asylum seekers that are 
running away from conflicts over land, religion or racial/ethnic persecution. According to their data 
(quoted from UNHCR sources) in 2008 a high record of asylum petitions (859) were filled, 38 per 
cent of them by people from Senegal. They also pointed out that a smaller group of immigrants were 
coming just searching to improve their standard of living, entering illegally through the Argentina-
Brazil border. 
NGOs officials describe the ordeal of African asylum seekers in Argentina until some of them 
are able to obtain the status of refugee. Both refugees and those who have filled the petitions receive 
six months of food and housing support, as well as medical and psychological assistance if needed, 
and they could also take Spanish lessons. Those who obtain the refugee status are able to get their ID 
and therefore get a formal job. Meanwhile if their application is rejected they will stop receiving help. 
In terms of their demographics, these African immigrants are described as mainly young men 
(younger than 40 years old) who have arrived in Argentina with no family. They are mainly street 
vendors, and reside and work in only a few neighborhoods. In the holidays they travel to seasonal 
cities in order to sell their wares. 
On the rare televised pieces, the debate tended to focus on refugees and on the contentious 
issue of polizones (stowaways). A couple of years ago televised statements made by high government 
immigration officials revealed a discourse of concern about the rights and possible exploitation of 
African migrants, particularly children. There was an implication of the government’s obligation to 
assist.41 Admittedly, the government continued to support refugees, but was unwilling to condone 
irregular entries. Soon after the steep increase in requests for asylum from African nationals, the 
nuances of this discourse were slightly altered to more frequent and frontal cautioning about such 
                                                        
41  Federico Augusti in video interview, op cit. 
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entries, based on the presumed (and as of yet unproven) involvement of human trafficking networks 
that had to be rooted out, and on alleged waves of stowaways. 
An official from UNHCR in Argentina explains this trend: “[as] a consequence of the 
toughening of migration policies in European countries, Argentina turned into one of the favorite 
destinations for people escaping ethnic conflict, or simply hunger.” Since not everybody who gets here 
has been persecuted, only about 25 per cent of those are recognized as refugees. A public official from 
the Migration Office in Argentina points out that those who have been rejected as refugees either start an 
appeal at the judicial system (which can last for several years) or ask to be recognized as residents. 
In 2008, 62 minors entered Argentina seeking refugee status, and 130 were already living 
with that status. They would have come mainly from Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Guinea-Conakry. A 
significant number would have arrived as stowaways in ships. A public official from the Ombudsman 
National Office stated that the situation had surpassed their capacity to provide proper assistance. 
It is worth noting that one of the longest and more elaborated articles started with this 
enlightened and meaningful sentence: “It will be a mistake to say that, almost as if it were a 21st Century 
discovery, suddenly Buenos Aires became filled with black immigrants, when two hundred years ago, at 
that historical 1810, 33% of Argentina´s population had black blood” (La Nación, April 25, 2009). 
Thus, some writers were making use of the arrival of Africans to communicate to a broader 
audience a significant part of Argentina’s history that has been systematically hidden and denied. In 
other words, the arrival of Africans in the 21st Century is not only meaningful in itself, but also because it 
serves to reconsider and re-evaluate the historical presence of a black African population in the country. 
The overwhelming fact about media coverage of new African migration to Argentina, 
however, is the absence of frequent references. In a few cases, reactions to more critical articles were 
met with reader’s backlash. Likewise, online comment boards on Argentinean newspapers are 
abreast—as is often the case—with extreme comments for and against Africa migration. As of yet, 
there appears to be little impact of any of the above on public opinion. Africans are often conceptually 
aggregated to other black members of the Argentinean ethnoscape, which contributes to their 
invisibility. Public opinion appears to be puzzled by Africans as “exotic” elements of society that are 
seen but not really interacted with. Assuming the trend for African migration is to maintain a modestly 
active corridor, the authors see no evident rationale for negative public outlash, other than the 
occasional incident. This does not, however, absolve authorities of alleged institutional racism, nor 
does it absolve Argentinean society from seeking integration solutions for this and other newcomers. 
The growing influence and visibility of Afro societies in Argentina may, in the long run, provide a 
mitigating effect. 
4. Argentina’s foreign policy towards Africa 
Africa has never been a priority for Argentina’s foreign policy. Gladys Lecchini, an acknowledged 
authority on this matter, has stated that “[a] revision of the evolution of Argentine-African 
relationships throughout the last four decades, since the independence of the African States, shows 
that Sub-Saharan Africa has a low profile in the external priorities of Argentina, with a low density 
relationship, lack of continuity among different Argentinean governments both in the design of 
strategies and in the actions towards the region” (Lecchini, 2006). For Argentina, the place Africa has 
occupied can be appreciated in the context of its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement. 
One crucial aspect to understand the policies towards Africa since 1960 onwards has been 
Argentina’s own political and institutional instability. The series of democratic and military 
governments resulted in fluctuations in its foreign policy that varied according to periods, 
governments and international integration projects (Lecchini, 2006). In clear contrast with the 
Brazilian policy towards Africa, Argentina’s policies were driven by ideological, political or 
commercial impulses depending on the necessities of specific governments, and the relevance given to 
South-South relationships. 
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This inconsistency was clearly reflected in the states chosen by Argentina to orientate its 
actions, sometimes Ethiopia -where the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity was 
located- and most of the times, South-Africa. In any case, policy impulses have much to do with the 
establishment of embassies, diplomatic and commercial missions, conventions and sudden variations 
in trade balances. 
During the last military dictatorship Argentina’s foreign policy was oriented to defend 
territorial matters and West values adopting a National Security Doctrine (Doctrina de la Seguridad 
Nacional). In economic terms, the country was looking to find new markets for its exports. Yet, a few 
years later, all through the Malvinas War,42 Argentina tried to get African votes in the United Nations. 
With the advent of democracy Argentina started a phase of bilateral and multilateral contacts 
with African countries. They tried to consolidate South-South alliances, by cooperation and 
commercial relations. According to Buffa (2008), the political will to incorporate sub-Saharan Africa 
in Argentina´s foreign policy agenda was evidenced by the creation in 1987 of the sub-Saharan 
Direction in the Office of Foreign Affairs. Together with Argentina’s breakdown of foreign relations 
with racist South-Africa and the establishment of a Peace Zone and the Cooperation of South Atlantic 
the level of dialogue with Africa improved substantially. 
However, the situation changed in the early nineties, when a neoliberal government ruled the 
country,43 and defined different priorities in foreign policy. Its main traits were a strong and aligned 
relationship with the United States and the substantiation of the MERCOSUR. Argentina’s 
membership in the non-aligned movements was considered irrelevant and relationships with African 
countries were neglected. Argentina’s embassies in Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Zaire (currently 
Democratic Republic of Congo) and Gabon were closed arguing budget restrictions. 
More recently, since 2003, commercial relations with Africa intensified. According to 
Escudero (2008), in 2006 the largest commercial surplus came from Africa, particularly with countries 
such as South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Angola. These types of relations were promoted 
from the Foreign Affairs Ministry with significant success. In fact, it is believed that trade with 
African countries is currently growing. Commercial trade is mainly of agricultural products. Yet, 
Argentina is paying more attention to North African than sub-Saharan Africa and keeps giving priority 
to commercial relations than to cooperation policies (Bologna, 2006). 
Currently commercial and economic relations are prioritized. Last year, Argentina’s 
Chancellor, Héctor Timmerman, met with his peers from Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, and Tunisia, declaring that Argentina’s 
government is aspiring to deepen its cooperation with African countries in many areas, and for that 
reason “look[s] to expand and to widen the bases of an economic and commercial relationship.”44 
More recently, public officials from the agriculture sectors from fourteen sub-Saharan African 
countries gathered in Argentina with the Minister of Agriculture in order to strengthen bilateral 
initiatives to increase food staples production.45. The Minister stated: “Africa is the region in where 
much remains to be growing; FAO foresees that our regions (Africa and Latin America) will be the 
ones in providing a growing demand for food staples.”46  
                                                        
42  Falklands War. 
43  Carlos S. Menem (1989‐1999). 
44  Sala de prensa. Secretaría de Medios de Comunicación, Presidencia de la Nación. ‹http://www.prensa. 
argentina.ar/2010/ 10/25/13249-el-gobierno-busca-profundizar-sus-relaciones-con-frica-del-norte.php›. 
45  Ministers from Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Kenya and Uganda participated at the meeting. 
46  ‹http://www.pais24.com/index.php?go=n&id=116379›. 
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D. Legal conundrums: the regulation of migration  
and the situation of migrants 
1. The legal framework in Argentina 
As it has been said, the migratory status of Africans residing in Argentina varies from those who have 
already obtained some kind of legal residency (either temporary or permanent) and those who are 
staying under different non-regular conditions. In order to evaluate their current situation it is 
important to provide a brief description of the legal migratory framework in Argentina, allowing 
immigrants to obtain a legal residence, particularly in reference to asylum seekers or refugees. 
The Argentinean Migration Policy is defined by the Law 25871 and 16/2010. The law 
establishes several admission criteria for three broad statuses: permanent residency, temporary residency, 
or transitional residency. In accordance to the provisions of current legislation, the ways and 
requirements to obtain a residence is different according to whether the applicant is a native citizen of 
any MERCOSUR member country or associated states, or citizens of non-MERCOSUR countries. 
Africans, as non-MERCOSUR citizens, can apply for permanent residency if: he/she is a 
relative (child, spouse, or parent) of an Argentine citizen; is a foreign-born child of an Argentinean 
parent; serves as diplomatic or consular staff at international organizations; or has refugee status. They 
could also apply for a temporary residency under any of these categories: as a labor migrant (with a 
contract); a person of independent means (rentista); a retiree with a considerable pension; an investor; 
scientific or specialized personnel with a labor contract; athletes and artists who have a contract in 
their area; clergy of cults or religions that are officially accepted in the country; patients under medical 
treatment; minors with special needs that will be cared for in specialized medical centers; regular 
students; asylum seekers or refugees that have been granted that status; humanitarian reasons; special 
reasons (not contemplated in the above categories). Finally, transitory residents can be admitted as: 
tourists; passengers in transit; international crew members; seasonal workers; academic personnel; for 
medical treatment; and special reasons. 
Argentina has recently undergone a massive regularization program. This program was 
created by Decree No. 836/04 with the purpose of improving “the insertion and integration” of 
irregular foreign born people in the country by regularizing them. In accordance with the Residency 
Agreement signed by MERCOSUR countries in 2002, in 2005 Argentina’s National Direction of 
Migration was instructed by Decree Num. 578/05 to implement a specific program aimed at nationals 
from MERCOSUR and associate countries: Argentina´s National Program of Migratory 
Regularization.47 In contrast to previous regularization efforts, this initiative was not conceived as an 
amnesty. The program was considered a success; the total number of immigrants who initiated the 
process reached 423,697. Among them, almost one hundred thousand got their permanent residency 
and 126.385 a temporary residency; the rest were people who started the process but did not present 
the required information. The immigrant groups that got the most benefits were Paraguayans, followed 
by Bolivians and Peruvians.  
2. Argentina’s legal provision on asylum seekers and refugees 
Argentina is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. In 1984, it also signed the 
Declaration of Cartagena, and in December of 2006, Argentina’s Congress passed the General Law of 
Refugee Recognition and Protection incorporating international instruments to its national corpus of law.  
The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee: “As a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
                                                        
47  Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, Programa Nacional de Normalización Documentaria Migratoria. 
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having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 2011). 
The Convention is both a status and rights-based instrument and is underpinned by a number 
of fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement. 
The 1967 Protocol expands the field of application of the 1951 Refugee Convention, eliminating 
both the time frame established by the Convention and the geographical limitation in the definition of a 
refugee. The 1984 Declaration of Cartagena, a nonbinding international instrument, also extended the 
field of application including as refugee people who have fled their country because their life, security or 
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive 
violation of human rights or any other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order. 
Argentina’s Law 26.165, passed in 2006, incorporates previous instruments to national law, 
establishing that their provisions should be interpreted and applied in accordance with the principles 
and norms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Convention of Human 
Rights, The Geneva Convention of 1951 and the New York Protocol of 1967, and all other provisions 
or conventions applicable to the Human Rights and Refugees ratified by the Argentine Republic and 
or contained in the article 77, subsection 22 of the National Constitution. It defines the concept of 
refugee and its extension to family members, respects for the principle of non-refoulment, determines 
the juridical condition of the refugee and the body that is in charge of processing and conferring the 
refugee status. 
In Argentina the office in charge of determining if an applicant will be granted the refugee 
status is the National Commission for Refugees (Comisión Nacional de Refugiados, CONARE). It 
depends on the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerio del Interior) and is composed by members of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the ministries of 
International Commerce and Cult, Justice, Security and Human Rights, Social Development, the 
National Institute Against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism (INADI), the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), by a well reputed and long standing NGO 
assisting and defending the rights of refugees. 
The purposes of CONARE are: (i) to protect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers under 
the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic; (ii) to solve at first instance both the recognition and the 
curtailment of the refugee status; (iii) to solve the authorization of applications related to family 
reunification and resettlement; (iv) to approve plans for voluntary repatriation, and resettlement of 
refugees to a third country: (v) to assemble national, provincial and municipal authorities in order to 
propose common actions to ensure the protection of refugee rights, to assist refugees and their 
relatives, and to promote their social and economic insertion. 
To apply for refugee status a person has to present at the office of the competent authority (at 
any branch of the National Migration Office or any other national, provincial or municipal authority) a 
letter clearly detailing the reasons for the request, an ID (or a letter explaining why the person does not 
have an ID), two passport photographs and basic contact information. The process is free of charge. 
Within twenty days, the authorities have to grant the applicant a provisional certificate of 
residence (known as precária), to be extended for as long of a period as it takes for the case to be 
decided. With that certificate in hand the applicant can seek lodge, work and travel legally within the 
national territory. With this provisional certificate it is possible to obtain a labor ID code and to work 
regularly, protected under Argentina’s labor regulations. The applicant must renew this certificate as 
long as he or she is under evaluation. 
The applicant will be informed of CONARE’s decision by mail. If the response is positive, a 
refugee certificate will be granted in order to obtain a temporary residency (initially for two years, but 
renewable). Having the temporary residency he or she can obtain a National Identification Number 
(Documento Nacional de Identificación, or DNI) for foreigners. If the response is negative and the 
application has been refused, the candidate can appeal the decision to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
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If the appeal is denied, and once all administrative instances are exhausted, the candidate may resort to 
a judicial instance. 
3. Similarities and differences with the Brazilian  
migratory framework in Brazil 
Law 6815, passed in 1980, defines the juridical situation of all foreign-born residents of Brazil. The 
provisions of the Foreigner Status (Estatuto do Estrangeiro) address all immigration and extradition 
procedures, as well as asylum and naturalization. The Brazilian regulatory framework recognizes full 
immigrant rights only for permanent residents, whereas rights for temporary residents are restricted. 
In September of 2009 Brazilian government passed two important decrees. Decrees 
6964/2009 and 6975/2009, which enacted a Residency Agreement for Nationals of MERCOSUR 
(Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay), Bolivia and Chile. Similarly to what Argentina 
accomplished a few years before, these decrees made possible for nationals of these countries to work 
and reside in Brazil by presenting a few documents (passport, birth certificate, and no-criminal 
background certificates in both the country of origin and in Brazil). According to these decrees, the 
immigrants and their families have the same civil rights as Brazilians, and equal treatment before the 
law. Family reunification is also promoted and there is a commitment with social security rights 
acquired in another country, the right to transfer resources, and the right to the nationalization of 
immigrant children. 
In the same year Brazil adopted a system of regularization of migrants. Since the Estatuto do 
Estrangeiro passed in 1980, three regularization programs were carried out in Brazil, in 1981, 1988, 
and 1998. Irregular migrants were allowed to petition for a provisional residency. According to 
Millesi, the number of petitions was estimated at about 43,000 to 45,000. Immigrants from Bolivia 
constituted the largest group (5,492) followed by Peruvians (4,642).   
A note on the legal framework regarding refugees  
Despite the fact that the Brazilian refugee law was passed in 1997, the country had already 
ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol in 1989. The 1997 Federal Law (9474/97) 
created the National Committee for Refugees (CONARE). According to the representative of UNCHR 
in Brazil, this country has a significant experience with refugees, an advanced legislation, several 
“good practices” and is one of the most important countries in the Southern Cone regarding solidary 
re-settlement.48 
Some of the most significant traits of the procedures to claim refugee status are: (i) the 
claimant has to be in the national territory and has to express the wish to be recognized as a refugee, 
irrelevant of the point or mode of entry; (ii) the process is free of charge; (iii) the refuge claimant 
cannot be deported; (iv) the claimant has to fill in a declaration in his/her mother tongue, stating 
motives, personal information, and information on dependants (Pacheco y Marcelino, 2010)..  
Until recently, the Brazilian Refugee regime stood out compared to all other countries in the 
region, since it adopted specific legislation for refugees, respected the principle of non-refoulment, did 
not establish a deadline for formalizing the request once in Brazil, had a straightforward and 
transparent process, and had in CONARE a hybrid composition. 
Nowadays, Argentina has improved its standards, as shown in the previous section, by also 
passing a specific Law on Refugee Recognition and Protection, and establishing a specific office 
coincidentally also called CONARE. However, it would appear that Brazil has larger experience and 
greater commitment regarding resettlement practices. In 2004, it joined a resettlement program for 
Latin American refugees, which “enabled any Latin American country, when adequate, to associate 
itself to the program and receive refugees from other Latin American countries, helping to reduce the 
                                                        
48  [Online] ‹http://www.oreporter.com/detalhes.php?id=32192›, 11 November 2010. 
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impact of the humanitarian situation faced in the region, and sharing the burden of those countries 
with more recognized refugees—such as Costa Rica and Ecuador” (Pacheco Pacífico and Marcelino, 
2010:10). Argentina implemented the program in 2005. 
E. Future prospects for immigration in Argentina 
1. Geopolitical and ideological mores 
A paradox affecting the African continent is the contrast between the liberal concept of development 
requiring and begetting greater mobility (as widely recommended by international organizations such 
as the United Nations Development Program, or the International Organization for Migration, among 
others) set against the current migratory policies of the preferred destination outside Africa: Europe. 
The EU precepts of migration are changing on a daily basis, and three key moments could perhaps be 
identified in the context of migration to Argentina: (a) the signature, implementation, and total 
enforcement of the Schengen Agreement; (b) the creation of FRONTEX, and its increasing influence 
in migration issues across Europe and in the borderlands; and (c) the doctrines rising out of the North 
African crisis of 2010-2011. The latter is still occurring as this report is finalized, for which reason the 
authors deem it necessary to be cautious. The trend appears to be, nonetheless, that enhanced barriers 
to mobility will be enforced proportionally to the political instability in the Southern Mediterranean. 
Current trends appear to suggest a more heavy-handed use of migration prevention tools 
(legal barriers, enhanced coastal controls, walls in land borders, etc.), taking precedence, or at least 
equaling European development strategies and practices in Africa. In other words, the current crisis 
might be resulting in the most important backlash in public opinion in Europe, and therefore 
influencing the authority’s response. “Fortress Europe”, who for long favored development in Africa 
as a way to curb out-migration, is now overwhelmingly enhancing and enforcing effective barriers to 
mobility, including the suspension of the Schengen agreement (as posited by President Sarkozy) in 
cases of extreme need for specific national controls over the borders. 
These changes in Europe do not go unnoticed to networks of African migrants. Invariably, as is 
always the case, migrants will find another way in, or another place to go. But they will go. It is in this 
context that Argentina appears to tangentially gain importance in African migration circuits. On the one 
hand, migrants’ networks, increasingly informed of the hardships tied to the European route will 
gradually consider alternative destinations as viable, interesting options. On the other hand, Argentina’s 
own migrant-friendly ideology, and its path toward qualifying the right to mobility as a basic human 
right suggests that, while a tangible institutional response should be forthcoming, an outright ban on 
African migration is not to be expected. The corridor should, thus, remain modestly active. 
2. Expected trends in African immigration 
From a demographic angle, the maintenance, erosion, or reinforcement of an active migratory corridor 
between Africa (especially West Africa) and Argentina/Brazil is currently determined by a complex 
combination of both endogenous and exogenous variables. Perhaps it is worth noting, first and foremost, 
that migration in and from Africa is far from being a new phenomenon. Instead, extensive anthropologic 
evidence suggests African out-migration is as old as humanity itself, making this an inherently 
exogenous continent. Nonetheless, in consonance with international migratory data, migration from 
Africa is mostly migration within Africa itself. The most significant corridors in the continent occur 
between neighboring states. This makes apparent one of the strongest paradoxes in migration generally, 
but most particularly —and tragically— in the African continent: while mobility keeps increasing, so do 
barriers to mobility. When only the last six post-independence decades are considered,49 the obvious 
                                                        
49  With the notable exception of Ethiopia, which was never colonized (but for a brief period of Italian occupation), 
and Liberia (1847), all other African states conquered their independence after 1951. 
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conclusion is that barriers to mobility among ancestral ethnic groups located across multiple national 
boundaries have increased. Simultaneously however, there have been added pressures for migration, 
including droughts and famines, civil wars, and multi-state wars. The current crisis in North Africa 
neatly illustrates multiple dimensions of this conundrum. As a tragic example, in Libya tens of thousands 
of sub-Saharan de facto refugees and economic migrants were forced to flee the country as they could, 
heading for the borders of Tunisia and Egypt, two nations from which other refugees and migrants had 
just fled weeks earlier… to Libya. These massive flows of people have occurred time and time again, 
with every new conflict in the continent. Only a small percentage, as dramatically evidenced during the 
Rwandese ethnic conflict of the 1990s, ever managed to leave Africa. Most mobile Africans, thus, move 
inside the continent, as they have done ancestrally (UNDP, 2009). 
Africa’s population is the fastest growing in the world (United Nations, 2011), but resources 
continue to be among the most unevenly distributed. The expectation, thus, is that out-migration will 
continue to be a reality in decades to come, even as some bright spots of development surface across 
the continent. For these reasons, migration pressure —the differential between people’s wishes to 
leave and their capability to do so— appears to be increasing in the continent. Out-migration should, 
thus, continue to be a reality. With EU barriers consistently and increasingly shut, minor flows to 
alternative destinations are expected to consolidate. From this perspective only, some continuity in the 
flows to Brazil/Argentina is expected. 
3. Inclusion, exclusion, and informal incorporation 
Processes of inclusion and exclusion are subject to a variety of factors at any given time, including the 
sociological character of the host society, the size and origin of the migrant community, and others, such 
as ethnicity and perceived occupation and economic contribution of the newcomers. This report does not 
aim to clarify all the simultaneous and complex processes at play but rather underlines that this 
complexity has only began to be studied in Argentina. While a study of African integration in Argentina 
would warrant a wholly different approach, necessarily dwelling into Argentina’s unresolved Afro 
history, currently existing studies of ethnographic nature (focused overwhelmingly on Senegalese 
migrants) suggest that what is occurring in most cases is a process of increasing liminality, rather than 
inclusion or integration. Some important factors for this are briefly outlined in this section and the 
following one. However, it is at the confluence of them all that the integrative process focuses. 
Currently, informal incorporation in Argentinean society appears to have become a survivalist 
strategy of interaction with a local population who is curious but at times cautious or suspicious about 
the newcomers, but also with the authorities and agents of the state, most notably the police, who deal 
with day-to-day societal control. Invisibility, in this manner, becomes a tool of a deformed integration: 
the migrant is here, but is not really here. This in-betweenness is becoming normalized in liminal 
micro-societies incorporated in larger communities dealing with complex change. It is suggested that 
this is the case in Argentina, now faced with a side of itself it had long forgotten. Times are different, 
nonetheless, and in consonance not only with other traditionally multicultural destinations of migrants 
across the Americas, but also with Argentina’s own history of incorporation, it is suggested that also 
in Argentina this new community will eventually become one more component of the urban 
ethnoscape. This transition comes with time, contact, and knowledge. Integration of Africans in Brazil 
does not appear to present particular challenges, but is subject to the same racial undertones already 
present in Brazilian society, and to the same resistance observed in any countries dominated by middle 
classes. However, in a context of a fast-growing Brazilian economy and a government with a strong 
social pennant, concerns are limited. 
4. Media coverage and public opinion 
The overwhelming fact about media coverage of new African migration to Argentina is the absence of 
frequent references to it. In the past, national and local newspapers have referred to it on occasion, 
mostly in the form of background “human interest” stories. Considering more recent media coverage, 
however, it becomes apparent that, at some point, there was a transition to an angle of mild concern, 
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as evidenced by recent reports in Buenos Aires newspapers. More than trying to understand who these 
migrants are, and why and how they appear in Argentina, newer pieces question the state’s response to 
their entry, their legal status, and their liminal positions as members of the informal sector 
(vendedores de baratillas). In a few cases, reactions to more critical articles were met with reader’s 
backlash. Likewise, online comment boards on Argentinean newspapers are abreast with extreme 
comments for and against Africa migration. 
On TV, on the rare occasion this debate has been showcased, it has focused on two major 
aspects: refugees, and polizones (stowaways). Only a couple of years ago, televised statements by high 
government immigration officials revealed a discourse of concern with the rights and possible 
exploitation of African migrants, particularly minors. There was an implication of the government’s 
concern with their welfare.50 Admittedly, the government continued to support refugees, but was 
unwilling to condone irregular entries. Soon after the steep increase in requests for asylum from 
African nationals, however, the nuances of this discourse were slightly altered to more frequent and 
more frontal caution about African migration, based on the assumed involvement of human trafficking 
networks that had to be rooted out, and an alleged massive wave of stowaways. 
As of yet, there appears to be little impact of any of the above on public opinion. Africans are 
conceptually aggregated to other black members of the Argentinean ethnoscape, which contributes to 
their invisibility. By contrast, the most evident signs of Africans in Buenos Aires —those that 
everyone sees— are the street sellers in the inner city and in out-of-town beach resorts. Public 
opinion, at the moment, appears to be puzzled by the African presence, referring to them as 
“exotic”elements of society that are seen, but not really interacted with. Assuming that the trend for 
African migration is to maintain the corridor modestly active, the authors see no evident rational for 
negative public reactions, other than the occasional incident. This does not, however, illibate the 
authorities of alleged institutional racism, nor does it ilibate Argentinean society of the underlying 
racism that has existed since its inception. The growing influence and visibility of Afro societies in 
Argentina may, in the long run, mitigate this. 
5. Multicultural nodes in the urban space:  
“Little Dakar” in Buenos Aires 
In most cities, urban voids —central spaces that remain empty and unused— tend to be assimilated by 
groups on the margins of society, with results effectively depending on a diversity of factors. 
Increasingly, however, urban planners, architects, and cultural programmers have considered this to be 
a source of cultural and artistic wealth and diversity. While unattended urban voids quickly become 
eyesores and a negative focus of public health and security issues, urban voids adopted by migrant 
communities have been shown to become thriving new centralities for an alternative side of the city.51 
As urban life becomes more diverse, these new inner city centralities become multicultural nodes, 
catering to different nationalities and ethnicities in the city, and becoming important points of contact. 
It is in urban voids turned into thriving centers for newcomer communities that cultural 
integration becomes possible by making contact available, and serving as a multicultural idea and 
business incubators. There is no doubt, in the opinion of the authors, that co-opting into the active 
urban fabric that is already the transitioning Buenos Aires district of Once/Plaza Misére, anecdotally 
known as Pequeña Dakar (Little Dakar), will bring benefits to multicultural understanding and to the 
diversity of the city. 
                                                        
50  Federico Augusti in video interview, op cit. 
51  Urban voids were one of the main focuses of the 1st Lisbon Architecture Triennale in 2007, with dozens of 
internationally reknown architects and scholars presenting different solutions for these spaces, notably those 
undergoing cultural change. The blog archives are still available here: http://trienal.blogs.sapo.pt/.  Similar ideas on 
gentrification and urban renewal have been recently explored in major conferences in London, England, and 
Philadelphia, as well as in a variety of smaller interventions 
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F. Policy implications 
While this report makes no claim to have identified every single aspect of African migration in 
Argentina, and much less so its Brazilian offshoot, it presumes to have made apparent some of its 
most striking characteristics and paradoxes. In fact, there is admittedly a lack of warranted knowledge 
about a community that is as misunderstood as it is fascinating. In light of the reality on the ground, 
and the expected trends presented in the previous section, the following policy recommendations 
briefly sum up the paths suggested by the authors primarily to institutional actors. 
1. Broadening Argentina’s immigration policy 
Considering North American, Australian and European immigration legislation, both Argentina and 
Brazil’s current laws compare favorably, being less restrictive in a number of aspects. They 
consistently practice non-refoulement of asylum seekers. Brazil’s law and common practice are, 
nonetheless, more restrictive than Argentina’s and both on access and penalties (Brazil, as many other 
countries, routinely practices expulsions of irregular migrants, for example). 
Foreigners in Argentina, on the other hand, are afforded most social rights regardless of their 
legal status. The main issue of concern, in the particular case of African migrants, is the process of 
settlement as permanent or even temporary residents (radicación). As non-MERCOSUR citizens, this 
process becomes a sequence of paper work loops difficult to surmount for migrants that, all too often, 
entered the country irregularly, and may not be able to show proof of entry.52 The question is, thus, 
how to facilitate the regularization of such migrants. An answer to this question would link back to 
asylum policies. It is the opinion of the authors that the absence of a settlement process designed to 
address the needs of this specific group has resulted in deceptive uses of asylum mechanisms (see 
6.6.). Thus, what should be a fluid settlement process for those who are entitled to it, has instead all 
too often been replaced with a sequence of asylum claims evaluation, negative rulings and appeals. A 
final refusal leaves a significant group of migrants in a legal limbo, overstaying their welcome but 
staying nonetheless. This could be avoided by creating feasible access to proper settlement by African 
citizens, who are at the moment de facto, if not de jure, locked out of the system. 
Once migration pressure in Africa is set to increase, and that the migratory realities in both 
Europe and in the United States will continue to push migrants to find alternative destinations such as 
Argentina and Brazil, it is suggested that, rather than creating an access labyrinth, Argentinean 
authorities may wish to consider paths for integration and formal incorporation that include settlement 
as a viable alternative for qualifying candidates.  
2. Technical instruments for regional and African immigration 
In an increasingly integrated region, it makes political sense to seek common ground in immigration 
and refuge policies. Thus, Argentina might benefit from seeking to align its own precepts to those of 
fellow MERCOSUR member states, in particular Brazil, given its role in this specific migratory 
corridor from Africa. Sharing resources in this manner might result in budget savings as well as 
enhanced controls. It is further suggested that, in the long run, Argentina and its regionally integrated 
partners might consider immigration agreements with its African counterparts, most notably with the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), from which most African migrant 
currently come. Given the limited nature of Argentina-Africa ties, it is likely that this path could be 
initiated by way of bilateral or multilateral commercial integration agreements. This, in the opinion of 
the authors, should keep in mind the human aspects, considering migrants an asset, and thus aiming to 
incorporate them productively, in line with Argentina’s migration history. 
                                                        
52  France24 (video), “Migration: From Africa to South America”, op cit. 
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3. Enacting effective border controls 
As it was previously pointed out, there is little doubt that border controls are an important piece of the 
puzzle. Eliminating irregular entries in the country requires, on the one hand, the creation of and 
access to a feasible regular avenue; and on the other hand, an efficient and effective border control. 
Although air borders appear to be adequately controlled, the entrance of polizones suggests 
insufficient cargo control in some maritime borders. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, however, the 
major challenge is the vastness and remoteness of the land borders between the two countries, and 
with third countries such as Bolivia or Paraguay. Admittedly, the resources that would have to be 
allocated for an integral control are unfeasible. Nonetheless, an important reinforcement of air and 
river patrols, as well as human resources and technology in some of the key points of entry might be a 
necessary investment. Once again, state integration in matters of immigration would prove beneficial, 
and could potentially curb other irregular corridors, as well as illegal merchandise traffic. 
4. Rooting out smuggling and trafficking networks 
The authors of this report suggest there appears to be, as yet, little evidence of large scale trafficking 
of African migrants, although the resource to established local smuggling networks, for instance in the 
Triple Border region, indeed appears to be a commonplace. Moreover, the number of Africans 
presumed to be in Argentina could not have entered the country solely as stowaways. This discourse, 
thus, echoes others around the globe, whereby the “fear of the boat” becomes a trope representing an 
entire group, when in reality the group is using different methods. While in Brazil ships might be a 
convenient method of arrival, it is suggested that, in Argentina, land borders are probably the main 
points of entry. As recommended on 6.1., creating an avenue for regular migration might curb the 
need to resort to smuggling networks. By the same token, it is suggested that comprehensive 
investigation of currently existing smuggling networks might be necessary. Based on field interviews 
with migrants, and with professionals interacting with migrants daily, it is the opinion of the authors 
that most arrive in Argentina using smuggling networks, but not trafficking networks. Nonetheless, it 
is admitted that trafficking might be in existence, particularly in the case of minors. Dismantling such 
networks should be a priority, but requires extensive collaboration with African authorities, tackling 
the issue on the side of demand. 
5. Migration as a human right: The Argentinean path 
Given Argentina’s history, the process of arriving at a common charter of human rights has been 
remarkable and trendsetting by international standards. A long process of advocacy and consultation 
with numerous civil society institutions such as the Argentinean Commission for Refugees (CAREF) 
and the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), both in Buenos Aires, has mainstreamed the 
debate on migration and mobility as a basic human right. Using a legal path to achieve this result has 
largely contributed to root out discriminatory practices and slowly build a path to full acceptance and 
implementation of this right. Even when, as these organizations admit, institutional bias, as well as 
legal and civil challenges may subsist, there is no doubt Argentina is in the right path. In Brazil, the 
process has taken a different path, based on rooting out discrimination, very particularly racial 
discrimination. This might have trickle-down effects on the immigration policy. Both countries appear 
to be on the right track. 
6. Refugee and asylum in the context of South American humanism 
It is of vital moral importance to resume a normal process of evaluation of asylum claims, as per 
Argentina’s international commitments. As in Europe, the fast increase in the number of claims may 
have resulted in an institutional knee-jerk reaction, making the words “asylum” and “refugee” almost 
indissociable from economic migration. Opening up a formal path for regular migration might defuse 
the instrumentalization of asylum as a step in the migratory process, a fact that is admitted by multiple 
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agencies acting on behalf of the Argentinean state. It should also reinstate asylum as a fundamental 
mechanism aimed at supporting those who are truly vulnerable and in need of assistance. 
7. Capacity building of the immigration and police authorities 
It has been repeatedly noted in interviews with migrants, migrant collectives, and officials in state-
sanctioned agencies and organizations dealing with migrants, that one of the biggest challenges to 
refugees is the fact that police authorities, and civil society at large, often do not recognize the official 
refugee or asylum claimant documents. It is important, therefore, to act on two fronts: firstly, train 
immigration and police authorities to recognize such documents, and accordingly honor their value, 
recognizing also that their holders are often individuals in need of special social or linguistic support, 
requiring tactful approaches. This can only be achieved by mainstreaming training on the subject as part 
of other training activities; secondly, consider replacing the said documents with cards similar to national 
identity cards (DNI), which might more easily be recognized as official documents. The back of such 
document could also consider a brief list of rights entailed by it, such as the right to work in Argentina. 
8. Measuring and enhancing integration policies 
On a wider societal level, national campaigns for integration are necessary, educating citizens about 
the rights of migrants and refugees, and about the fact that the temporary residence document 
(residencia temporaria) in fact has legal tender, granting the holder the right to access the job market 
or to rent a house. Although this does not solve issues of racial discrimination that have been 
identified, it would be a step in the right direction. Sustained campaigns of this kind have shown 
positive results in other countries.53 
As widely noted throughout this report, it is of fundamental importance to promote, at the 
earliest possible moment, a widespread, anonymous, and state-backed quantitative and qualitative study 
that traces all information about migrants, identifying needs, and promoting integration policies to match 
them. Most importantly, it is necessary to identify those problematic issues in Argentinean society that 
might also need to be tackled. It is suggested that a broad study on migrant integration in Argentina 
might be an invaluable tool to assess and measure the real situation on the ground. This might be based 
on the European Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX), which has provided EU member states not only 
with useful statistical tools, but also with a vital barometer of the real effects of policy-making. 
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IV. International migration: Trends and  
institutional frameworks from 
the African perspective 
John O. Oucho54 
A. Introduction 
In Africa, the discourse on international migration has become the point of reference in global and 
regional cooperation whether from the perspective of trade, international relations or security in terms 
of development and human rights. Over the last decade, the African Union (AU) and the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) have paid special attention to migration from 
different perspectives, putting the topic at the centre stage of regional as well as sub-regional 
development (AU, 2006; ECA, 2006). Increasingly, countries are becoming more conscious of the 
implications of international migration for not only national development but also regional and sub-
regional concerns of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to which different states belong. To 
this end, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has developed the Regional 
Migration Policy Framework (IGAD-RMPF) and certain sub-Saharan African countries have either 
developed or are in the process of developing National Migration Policies (NMPs).55 
This study sheds light on African international migration trends and institutional frameworks 
intended to manage migration for the benefit of the countries of both origin and destination. The first 
part introduces the subject that has dominated discourse at national, regional and global levels and in 
which there is a constant search for durable solutions for all countries involved. Different types of 
migration discussed rationalize equally diverse institutional frameworks for migration management 
through globally binding initiatives as well as bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Subsequently, 
the study delves into institutional frameworks which guide international migration into and from 
African countries, including those guiding regional migration in the context of the African Union 
(AU) and different Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the region. The study also explores 
demographic and socio-economic attributes of migrants in migration policies; the first set includes age 
and sex, while the second comprises gender, educational and economic standing of the migrants that 
policies often address. In addition, the study concentrates on contemporary issues in migration policies 
                                                        
54  Consultant from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 
55  Nigeria, Rwanda and Zimbabwe have already formulated national migration policies addressing issues they 
consider pertinent on the basis of the migration situation and management of various migration types; and 
Uganda’s policy-formulation process is currently underway.  
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that African RECs and individual countries grapple with in migration management for the desired 
development, such as remittances as an indication of migrant origin-destination links; policies 
pertaining to circulation migration and transnationalism that are fast replacing longer-stay movements; 
and the consequences of the global economic crisis for migration flows. The final section consists of 
both conclusion and recommendations. 
1. Nature and scope of the study 
This study draws heavily from the experience of selected African countries from the region’s five sub-
regions, simply to elaborate certain issues in which the countries provide useful examples. The 
countries mentioned numerous times represent Africa’s linguistic blocs —Anglophone, Francophone 
and Lusophone as well as Arabic— whose policies are founded on their evolution and development 
challenges since independence. Although ranking as origin, transit and destination countries of 
international migration, African countries are largely origin and destination countries of intra-African 
and extra-African migration. The study adopts the United Nations categorisation of African sub-
regions as Eastern Africa (19 countries), Middle (9 countries), Northern (7 countries), Southern (5 
countries) and Western (17 countries), or a total of 57 countries. 
2. Typologies of international migration 
There is no single unanimously accepted typology of international migration. Bilsborrow et al. (1997) 
suggest an elaborated typology whose main characteristics are included below: 
• Permanent settlers: permanent residence status (South African whites, East Africa’s 
Asiatic people; naturalisation on acquiring citizenship; amnesty beneficiaries (black 
workers in post-apartheid South Africa). 
• Labour migration: unskilled/semi-skilled workers (domestic and menial workers); 
skilled/professional workers (brain drain and brain circulation). 
• Refugees and asylum seekers: within and outside of Africa; beneficiaries of third country 
settlement. 
• Undocumented/illegal/clandestine/unauthorised: often undocumented in any official 
records and changing residence to avoid being detected by national authorities. 
• Irregular migration: Dominated by victims of trafficking and smuggling. 
• Itinerant traders and business persons: Dominated women in Western Africa, 




ESTIMATES OF MIGRATION WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF AFRICA, 2011  
(As percent of all emigrants) 
Origin sub-region Destination sub-region 
Central Africa East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West Africa Out of Africa 
All Africa 3 13 2 11 21 50 
Central Africa 23 26 0 9 3 39 
East Africa 1 52 3 3 0 41 
North Africa 0 0 6 0 0 93 
Southern Africa 0 7 0 66 0 28 
West Africa 5 0 0 0 71 24 
Other regions 0 0 0 0 0 100 
Source: World Bank (2011), Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills and Investments, table 1.3, page 19. 
Note: Includes only identified sources and destinations. Rows may not sum to 100 because of rounding errors. 
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Intra-sub-regional migration is dominant, heaviest in Western Africa, followed by Southern 
Africa and Eastern Africa in descending order. Outside of Africa, Northern Africa contributes by far 
the highest percentage of emigrants, followed by Eastern Africa and Central (Middle) Africa in 
descending order. It would appear that Northern Africa’s proximity to Europe and previous political 
upheavals in Central (Middle) Africa might be some of the drivers of emigration from the sub-regions. 
3. Limitations and gaps 
This study has limitations on the subject of data availability. For example, population censuses in most 
African countries have not captured data on emigration whether the destinations of emigrants are 
within Africa itself or outside of the region. Moreover, national migration surveys have been sporadic, 
with the few undertaken limited to labour force surveys and clearly falling short of different types of 
migration and migrants. Lack of data constrains efforts to proffer meaningful migration policies and 
institute relevant programmes. Another limitation is the recent engagement of the AU with the EU, 
IOM and other organisations in matters pertaining to migration management. As it is too early to 
expect African countries and the RECs to which they belong, to initiate migration policy development 
and relevant institutions with adequate capacity to institutionalise migration management, information 
is lacking on virtually all aspects of the topic of this study. A third limitation is the lack of research 
and researchers studying migration as providing opportunities and posing challenges for development 
in Africa. Many arguments on either perspective amount to anecdotal evidence which cannot hold 
where empirical evidence is necessary for dependable solutions. Migration research has been starving 
of resources and migration researchers tend to stay within their disciplinary pigeon holes, hardly 
embracing multi-disciplinary research on a multi-dimensional subject.     
B. Institutional policies and arrangements 
There are five main issues: origin-destination links in terms of policy and legislative measures in the 
two settings and bilateral arrangements; international instruments and migrants’ rights; international 
migration in the context of regional integration: Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs); 
migrants’ rights in health and gender; and perspectives of migration and development.     
1. Origin-destination links of migration 
a)  Emigration without policy prescriptions in countries of origin 
Most African countries lack explicit policies relating to emigration of their nationals. Biennial 
enquires of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) of The Population Division of the 
United Nations provide useful insights of the country views and policies on international migration, 
distinguishing between immigration and emigration. The overwhelming response of African countries 
is ‘satisfactory’ view and ‘non-intervention policy’, suspiciously indeterminate responses due to either 
lack of reliable information or absence of explicit migration policies and strategies. Table IV.2 
provides some useful insights. 
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TABLE IV.2 
IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION VIEWS AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES  




View Policy View Policy 
Angola Satisfactory NI Satisfactory NI Probably not clear of emigration and 
immigration 
Cameroun Satisfactory Lower Satisfactory NI Emigration prone 
D.R. Congo Satisfactory Lower Satisfactory NI Emigration prone; just settling after decades of instability 
Egypt Satisfactory Lower Too low Maintain  
Ethiopia Satisfactory NI Satisfactory NI Emigration prone 
Ghana Too high Lower Too high Lower Emigration prone; immigration prone 
Kenya Satisfactory NI Satisfactory NI Emigration prone 
Malawi Satisfactory Lower Satisfactory NI Emigration prone 
Mali Too high NI Too high Lower  Emigration prone; immigration prone 
Morocco Too high Lower Too low Maintain  Emigration prone 
Nigeria Satisfactory Maintain Satisfactory NI Emigration prone 
Rwanda Satisfactory Maintain Satisfactory Maintain Emigration prone; encourages skilled immigrant labour 
S. Africa Too high Lower Too high Lower Emigration and immigration prone, the latter fuelling xenophobia 
Tunisia Satisfactory NI Satisfactory Raise Emigration prone 
Uganda Satisfactory Maintain Satisfactory NI Emigration prone 
Zimbabwe Satisfactory NI Too high Lower Emigration prone 
Source: United Nations (2006), World Population Policies, New York, DESA, Population Division. 
NI = No intervention. 
 
 
In all sixteen African countries but South Africa and Tunisia, which consider immigration too 
high, the dominant view on immigration is that it is satisfactory but policy responses vary from no 
intervention (NI) in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe and to maintaining (Nigeria, 
Rwanda and Uganda) and lowering in Egypt and Morocco. The dominant view on emigration also 
pertains to satisfactory, though traditional emigration countries like Ghana, Mali and South Africa 
consider it too high. Policy response is predominantly no intervention; Ghana, Mali, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe consider lowering it; Egypt and Morocco (which consider emigration too low) and Rwanda 
wish to maintain it; and Tunisia is the only country wishing to raise emigration It is likely that 
migration scenarios in respective countries correlate with these diverse views and policies propagated. 
Yet, in the absence of migration policy, the responses reflect the position of national governments and 
fail to capture perspectives of individuals and the households with varying perceptions of immigration 
and emigration.56 
Before the AU galvanised the support of Member States to adopt the AU Migration Policy 
Framework of June 2006, the debate on international migration featured only in RECs, with their 
Member States sharply divided in their responses to and handling of an issue which lies at the core of 
national, regional and global development agenda. The AU stewardship has stimulated migration 
policy development in Africa, with some countries already having national migration policies. 
                                                        
56  Calls for national migration surveys in Africa in the mould of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been 
made, but the calls have been ignored, even by international organisations working on migration issues. This 
reflects the reluctance of world nations to address international migration in the Programme of Action of the 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994, instead favouring partial initiatives such 
as the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), annual meetings of the Global Forum for Migration 
and Development (GFMD), the Global Dialogue on International Migration (2006) and so on, which are no means 
binding. Moreover, all these address global, regional and national perspectives of migration at the expense of 
migrants’ and migrant households’ dynamics. 
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b)  Policy and legislative measures in countries of destination 
In the absence of a blanked policy and a raft of legislative measures, the countries of 
destination adopt these as they best suit their needs and meet their citizens’ comfort. As most 
immigration involves labour, IOM’s (2008) highlights of policy and legislative issues in the countries 
of destination are instructive. The countries of destination need to: satisfy their labour market needs 
and better manage the labour migration process; prevent or reduce irregular migration by affording 
regular migration opportunities; make use of bilateral labour agreements to promote and support 
broader economic relations with countries of origin; and preserve or strengthen ties between countries 
sharing historical (sometimes post-colonial) and cultural links (IOM, 2008:372-3). Thus, apart from 
Northern Africa from which large numbers of emigrants are to Europe, the rest of Africa experiences 
widespread intra-regional and inter-sub-regional migration.     
c)  Bilateral and multilateral agreements  
In the context of labour migration, the IOM’s World Migration 2008 recognizes three 
different forms of bilateral arrangements in migration management, namely legal status, the 
comprehensiveness or specificity of the migratory issues addressed and the categories of workers 
covered (IOM, 2008: 377-380), identifying impediments to bilateral arrangements such as preference 
for a unilateral/universal approach and problems relating to negotiation and implementation of 
arrangements made. However, developments worth acknowledging include the Euro-Mediterranean 
basin initiatives; the co-development between France and its former colonies; the Commonwealth 
Teacher Recruitment Protocol (adopted in 2004) and the Commonwealth Code of Practice for the 
International Recruitment of Health Workers; and IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa 
(MIDA). Table IV.3 gives information on some of the current bilateral and multilateral agreements.  
The Mediterranean basin has witnessed Euro-African agreements involving the European 
countries of destination along the Mediterranean Sea and their African neighbours —the Maghreb states 
and Egypt— producing migrants or featuring as transit countries of clandestine irregular migrants from 
sub-Saharan Africa.57 It has been noted that November 1995 marked the starting point of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), a wide framework of political, economic and 
cultural cooperation between the Member States of the European Union and the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean Basin countries. Official EU statistics indicate that France is home for 90% of Algerians, 
72% of Tunisians and 45% of Moroccans; Spain and Italy host respectively 20 and 13% of Moroccans, 
and Italy receives 16% of the Tunisian migrants living in the EU (Gallina, 2006 b). Agreements in this 
partnership are meant to streamline migration management as well as eliminate undesirable outcomes of 
migration. Emigration from Western African countries, through the Maghreb states, dominates media 
reports and has necessitated these agreements. 
Co-development is a partnership which France has been undertaking with its former colonies 
and has become a subject in post-graduate studies in Spanish and other European universities. The 
concept is attributed to a French scholar, Sami Naïr (1997), who, in an Inter-Ministerial Mission on 
Migration and Co-development, defined it as: ...a proposal for integrating immigration and development 
in a way that migration fluxes will benefit both the country of origin and the country of destination... a 
consensual relationship between two countries that will allow migration to the country of destination not to 
imply an equivalent loss in the country of origin. 
The France-Mali partnership is frequently cited because it has enabled Malian migrants and 
migrant organisations in France to stimulate development in both settings in which they have adopted 
ambivalent lifestyles. The partnership receives support from the French Development Cooperation, 
which renders it a control mechanism by France and undermines its mutual benefits. It is an initiative 
likely to serve the rest of Africa as a fortress as Europe becomes increasingly impenetrable. 
                                                        
57  The term Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) has been adopted; it includes that are signatories of the 
Barcelona Agreement in 1995 with the EU launching the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Turkey. 
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TABLE IV.3 
SOME BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION INVOLVING AFRICAN COUNTRIES, CIRCA 2010 
Bilateral/multilateral Agreement Major Characteristics Examples 
Euro-Mediterranean   
Co-development 
Partnership to facilitate the exchange of 
initiatives relating to migration workers for 
country of origin development 
France-Mali  
Commonwealth initiatives:    
Teacher Recruitment Protocol 
Ethical recruitment of teachers within the 
Commonwealth or the latter and non-
Commonwealth countries 
Many within the Commonwealth and 
between the Commonwealth and non-
Commonwealth countries 
Code of Practice for the 
Recruitment of Health Workers 
Ethical recruitment of health workers as 
applies to that of teachers 
Many within similar arrangements as of 
teachers 
Migration for Development in 
Africa (MIDA) 
IOM’s capacity-building programme 
helping to mobilise competences required 
by African nationals abroad for the benefit 
of Africa’s development  
Involves several interested African 
countries in terms of periodic or virtual 
return for specific undertakings 
Source: Readings from websites of institutions involved and publications on the topic. 
 
 
The Commonwealth has been spearheading two forms of recruitment of professionals that 
dominate the brain drain of the countries of origin, the vast majority in Africa. The Commonwealth 
Teacher Recruitment Protocol specifies the rights and responsibilities of recruiting countries, the 
countries of origin and the recruited teacher; it also provides for monitoring and evaluation of its 
implementation. Reviewing the Commonwealth Protocol in the context of Africa, Keevy (2011) 
identifies seven critical matters for thorough consideration in the Protocol: context, teacher emigration, 
professionalization, advocacy, collaboration, data and oversight; recognises the role of African RECs 
(SADC, ECOWAS, COMESA) in invoking harmonisation of national education systems; and concludes 
that the Protocol is necessary to balance the right to teacher education to the integrity of national 
education systems and to prevent exploitation of this scarce human resource in Africa. 
The Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International of Health Workers was adopted at 
the Pre-WHA Meeting of the Commonwealth Health Ministers held in Geneva on 18 May 2003.58 It 
recognises the most severe shortage of health workers in the small island states, remote and rural areas 
and some African countries, which affects these countries’ capacity to provide good quality health 
services to their populations. No wonder, African countries fall too far short of the WHO stipulated 
standards of health worker/population ratio, not to mention the weird doctor/population ratio. The 
Protocol aspires to transparency, fairness and mutuality of benefits, and recommends compensation, 
reparation or restitution where appropriate. In situations where health workers leave their countries 
without knowledge of the health ministries, it is not possible to observe these principles or to invoke 
the measures recommended. 
As scanty information exists on the extent to which African countries adhere to both the 
Commonwealth Protocol and the Code of Practice, it is risky to pronounce on their performance in these 
countries of origin. The Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development, which has just completed 
                                                        
58  Details of the Protocol are contained in 7BDD 97OB-53AE-441D-81DB-1B64C37E992A- Commonwealth Code 
of Practice, downloaded on 08/08/11. 
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its two-year work, has made far-reaching recommendations that should attract the attention of not only 
Commonwealth countries but also those to which they relate in matters of migration and development.59 
2. International instruments and human rights 
Five Conventions/Protocols are singled out because they govern international migration through the 
lenses of refugee movements, labour migration in a family context and two forms of irregular 
migration involving human trafficking and smuggling, which are criminalised (Table IV.4).  
 
TABLE IV.4 
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN STATES PARTIES TO UNITED NATIONS  
INSTRUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 2009 














Number of countries 55 19 9 6 5 17 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) 47 14 9 4 5 15 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) 47 13 9 4 5 16 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(1990) 
16 3 - 4 1a 8 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000)b 
33 10 5  4 13 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Sea and Air (2000)b 
28 10 4  4 10 
Source: Compiled from International Migration 2009 wall chart (UN/DESA). 
a Lesotho. 
b Falls within United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime. 
 
a)  Refugee conventions and protocols 
The status of refugees has entailed mutual arrangements of the countries of refugee outflows 
and the host countries, acting in conformity with internationally recognized instruments - the UN 1951 
Convention and the UN 1967 Protocol. In the case of Africa, the 1969 OAU Protocol applies, as do 
the UN 1990 Convention and the two 2000 Protocols. Table IV.4 reveals how Africa’s sub-regions 
fare in the five United Nations Conventions pertaining to refugees and international labour as well as 
irregular migration. The vast majority of African countries have signed the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol on Refugees, but not necessarily ratified it and the same number has signed the OAU 
Protocol on the Status of Refugees in Africa, which the AU (the successor of the OAU) has inherited. 
These days, UNHRC statistics also capture ‘other persons of concern to UNHCR’ who are not 
conventionally considered refugees —for example, victims of the vagaries of climate (floods and 
drought) and other environmental hazards who eke out precarious living in the Sahel and much of the 
Horn of Africa. 
                                                        
59  Named after Sir Shridath Rampal, the eminent former Commonwealth Secretary-General in 1975-1990, the 
Commission comprised seven Commissioners: two former heads of State (a former Prime Minister of who chaired 
it and a former President of Republic of Cyprus; a former Chair of UK’s Sustainable Development Commission; a 
former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh and current President of the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute; the current 
Executive of the Commonwealth Nurses Federation; and two Professors who are migration experts on South-East 
Asia and Africa. The report of the Commission will be presented to the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government (CHOGM) due in Perth, Australia in October 2011.  
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b)  Migrant workers and members of their families 
Given the evolution of recognition of migrant rights, it is necessary to shed light on the latest 
version (the UN Convention 1990) which is more comprehensive than previous ILO Conventions - for 
instance, C97 on Migration for Employment (Revised) 1949 and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary 
Provisions) Convention (No. 143), 1975. Theoretically, the UN 1990 Convention on Protection of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families would be expected to find strong support 
in African countries given the saliency of labour migration within and from the region. Yet, a minority 
of the countries has been party to it, which implies lack of attention to the protection and other 
interests of emigrant and immigrant workers. While nearly half of Western African countries have 
signed it, three Eastern African countries (Rwanda, Seychelles and Uganda) and only Lesotho in 
Southern Africa have joined the pack, and no country has done so in Middle Africa. Except for a 
dismal performance in Middle Africa, countries in all other sub-regions have responded well to the 
two aspects of the Convention on Transnational Crime.  
Thus, conventions on refugees and irregular migration have the most appeal to African 
countries. This is presumably because the refugee menace has been a typical feature of the 
independent African state (Oucho, 2002) and because large numbers of Africans have been and are 
being trafficked or smuggled to the Middle East and across the Sahara to the Mediterranean basin in 
both the Magreb and southern European states.  
The reluctance of African countries to sign United Nations Conventions pertaining to labour 
migration in particular is worrying given its centrality to the free facilitation of movements of persons 
(FMOP/FOMP) protocols which all RECs embrace. This poor response underscores the insignificance 
of claim of African countries to the benefits or costs of migrant labour, why the rights of migrant 
workers and their families are often violated in the countries of destination, why African countries of 
both origin and destination have no way of making mutual arrangements on this category of migrants 
and why xenophobia erupts from time to time in the countries of destination, particularly the three 
successful Southern African economies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia (Crush and 
Pendleton, 2004).   
c)  Conventions and protocols on irregular migration 
Two closely linked protocols adopted in 2000 relate to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Crime: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Children and Women (HTP) and Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 
((MSP). In terms of the UN categorization of African sub-regions, both HTP and MSP have been 
signed by all Eastern African countries with the exception of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe; all Middle African countries except Angola, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe; all 
Western African states with the exception of Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Sierra Leone, with Guinea 
Bissau, Niger and Togo signing HTP only; and all Southern African countries except Swaziland.  
3. International migration in the context of regional integration 
a)  Fee movement of flows: people, labour, goods, capital and services 
In the spirit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), all sub-regions were encouraged to 
establish RECs as regional blocs to entrench economic cooperation among countries, expected 
ultimately to coalesce into the African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. The result was a 
proliferation of RECs in which Member States belong to multiple RECs, constraining their loyalty and 
ability to cope with respective RECs’ varied requirements. To institute order where such chaotic 
development took place, the AU recognizes only eight RECs, seven of which are located in Africa, 
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even though their membership includes some countries in North Africa.60 Table IV.3 presents 
membership of the eight. 
All these RECs are at different phases of the regional integration process as recognized by 
ECA from El Agra’s work: from Preferential Trade Area through Free Trade Area, Customs Union, 
Common Market, Economic Union, culminating in a Political Union, such as a federation currently 
being touted by the EAC Partner States. A characteristic feature of all Africa’s RECs is the 
domination of anyone country: Nigeria in ECOWAS, Kenya in EAC and South Africa in SADC. 
As more detailed analyses of migration and regional integration in the context of regional 
integration appear elsewhere (Oucho, 1995, 1998, 2009; Adepoju, 2007b), this discussion merely 
highlights salient issues about respective RECs. Highlights of all the RECs except ECOWAS are 
attributed to the first three references, with information on ECOWAS attributed to the last reference.   
East African Community (EAC) I &II  
Three EAC Member States —Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania— have had much in common 
since the colonial period, with their union beginning in 1948; and their once politically troubled 
neighbours of Burundi and Rwanda joined them in 2007 to logically complete a geographically well-
knit REC. East Africa has witnessed two versions of regional integration with the same name —the 
East African Community (EAC). The first version (EAC I) existed in the decade 1967-1977 and, after 
a two-decade lacuna, the second version was mooted to become EAC II from 2001. It saw two Great 
Lakes region countries, Burundi and Rwanda, become EAC II Partner States in 2007, and the 
Republic of South Sudan applied for membership before its emergence on 9 July 2011. The EAC II 
aims to promote and strengthen the balanced and sustainable integration of economic, social, cultural 
and political aspects of its partner states. 
When the EAC adopted the Protocol on the Common Market in July 2009, it unleashed a 
comprehensive strategy for ‘five freedoms’ in movement: of people, labour, goods, capital and 
services in its area of jurisdiction.61 Free movement of Persons and Labour is provided for in six 
Articles: 7 on free movement of persons who are citizens of the Partner States; 8 on Standard 
Identification System through a common system of issuing national identification documents; 9 on 
Travel Documents recognised in Article 8; 10 on Free Movement of Workers; 11 on Harmonisation 
and Mutual Recognition of Academic and Professional Qualifications; and 12 on Harmonisation of 
Labour Policies, Laws and Programmes. Other aspects of free movement are detailed under all other 
four components. The Common Market is detailed and will require sustained interest and commitment 
of the Partner States to realise as envisaged in the timetable of implementation. Unfortunately, apart 
from the visa entry phase which operates with few hitches, if any, all other phases are controversial 
and might not clear the hurdles on the way, among them nationalist xenophobia and mistrust as well 
as economic inequality among and human resource capacities of the Partner States. 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), founded on May 28, 1975, is 
an African REC comprising fifteen Member States. Nwauche (n.d.: 322) argues that the REC’s good 
intentions were subsequently thwarted by military dictatorships in virtually all its Member States.62 
                                                        
60  The unrecognised RECs are: the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA/WAEMU), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes 
Countries GEPGL), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(CIRCGL/ICGLR), the Mano River Union (MRU), the Senegal River Basin Development Authority (OMVS) and 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).    
61  The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market covers in detail free 
movement of goods, free movement of persons and labour, rights of establishment and residence, free movement of 
services and free movement of capital. 
62  [Online] ‹http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/Human_Rights_in Africa/10_Nwauche.pdf›. 
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That only Senegal has never fallen prey to military rule explains why peace-making has been a 
cardinal mission of ECOWAS through ECOMOG.63 
Thorough analyses of development at ECOWAS have been made by Adepoju in several 
insightful articles. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of 
Residence and Establishment, adopted in May 1979, formalised the free movement of 
ECOWAS citizens within the Member States, and which has been acclaimed as a trend-setter in 
migration policy development and management (Adepoju, 2007a). Its key milestones include: 
90-day visa-free entry for ECOWAS citizens in possession of valid travel documentation 
(ECOWAS, 1999 and 2004), though Member States may nevertheless refuse admission to 
would-be immigrants deemed ‘inadmissible’ under their laws; the second phase (Right of 
Residence) which came into force in July 1986, and the revised Treaty of 1992, affirming the 
right of Community citizens to entry into, and residence in other Member States, with the 
expectation that ECOWAS biometrically viable passports would progressively replace national 
passports over a transitional period of ten years (Adepoju, 2002) and ECOWAS travellers’ 
cheques and a common currency eventually would facilitate cross-border movement (Adepoju, 
2004b); and a third phase when national laws, employment and investment codes which restrict 
‘foreigners’ from participating in certain economic activities were being harmonised with 
regional and sub-regional treaties to ensure the rights of migrant workers within host countries 
(United Nations, 2004) thereby granting the Right of Establishment. 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
The first expansive REC to cover Eastern and Southern African (ESA) countries was the 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which operated in 1982-1993, transforming into the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994. COMESA drew membership of countries with diverse 
political, economic and social backgrounds, which probably creates tensions in the Common Market. 
Above all, COMESA treaty aims to strengthen the REC’s relations with other organisations 
and cooperating partners as it matches steadily toward the African Economic Community (AEC), 
alongside its counterparts in Africa. COMESA has lost old and gained new members; it has lost 
Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania (the latter tending toward the south since the days of Frontline 
States) to SADC, and gained Egypt and Libya in North Africa. SADC has fifteen Member States 
compared to COMESA’s nineteen.64 The COMESA protocol observes the visa-free arrangement for 
citizens of its Member States, underlining bilateral, rather than multilateral arrangements, but nothing 
beyond that non-controversial phase. However, with the implementation of the “yellow certificate”, 
COMESA is implementing free movement of vehicles across, which only permits transit of the 
citizens involved. 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
In the late 1970s, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) 
emerged to challenge South Africa’s apartheid policy and to safeguard citizens of its Member States 
from the country’s propaganda of deceptive diplomacy. The grouping was replaced by SADC at a 
time the PTA was already operational and transforming into COMESA. SADC was established in 
1992, with South Africa joining at the onset of majority rule in 1994. The dominant country is South 
Africa which has been wielding a lot of power and demonstrating its superiority over all other 
Member States. Three SADC Member States —South Africa, Botswana and Namibia - enjoy 
sustained economic buoyancy that has attracted huge volumes of foreign migrant labour over the 
                                                        
63  ECONOMOG, in full, is the Economic Community for West African States Monitoring Group. 
64  As of 2011, both SADC and COMESA shared eight Member States, namely D.R. Congo, Malawi, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, more than half of membership of the former and slightly 
less than half of the latter.  
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years; this status makes them good neighbours in shaping the SADC Protocol which emphasizes 
‘facilitation of movement’ in place of freedom of movement. 
The SADC protocol remains the most controversial, more so because it has changed 
complexion several times and probably keeps the Member States wondering why it was drafted in the 
first place. Within the decade 1995-2005, the protocol changed from being a “free movement” of 
persons (FMOP) idea embroiled in a gridlock, giving way to the draft protocol on “facilitation of 
movement” of persons (FOMP), championed by South Africa which has received strong support from 
its economically buoyant neighbours, Botswana and Namibia. The SADC case deserves elaboration 
because although the REC seems to appeal most to the western world, it serves countries where 
xenophobia and lack of transparency and the overarching role of South Africa are frustrating regional 
integration efforts, if not holding the Member States hostage to the country’s whims (Oucho, 2009). 
Two contrasting reviews —one by a fervent proponent of South Africa’s disenchantment with 
freedom of movement or the FMOP protocol (Solomon, 1997 and 2000), the other critical of the 
country’s obsession with reliance on “unscientific evidence” (Oucho and Crush, 2001) — provide 
insightful information. Above all, they underline why the draft protocols on freedom/facilitation of 
movement have not made significant progress. 
It was not until 2005 that the SADC Member States adopted the FOMP protocol when the 
requisite minimum number of signatories was attained, but since then the majority of Member States 
have not ratified it. Still the conclusions of the review of the SADC protocols drawn before signing 
the draft FOMP version remain valid (Oucho and Crush, 2001: 154-5), but with a caveat: SADC needs 
to take into consideration the findings of the decade-long Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) 
research on citizen attitudes to migration and migrants, actual and potential emigration, xenophobia 
and migrant remittances in some SADC Member States.65 The shadow of South Africa that looms 
over the entire region is inimical to liberalised movement within SADC where the Member States 
have to face the realities of the changing times. Take Zimbabwe, for example, which before the turn of 
the century was a vibrant economy but where political repression and economic crisis have sparked 
huge emigration of refugees and economic migrants, without SADC taking a punitive or corrective 
stance on the country’s leadership (Oucho, 2009). 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
Drought and incessant famine, which protracted civil war aggravated, brought together IGAD 
Member States that have made significant inroads in peace-building and reconstruction of some war-
devastated economies. It is a specialised REC without a treaty but an agreement focusing on drought 
and conflict mitigation.66 A customs union is the one feature of regional cooperation towards which all 
RECs in Eastern and Southern Africa are resolutely moving. Highlights of the main RECs help to 
drive home this point. 
As drought is a persistent feature of the Horn of Africa, IGAD began as the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), later dropping ‘drought’ and 
acquiring the name Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Its Member States are 
Djibouti (which hosts the headquarters), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda; the 
Republic of South Sudan is expected to become the newest Member State. These countries have had 
oscillating relations over the years, most neighbouring states having uneasy co-existence. Wavering 
                                                        
65  The SAMP Migration Policy Series provides extremely useful facts on migration and development issues which the 
SADC secretariat has never committed its Member States to take on board their deliberations. The series are 
instructive for taking a fresh look at migration and regional integration in both SADC and COMESA. 
66  The Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, signed on 26 March 1996 by 
Heads of State and Government and developed in the spirit of the COMESA Treaty, does not have any provision 
for free movement of persons, the nearest to this is Article 13A on Cooperation, paragraph (s), which aims to 
“facilitate repatriation and reintegration of refugees, returnees and displaced persons and demobilized soldiers in 
cooperation with relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations in accordance with the existing 
national, regional and international instruments”. 
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inter-state relations or persistent strife are inimical to IGAD’s performance and threaten peace and 
security which are important ingredients of regional integration. 
IGAD has no protocol yet on free movement of persons. However, in June 2011, the IGAD 
Secretariat announced a positive move, calling on interested consultants to make bids for developing 
the protocol. It will most likely be similar to other RECs’ protocols on the ground. 
b)  The status and challenges of free movement Protocols in African RECs 
All has not been well at the RECs in their efforts to foster free movement of persons within 
their areas of jurisdiction. Cushioned by theories of regional integration, the RECs have crafted 
phased processes of free movement, all but one extremely difficult to realize. Table IV.6 provides 
some insights of the processes relating to respective RECs in sub-Saharan Africa.     
 
TABLE IV.5 
AFRICAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES BY DATE  
OF FORMATION AND MEMBER STATES 
REC Date of formation Member States 
ECCAS (CEEAC in French)  1983 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the 
Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe. 
CEN-SAD 1998 Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the 
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
BiAfricau, Liberia, Libya, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia. 
COMESA 1993 Burundi, the Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
EACa 2001 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda. 
ECOWAS 1975 Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
IGAD - Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda. 
Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) 
1989 Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia. 
SADC 1992 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Source: J. O. Oucho (1998), table 7.1, p. 266; updated from Wikipedia. 
a  Consists of Partner States. 
 
 
Some challenges facing RECs 
On migration and the RECs, countries can forge bilateral relations among the various REC 
Member States within different sub-regions, as well as multilateral arrangements between the 
various RECs in Africa and in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and so 
on (GCIM, 2005, quoted in Adepoju, 2008). At the national level, it is relevant collaboration 
between agencies of government dealing with migration matters and the need for dialogue among 
the various stakeholders on approaches to migration concerns, sharing of ideas and enhancing 
cooperation in migration management, ultimately to develop coherent policy frameworks for 
effective management of migration. 
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A recent study (Oucho, 2009) identifies other challenges. First, since the FMOP and FOMP 
protocols were drafted, they remain virtually stalled as neither of them has gone beyond visa-free 
entry for a specified period and multilateral arrangements in anyone REC are lacking Nor are there 
strong bilateral arrangements even between neighbouring countries whose citizens have much affinity 
and where they could benefit from intra-REC migration; and individual countries cling so much to 
national legislation and policies that they have not taken due advantage of the trappings of 
globalisation that influence development worldwide, including African countries. A SAMP-sponsored 
study on SADC Member States (Klaaren and Rutinwa, 2004) deserves replication in all other African 
RECs. Finally, xenophobia, whether overt or covert, is killing well-intended efforts of RECs to 
fashion out effective regional integration, observing the treaties and protocols of all RECs. SADC 
countries have no excuse failing to take on board research findings on xenophobia, based on SAMP 
surveys in the SADC region. Similarly, other African RECs should carry out surveys on xenophobia 
to avoid pretending that the problem does not exist within their areas of jurisdiction. Tolerance should 
be the hallmark of observing the principles of regional integration and liberalised movement of 
persons in the true spirit of African goodwill enunciated in the AU and REC treaties (Oucho, 2009). 
c)  Marching towards the AEC and the ultimate protocol  
The challenges raised in the previous paragraph should be instructive to the AU as it oversees 
moves by all RECs towards the African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. The path towards the 
AEC has six phases: phases one through three (1997-2017) is envisaged to address purely economic 
integration matters; the fourth phase (2017-2019) envisions harmonisation of policies and programmes 
in trade and other sectors as a precursor to full liberation of the African Common Market and AEC, 
resulting in free movement of people, with rights of residence and establishment among the RECs (as 
stipulated in Article 43 of the AEC Treaty); the fifth phase (2019-2023) would usher in consolidation 
of the continent-wide AEC, an incremental development from the fourth phase; and the sixth and final 
phase (2023-2028) would sharpen the vision of the AEC, with complete economic, political, social 
and cultural integration and common institutions in the respective spheres of integration (ECA, 2004: 
31). This is clearly a well-conceived programme and one with gradual integration measures before the 
free movement protocol takes effect. 
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TABLE IV.6 
PHASES OF FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS (FMOP)/ FACILITATION  
OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONS (FOMP) PROTOCOLS OF SSA’S RECS 
REC Name of Protocol Phase Remarks 
CEN-SAD Free movement of 
persons, capital and 
interests of nationals of 
Member States 
 Right of establishment, ownership and 
exercise of economic activity, subject to 
the laws and regulations of individual 
Member States. 
COMESA Free Movement of 
Persons, Labour, 
Services, Right 
of Establishment and 
Residence 
The complete timetable is as follows: 
2000-2002: Gradual removal of visa 
requirements; 2002-2006: Movement 
of skilled labour and movement of 
services; 
2006-2010: Right of establishment; 
and 2014: Right of residence (20 
years from date of entry of COMESA 
Treaty) 
Right to enter all Member States for up to 
90 days; No visa required; Member States 
to harmonize their national laws, rules and 
regulations having regard to the need to 
grant the right of residence to COMESA 
citizens. Protocol adopted at the Sixth 
Summit of the COMESA Authority held 
in Cairo, Egypt in 2001. 
EAC  Gives provision for: the right to enter 
the territory of a Partner State 
without a visa; the right to move 
freely within the territory of a Partner 
State; and the right to full protection 
by the laws of a Partner State. 
Protocol on the EAC Common Market 
signed by Partner States in October 2009, 
spelling out “five freedoms” of 
movement; Right to cross borders with the 
EAC passport, duly allowing for multiple 
entries over a 6-month period. 
ECCAS Freedom of movement 
and Rights of 
Establishment of 
nationals of Member 
States 
Right to enter all Member States; 
identity card, passport or health 
document required; Visa is required; 
Right to reside freely within the 
Community but with residence 
permit required. 
Little progress though movement between 
counties is fluid. 
ECOWAS Free Movement of 
Persons, Settlement 
and Establishment 
 Right to enter all Member States with a 
valid travel document and an international 
health certificate; no visa required for a 
period of 90 days (ECOWAS passport 
available); right of residence for the 
purpose of seeking and carrying out 
income-earning employment. 
IGAD Protocol yet to be 
developed as IGAD 
Secretariat only 
recently (in July 2011) 
called for bids for a 
consultancy on the 
issue 
 Reciprocal visa-free entry for limited 
stays is granted bilaterally by some 
member States. 
SADC Facilitation of 
movement of people 
1) 90-day visa entry per year for bona 
fide visit and in accordance with the 
laws of the State Party concerned; 2) 
permanent and temporary residence 
in the territory of another State with 
an application for a residence permit, 
subject to national laws; and 3) 
establishment of oneself and working 
in the territory of another State Party. 
Signed by member states in March 2005; 
specifies handling of travel documents; 
urges harmonisation of existing 
immigration practices; introduces a 
population register; provides for expulsion 
of undesirable elements; makes provision 
for asylum seekers and refugees; and 
underlines relationship with other African 
RECs. 
Note: For detailed discussions, see N. Harris, M. Ugur, Adepoju and S. Peberdy and J. Crush, in Pecoud and 
Guchteneire; and Oucho and Crush (2001). 
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4. Migrant rights in gender and health 
a)  Migrant Rights through the Gender Perspective 
United Nations (1995) book, International Migration Policies and the Status of Women 
opened a new chapter in shedding light on female migration, paving the way for considering the rights 
of female migrants. A notable fact is the absence of a chapter on migration of African women. Lim’s 
(1995: 29) analysis of the status of women and international migration notes that: “In so far as 
women’s status is a socially constructed rather than a biologically dictated concept...international 
migration, more than any demographic phenomenon, has major implications for changing women’s status, 
since migrant women move from one social context to another” […] “the interactions of forces generated 
by markets, nation States and social networks, all of which shape international migration flows... are of 
special relevance for the study of female migration”.   
Yet this is but one side of the coin as both females and males migrate, in the process 
becoming exposed to violation of their rights from a gender perspective. Lim (1995: 39) proposes a 
diagrammatic representation of macro-structure, women’s status and international migration, which 
depicts the following relations: socio-cultural environmental systems influence the family functions 
and structure, as well as individual characteristics, all of them determining women’s multiple roles; 
women’s roles in turn shape both women and men’s positions and women’s status indicators, both of 
these affecting family and individual decision-making, ultimately resulting in either “associational 
migration” or “autonomous migration”. 
Some of the issues countering observance of female migrants’ rights include stereotyping 
female migrants as unskilled migrants; linking ageing in Western societies to feminised care labour; and 
restrictions imposed by family immigration policies (e.g. income requirements for family reunification 
and women being confined to informal work. These challenges stand in the way of African female 
migrants who then become victims of immigration policies and legislation in African countries of 
destination as well as in the developed world. In the Middle East, there are incidents of unspeakable 
treatment of migrant African domestic workers who often dub it ‘modern slavery’ without governments 
of the countries of origin intervening, let alone comprehending the situation. The solution lies partially 
on OSCE’s (2009) call for a ‘two-way’ approach encompassing general migrant protection provisions 
(especially for female migrant workers) to empower them with choices, to access resources and to claim 
rights; it is partially a subject of research to investigate the process of recruiting migrants and the 
situation of migrants at the destinations before prescribing any plausible solutions. 
b)  Migrant rights in health access  
Migrants’ rights are often violated in access to health services in the countries of destination. 
A good example is Botswana which, despite impressive health facilities, denies immigrants and 
refugees unrestricted access to health services. An empirical study on the issue reveals worrying 
findings. The majority of the healthcare providers indicated that the most important reproductive 
health needs of the immigrants and refugees, namely pregnancy-related services (prenatal, obstetrics, 
postnatal conditions), treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), HIV/AIDS treatment and 
counselling and family planning were not different from those of the locals. The major differences 
between the local population and the foreigners were found to be: (i) antiretroviral (ARV) treatment 
and prevention of mother-to-child-transmission (PMTCT) programmes were never accessible to the 
non-citizens; and (ii) while treatments and other health services were free to Botswana, a fee was 
charged to non-citizens. Although 86% of the 21 studied reproductive health services were available 
in the healthcare system more than half of the time, only 62% of them were accessible to the 
immigrants and refugees. Immigrants’ reasons for inability to access these services were: (i) the 
immigrants and refugees have to pay higher fees to access the reproductive health services; (ii) once 
an immigrant or refugee is identified as HIV positive, he/she does not qualify for further follow-ups, 
for instance to detecting the immune status through CD4 count or testing the viral load; (iii) the 
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immigrants and refugees do not have referral rights to referral clinics/hospitals for follow-ups in case 
of certain health conditions; and (iv) both immigrants and refugees are required to join a medical aid 
scheme to help offset part of the costs for the desired services. The study recommends that the 
government of Botswana should improve the availability of reproductive health services to 
immigrants and refugees, and expunge those laws and practices that make it difficult for immigrants 
and refugees to access the available reproductive health services (Oucho and Ama, 2009). Poor access 
of immigrants to the available health facilities makes them susceptible to disease which might spread 
to locals despite their receipt of health attention. 
5. Perspectives of migration and development 
a)  Brain drain, brain circulation and brain gain 
Education and skill training have produced increasing numbers of Africans who fuel the brain 
drain stream.67 Initially, emigration of highly educated nationals of developing countries to the 
developed world was considered a loss given the extent to which the countries of origin had invested 
in them (Bhorat et al., 2002; Collier et al., 2004) and more recently, it is considered beneficial to the 
countries of origin. Some authors —for example, Glaser (1978) considered it a “safety valve” to 
leverage unemployment. As the developed countries tightened immigration regulations, brain drain 
changed to ‘brain circulation’ - back and forth movement —Saxenian (2002) and many others. The 
current emphasis is on both brain drain and brain circulation as ‘brain gain’ (Kuznetsov, 2006) 
whereby the returning former emigrants apply their knowledge and skills in their countries of origin. 
African countries put premium on this last perspective of international migration, even where there is 
no evidence of it actually happening (Oucho, 2008). 
Public expressions of the African situation attest to the magnitude and effects of brain drain in 
Africa (‹http://images.derstandard.at/20080615/factsandfigures.pdf›): 
• The position of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is that 
“emigration of African professionals to the West is one of the greatest obstacles to 
Africa’s development;” 
• The Deputy Executive-Secretary, ECA, Dr. Lalla Ben Barka, contends that “African 
governments have a great responsibility to ensure that brains remain in the continent, 
otherwise, in 25 years’ time, Africa will be empty of brains; 
• Professor Edward Ofori-Sarpong, Pro-Vice Chancellor, University of Ghana at Legon 
warns that “[by] failing to offer greener pastures for its own intelligentsia, [Africa] is 
committing suicide.” 
• South African President Thabo Mbeki, in his 1998 “African Renaissance” speech, 
underlined the nature and significance of brain drain. 
Viewed in the African context, brain drain has affected virtually all African countries that, 
since independence, have trained large numbers of their nationals at tertiary level. African brain drain 
statistics indicate that the region loses to the developed world the cream of its highly educated and 
skilled persons, among them teachers and university lecturers, doctors and nurses, engineers and so 
on. Some startling statistics by Shinn (2008) tell the whole story: it is estimated that over 300,000 
African professionals work outside the continent, over 20,000 leaving every year; over one-third (over 
                                                        
67  Some migration scholars prefer different nomenclature: McDonald and Crush (2002: 6-7) prefer “skilled 
migration” because “skilled” includes people who have worked their way up the corporate ladder, those with their 
own successful businesses and those who play a critical role in the public sector; Iredale (1999), on the other hand, 
underlines that the term “skilled migration” encompasses brain drain, transitory or permanent movements of 
professionals, and job transfers.; and the OECD-SOPEMI (1997: 21) uses the term “highly skilled workers”, which 
includes degree holders or those with extensive experience in a given field or its equivalent.   
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3,000 every year) of Kenyan skilled professionals and 10 per cent of South African IT and finance 
executives have emigrated; over 30,000 PhD holders from SSA live outside Africa; in 2007 alone, 150 
professional Ethiopians left Ethiopian Airlines staff for the Gulf States; some 70-90 per cent 
Zimbabwean university graduates work outside their country; over 21,000 Nigerian doctors practise in 
the United States; and there are more Malawian doctors in Manchester, United Kingdom than in 
Malawi itself. Shifting immigration policies, legislation and regulations in the countries of destination 
in the developed North have resulted in “brain drain” turning into “brain waste”, a condition in which 
a migrant takes up employment and receive remuneration that is grossly incommensurable with one’s 
qualifications or skills. Africans leave their countries of origin and end up as drivers, cooks, security, 
guards; health workers become mere home-carers at the destinations. The “fortress” North now 
dictates that African migrants engage in “brain circulation”, movement back and forth from an origin 
to a destination with little prospects for longer stay or permanent residence. 
In 2008, an editorial of a Nigerian daily gave the sad tale of brain drain in every African 
country: 1 out of every 5 black doctors in Britain and 1 in every 10 black doctors in the United States 
was Nigerian; about 50% of Ghanaian doctors were practising in the United States; South Africa is 
losing between 70 to 100 of its doctors every year for greener pastures elsewhere; a report indicated that 
about 18,000 nurses from one particular African country were working abroad, while in another, an 
entire graduating nursing class was recruited to work in one European country; and Malawi, despite its 
small size, had more of its doctors working in the English city of Manchester alone than those practising 
at home where the country was being devastated by AIDS scourge, malaria and cholera (Nigerian 
Newsday, March 31, 2008). These are by no means isolated cases of how deeply the developed world 
has extracted Africa’s human resources, notably health professionals, engineers and teachers. 
Frechi (2010) on the other hand, identifies four ways in which brain drain is a good thing: 
migrants themselves gain from it; there are gains to families from which the migrants originate; it 
often results in ‘brain circulation’ which occurs between origin and destination; and it stimulates skill 
accumulation, better known as ‘brain gain’. Brain drain, therefore, provides scope for a balancing 
equation or a cost-benefit analysis. Unfortunately, the conceptual terrain has not been explored well 
enough to provide empirical evidence of these brain-based states. Estimates of the African brain drain 
reflect startling statistics. Easterly and Nyarko (2005:3-4) argue that although Africa is a continent 
with small aggregate outflows of highly educated human capital, it has high flows as a percentage of 
existing stocks of human capital. Migrants with tertiary education going to the United States constitute 
large percentages of their home country stocks of tertiary educated citizens: 60% for Gambia, 20% for 
Ghana, 15% for Uganda); they cite Docquier and Marfouk’s (2005) data which suggest that the rate of 
skilled migration (defined as the college-educated emigration stocks as percent of the total college 
educated number of people born in the source country) exceeds 50 percent in five African countries: 
67.5% in Cape Verde, 63.3% in Gambia, 55.9% in Seychelles, 56.2% in Mauritius, 52.5% in Sierra 
Leone. For African countries with population above 5 million, the rates are: Ghana (46.9%), 
Mozambique (45.1%), Kenya (38.4%), Uganda (35.6%), Angola (33%) and Somalia (32.7%). These 
statistics, taken more than five years ago, speak volumes of the African brain drain. 
b) The African diaspora and homeland development 
The African Diaspora has been defined through different epochs underlining varying 
standpoints. It is not only often misunderstood, but is also too complex to interpret without exploring 
its nature, dimensions and changing configuration. Indeed, the notion that the African Diaspora is 
homogeneous it is both simplistic and unrealistic given both the temporal and spatial dimensions of 
African emigration to the rest of the world. To the Old World of Asia went a large slave traffic which 
analysts have been unable to account for successfully and to the New World was a much larger traffic 
of slaves who settled Latin America and the Caribbean, currently the largest African diaspora but with 
more remote links to Africa than the Diaspora in the United States. Then a new wave of the African 
diaspora came with independence. As Africa looked to the developed North for educational 
opportunities of its citizens to attain high qualifications and skilled training necessary for the 
continent’s development in the wake of colonialism, huge numbers of Africans remained overseas, 
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some of them remaining to form yet another category of diaspora. Another category consists of those 
who relocated overseas as workers, refugees and asylum seekers as winners of the US green card and 
similar opportunities. The first-generation immigrants’ children and grandchildren augmented the 
numbers as younger generations of Africans migrated overseas for education, work and security from 
repressive African regimes that have left in their wake untold political and economic crises. 
 The African diaspora is therefore a heterogeneous group of people of African descent 
spanning much of Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. There are people of African descent who 
constitute diasporas of African countries which they identify with, others who are of the Caribbean 
diaspora with no links whatsoever with the African continent and still others who are transnational, 
being footloose given the trappings of globalisation which have invalidated formerly restrictive 
geographical boundaries. African migrants are part of the diaspora who may be temporary in the 
countries of destination, may join the existing diaspora to stay permanently or may be transnational 
whenever they engage in circular migration. In this study, the term diaspora is used generically to 
denote people of African descent residing outside Africa or in countries other than their own within 
Africa as citizens and permanent or temporary residents engaging in circulation as well as 
transnational lifestyles. Simply stated, the “African Diaspora” denotes people from Africa 
(circumstances or reasons notwithstanding) in non-African countries who look to and identify with 
Africa as the homeland. Realistically, against the backdrop of the Berlin Conference of 1884, which 
balkanised Africa into territorial dependencies that subsequently went their separate ways as nation-
states, we have seen the emergence of “nationalist diasporas”: Nigerian, Senegalese, South African, 
Kenyan, Ugandan, and so on. Most Africans out there think first of their countries of origin before the 
continent. People from sub-Saharan Africa, including many Africans, number at least 800 million in 
Africa and over 140 million in the Western Hemisphere, representing around 14% of the world's 
population (Wikipedia). Different categories of the diaspora play roles by committing their skills and 
knowledge to homeland development and by sending remittances which stimulate development as 
well as influence poverty reduction (Oucho, 2010: 139). 
Size and geographical distribution  
Three Maghreb countries underline the significance of Northern Africa in the European 
migration system (Table IV.7). The European Mediterranean countries —France, Spain, Italy and 
Belgium— stand out as by far the most important immigration countries for Northern Africans. Not 
surprisingly, the European and African Mediterranean belt has witnessed a flurry of activities in 
migration management in recent years. 
It is difficult to know the exact size of the African Diaspora though the OECD countries have 
good data by immigrants’ citizenship and/or country of birth. Estimates vary widely. For example, the 
American Christian Monitor of February 26, 2002 estimated that 15 million Nigerians (more than 1 in 
10 Nigerians) lived outside Nigeria (Nworah, 2008). With the appointment of a Special Assistant to 
the President on Nigerians in Diaspora and sponsoring of the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organisation 
(NIDO), the Federal Government of Nigeria has given impetus to the Nigerians in Diaspora to 
participate more effectively in homeland development. However, sustainability of such dramatic 
developments in the absence of law enforcement and policy support has been African countries’ 
greatest undoing. 
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TABLE IV.7 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE AFRICAN DIASPORA IN THE MAJOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
OF RESIDENCE BY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN SUB-REGION AND SELECTED  
NORTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION, CIRCA 2000 













































































































Source: Ratha et al. (2007), table 4; H. de Haas (2008), tables 2-4, pp.159-160; J.O. Oucho (2010), table 4.1, page 142.  
 
 
Diaspora remittances: destinations, volume and value  
Diaspora remittances have become Africa’s coveted source of household livelihoods, 
communal projects and investment capital. Highlights of the destinations, volume and value of 
remittances to Africa provide informative insights (Table IV.8).   
With a huge Diaspora in Europe and the rich Gulf States, Northern Africa receives a 
substantial amount of remittances, with Egypt and Morocco always ranking among the world’s top ten 
recipients. The IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2001 ranked Egypt and Morocco fourth 
and eighth respectively among the top ten in 1994, Egypt alone ranked eighth in 1997 and the two 
countries followed each other as seventh and eighth respectively in 2000 (Ramamurthy, 2006:73). In 
sub-Saharan Africa, Western Africa receives nearly double the remittances to the entire block, with 
Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal, in descending order, dominating the pack. Eastern Africa is topped by 
Kenya, followed by Somalia (despite having no recognised government in place since 1991), Uganda 
and Ethiopia. Apart from Kenya, the rest are countries that have had political problems which left 
conflict in their wake, the last two attracting remittances as an important resource for national 
construction. Central African countries of Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) lead the 
pack in receiving remittances. Finally, in Southern Africa, South Africa is by far the main recipient, 
with Lesotho second, the latter a well-known remittance- and deferred payment- dependent economy 
(Oucho, 2010:143-44). 
Yet remittance flows are both volatile and unpredictable, depending on political and economic 
conditions of both their sources and destinations. Two examples illustrate these conditions: remittances 
to Burkina Faso declined radically since the late nineties following political disturbances and economic 
crisis in Cote d’Ivoire where most Burkinabes had migrated and settled permanently for decades; 
conversely, remittances to Zimbabwe have increased over the years, albeit through unofficial sources, as 
Zimbabwe experienced a similar fate (Mutume, 2005, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 144). 
ECLAC – Project Document collection Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration… 
166 
TABLE IV.8 
INFLOW AND VALUE OF REMITTANCES TO AFRICA  
BY SUBREGION AND COUNTRY, 2008 
Sub-region and Country Remittances 
US$ million Percentage of GDP 
Eastern Africa 5 929  
Burundi 164 22.8 
Comoros 85 21.1 
Eritrea 411 37.9 
Ethiopia 591 4.4 
Kenya 796 3.8 
Madagascar 316 5.7 
Malawi 102 4.6 
Mauritius 356 5.5 
Mozambique 565 7.4 
Rwanda 149 6.0 
Somalia 790 - 
Uganda  642 6.9 
UR Tanzania 313 2.4 
Zambia 201 1.8 
Zimbabwe 361 7.2 
Central (Middle) Africa 2 690  
Angola 969 2.2 
Cameroon 267 1.5 
CA Republic 73 4.9 
Chad 137 2.1 
DR Congo 636 7.4 
Eq. Guinea 77 0.9 
Gabon 60 0.5 
Western Africa 10 399  
Benin 263 5.5 
Burkina Faso 507 8.2 
Cape Verde 391 34.2 
Cote d’Ivoire 282 1.6 
Gambia 87 17.0 
Ghana 851 6.6 
Guinea 286 8.6 
Liberia 163 25.8 
Mali 739 12.5 
Mauritania 103 3.9 
Niger 205 5.8 
Nigeria  5 397 4.7 
(continued) 
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Table IV.8 (concluded) 
Sub-region and Country Remittances 
US$ million Percentage of GDP 
Senegal 687 7.5 
Sierra Leone 168 11.6 
Togo 142 6.4 
Northern Africa 17 614  
Algeria 5 399 4.7 
Egypt 3 637 3.4 
Libya 134 0.3 
Morocco 6 116 10.7 
Tunisia 769 5.1 
Southern  Africa 1 979  
Lesotho 355 24.1 
South Africa 1 489 0.6 
Swaziland 89 3.4 
Sources: Rural Poverty Portal, ‹http://www.ifad.org/events/ 
remittances/maps/africa.htm›, accessed on 10/10/2008, and J. O. 
Oucho (2010), table 4.2, page 143. 
 
 
The place of social remittances 
Much of the literature and research on remittances to Africa has dwelt on financial 
remittances, leaving social remittances crying for research. Yet many African countries receive social 
remittances without recognising them as such. Peggy Levitt (1996) identifies three types of social 
remittances. First, there are “normative structures” consisting of ideas, values and beliefs as well as 
norms for behaviour, notions about family responsibility, principles of neighbourliness and 
community participation and aspirations for social mobility. The second type consists of “systems of 
practice” which are actions by normative structures relating to how individuals delegate household 
tasks —for example religious rituals that they engage in; it includes how much individuals in this 
category participate in political and civic groups through organisational structures which recruit and 
socialise new members, goal setting and strategising and establishment of leadership roles and 
formation of inter-agency ties. Finally, the two categories can become “social capital” with social 
remittance exchanges occurring when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin; 
when non-migrants visit their migrant relations in the countries of destination; or through exchanges 
of letters, videos, cassettes, emails and telephone calls. Often, social and political leaders harness the 
status they acquire in the country of destination to advance their cause in their homeland.68 
Insights of a survey of social remittances of the African diasporas in the Netherlands and 
Portugal are instructive for African countries (North-South Centre, 2006). In Portugal, Cape Verdean, 
Guinea Bissau and Senegal Diaspora constitute social capital for collective action for wellbeing but 
with varying approaches to realise their ambitions (North-South Centre, 2006: 14, quoted in Oucho, 
2010: 151). 
Pathways by which the African diasporas transfer social remittances vary a great deal. The 
North-South Centre (2006:17-20, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 152) study found that the pathways include 
return, either permanently or temporarily for holidays and family visits; social affiliations whenever in 
                                                        
68  [Online] ‹http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wesdocs/getdocument-asapx?docnum=56717›. 
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contact with key political and social figures in the home countries; facilitation of transnational 
networks to mediate and smooth the connection of overseas and African businesses; and influencing 
the political climate by infusing democratic political habits, sometimes acting as pressure groups. 
Unfortunately, African diasporas transmit social remittances to their home countries irregularly and 
unsystematically as these remittances do not go well with African governments. Indeed, a number of 
challenges confront social remittances in African countries. The North-South Centre (2006: 23-4, 
quoted in Oucho, 2010: 152) found these to be: poor governance and the lack of an enabling 
environment, such as personal freedom, basic civil rights, democracy and the rule of law which are 
often violated; unwillingness of the governing elite in most countries to seek the assistance of skilled 
and professional Diaspora for national development initiatives; and the lack of national strategies and 
policies that specifically target Diaspora interests to participate in homeland development. Even a 
direct policy approach such as dual citizenship —already formalised in Eritrea and Ghana, for 
instance— seems too tall an order for African countries to adopt. 
Networks of the African diaspora defy treating the group as homogeneous and all inclined to 
play uniform roles in homeland development (Table IV.9). They range from business networks to 
professional and scientific categories to community-based initiatives. 
 
TABLE IV.9 
TYPOLOGY OF DIASPORA INITIATIVES WITH SSA EXAMPLES 
Type of initiative SSA examples 
Business networks Nigerian, Ghanaian and Senegalese entrepreneurs 
Chambers of Commerce Sierra Leonean Diasporas Council with representatives in countries of destination 
Professional networks 
Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association (ENAHPA), Ethiopians’ Action for 
Health, Education and Development (AHEAD), Ethiopians’ Association for Higher Education and 
Development (AHEAD), Ghanaian Doctors and Dentists Association (GDDA) in the UK, 
Association of Nigerian Physicians in Americas, South African Network of Skills Abroad 
(SANSA) 
Scientific networks African Scientific and Academic Network (ASAN), African Women Scientific Academic Network (ASN),a Ethiopian Knowledge and Technology Transfer Society (EKKTS) 
Skills Capacity Directory of African Development Management Professionals, African Foundation for Development (AFFORD), African Axis (AFAX) 
Community Initiatives Many African Hometown (including ethnic) Associations in diaspora by nationals of different SSA countries 
Migration and 
development associations Association Migrations Solidarités and Exchanges pour le Développement (AMSED) in France 
Gender and development Many SSA women-only diaspora associations in the UK and France 
Umbrella organizations Many national and ethnic associations of African diaspora 
Diaspora networking Zimbabwean diaspora’s online discussion groups and newspapers, Ghanaians Abroad  
Co-development 
initiatives 
Developed between France on the one hand and Senegalese, Malian and Comorian diasporas on 
the other, Dutch-African diaspora organizations, AfroNeth Foundation (platform for African 
diaspora organizations 
Finances Somalis Xawilaad, microfinance institutions 
Source: J. O. Oucho (2009). 
a  Rejects the term “brain drain” and adopts “brain mismanagement” and rejects “African diaspora”, stating that 
Africa is where Africans are. 
 
c)  Return and capacity-enhancement schemes: MIDA and TOKTEN 
Participation of the African diaspora in homeland development can take place in different 
forms. Ratha et al. (2007) see three modes of engagement with the African diaspora: permanent return 
to the home country; short-and long-term placements due to family, children’s education, mortgages, 
career advancement and so on; and virtual “return” of talents and skills. The last two seem more 
plausible than the first as younger generations of Africans in the developed North tend to sever links 
with their homelands. Previous efforts to return African brain drain in the North have had dismal 
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outcomes. Both the Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) sponsored by the European Union 
and implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UNDP’s Transfer of 
Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) performed below expectations. It was one of 
the programmes implemented without prior research. When the IOM (2000) evaluated RQAN, it was 
not surprising that it lacked African governments’ “ownership” despite the governments’ appreciation 
and welcoming of its benefits. Nonetheless, a study of the impact of RQAN in a sample of African 
countries (among them Ghana, Cape Verde, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) suggests clearly positive 
outcomes of returnees’ utilisation of skills in both management and technical fields; contribution to 
financial growth of organisations through income generation and cost-saving measures; and making 
better performance of organisations (ACTS, 2000). Against the lukewarm efficacy of RQAN, the IOM 
initiated the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA), which embraces both placements and 
periodic physical and virtual returns. The IOM’s (2007) initiation of MIDA —among other things to 
evolve collaborative ventures with the countries of both destination and origin, Diaspora 
organisations, local authorities and the private sector— has not gone far either. 
These apparent failures of involving the African diaspora in homeland development imply 
that the diaspora do not seem to have made significant contributions to poverty reduction in African 
countries. The World Bank (2007, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 147) expects to increase Diaspora activities 
in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), targeting in particular poverty reduction, access to 
education and health care. Yet it is only recently that the World Bank announced the call for 
commissioned surveys on migration and development in selected African countries after failing to 
include sub-Saharan Africa in its recent publication on international migration, economic development 
and policy (Özden and Schiff, 2007, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 147). This is a step in the right direction, 
providing hope for more focused assessment of the African diaspora’s involvement in their home 
countries’ development. A conference convened by the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague 
with the support of Oxfam-NOVIB in 2006 on remittances and poverty reduction in Africa is a step in 
the right direction, one whose proceedings should of necessity find a place in the AU frameworks and 
national development programmes. In addition, organisations such as the Diaspora Openhouse in 
Washington, D.C., the Development Marketplace for African Diaspora in Europe and Africa Recruit 
and many more national and sub-national Diaspora organisations have such vital agenda that should 
attract African diasporas to sharpen their poverty-reduction undertakings in Africa. Potentially, these 
associations hold the key to poverty reduction in Africa but lack appropriate approaches to that end. 
Le Goff (2008, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 47) examines how remittances contribute to poverty reduction 
(the first of the MDGs) as a stabilising force in 65 countries, arguing that: as co-insurance, remittances 
constitute an answer to the shocks of revenue which occur in migrants’ countries of origin, pushing 
the people affected in poverty traps; that by using the “poverty gap”, remittances have a negative 
effect on the depth of poverty; that remittances can promote growth in countries where the financial 
system is less developed; that the effect of remittances on growth would be better improved if the 
political situation is bad; and that remittances can play an essential role by allowing households living 
in developing countries to diversify their income sources. From econometric models run, the study 
concludes that remittances play a positive and effective role in reducing poverty headcount and the 
poverty gap in the migrants’ countries of origin, they influence poverty reduction in the migrant’s 
countries of origin with macroeconomic instability and they become necessary where households in 
these countries have incomes that are subject to frequent and important fluctuations (p. 22). The mixed 
hypotheses and empirical results of the study suggest both positive and negative impacts of 
remittances on poverty reduction, and require empirical research, especially in Africa, to corroborate 
or refute them. Indeed, as argued by De Haas (2003: 10), there is a clear danger of unrestrained 
optimism concerning the potential of remittances to reduce poverty and inequality because: (a) there is 
a tendency to overestimate the magnitude of migration and remittances (quoting Ratha, 2003:10) and 
(b) the observation that remittances significantly contribute to income stability and welfare in 
developing countries does not necessarily imply that they contribute to poverty alleviation. The author 
contends that as migration is a selective process, most direct benefits of remittances are also selective 
and tend not to flow to the poorest members of communities (Centre for Development Research 
2002:2; Schiff 1994:15, quoted in De Haas, 2003:10) nor to the poorest countries (Kapur 2003:7–8, 
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quoted in De Haas,2003: 10). These findings imply that the faith of African countries in remittances 
might be misplaced. 
d)  Return migration and of prospects of physical and virtual return  
Return migration of their skilled and professional nationals in the diaspora is one option on 
which African countries pin their hopes and one tried by UNDP and the IOM without much success. In 
this age of IT technology, virtual return is gaining even more interest than physical return. Yet, as 
Skeldon (2005: 15, cited in Oucho, 2008 62) wonders, there has to be something for skilled migrants to 
return to. Building on the work of Bovernkerk (1974), King (2000: 80, cited in IOM, 2001: 18), defines 
return migration as a “process whereby people return to their country or place of origin after a 
significant period in another country or region” (Cerase, 1974, cited in IOM, 2001: 22) took the debate 
a step further by identifying four types of return the return of failure by migrants who failed to overcome 
the “traumatic hock” in the new abode or were unable to adjust to the new environment; the return of 
conservatism by migrants who migrate to pursue a specific objective and thus save a significant portion 
of their income to realise their plans back home; the return of motivation by migrants who stay in the 
host society long enough to start referring to its value system, but who eventually return home; and the 
return of retirement by migrants who have terminated their working lives and go back home to retire. 
This characterisation of return possibilities is never clear to African governments, not least the 
households and communities that benefit from diaspora support, including remittances. 
Consideration of several return schemes point to why they have failed in Africa (Oucho, 
2008). First, conditions that sparked emigration of professionals and highly trained Africans have 
deteriorated rather than improved in their countries of origin. Returning doctors and nurses find 
dilapidated health programmes with obsolete or irreparable equipment; teachers return to schools with 
poor learning environments or grossly lacking basic facilities; university lectures are confronted with 
unbearably large classes, lack of equipment and poor research facilities, including lack of research 
funds; and returning migrants with capital and entrepreneurial skills cannot afford to invest in a risky 
economic environment ravaged by crime, corruption and bad governance. Second, the public service 
(represented by national governments), which is supposed to benefit from return migrants, merely sign 
(and hardly adhere to the provisions of their) agreements with the IOM or other parties. Finally, even 
those returning home find a most shocking homecoming where relatives await gifts from them rather 
than collaborate with them in whatever initiatives they offer (Oucho, 2008: 225)  
Ethiopia is one country whose diaspora has been keen on return, especially virtual return. But 
it is doubtful whether Ethiopians who underscore the need for virtual return would do so to a country 
with strict controls on the usage of the internet and mobile phones. Even countries with better IT 
facilities rarely maintain them well enough for sustained usage. There has been physical return by 
Nigerians and Ghanaians in diaspora but how sustainable these will be is open to question. On 
returning, the diaspora would most easily work with their professional or business colleagues who did 
not emigrate. But there have been stories of lost trust between the two parties and efforts by those who 
stayed behind to refuse re-entry of, or engagement with, their diaspora colleagues. 
e)  Dual citizenship: the balancing act at destination and origin 
A growing number of African countries currently favour dual citizenship (also nationality) of 
their nationals, which would most likely enhance ambivalent residence and establishment in the 
countries of origin and destination. Currently, African countries are polarised between proponents and 
opponents of this status which promises to affect their perceptions of and attitudes toward the 
diaspora, dual citizens and trans-nationals. Policy options and programmes that relate to them will of 
necessity have to address the respective needs of migrants who have one thing in common: a place in 
Africa still regarded as home. 
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6. Bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation 
The first decade of this century witnessed a flurry of conscious efforts by the African Union, different 
RECs and individual countries to develop policy frameworks on migration management.  
a)  The AU: African migration policy framework  
Since its inception, the AU has shown strong commitment to take forward the development 
agenda in Africa from various perspectives. The AU attaches a lot of importance on migration, the 
bulk of which occurs within the African continent itself, though an increasing proportion of 
emigration from individual States or particular RECs is currently outside the continent. The last 
decade witnessed a flurry of frameworks on migration focusing on Africa, EU-AU relations and 
migration issues of interest to different parties. AU’s adoption of the Migration Policy Framework in 
Banjul in 2006 grew out of the OAU Council of Ministers’ adoption of Decision CM/Dec 614 
(LXXIV) at the Ordinary Session in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001. The Decision recommended the 
formulation of a Strategic Framework for a Policy on Migration in Africa which the Summit of the 
Heads of States approved. It aimed: 
• To develop a strategic framework for migration policy in Africa that could contribute to 
addressing the challenges posed by migration and to ensure the integration of migration 
and related issues into the national and regional agenda for security, stability, 
development and co-operation; 
• To work towards free movement of people and to strengthen intra-regional co-operation 
in matters concerning migration on the basis of the established processes of migration at 
the regional and sub-regional levels; and 
• To create an environment conducive to facilitating the participation of migrants, in 
particular those in the diaspora, in the development of their own countries. 
The starting point is recognition of migration issues in the African Migration Policy Framework 
which the AU Heads of State and Government adopted in Banjul, Gambia in July 2006.69 Table IV.10 
highlights the issues and their basic elements, indicating special concerns where applicable. 
b)  Regional Consultative Processes (RPCs) 
Despite the spirited interest in migration management in the continent, African RECs have 
not developed their own Regional Migration Policy Frameworks which address migration issues of 
concern to them. The Member States of several African RECs are part of Regional Consultative 
Processes (RCPs) on migration, which in essence, are platforms for continuous regional dialogue on 
migration leading to and by and large non-binding outcomes that, nonetheless, can be taken forward 
more concretely in the more formally constituted RECs. With the support of the IOM, SADC formed 
the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) established Migration Dialogue for Western Africa (MIDWA) that help sustain 
dialogue on regional migration and development issues. IGAD also has a Regional Consultative 




                                                        
69  Other relevant AU Migration related decisions which should be recognised include: African Common Position on 
Migration and Development (Banjul); the Convention for the protection and assistance of internally displaced 
persons in Africa (Kampala Convention); the Ouagadougou Plan of Action to combat trafficking in Human Beings 
especially women and children; and the Social Policy Framework.  
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TABLE IV.10 
MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE AU CONTINENTAL MIGRATION POLICY FRAMEWORK, 2006 




Migration realities and trends.  
Need for a comprehensive 
migration policy  
Labour migration 
National Labour Migration Policies, Structures and Legislation; 
Regional Co-operation and Harmonization of Labour Migration 
Policies; Labour Movement and Regional Economic Integration. 
Border management Border management issues. 
Irregular migration Migrant Smuggling; Human Trafficking; Return and Re-Admission; National and International Security and Stability. 
Forced displacement 
Refugees and Asylum-Seekers; Internally Displaced Persons; Protracted 
Displacement Situations; Crisis Prevention, Management and Conflict 
Resolution; Principles of Non-Discrimination; Integration and Re-
integration; Stateless Persons. 
Internal migration Urbanization; Push-pull forces. 
Migration data Collection and Analysis of Migration Data; Regional Migration Data Exchange. 
Migration and development Collaboration with African Diaspora; Brain Drain; Remittance Transfers. 
Inter-State and inter-regional 
cooperation 
Cross-border “common language”; Exchanges, strife and tensions; Other 




Migration, poverty and conflict Conflict, insecurity, environmental degradation and poverty as root causes. 
Migration and health Linkages with communicable diseases (HIV/AIDS, etc.) 
Migration and environment 
and trade 
Environmental degradation and disasters; WTO trade instruments (e.g. 
Doha Mode 4). 
Migration and gender 
Migration, children, 
adolescents and youth, 
Migration and the elderly. 
Feminization of migration; skills, services Movements on own volition, 
smuggling and trafficking; Determinants and consequences. 
Prioritization of 
migration issues 
Upholding the humanitarian 
principles of migration 
Human and Migrant’s Rights, Women’s Rights; Rights of the Child, etc., 
and their implementation   
Border management and 
security 
Internal and external security arising from migration. It is imperative for 
countries to make border management a policy priority 
Promotion of regular and 
labour migration 
Migration brings efficiency in the labour market and skills and 
knowledge transfer, cultural diversity, stopping migrant trafficking and 
smuggling and strengthening the broader globalization process. 
Information, proper documentation necessary for various needs of 
migrants in the countries of destination and for educating host 
communities. 
Integration of migrants in host 
communities 
Successfully integrated migrants have a greater chance of feeling a sense 
of belonging in the host society, thus leading productive social and 
economic lives to the benefit of both their State of origin and host State. 
Migration and development 
The developmental impact of migration is the contribution of the 
Diaspora to their State of origin through remittance, stimulating trade 
and investment, skill and technology transfer, advocacy in host 
countries, etc. 
Capacity building For strengthening the human and institutional capacities of Member States to properly handle migration and migration-related issues. 
Promotion of policy-relevant 
research and capacity on 
migration    
Policy makers need to base their decisions on well- informed and well-
researched problem analysis: causes, determinants, consequences, 
advantages, disadvantages of different types of migration and migrants 
in a given country; and research on the effects of a particular policy on 
the different aspects of migration (security, health, integration, 
trafficking, labour migration, human rights etc). 
Source: Executive Council, Ninth Ordinary Session (2006), The Migration Policy Framework for Africa, Banjul, The 
Gambia, June 2006. 
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c)  The IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework (IGAD-RMPF) 
IGAD blazes the trail by being the first African REC to prepare a Regional Migration Policy 
Framework, hereafter IGAD-RMPF. Against the backdrop of two meetings of IGAD’s RCP in 2008 
and 2010, the REC has a legitimate stance to foster a process aimed at an explicit migration policy for 
its Member States, ultimately for the latter to formulate national migration policies (NMPs) that 
streamline migration management regionally and nationally respectively. Ideally, the IGAD-RMPF is 
but a guide rather than a binding document which must be enforced at all cost; it is meant to be 
sensitive to regional commonalities and national peculiarities which translate into varying migration 
realities in the region. The IGAD-RMPF has borrowed largely from previous migration management 
initiatives with similar sentiments, notably the Berne Initiative on the International Agenda for 
Migration Management70 and the AU’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa of June 2006.71 The 
Berne Initiative calls for the “need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration taking 
into account migration realities and trends as well as linkages between migration and other key 
economic, social, political and humanitarian issues” (p. 18). It underlines the point that “positive 
developments in the field of international migration management have emerged through regional 
processes on migration” (p. 20). The AU document recognises diverse driving forces, dynamics and 
patterns of migration in various regions of Africa, mainly shaped by internal factors, and also by the 
globalization process which facilitates migration across the various regions through regional 
integration and to other regions outside the continent. It acknowledges that both countries of origin 
and destination do benefit from migration, problems often arise due to irregular and uncontrolled 
migration, jeopardizing the relations between countries and also the integration of migrants in the 
destination society. 
The IGAD-RMPF is necessary as an expression of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) where 
certain regional imperatives —among them the Nile basin, climatic and environmental conditions and 
affinity of the peoples— rationalize the framework.72 The policy framework serves to provide the 
necessary guidelines and principles to assist governments in the formulation of their own national 
migration policies as well as, their implementation in accordance with their own priorities and 
resources. IGAD Member States can borrow elements of the IGAD-RMPF as they deem fit, 
appropriate and applicable to their country-specific migration challenges and situations. It is now 
doing rounds in IGAD’s established organs before it is finally adopted. The IGAD-RMPF has useful 
lessons for other RECs intending to develop a similar framework. 
d)  National migration policies 
The AU framework has provided impetus for formulation of (NMPs). To date, Rwanda, 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe have formulated NMPs, placing emphasis on aspects that are most relevant to 
national interest and in the context of regional integration.  
The respective policies are: the Nigeria National Labour Migration Policy; Rwanda’s 
National Migration Policy and Strategies; and the Zimbabwe’s National Migration Management and 
Development Policy. Uganda is in the process of formulating its policy, the drafting of which is 
expected before the end of this year. 
                                                        
70  The IOM and Federal Department of Justice and Police and Federal Office for Migration, Swiss Government 
(2004) published a trilingual document entitled International Agenda for Migration Management: Common 
understandings and effective practices for a planned, balanced, and comprehensive approach to the management 
of migration, Berne 16-17 December 2004. 
71  See (ii) in footnote 1 above; details are contained African Union, Executive Council, Ninth Ordinary Session, 25-29 
June, Banjul, The Gambia, EX-CL/276 (IX). 
72  The African Migration and Development Policy Centre (AMADPOC), based in Nairobi, adopts the GHA concept 
which it borrowed from a USAID project which once defined the region thus. AMADPOC primarily serves the 
IGAD region and secondarily the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).   
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C. Migrants’ attributes in migration policies 
Migration policies in Africa began to take shape after independence was granted to several countries 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That period saw several countries develop their own migration 
policies as part of the process of establishing themselves as independent sovereign states from their 
neighbours specifically to control and monitor the movement of people within the region (Adepoju, 
2005). It was a time when rural-urban migration was the order of the day and before inter-regional and 
international migration began picking up in the 1970s. The policies at the time were designed to 
control the movements of skilled labour migrants, a wide range of international migration policies 
identified by organisations such as the United Nations including the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) relating to both developing and developed countries. These policies underscore the rights 
protecting labour migrants in destination countries and were a reaction to the type of migration taking 
place at the time. By the 1980s, conflict and turmoil were rampant in Africa, some of the most 
affected states being Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda, just to mention a few. These events began to 
reshape the policies regarding human rights which had already featured in the 1951 UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, developed as the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. 
However, the conflict that plagued pre-independence African countries necessitated a new definition 
of refugee as befitted a region still struggling for independence. The OAU’s 1969 Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa defined a refugee as: every person who, 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it…[and] every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, 
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of 
origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another 
place outside his country of origin or nationality (OAU, 10 September 1969). 
1. Demographic attributes in migration policies 
a)  Importance of age  
The SSA scenario 
Data on migration patterns from different countries have identified age of a migrant as an 
important demographic characteristic in the calculus of causes and consequences of and propensity to 
migration. Age is a variable phenomenon policy makers and planners acknowledge, especially in 
developing national and regional migration policies. Migration of youth in African countries tends to 
be dominated by rural-urban migration (Oucho and Gould, 1993; Oucho 1996), followed by intra-
regional, then international migration (Adepoju, 2006, 2008). Indeed, data gathered by government 
officials, non-governmental organisations as well as international bodies such as the United Nations 
highlight the dominant age groups in a migration episode. The dominant age bracket of rural-urban-
migrants is 20-29 years (Oucho and Gould, 1993; Oucho 1996), while international migrants are older, 
generally from the early thirties (Adepoju, 1998; Oucho, 1998). Comparison of international migrants 
in developed and developing countries reveals stark differences: international migrants’ median age in 
developed countries is 43 years, whereas that of their counterparts in developing countries is just 34; 
international migrants in the group of least developed countries tend to be still younger, with a median 
age of 29 years (United Nations, 2010). With Africa having the vast majority of the least developed 
countries, migration of the youth within and from the region is an important issue that must be 
incorporated in migration policy development.  
Migration policies that take into account the age of migrants underline their rights by age, 
criminalising child migration which often features in human trafficking or smuggling. In addition, 
some policies target specific migrant categories —for example, victims of forced migration (e.g. 
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refugees) and voluntary migration (e.g. labour migration) and irregular migration, notably victims of 
trafficking, such as children (age bracket 0-14 years) and youth (15-29 years). Children involved in 
migration are highly vulnerable, especially when they happen to be the primary migrants. Research 
and data archives in Africa have shown that children are victims of migration as refugees, juvenile 
labour or human trafficking. A study of independent migration of children in Ghana (Anarfi and 
Kwankye, 2009) provides scarcely known insights into a problem that is rife in many African 
countries but which certain countries are reluctant to acknowledge.  
Several international instruments have been developed since the birth of the United Nations to 
protect the rights of children from human trafficking, labour migration, refugees as well as other forms 
of migration where children are highly vulnerable. Relevant international instruments include the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United Nations Convention against the Trans-
national Organised Crime with its two protocols: the Palermo Trafficking Protocol and the International 
Labour Organisation Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. As mentioned earlier, these 
instruments were designed to give countries a set of guidelines to provide a basis for developing their 
own national as well as regional policies through bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
The African Union’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa identifies specific categories of 
affected people, notably children (youth), men and women (adults) as well as the elderly. The beauty 
of the AU framework is its coverage of both internal and international forms of voluntary and forced 
migration. On child trafficking, the document observes that: 
Child trafficking presents particular challenges in Africa, and special requirements should be 
considered to ensure protection and assistance to child victims of trafficking. An effective three-point 
strategy that reduces trafficking includes (i) prevention through revising and strengthening legislation;  
(ii) focusing training, capacity building and developing information campaigns for vulnerable groups; and 
(iii) providing material and legal protection for victims of trafficking including return and reintegration, as 
well as, the prosecution of traffickers and their accomplices (AU, 2006, 16).  
The AU framework recommends that individual Member States adopt international 
instruments for formulating their national policies to deal with human trafficking.73 All the 
international instruments recommend punishment of perpetrators at all levels (internal, regional and 
international), guiding government officials to deal with the applicable forms of irregular migration 
and to formulate policies based on national research and data. 
The policies regarding children and migration in different countries in Africa are similar in 
that they use the international instruments to design their national policies. 
Other international instruments that cater to the needs of women and men commonly focus on 
either labour migrants or refugees. In the same way that children’s rights are outlined in the policies 
highlighted above, a range of international bodies have provided general definitions and developed 
policy guidelines to assist governments in national policy development.  
South Africa’s centrality in Southern Africa 
Southern Africa has been plagued by a host of events that have changed national as well as 
regional policies. South Africa had a long history of apartheid which ended in 1994, with its scars 
deeply embedded in the country’s social, economic and political systems. Zimbabwe has had a host of 
political, social, economic and environmental crises that have led to a surge of migrants across the 
region and internationally (Tevera and Crush, 2003). The Kingdom of Lesotho has traditionally 
supplied migrant labour to South African mines, Basotho migrants being the economic lifeblood of the 
                                                        
73  The relevant international instruments include United Nations Convention Against Trans-national Organized Crime 
and its Trafficking Protocol (2000); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and Convention 
182 of the ILO on the Worst Forms of Child Labour” (AU, 2006:17).  
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small country. In an interesting analogy, Gay (1997) likened Basotho miners’ permanent residence in 
South Africa to riding the tiger. 
Post-apartheid South Africa remains a major country of destination for migrants from 
neighbouring African states, in particular the SADC Member States: from an immigration policy 
based on exclusive development of the European minority exploiting cheap black labour during the 
apartheid period, to ‘apartheid’s last act’ in the form of Aliens Control Act (1991) to adopt a policy 
that would accommodate the changing migratory climate (Crush and Williams, 2001), to the 
Immigration Act of 2002, which was subsequently revised in 2004 (Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Landau, 
2008:33-4). These revised policies were designed to take into account the migration trends at the time, 
especially movement of persons from the neighbouring African states. 
Age is important to consider in policies also because it helps the national government define 
the rights that an individual of a certain age group may have. In terms of children/minors, South 
Africa outlines the rights of children in the Children’s Act (2005) which takes cognizance of 
international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The four core principles 
of the Convention are non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child; the right to life, 
survival and development; and respect for the views of the child (‹http://www.unicef.org/crc/›). 
The able-bodied migrants, categorised as migrant workers, have their rights and forms of 
behaviour stipulated in the 2002 Regulation of Admission of Persons to the Republic of South Africa. 
These policies outline who is allowed access to the country and outline rights as well as conditions in 
which they can be removed from the country. Crush et al. (2005) noted that South Africa received 
more labour migrants from a range of African countries, including a large stream of irregular migrants 
from Zimbabwe (2005:12). The authors are convinced that the policy discriminates against 
Zimbabweans (Crush and Williams, 2005) perhaps because a majority of the people who enter South 
Africa as refugees or as undocumented/illegal migrants happen to be Zimbabweans.  
b)  Migrants’ sex in migration policies  
All demographic accounting often distinguishes between sex and gender, one a biological 
condition, the other a social construct. For a long time in much of Africa, males were preferred to 
females in migration as they were recruited for arduous tasks in both rural economic islands and urban 
areas during the colonial period, women were more enrolled for education than males; women were 
often left behind in traditional rural settings, waiting for the return of their migrant spouses. Bohning’s 
(1981) edited book on black migration to South Africa is a classical work reflecting the happenings 
during the peak of apartheid in that country where male labour shaped the country’s economic fortunes. 
Since independence, the situation in much of SSA changed for the better when females 
acquired similar educational attainment as males, competed favourably in the world of work and as 
the ‘working couple’ became the norm rather than the exception. Such changes influenced gender 
roles and status, making both males and females migrate largely from a gender perspective rather than 
by virtue of sex.  
2. Socio-economic attributes in migration policies: Focus on gender 
Gender is a social construct that has an important bearing on migration policies, especially in view of 
changes in gender roles and status in the countries of origin and destination. The AU (2006) 
framework already referred to emphasizes the need to articulate the gender dimension of migration 
policies, especially to protect the rights of trafficked persons as well as labour rights. Yet, whenever 
gender features in migration discourse, women’s concerns tend to dominate, primarily because women 
are often considered recent migrants in a phenomenon fashionably dubbed ‘feminisation of 
migration’, and secondarily because they are more vulnerable and shamelessly subjected to excessive 
forms of abuse in migration, particularly as trafficked or smuggled migrants. Contemporary scholars 
and some organisations propagate the emergence of women as independent migrants who move for 
similar reasons as men’s. In view of discussions taking place nationally and regionally, it is necessary 
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to incorporate gender in migration policies given numerous cases of smuggling and trafficking of 
women as well as abuse of the rights of female labour migrants; many incidents of mistreatment of 
African female migrants in the Middle East speak volumes on the issue. 
Reports of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) have put gender at the centre 
of global dialogue since the mid-1980s when the United Nations declared the Decade for Women in 
the 1985 Women’s Conference held in Nairobi where gender equality between men and women 
became incontestable. Several conventions and protocols that have been developed incorporating 
gender appear to take up a non-discriminatory position that aims to lead to gender neutrality as 
opposed to gender blindness.74 In migration policies in Africa, gender has been a challenging concept 
to integrate into internal and international migration policies. Some examples from Southern, Western 
and Eastern Africa are relevant at this stage. 
Southern Africa 
Southern Africa provides some useful perspectives. Before the end of apartheid, the most 
mobile migrants in southern Africa were men who migrated to work in the mines for long periods 
without a break, leading to the emergence of female-headed households in the migrants’ countries of 
origin around South Africa. The country’s migration policy during apartheid restricted the free 
movement of most black people in the country, with more stringent restrictions on women (Dodson, 
2005). Yet, women were just as mobile as men as they, too, were employed as maids mostly in the 
white suburban neighbourhoods. From a gender perspective, Dodson (2001a) noted that policies 
adopted in post-apartheid South Africa failed to adopt a gender-neutral approach, let alone include 
gender in the policy. She suggests that policy makers and planners should understand and appreciate 
women’s migration experience by being aware of and sensitive to demographic and socio-economic 
variables in particular age, marital status and educational status) and by being aware of diverse 
economic, social and political reasons that differentiate women’s from men’s migration propensity. In 
the author’s view, “Migration should aim to increase rather than decrease the range of options 
available to women in the range of productive and reproductive responsibilities that they bear” 
(Dodson, 2001b:144). But Crush and Williams (2005) noted that the movements of women tend to be 
“complex and multi-motivational” (2005:15) as their reasons for migrating range from social to 
reproductive purposes and economic motives are normally for trade purposes, whereas men migrate 
mainly for employment in the formal sector; women would engage in migration for employment 
purposes when social and economic conditions in their countries of origin (such as poverty), force 
them to seek an alternative location for economic gains; and that the women who migrate to South 
Africa tend to be older and married, whereas the men are of all age groups. The stated distinctions 
underline the gender differential of migration patterns which policy makers and planners must of 
necessity take into consideration when designing migration policies.  
Western Africa 
In Western Africa, the situation appears to be different. In 2007, ECOWAS proposed actions 
and measures that its Member States should consider in their development of gender-sensitive 
migration policies: inclusion of gender in migration policies; strengthening and supporting institutions 
for female migrants; entrepreneurship; and removal of illegal trade barriers that stifle female migrants’ 
entrepreneurial activities (2007:10). Thus, ECOWAS focused on the economic development of 
women to eliminate barriers that once prohibited their economic activities.  
Eastern Africa 
In Eastern Africa, recruitment of female labour for domestic work and men for menial jobs in 
the Middle East has become an important aspect of emigration. A recent stakeholders meeting organised 
                                                        
74  [Online] ‹http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/developing-migration-policy/migration-gender/legal- 
framework-global-agenda/cache/offonce/› (downloaded on 10.5.11). 
ECLAC – Project Document collection Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration… 
178 
jointly by the IOM and Kenya’s Ministry of Labour provided a forum for different private recruitment 
agencies to ventilate the recruitment process, working conditions of and problems experienced by their 
clients and other issues in the countries of destination.75Among other things, the meeting identified areas 
that need strengthening between government and the private recruiting agencies, sustained worker-
recruiter relations and a number of issues affecting contract work in the Middle East.  
D. Contemporary issues in migration polices 
1. Remittances in migrant origin-destination links 
By 2003, there was very little focus on remittances within the African region because the amount 
received in the region was a mere 5% of the 15% of remittances sent to other developing countries in 
Asia and Latin America. In Africa, Northern Africa received 72% of the remittances, followed by East 
Africa (13%), Southern Africa (7%) and West Africa (5%); the proportion of remittances to Central 
(Middle) Africa was extremely insignificant (Sander, 2003:5). Plausible reasons for Africa’s low 
remittances rating included: fewer emigrants than intra-African migrants, remittances from abroad 
often higher than intra-regional contribution and the tendency of refugees to receive remittances in 
countries other than their countries of origin. Other reason was the identification of remittances sent 
through informal channels, making it difficult to trace and quantify remittances received (Sander, 
2003:6). Informal channels include individuals (e.g. friends, family and oneself) carrying with them 
money when visiting home or on behalf of remitters. In order to understand policies that have been 
developed to manage and monitor remittances, it is important to have a grasp of policies in the 
countries of destination vis-à-vis the countries of origin, determining their symmetry and asymmetry. 
The World Development Report 2011 indicates that the inflow of remittances to Africa 
quadrupled between 1990 and 2010 from 9.1 billion to 40 billion, increasing Africa’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) from 1.9 percent to 2.6 percent in the two years (World Bank, 2011). Since the 1990s, 
the modes of money transfers have changed, making it easier to transfer a large amount of money 
from the destination country to the country of origin, for instance through money transfer 
organisations (MTOs) such as the Western Union and Money Gram which reached agreements with 
African banks and post offices to facilitate easy transfer of money. More recently, there have been 
more innovative money transfer mechanisms —for example, using mobile phones through money 
transfer businesses. Nevertheless, the report reiterates that much of the remittances is geared towards 
household needs, with little evidence on utilisation of remittances in national development 
endeavours; that households receiving remittances are able to gain access to better facilities and 
services (such as quality health and education) than those not receiving any remittances; and that the 
location of the recipient is important because it determines the most appropriate mode(s) of money 
transfer between remitters and recipients. The report sheds light on the implications of migrant 
remittances from African migrants abroad to the receiving households, addresses the challenges and 
oppositions of remittance markets and makes policy recommendations for leveraging remittances to 
promote development in Africa (2011:47).  
a)  Policies in the countries of origin of migration 
Policies developed from the perspective of the countries of origin often focus on attracting 
more remittances from abroad with the intention of using it towards development initiative. However, 
there is a problem with this approach as it is not as straight forward as it seems. In Ghana, for 
example, Sophism (2003) suggested that the country needs to formulate national policies that 
encourage migrants to use their remittances in national development, especially in their local 
                                                        
75  Courtesy of the Consultative Stakeholders Meeting to Enhance Foreign Employment Administration held in 
Nairobi on 28-29April 2011. Among the worrying revelations were: lack of sustained recruiter-client contacts, 
inability of the recruited labour to report violations of contracts as well as other migrant rights, inhuman working 
conditions in the countries of destination and so on. 
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communities; he argued that economists, researchers and policy makers do not see the need for 
focusing on the uses of remittances because most remittances are for individual consumption rather 
than development. Yet this perception soon changed as successive World Bank reports and other 
studies have identified certain organised migrant groups established in the destination countries which 
target certain projects in their communities in Ghana.76 
One of the reasons for migrants leaving their countries of origin is the inability of the countries 
to develop the facilities providing decent living, emigration becoming an inevitable option. In such 
situations, governments of the countries of origin can only convince migrants abroad to invest in 
development in their countries as they may reject using government-preferred channels to transfer their 
remittances, indeed a daunting task in trying to build trust with the migrants abroad and/or underwrite 
assurance that the remittances will be directed towards development. Policies will be ineffective if the 
people it is targeting feel that their assets and individual interests are not being protected. 
In Nigeria, a World Bank report, targeting remitters and recipients of remittances, development 
initiatives in Nigeria as well as meeting the financial requirements of the UK financial system. 
recommended that a policy bearing interests of both the country of origin (Nigeria) and destination 
country (UK) needs to improve relations between the two regarding transfer of remittances ( Hernandez-
Coss and Bun, 2007). The authors recognised that half of the remittances sent by the Nigerian diaspora, 
for family support in Nigeria in terms of educating children, purchasing housing or saving up for the 
remitters’ return to the country, was through informal channels despite there being formal institutions in 
place in both the UK and Nigeria. As in the case of Ghana, Nigerian migrants are concerned with 
individual or family needs as opposed to national development and articulate strong concern about the 
government’s inability to develop or improve facilities and structures in different psrts of the country. 
b)  Policies in the countries of destination of migration 
From the perspective of the destination country, policies have been designed with the 
intention of preventing criminal activities, such as money laundering activities or funds used towards 
terrorist activities. To this end, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitors activities relating to 
money transfer organisations (MTOs) in order to gain insights of regular remitters, tracing their 
remittances back to their countries of origin and identifying those engaged in clandestine activities 
with innocent customers. The destination countries develop policies on remittances to regulate, 
monitor and manage money transfers against the backdrop of the September 2001 bomb blast in the 
United States, which has dramatically revolutionised the migration regime. Thus, from the perspective 
of the countries of origin, national policies should of necessity target different ways for the migrants 
abroad to make more remittances through ‘safer’ channels and cheaper means on the assumption that 
remittances can in one way or another be used towards development initiatives. Maimbo and Passas 
(2005:218) observed that with money transfer operators (MTOs), there was very little paper trail or it 
was difficult to decipher anything as the representatives handling the transfers would use different 
codes or initials that, while familiar to them, were not the auditors. They also found it difficult to trace 
non-monetary remittances, such as commodity-based value transfers. There is a need to undertake 
research on the various informal channels and modes of making remittances for purposes of both 
designing and implementing the appropriate policies that cater to any changes. 
In a global analysis of remittances, three kinds of remittance-sending intermediaries have 
been noted: the non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs); banks (including credit unions) with 
remittance sending services; and informal intermediaries, for example, family members (Orozco, 
                                                        
76  Sophism recommended that the policies that the Ghanaian government should adopt on remittances should focus on 
three issues: increase the flow of remittances that would be channelled through national financial institutions; increase 
the savings and investments in receiving households in the country of origin; promote development initiatives partially 
or totally financed by the collection of remittances. These moves would make the government motivate the migrants 
abroad to use national financial institutions (e.g. Ghanaian banks) to transfer funds and encourage households in the 
country to direct remittances to investment or development of their local communities.   
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2005).77 In the case of the remittance exchanges between the UK and Nigeria, Hernandez-Coss and 
Bun’s report (2007) provided details of how the British government ensures the protection of its 
financial system. Any money transfer operator must register with Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) who would assess the legitimacy of the business and ensure that it adheres to the 
policies regarding anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) as well as 
bearing in mind the customer due diligence (CDD). As a result, the MTOs require certain 
documentation from the remitters such as a form of ID and proof of address, which can be used to also 
trace irregular migrants. For this reason, those who no longer hold a legal status in the country are less 
likely to use this channel because of the required documentation. These policies and regulations affect 
the way migrants from AFRICA remit back to their countries of origin, and explains why some 
remitters have resorted to more informal channels through the country of destination where authorities 
would not trace remittances. 
Debates have taken place on developing viable policies that reduce or even eliminate reliance 
on informal channels for remittances both from the destination country to the country of origin. The 
debates are meant to encourage remitters to use formal means for their benefit, though it is difficult to 
convince them otherwise because of the high costs and the requirement of remitters’ personal 
identification documents, requirements that remitters generally detest, not to mention remitters’ 
mistrust and rampant corruption of their home-country governments. Three pertinent questions are 
relevant here. 
The first question is, can policies dealing with remittances be linked to some form of bilateral 
or multilateral agreements between the destination country and the country of origin? Essentially, such 
a policy would have to accommodate to the needs of the remitters and recipients and help build trust 
with them as well as encourage the use of financial systems in the country of origin while abiding by 
the rules and regulations set by the destination country. This is a tough balancing act and would be 
challenging to design and implement. 
Informal channels also pose a problem for policy makers as they are dynamic, making it 
difficult to establish a way of monitoring and managing this form of remittance transfer. Although the 
aim of the policies is to ensure that individuals’ assets are protected and the financial sector/systems in 
the destination country are protected and controlled, migrants are very sceptical of policies that control 
how much is transferred, especially the migrants without proper documentation. In essence, migrants 
are looking to ensure that they are able to transfer funds with fewer costs and less paper work. The 
task for policy makers in the destination countries is to positively promote safer, easier and more 
controlled transfer of funds whereas the policy makers in the country of origin are trying to develop 
policies that channel migrant remittances towards development. This becomes a challenge as at both 
ends, with the destination country trying to control the migrant’s funds using the financial institutions 
and other affiliated bodies, not taking into consideration the nature of human behaviour. 
Two additional questions are: How can the policies in a destination country and a country of 
origin be inter-linked to meet mutually reinforcing stances facilitating migrants’ remittances for 
development initiatives? And do origin-country governments work with destination-country 
governments on policies that safeguard them from criminal activities?  
c)  Inter-linkages of remittance policies 
Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007) report further that both the Nigerian and UK governments 
have taken steps towards establishing a remittance country partnership (RCP). The RCP helps to 
introduce new remittance packages available to the Nigerian diaspora in the UK and the relationship 
                                                        
77  The author notes that whereas the first two are subject to local, national and international laws related to 
remittances, the last one is also subject to laws but can be a means of averting the laws in place (e.g. avoiding high 
fees of sending via MTOs); the countries of destination regulate the institutions that allow for transfer of funds, 
prescribing the conditions by which this is possible; but the major concern, as mentioned earlier, is money 
laundering and funds that are geared toward terrorist activities. 
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permits gathering data to influence policy on remittance outflows from UK to Nigeria; the partnership 
entails utilising new technologies to help with the process such as the MTOs mentioned earlier. 
However, the authors caution that for the partnership to be successful, both sides have to remain 
committed to it (2007:20). On establishment of relations with the Nigerian diaspora in the UK 
regardless of their immigration status, Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007:20) found that knowledge of 
the remitters’ characteristics and targeting those who prefer informal channels can be an arduous task, 
the two countries having to benchmark their RCP with best practice of the scheme elsewhere. 
In June 2010, the World Bank had established the Future of African Remittances (FAR) 
programme with the aim of reducing the cost of sending remittances, increase the use of formal 
channels and increase financial products associated with remittances. An additional task was to 
promote “non-traditional remittance channels through microfinance institutions and mobile and 
non-bank correspondent agency networks to reach the rural areas” (Ratha et.al., 2011:86). This 
proposed programme suggests that the international community wants to establish remittance 
partnerships (bilateral and multilateral) and agreements that allow remitters to send money in a way 
that they can control and monitor their activities and to create awareness in the destination country. 
Yet, even as the programme operates, policies change to accommodate the changing environment. 
The African Development Bank has been active in engaging in discussions on remittances to the 
continent, developing reports to create an awareness of the process and making policy 
recommendations based on them.  
2. Policies on circular migration and transnationalism 
Circular migration in Africa has strong historical roots from the nomadic movements of African 
peoples within the continent to the present day when policies and regulations determine movement 
within and outside of the continent. Within Africa, national governments in their respective regions 
have been engaging in discussions on ways and means of harnessing free movement within Regional 
Economic Communities RECs) to which they belong, namely ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD and SADC. 
This development encourages circular migration and trans-nationalism as it involves movement of 
citizens of neighbouring countries who share much in common. Inadvertently, it belies the second 
phases of free movement protocols that address residence and establishment that may be redundant as 
movers stay relatively close to their home areas. 
ECOWAS, for instance, established the Protocol of Free Movement of Persons and the Right 
of Residence and Establishment in 1979, the Protocol coming into force in 1980. This protocol 
provided for the free movement of people using a common passport in the region, allowing the 
Community citizens to move freely within ECOWAS’ jurisdiction. The ECOWAS protocol provides 
for a multi-stage process: from visa-free entry currently in operation, to the right of residence 
(enforced in 1986) and the right of establishment (revised in 1992); the last two phases remain elusive 
as Member States, in conformity with citizen sentiments, resent them. Evidence of reneging includes 
replacement of ECOWAS passports with national passports but with improvements in the border-
crossing procedures. 
Improvements have been made on handling citizens of the region with the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) which has established national identity cards that can be 
used for crossing borders and plans of establishing a common currency for the Union by 2020.78 
The East African Community (EAC) has also established a protocol on free movement very 
much similar to that of ECOWAS in terms of right of residence and establishment. In July 2009, the 
EAC adopted the Protocol on the Common Market which gives provision for “five freedoms” of flow 
phenomena movement: people, labour, goods, capital and services. 
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The thrust of SADC is ‘facilitation’, rather than freedom of movement. This is because the 
economic magnates in the Community —South Africa, Botswana and Namibia— resent freeing 
movement which would open immigration floodgates thereby frustrating national development goals. 
Circular migration within the context of international movements has largely been 
unregulated and spontaneous. It lies at the core of EU-AU arrangements through co-development, EU-
Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, Sirte, Libya on 22-23 November 2006, 
and, lately, the AU Regional Migration Framework for Africa (2006). These milestones imply the 
desire of the EU to establish a strong partnership with Africa to manage circular migration within a 
legal framework. The collaboration, according to the African-EU Partnership is meant to lead to a 
‘triple win situation’, that is, the destination country would be able to respond to its own labour market 
needs, the countries of origin would be able to transfer excess human capital to other labour markets 
and individual migrants and their families would be able to get access to better conditions and 
prospects while maintaining their transnational links79. The dialogue between African and EU 
representatives on fostering circular migration have been trying to tease out the issues and concerns 
faced from both ends. Circular migration as it has been presented from an EU context means allowing 
migrants to move to and from their country of origin and the destination country, taking away the idea 
of permanent settlement in the destination country. This is a solution to avoid attracting the best and 
brightest from the poor countries that need this human capital to build up the economy. This is also a 
solution for EU states that will be able to gain a source of human capital when there are shortages 
which would help to develop the skills and innovation of the migrants who they hope would return to 
their country of origin with a wealth of knowledge. It would also ensure that African countries would 
not lose out the important skills such as doctors to EU states and possibly discourage illegal migration 
by giving migrants this flexible option of movement (Brady, 2008:9). 
Circular migration has been recently and closely associated with transnationalism. According 
to Vertorec (2007:2-3), transnational ties condition the migration process, meaning that the activities 
of transnational migrants continue to maintain links with their country of origin, for instance, through 
remittance practices as discussed in the previous section. This implies a change in migration patterns 
which are no longer temporary or permanent but circular in nature suggesting that a migrant resides in 
one country for income and contributes to the other for development. 
Interestingly, the partnership resembles that of the ‘guest worker’ programme of the 1960s in 
which migrants abroad were allowed to move to countries with the programme to work in the industries 
that needed to be developed with the expectation that once the task was completed the migrants would 
voluntarily return to their countries of origin. The guest worker programme was a temporary solution to 
labour market shortages, for example in Germany which was unable to recruit locally the numbers 
needed for the industrialising economy, local labour then more costly than imported labour. The 
programme was recruitment of cheap labour without a strong contractual agreement between the 
employer and employee. As programmes of this nature do not usually turn out as planned, the workers 
who migrated to Germany ended up staying for a longer term than expected, forcing the country to 
consider a family reunification scheme that would allow family members of the primary migrants to join 
them in the destination country. In the context of policies around circular migration, schemes and 
policies have been developed to regulate the movement of people to discourage illegal migration or 
settlement in the EU states. Heckmann et al. (2009) drew a parallel between the guest worker 
programme in Germany and the Bracero Programme in the United States, detecting strong elements of 
circular migration which became as a possible solution for the United States, too. 
Transnationalism is such a multi-faceted concept that is interpreted across disciplinary 
boundaries in economic, political and ‘flow phenomena’ terms. A seminal work on transnationalism 
identifies four main contemporary transnational flows, namely the globalisation of capitalism with its 
destabilising effects on developing countries; technological revolution in terms of transportation and 
communication; global political transformations, in particular decolonisation and universal human 
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rights; and the expansion of social networks that enhance transnational migration, economic 
organisation and politics (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998: 3). In its wake is recognition of the growing 
volume and dynamism of international migration and transnationalism in the contemporary world 
(Faist, 2000). 
In the context of migration, trans-nationals have become a new breed of migrants who 
traverse different regions of the world irrespective of places that they identify with as home. It is 
gaining prominence among African migrants as the developed North solidifies its ‘fortress’ stance, 
forcing the migrants to either adopt circulation or trans-nationalism, or a combination of both. 
a)  Policies and partnerships: origin-destination links 
As described in the previous section the partnership between Africa and the EU is one of the 
ways in which the two continents are developing effective strategies of collaboration to manage 
circular migration and trans-nationalism. Like any other partnerships, the African countries in 
particular need to understand how these activities function and affect their citizens. 
3. Consequences of the global economic crisis for migration flows 
The actual global economic crisis has dealt a massive blow to migration flows from Africa. The 
international crisis has created conditions within destination countries which have had to rethink their 
migration policies in relation to the needs and perceptions of their local population. Unemployment 
has risen globally which is putting a strain on the economic system in most developed countries, 
including those with long-term sustaining welfare systems. In some destination countries, for example 
the United Kingdom, the crisis has led the coalition government to reconsider the number of migrants 
accessing the country from both EU and non-EU countries. In terms of migrants from Africa, the 
government has imposed certain conditions whereby only a certain number will be permitted access 
per year. In addition, the United Kingdom has changed policies that relate to new international 
students, restricting their access to employment and ability to bring their family with them, depending 
on the courses that they are pursuing. For students who are already in the country and recent 
graduates, the UK government has begun phasing out graduate schemes such as ‘Tier 4’ which gave 
an international graduate student the right of abode to work in the country for two years. The purpose 
of this scheme, introduced by the Labour government, was to retain highly skilled migrant graduates 
to help develop the UK economy. 
In Italy, there has been a debate on how to handle the flow of international migrants into the 
country, especially those who have accessed it illegally. Apart from Western Europe, Italy is a popular 
destination for West African migrants, which has given rise to the Mediterranean accord in EU-AU 
migration initiatives. 
Some research has indicated that the countries of origin in Africa have not been as adversely 
affected by the global economic crisis as have the more powerful economies in the developed world, 
though conflict verdicts have been made. Where the global economic crisis has bitten deep, many 
African migrants to the developed world have returned to their countries of origin, return migration 
diminishing remittance flows as well as other benefits. 
E. Some conclusions 
This study has provided many perspectives of African international migration relating to the 
contemporary trends as well as institutional frameworks including policies aimed at governing 
international migration. The issues analysed lead to some important concluding remarks. 
It should be appreciated that international migration within and out of Africa consists of 
several types which, though distinguished as voluntary and forced, is but a continuum of the 
phenomenon. While no single typology can be unanimously adopted, deliberate efforts have to be 
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made to identify the type of migration being addressed in order to grapple with its features, causes and 
consequences. A typology is therefore the first step in wading into the complex subject. 
The problem of paucity of international migration data cannot be overstated if African 
countries have to grapple with the dynamics of migration, migration management and migration in the 
context of development in African countries. The strong lead of the AU and sustained involvement of 
the RECs in their Member States’ concerns on international migration is a boon to efforts in migration 
management in Africa. It is time for the AU Migration Framework for Africa to be adopted by all 
African RECs and for all their Member States to develop appropriate national migration policies that 
reflect national concerns as well as regional interests and commitments. 
A major shortcoming is knowledge of citizen perceptions of and attitudes to the free 
movement of persons including other factors of production. Respective RECs’ protocols on 
free/facilitation of movement of persons mean little if not backed with citizens’ sentiments, concerns, 
fears and aspirations in their individual countries and in the entire RECs trying to institutionalise this 
protocol. Even some national governments renege on protocols and international instruments which 
they have signed and/or ratified, fearful of their citizens’ reactions. This is an issue crying for 
multilevel research to investigate it from governmental to community and individual levels. 
It is most likely that citizens are generally unaware of international instruments which their 
governments have signed and/or ratified. This might reflect lack of domestication of international 
instruments that have been adopted, and much less ignorance of the likely reaction of the citizenry 
should the instruments be brought to their attention. The instruments are analogous to research 
findings sitting comfortably in universities as citadels of knowledge without recourse to disseminate 
appropriately for eliciting informed reaction. 
National universities in ESA should work closely with governments, migration-based 
institutions, NGOs and the civil society to undertake relevant research, offer appropriate training, 
initiate sustained policy dialogue and cultivate viable networks which would foster regional 
integration-migration-tolerance linkages. 
Diverse aspects of migration policies have been gaining significance in African countries. 
They call for proper research to yield baseline information which in turn would inform policy, leading 
to appropriate programmes which appeal to African countries individually and severally within their 
RECs and the AU system. Research should be the hallmark of the path towards proper understanding 
and appreciation of the African international migration, its implications for national and well regional 
development and Africa’s links to the rest of the world as the region anticipates a full-fledged African 
Economic Community (AEC) by 2028 and frees intra-regional migration. 
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Annex 1 
Report of the Interregional Workshop  
on International Migration80 
Geneva, September 2011 
A. Opening and welcome 
The workshop was opened by Mr. Andres Vikat, Chief of the Social and Demographic Statistics 
Section at the ECE, who endorsed the need to tackle international migration at the UN level, despite 
the absence of a specific multilateral body on migration within the UN system. High-level 
processes, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) or the Global 
Migration Group (GMG) are important mechanisms to stimulate the search for desirable policy 
options and contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon. The most influential however, 
was the high-level dialogue of the General Assembly devoted to international migration and 
development in 2006 that called upon the UN system to enhance cooperation to improve statistical 
data and to make it internationally comparable in order to promote evidence-based policies. 
Nonetheless, there are still many challenges with regard to data on international migration and Mr. 
Viktat argued that it was up to UN organisations to assist member states in capacity-building in 
order to produce reliable migration statistics. 
Mr. Hassan Yousif, Senior Population Affairs Officer at the ECA, on behalf of Ms. Thokozile 
Ruzvidzo, Director of Africa Centre for Gender and Development United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, emphasized that international migration was of major concern for all 
countries in Africa and hence reflected a priority of ECA. Since 2006, ECA has prepared three reports 
on international migration and development in Africa and organised a regional dialogue in Africa for 
increased coherence and the sharing of best practices. ECA had enhanced cooperation and dialogue 
between countries —bilaterally, regionally, multilaterally and globally. Yet despite the growing 
recognition of the need for cooperation and policy dialogue at all levels, progress had yet to be seen in 
the implementation of regional and international migration agendas and Conventions.  
Mr. Paulo Saad, Chief of the Population and Development Area of CELADE–ECLAC 
Population Division, made some introductory remarks on the interregional project “Strengthening 
national capacities to deal with international migration: Examining development, institutional and 
policy aspects of migration between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean” The 
project, led by ECLAC and funded by the United Nations Development Account, emerged within the 
context of the UN High-level Dialogue and aimed at a) providing countries with tools to enhance 
positive aspects of migration and reduce negative ones, b) strengthening institutional capacities,  
c) promoting cooperation for an interregional network for exchange, and d) introducing international 
migration policies into national development plans. Whereas workshops held in 2009 and 2010 have 
mostly been of regional nature, this workshop was of interregional nature.  
B. Introductory session 
Ms. Claire Menozzi, Population Affairs Officer in the Migration Section of the Population Division - 
DESA, opened the introductory session praising the timeliness of the workshop, given the gap in 
dialogue and exchange on South-South migration. In her presentation on “Setting the stage: levels, 
trends and policies on international migration and development” she recalled the different definitions 
of migrant stocks (as the number of foreign born or foreigners living in a specific country at a specific 
                                                        
80  This report was prepared by Dr. Jérôme Elie (Programme for the Study of Global Migration at the Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva), with Ms. Marina Peterhans acting as Research 
Assistant., under the supervision of Jorge Martínez Pizarro and Leandro Reboiras Finardi, of CELADE–ECLAC 
Population Division. 
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point in time) and migration flows (as the event of moving from one country to another within a given 
period). She then presented the newest 2011 DESA data on levels and trends in international migrant 
stocks. Total international migration would add to 214 Mio migrants of which 69.8 Mio live in 
Europe, 19.3 Mio in Africa and 7.5 Mio in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The area of 
origin of international migration was predominantly Europe with 28% (60.7 Mio), Africa with 15% 
(31.4 Mio) and LAC with 16%.  
FIGURE A.1 
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In Africa and Europe most international migration was intra-regional, whereas in LAC it was 
mainly extra-regional. Between 1990 and 2000 migration stocks increased , yet the share of refugees 
within that stock had declined, which indicated that migration for economic and social reasons had 
augmented. Although data on levels and trends in international migration flows was hardly available, 
the existing data exemplified that immigration from Europe to Europe was the predominant pattern. 
Generally speaking, immigration from Africa and LAC was only a small share of international 
migration flows and had remained constant in time. Against the common perception, African 
migration to Europe accounted for only 12% in 2008. The changing pattern though, was the 
composition of the countries of origin rather than the numbers, with a majority of African migrants 
coming from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria.  
In terms of the age and sex characteristics of international migration, she remarked that half of 
all international migrants were women, but the proportion of female migrants to all migrants was 
declining and hence total flows were less feminized. This statistics tends to contradict the often 
pronounced process of feminization of migration. However, there are certain regions such as Africa 
and the LAC, which experienced increased female migrant flows. International migrants in Africa 
were relatively young, whereas in LAC and Europe they would be older given that they had often 
aged in place, she explained. 
In her last point, Ms. Menozzi found that immigration and emigration policies had generally 
become less restrictive since the 1990s, with the most drastic decline in Europe with 65% of restrictive 
policies in 1996 compared to only 9% in 2009. Only Africa was portrayed as an exceptional case, where 
governments had increasingly sought to limit migration due to the loss of highly skilled personnel. 
C. International migration in Africa and institutional  
frameworks (Session 1) 
Prof. John O. Oucho, Founder and Executive Director of the African Migration and Development 
Policy Centre (AMADPOC) in Nairobi, Kenya, presented his study on “African International 
Migration: trends and institutional framework from the perspective of selected countries”. At the 
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outset, he endorsed the necessity for selective coverage of African countries given their size and 
diversity and identified gaps and limitations in terms of data, in particular the lack of migration 
surveys, proper research institutions and explicit migration policies.  
He then introduced several issues with regard to the institutional policies and structures of 
African international migration. Whereas the policy framework on origin-destination links would be 
characterised by the absence of policies and legislative measures on emigration of African nationals, 
he identified a solid legislative framework on migrants rights, derived from regional and international 
Conventions.81  
He further analysed the framework on a regional level, emanating from the context of the 
ongoing integration process with the ultimate objective of the various African Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) coalescing into the African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. Despite the 
existence of different region-specific protocols on the free movement of persons and on the facilitation 
of movement of persons, they would unfortunately not go beyond visa-free entry. Several 
misconceptions and policy shortcomings were also identified in terms of the institutional framework 
on migrant health and gender, for example the restrictions imposed on family migration or the poor 
access of migrants to health services.  
In his last point, Prof. Oucho analysed institutional policies for migration and development 
and called for a better understanding of migration configurations in Africa and a clear definition of the 
term Diaspora. Moreover, physical and virtual return migration would not always be a positive 
experience, which made it indispensable to recall Prof. Skeldon’s question: “Return to What?”. With 
regard to remittances, he pointed out the existing initiatives to reduce the costs and encourage formal 
channels, for example the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT), the UK-Nigeria Remittance Country 
Partnership (RCP) or the World Bank’s Future of African Remittances (FAR). Yet he reminded the 
audience not to consider only monetary, but also social remittances and stressed the need to develop 
further bilateral and multilateral remittance-based policies.  
Ms. Susanne Melde, Research Officer of the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) 
Observatory on Migration, demonstrated challenges and opportunities of South-South Migration 
between Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Regardless of the importance and potential of 
South-South migration, it would often be marginalized in research, she argued. South-South migration 
was mostly intra-regional, with 80% of the movements happening between neighbouring countries in 
Africa and LAC. Some anecdotal evidence existed on inter-regional movements between West Africa 
and the Caribbean. 
Ms. Melde then pointed out some regional and national frameworks in the South, such as the 
MERCOSUR regularization policies and the CARICOM agreement for social integration and security. 
She highlighted the lack of bilateral agreements on labour mobility in the South and the focus of 
Diaspora engagement on Europe and North America rather than on South-South movements. 
Noticeable irregular migration frameworks in the South were the different anti-trafficking-in-persons 
legislations as well as the cooperation between Brazil and Cape Verde. Yet although regional, bilateral 
or national frameworks on migration were in place, these would rarely focus on South-South 
migration in the absence of policies between Africa and LAC. Hence inter-regional and intra-regional 
South-South cooperation should be strengthened.  
The lack of data and research on the impact of South-South migration on development, the high 
degree of informality in the labour markets and the limited access to social protection schemes for 
migrants were identified as challenges. Opportunities included the comparably lower costs of intra-
                                                        
81  He mentioned Conventions such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and Protocols, the OAU Protocol on the Status of 
Refugees in Africa, the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families and the Conventions and protocols on irregular migration, mainly the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Children and 
Women, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.  
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regional migration and the cultural and linguistic similarities as factors of better integration. 
Furthermore, South-South migration could be beneficial for development if included into national and 
regional development planning. Migration among developing countries and opportunities for 
development were often overlooked. Only evidence would fill that gap to inform policies and strengthen 
South-South cooperation. The ACP Observatory, she concluded, would take on important steps to 
achieve this aim through consolidating existing data, increasing information dissemination, creating a 
network of the different actors and reinforcing training and capacity for specialists and experts. 
During the discussion, Mr. Mustapha Djemali from the International Centre for Migration and 
Development in the Maghreb Countries (ICMPD) raised the issue of irregular migration, the risks 
involved and the sad casualties resulting thereof. He lamented the lack of a specialised UN agency on 
migration and called to unite the efforts of different institutions in order to take common steps.  
The representative from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) referred to Prof. 
Oucho’s comments on Diaspora and remarked that the definition of Diaspora originated in Trinidad 
Tobago and was hence intrinsically linked to people of African descent. He further called attention to 
the Diaspora summit in 2012 in Johannesburg to underpin the concept of Diaspora and how it could 
make a contribution for African development.  
A representative from ECLAC raised the question of potential contributions of South-South 
migration for development. Ms. Melde answered that South-South remittances could be beneficial to 
more people and hence spread the potential for education and the increase of income. Promising were 
also the skills-training in the South and more frequent returns due to shorter distances between country 
of origin and destination.  
Lastly, several participants insisted on the different frameworks, international instruments and 
bodies that existed despite the absence of a specific UN agency for migration. 
D. International migration in Africa and institutional frameworks  
(Session 2, continued) 
The Tunisian Ambassador Ali Goutali initiated the second session with an overview of Tunisian 
Diaspora in Europe amounting to 1 Mio migrants, recalling that migration flows had not been 
unidirectional in history and that the “Mediterranean sea was not a dividing wall, but a connecting 
space of cultural cross-fertilisation”.  
He then gave the audience an understanding of the Tunisian perspective on migration: it was 
marked by a more humane, comprehensive and integrated approach that took into account root causes 
and enhanced legal migration as a win-win strategy for the development of countries of origin and 
destination. Europe, he continued, needed to recognize that Tunisia was endowed with a highly trained 
labour force, suitable for the European labour market and that partnerships between European 
countries and Tunisia had to be arranged for regular labour migration. This would also contribute to 
reducing irregular migration, in conjunction with the creation of income generating activities and 
economic development in Tunisia. 
Giving an overview of existing bilateral and international agreements, Amb. Goutali 
highlighted the new cooperation with the EU in order to assist the Tunisian authorities with capacity-
building in border management and combating of trafficking networks. He further mentioned the 
bilateral agreements on irregular migration, return and readmission that Tunisia had signed with 
France and Italy. However, return should preferably be through assisted voluntary return schemes 
providing returning nationals with economic prospects, he argued.  
Lastly, Amb. Goutali presented new strategies to streamline migration management in Tunisia: 
knowledge dissemination to potential migrants (on migrants rights, risks of irregular migration and 
investment opportunities), specific training coinciding with the labour market needs of destination 
countries and the establishment of networks of highly-skilled migrants for knowledge transfer.  
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Ms. Malika Benradi from the Association of Moroccans in Diaspora gave a review on 
characteristics of and policy responses to irregular migration in the Mediterranean area. Irregular 
migrants, she pointed out, had been predominantly sub-Saharian, male and aged 27 on average. 
However, recent trends showed an increase in women and children migrating through irregular 
channels and a rising level of education.  
She then gave a perspective on irregular migration in Morocco. Given the closed borders in 
Europe, Morocco had changed from a country predominantly known as transit to a destination country 
of migration. In 2007, the Ministry of Interior estimated about 10 000 irregular migrants in Morocco, 
with an education level of 31.7% illiterate and 48.5% with primary education. They had lived in 
precarious conditions since departure —and thus also in Morocco— including a difficult relationship 
with the receiving society. 73% of irregular migrants aspired to move on to a third country. Although 
Morocco had envisaged the “global approach” towards migration and ratified the Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the government 
would still pursue a rigid strategy against irregular migration. 
Ms. Benradi called on European countries to re-open their borders, since the precarious 
situation of increased migration flows would only be shifted towards the Southern border of the 
Mediterranean. Furthermore, different agencies should monitor the activities of FRONTEX, who used 
an ever more sophisticated technology to fight irregular migration. She reminded the audience of the 
high number of casualties, particularly in 2005, and identified poverty and unemployment, 
desertification, demographic pressure, salary differences as well as the faulty images of social success 
in Europe as the most important pushing factors for irregular migration. The dichotomy between the 
economic demand in the North and the concurrent judicial rejection of migrants opened the way for 
the “trade of illusions with irregular migration” (“le commerce des illusions”), as she termed it, and 
hence for human trafficking and smuggling.  
In the discussion of Session 2, Mr. Pablo de la Vega from the Plataforma Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarollo (PIDHDD) complimented Tunisia on its policies and 
invited the government to constantly take on a human rights perspective, despite the current difficult 
and complex situation.  
Amb. Goutali then endorsed Tunisia’s commitment to human rights standards and democracy 
after the crisis, and emphasized the “holistic approach with partnership” that the new European 
neighbourhood policy would develop regarding migration issues.  
E. African and Latin-American migration to Europe (Session 3) 
Mr. Andreu Domingo from the Centre for Demographic Studies (CED) at the Autonomous University 
of Barcelona (UAB) and Ms. Daniela Vono from the Institute for Longitudinal Educational Research 
at Bamberg University presented their study “Africans and Latin-Americans in the Southern European 
Countries: Italy, Spain and Portugal”.  
Their comparison revealed trends that tended to go against replacement migration theories. 
They identified socio-demographics as a complementary rather than a determining aspect of migration 
patterns. In Italy and Spain economic conditions were the most important reasons for immigration from 
LAC and Africa. Spain for example, attracted migrants due to its dual labour market as a response to a 
rising educational profile of the Spanish population and the feminization of the labour market. In 
Portugal, it was the colonial path that had substantially influenced immigration with over 90% of 
migrants coming from ex-colonial countries such as Angola, Cape Verde or Guinea-Bissau. The colonial 
ties were in many respects an important factor for the chosen destination, in particular because of the 
value of language as social capital: Spain hosted 58% of all migrants from LAC to Europe, whereas 
France hosted 31% of all African migrants to Europe. However, the authors also pointed to the fact that 
colonial ties could induce legal discrimination and social prejudices for some migrant groups, as for 
example in Spain where migrants from LAC were often positively discriminated. 
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Regarding migration characteristics, the authors found a differing migration strategy in terms 
of gender: whereas migration from LAC to Europe was predominantly female, migration from Africa 
was essentially male (with the exception of high numbers of Cape Verdean women in Portugal). In 
terms of the educational profile, the authors recorded a segmented integration. In Portugal and Italy, 
the percentage of LAC and African migrants with high education was similar, whereas in Spain the 
African profile showed less highly-educated migrants in comparison to Latin-Americans. In Spain, the 
authors established the highest difference in the educational profile between natives (both men and 
women) and migrants. Further migrant characteristics included that male immigrants work mostly in 
construction and services in all three countries, most likely in the agricultural sector in Spain and the 
industry in Italy. Migrant women were mainly employed in the service sector —over 80% in care 
work— and the participation of women in the labour market was higher for LAC migrants than for 
African migrants (again with the exception of Cape Verdean women in Portugal). 
In terms of the educational profile, the authors recorded a segmented integration. In Portugal 
and Italy, the percentage of LAC and African migrants with higher education was similar for men, 
whereas in Spain the African profile showed less highly-educated migrants in comparison to Latin-
Americans. Women originating from LAC were better educated in all three countries than women of 
African descent. In Italy the percentage of highly educated migrants from LAC was even higher than 
that of native women. In Spain, the highest difference in the educational profile was documented 
between natives (both men and women) and migrants.  
Analysing the impact of the economic crisis on migrants, Mr. Domingo and Ms. Vono found 
that it vastly affected migrants in all three countries. Africans are more likely to be unemployed than 
LAC migrants and unemployment has mostly affected men. However, recent trends show that female 
migrants are increasingly concerned as well. The chances to deal with the economic crisis would rise 
with the level of education. The impact of the economic crisis, the presenters concluded, called upon 
policy makers to prioritize social integration, since social cohesion depended highly on the integration 
of the migrants into the labour force for future recovering from the crisis. 
The second input of Session 3 was given by Ms. Helga A.G. de Valk, senior researcher at the 
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI). She reported on Africans and Latin-
Americans in the Northern European Countries and gave insight into recent migration patterns and 
immigrant characteristics, focusing on Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Despite the 
diverse migration histories and different colonial ties, the countries showed common patterns such as 
the reception of asylum seekers, the labour recruitment of migrants and the determination of migration 
by job opportunities. Furthermore, most migration was family related and the share of foreign-born 
population was similar in all countries.  
Migration trends showed an increase in total migration in the Netherlands, the UK and 
Belgium, with constant numbers in Germany. Against the common perception, most immigrants were 
of European descent. Migrants from Africa were predominantly young and male, whereas migrants 
from LAC tended to be older. However, the comparison of data between the four selected countries 
was delicate, since data was poorly harmonized, she added. 
Ms. de Valk then gave insight into the understudied groups of children of immigrants and 
stressed the importance of looking at this group, given that 20 to 25% of the school-aged population 
was already of immigrant origin in the selected countries. They hence constituted an important factor 
of the future labour market in an ageing society. The family situation of these immigrant children was 
characterized by a high percentage of single-parent families (due to divorce or incomplete family 
migration). Furthermore, statistics showed that children from LAC were more likely to have a Dutch 
parent, whereas intermarriages between North-Western Europeans and migrants of African descent 
were rare. The socio-economic position was determined by the characteristics of the migrants and the 
country of settlement. The economic crisis had particularly impacted the young generation and hence 
also the second generation of immigrants.  
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The ageing immigrant population in the selected countries had arrived mainly prior to 1970 
due to labour migration or colonial links. Data on that particular group was really scarce, she 
explained, yet the study of ageing migrants and their needs and expectations would be increasingly 
important in the future. 
Acting as discussant, Mr. Iván Martin, Associate Fellow at the Instituto Complutense de 
Estudios Internacionales in Madrid, re-emphasized the importance of studying immigrant children, 
which would reveal pivotal information on different migratory trajectories. He further underlined the 
necessity for systematic comparison of data, the need for common matrixes of analysis and the gaps in 
data and research on countries of origin, longer migrant trajectories and undocumented migration.  
He lastly referred to a point raised in the paper of Mr. Andreu and Ms. de Vono on the 
replacement migration in Southern Europe and the shift from an emigration to an immigration region. 
He advised to be cautious when anticipating that Northern Africa would follow a similar path, given 
the large historical and political differences between the two regions.  
During the discussion, Ms. Astrid Abecassis from the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) remarked that the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families was mostly signed by developing countries and urged the 
state representatives to advocate for its increased ratification. She further stressed the importance to 
apply a human rights approach on migration policies and to monitor international human rights 
standards in migration management.  
Other participants brought up that African countries should engage in outmigration policies 
more actively, for example through the signing of memoranda of understanding. The importance of 
language was highlighted once again, in particular regarding integration and the prevention of 
stigmatisation of migrants.  
F. African and Latin-American migration  
to Europe (Session 4, continued) 
Mr. Ivan Martin from the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales in Madrid introduced his 
study carried out for the IOM and financed by the European Union on “Labour Market Information 
Systems and information on labour migration in six developing countries: the integration challenge”. 
In the selected case studies Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Nicaragua, Senegal and Tunisia were 
examined in terms of the existence of Labour Market Information Systems (LMIS). The study aimed 
at comparing challenges and good practices and developing recommendations for improvement and 
reinforcement of these systems to better manage migration flows. Although the selected countries 
differed in geographical region and their development level, common features were the importance of 
migration as a factor of the economy in general and the labour market in particular, and the necessity 
of further developing efficient LMIS. LMIS, he explained, were complex information systems that 
reflected the different competences of the institutions concerned, the operative measures of inter-
institutional cooperation, the mechanisms of the interactions between the different actors, the circular 
information flows (exchange of data, concepts, definitions, classifications etc.) and the components of 
a labour market information system that included the integration of information into the policy 
implementation process. 
The comparative analysis of the countries in question displayed a disenchanting result: only 
Tunisia collected all the different data elements that were the precondition for a functioning LMIS, 
whereas Senegal and Ghana had no systematic data collection on labour migration. Mr. Martin hence 
concluded that information on labour migration was generally scarce, and if available, it was poorly 
disseminated and analysed. This again, would mean that none of the countries had a system in place that 
would generate all the data needed to guarantee an ongoing analysis of policy development. Countries 
would need a common framework and hence an integrated model for analysis and policy development.  
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Mr. Oscar Alejandro Jara Albán of the National Secretariat for Migrants in Ecuador presented 
figures and characteristics of “Ecuadorian Migration Dynamics to Europe”. Ecuador, as a country of 
origin, transit and destination, had experienced a pronounced wave of emigration between 1998 and 
2004, with 11% (3 Mio) of its citizens currently living abroad. Yet having the dollar as its official 
currency had also made it an interesting destination for immigration. Most of Ecuadorians migrated to 
Spain —the numbers had quadrupled between 2000 and 2005. The language and visa free entry certainly 
constituted an advantage, yet over 55% of those migrating to Spain lived in irregular situation. The 
activity rates had been particularly high for female Ecuadorians in the service sector, whereas only few 
jobs were open to male migrants. Nevertheless, the economic crisis deteriorated this situation and 
approximately 27% of the Ecuadorian community in Spain had recently become unemployed.  
The National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI) has tried to serve, support and protect 
the rights of migrants, not only in Ecuador, but also in its various offices across Europe. It has 
taken on a perspective of human rights and human dignity in the promotion of security and has 
tried to develop public policies through participatory processes with academia and civil society. 
Mr. Jara Albán concluded that it was up to countries of origin to challenge the restrictive 
migration policies in industrialized countries with migration policies that brought forward human 
values and the right to mobility.  
The subsequent contribution showed the inverted perspective: “Policy trends in a new 
migration scenario” was the title of the presentation of Ms. Rosa Bravo Rodríguez from the Ministry 
of Labour and Immigration in Spain. Similar to other European countries, the newest figures of 2011 
showed that 40% of migration in Spain originated from other European countries (EU/EFTA/AELC), 
28.09% from LAC and only 20.98% from Africa. The total stock of immigrants increased since 2008, 
with a growing diversity of countries of origin. From LAC, more female immigrants lived in Spain, 
whereas African migrants were mostly young men. Both, migrants from LAC and Africa were mainly 
employed in the service and social security sector —LAC migrants principally worked in elderly care. 
Only 40% of immigrants stayed long-term.  
Patterns such as rising unemployment and declining social security registration among migrants, 
the identification of new labour shortages in the labour market or the management of social diversity and 
complexity were particular challenges for the future, Ms. Bravo Rodríguez explained. The policy 
responses would constantly be adapted, in particular since the new strategic plan for 2011–2014 had 
taken on more social aspects and a clear human rights perspective. It now included a national strategy 
against racism and xenophobia, strengthened anti-discrimination bodies and acknowledged the 
importance of political participation for the integration of immigrants with the right to vote in local 
elections. Nevertheless, the human rights framework for migrants and foreigners had been part of the 
Constitution already before, as for example the right to family reunification, equal and non-
discrimination principles or the right to education for all children irrespective of the migrant status.  
The Spanish migration policy, she further elaborated, was in line with the EU global approach 
towards migration and would be based on the four pillars a) Management of migratory flows through 
legal migration channels, b) the fight against irregular immigration, c) social integration of legal 
immigrants, and d) cooperation with countries of origin and transit. The migration policy was 
consensus based and hence fostered the participation of different actors, including trade unions, 
employers’ organizations and NGOs.   
In the following discussion, the question was raised whether Mr. Martín had found solutions 
to fill the gaps of LMIS in Africa and LAC. He answered that several workshops and training sessions 
were held on how to produce and maintain data bases, on how to develop common strategies and 
implement the recommendations made in the study.  
Ms. Anja Klug from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
remarked a lack of reflection on forced migration in previous presentations and urged the presenters 
and the audience to look beyond labour migration. Some migrants might have moved not only due to 
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labour migration purposes but also as part of a forced movement. She further suggested that it would 
be interesting to study how the various reasons for moving impact on issues such as integration.  
G. African migration in Latin-America and institutional  
frameworks (Session 5) 
Ms. Marcela Cerrutti, member of the Population Studies Centre (CENEP), in Buenos Aires, Argentina 
and researcher for the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina 
(CONICET), was the first presenter of this session, giving insights into her study on “Recent African 
Immigration to South America: the Argentine Case in a Regional Context”, jointly elaborated with 
Pedro F. Marcelino researcher at the Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean at York 
University in Toronto. Although a marginal phenomenon, Ms. Cerrutti examined elements such as 
socio-demographic trends, migration motives, modes of entry and the existing institutional framework 
of African migration to Argentina. The objective was to propose evidence on why this new migratory 
pattern came into existence and to stimulate an institutional debate.  
The lack of reliable border crossing data left figures on the size of African migration to 
Argentina only vague —there was evidence, however, that it was a marginal trend that was growing, 
especially with migrants of various countries of origins seeking human security. Argentina was an 
attractive destination particularly due to its welcoming migration policies, fairly affluent communities 
open to informal activities, and the porosity of borders, Ms. Cerrutti explained.  
African presence in Argentina was not new, she further elaborated. The recent trend of 
immigrants from African countries such as Senegal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Congo and Angola merged 
with older types of migratory flows. However, these previous movements had not been acknowledged 
in Argentinean society, partly due to a “glorification of whiteness”, she added. The new migratory 
patterns had brought African and multicultural narratives back into academia and society and had 
contributed to an increased visibility of people of African descent in the major urban conurbations.  
According to census data, there were 2738 Africans registered in 2010 (linked to both the 
above-mentioned migratory flows), of which 66.5% were men. Although migration policies would be 
welcoming, they were more open to immigrants of MERCOSUR countries than of African countries, 
she explained. Non-MERCOSUR nationals found a lengthy and tedious process to become a 
temporary or even permanent resident. This gave rise to a new pattern, whereby many African 
migrants petition for refuge as a strategy to obtain regular residency in Argentina. Between 2004 and 
2009, the National Office for Migration received 296 applications for permanent residency and 353 
for temporary residency from Africans, whereas the UNHCR registered 3233 refugees and 329 
asylum seekers in the same time period, of whom the majority were Africans.  
The migratory trajectory of Senegalese migrants —the community most studied in 
Argentina— would lead through Brazil due to an agreement between Senegal and Brazil that 
facilitated border crossing. They mainly worked as street vendors or wage-workers in the informal 
labour market. The growing African migration to Argentina, Ms. Cerrutti concluded, called for 
increased relations and agreements between African countries and Argentina, particularly considering 
the scarcity of African embassies and consulates in Argentina.  
Pedro. F. Marcelino, gave a geopolitical interpretation to the above-mentioned migratory 
flows between Africa and Argentina and Brazil. He argued that the migratory path to Argentina with 
its inherent hardships such as lengthy journeys, higher travel prices and the resort to smuggling 
networks would be a repercussion of the clash between the micro and macro level of migration. 
Restrictive post-9/11 policies and concurrent migration pressures in Africa had limited the choices of 
migrants and pushed them to develop alternative routes. These escape routes had become what Mr. 
Marcelino called a “set of peripheral nodes of a novel global migration nexus”. Although costly and 
lengthy, Argentina was a more accessible destination than Europe or the United States. Migrants 
preferred Argentina as a first passage over the rejection at European or the US border, in particular 
given that they often shouldered the burden of family debt —money that had been collected to render 
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the rite of passage possible for these young African men. This did not change, however, that many 
aspired to move further to the United States. The hardships of the travel route characterised the 
migrants arriving in Argentina: they were often young men from the lower/middle classes who had 
completed secondary education. Besides the economic reasons for coming to Argentina, Mr. 
Marcelino would not exclude that some of them were also escaping violence.  
With regard to future trends, he recognized that the popularization of Argentina as a 
destination country for African migration was only based on anecdotal evidence. It would most 
probably continue, yet remain modest given the high costs involved. In contrast, the influence of 
different geopolitical shifts on migrant strategies and patterns would certainly continue. The often 
“selective exclusion of migrants” would also persist and hence encourage informality rather than 
regular migration.  
Argentinean migration policies, Mr. Marcelino anticipated, would probably undergo a shift 
from relatively welcoming to more restrictive measures. This was already reflected in the often 
polarised debates in current media discourses. His policy suggestions for Argentina were to enhance a 
path to settlement (temporary or permanent) for these migrants and foster the creation of legal 
migratory channels. Concurrently, border controls and policies to curb smuggling and trafficking 
should be established and integration policies for social cohesion implemented while maintaining a 
focus on human rights.    
The discussant, Alejandro I. Canales from the University of Guadalajara in Mexico, 
commented on the previous presentations, reminding the audience of the complexity of South-South 
migration and asked to refrain from generalizing the particularities and individual situations of the 
different countries and regions in Africa and Latin America. He alluded to the point that despite the 
recent nature of the migratory phenomenon, African influence in Latin America was not new and 
suggested policy makers to increasingly investigate on the reverse migration flows from Latin 
America to Africa. Concluding, he raised questions concerning the capacity of Argentina to host 
African migrants, the ability of African migrants to go to Argentina and whether Africans would face 
similar stereotypes than in Spain.  
The audience then asked the presenters to comment on the integration of Africans in terms of 
housing, education, employment and family migration from Africa to Argentina. The authors 
lamented that they were not able to give informed answers given the census data from 2011 was not 
available yet. However, women and children would certainly start to arrive in larger numbers, access 
to education was free in Argentina and the main characteristic of employment was informality. 
Mr. Paolo Sergio de Almeida then brought forward the Brazilian case and endorsed the cultural, 
commercial and political exchange between Brazil and the Portuguese-speaking African countries. These 
worked as pulling factors for African migration to Brazil, in addition to scholarship programs and the 
presence of associations and religious and social leaders in Brazil. Commenting on that, Ms. Cerrutti 
suggested that this South-South relationship and exchange was way ahead of Argentina.  
Following, Prof. Oucho made a case for the high number of young migrants, which indicated 
that this type of migration was primarily a response to unemployment. Mr. Marcelino countered that 
forced migration was an important phenomenon occurring in parallel to economic migration. 
Ms. Rosa Bravo Rodríguez made one last comment arguing that the legal system in Spain 
would ensure equal treatment for any alien and that racial discrimination was absolutely prohibited. 
Every foreigner who felt discriminated against would have the opportunity to file a complaint. Ms. 
Bravo Rodríguez also advised Latin American policy makers to think about more long-term policies 
and strategies in case migration to Latin America scales up as fast as it had in Europe.  
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H. African migration in Latin-America and institutional frameworks  
(Session 6 continued) 
Ms. Nora Pérez Vichich from the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto 
from Argentina complemented the preceding presentation with insights on the institutional framework 
in Argentina. She presented new standards and policies for migration and argued that Argentina had 
applied a distinct perspective that emanated from a human rights perspective, taking root causes of 
migration into account.  
The public policies on migration, she elaborated, were an expression of these principles and 
hence promoted social, labour and cultural integration and guaranteed fundamental migrants rights. 
The new law 25.871/2004 explicitly established the right to migrate and attested the contribution of 
migrants in the country. Furthermore, migrants benefit from equality of treatment in health, education, 
services and goods and one particular chapter was dedicated to the freedoms and rights of migrants.  
Argentinean law equally enhanced the rights of migrants in irregular situation through 
holding employers liable and obliging the state to regularize those in irregular situations. Access to 
justice and to education (including tertiary education) was guaranteed regardless of migrant status and 
health authorities were obliged to establish a level of advice and guidance to help irregular migrants. 
All these mechanisms, Ms. Perez Vichich endorsed, were newly integrated into the amended law and 
complemented the already existing mechanisms against active discrimination, xenophobia etc.  
Ms. Pérez Vichich was convinced of the need for non-discriminatory state policies and argued 
that keeping irregular migrants outside the law was itself discriminating and a segregation creating 
inequalities. This in turn, would only encourage society to feel legitimized for its own discriminatory 
patterns. Only speedy regularization processes could work against the violation of fundamental rights 
of irregular migrants and their increased criminalization. In this regard, she presented different 
regularization processes in Argentina, for MERCOSUR as well as non-MERCOSUR nationals, and 
noted that these mechanisms had had a demonstrated impact on the formalization of work for non-
national workers. Concluding, she highlighted that this process was only viable in its regional context 
and possible through international, multilateral and regional cooperation with policies bringing 
forward a human rights approach.  
Subsequent to the insight into the Argentinean features, Mr. Paolo Sergio de Almeida, 
General Coordinator for Immigration at the National Immigration Council of Brazil, illustrated the 
Brazilian institutional framework. A Tripartite Council of different government units, ministries and 
social partners (trade unions and employers) developed and enhanced immigration policies based on 
legislation 6.815/1980 on foreign citizens and the core principle of the protection of migrants’ human 
rights. The institutional framework included the main international migration agreements concerning 
the freedom of residence for nationals from MERCOSUR (including associated states such as Bolivia 
and Chile.), laws on refugee status and the different international instruments such as the Geneva 
Convention. Most recently, the Tripartite group had recommended the government of Brazil to ratify 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families. 
Mr. de Almeida then added a short review on migration history and migrant characteristics in 
Brazil. Brazil, a multicultural society, had experienced an important wave of immigration from 
Europe in the 19th century. From the 1980s onwards emigration defined Brazil’s migration process  
—a rather difficult experience from an economic viewpoint. Today, statistics recorded an estimate of 
about 1 Mio immigrants as of 2011, compared to the impressive number of 3 Mio Brazilian emigrants. 
Given that figures from the 2011 census had not yet been published, these newest numbers presented 
were from the Federal Police Office. The estimates further indicated that 56% of immigrants were of 
European origin, about 22% from Latin America, 18% from Asia and African migrants accounted for 
less than 1% of immigrants. The first African nationality was Angolan. Brazilian outmigration to 
Africa was also quite frequent with around 20 000 Brazilians living in Angola. 
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Concluding, Mr. de Almeida presented current trends and future prospects, predicting an 
increase of migration flows to Brazil linked to its economic development, the migration policy based 
on human rights, the intensification of the political and commercial relationships between Brazil and 
Africa, as well as the creation of the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community (CPLP). The 
immigrant flows, he added, were increasingly diversified due to different policies strengthening 
South-South cooperation and Brazilians increasingly returned from abroad. 
The third presentation was given by Mr. Pablo de la Vega from PIDHDD, who wanted to 
share some concerns on migration from a human rights perspective, starting with a summary of 
existing legal mechanisms regulating international migration. Despite the absence of a global and 
universal body of law in favour of migrants rights, there were various legal mechanisms and 
instruments. The legal umbrella was given by the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. This body was strengthened through 
specific ILO Conventions (in particular 93/147 but also the recently adopted framework for domestic 
workers). Furthermore, a complex institutional system gave account on human rights of migrant 
workers such as the Human Rights Council or its new mechanism called the Universal Periodic 
Review. The Special Rapporteur, treaty bodies as well as case law were further mechanisms to defend 
the human rights of migrants, which should be increasingly put to use, Mr. de la Vega argued.  
The second part of the presentation advanced some striking human rights reports identified 
by the PIDHDD. Concerns were expressed about standards for labour migrants in Arab and North 
African countries such as Qatar, the Emirates, Libya and South Arabia. The human rights situation 
in Libya was found to be particularly striking with the expulsion of about 145 000 African migrants 
between 2003 and 2005 for political reasons. In Europe, Mr. de la Vega found the Spanish policies 
on irregular migration in the two enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla alarming. Furthermore, the trend of 
externalizing control of migration flows to other countries was mentioned —it had been linked to 
the return of some 200 000 migrants to countries with questionable human rights records such as 
China, Egypt, Palestine, Eritrea or Somalia. These developments were a sign of the new paradigm 
of the securitization of migration that would gain momentum with the militarization of frontiers and 
controls of migratory flows. Most notably, Mr. de la Vega expressed concerns about FRONTEX. 
Only recently, he explained, had Italy requested the EU to turn FRONTEX into a more operational 
agency that acted according to the needs of Italians. Furthermore, FRONTEX would cultivate close 
links to European security agencies or the European Office to Combat Fraud. He re-endorsed the 
reference already made by Mr. Marcelino: the recently published Human Rights Watch Publication 
called “EU Dirty Hands and involvement with FRONTEX” and added that Europe’s compliance 
with human rights was put to the test with these recent developments. Lastly and most concerning, 
would be the various incidences of arbitrary detention and cases of mistreatment (and even killing) 
of people in detention. 
The concluding recommendations touched upon the implementation of consular 
notifications for those detained and deprived of their liberty by another nation state. The notification 
was often jeopardized in Latin America, where many African countries were not represented with 
diplomatic commissions or consulates. He therefore called the states to open the doors for 
agreements, conventions and cooperation among these countries. Furthermore, he suggested 
designing migration policies to facilitate legal migration instead of providing disproportionate 
punishment for those without documents, to reform labour laws to broaden protection for migrant 
workers, to establish effective measures for supervision and mechanisms to submit complaints and 
to strengthen international cooperation in order to combat human trafficking, including support and 
rehabilitation for victims.  
In the discussion more information on LAC migration to Africa was requested for better 
informed policy development. Moreover Ms. Bravo Rodríguez asked Mr. de la Vega for clarifications 
on human rights concerns in Ceuta and Melilla, given that Spain acknowledged any migrant for legal 
assistance irrespective of the administrative situation. A last comment endorsed that many countries 
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had implemented independent domestic legal and policy initiatives that should be credited and did not 
necessarily depend on international legal instruments.  
I. Migration between Africa, Europe, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean: challenges and opportunities (Roundtable 1) 
The first person to present at the roundtable was Mr. Jason Schachter, Policy Affairs Officer at DESA, 
who launched the discussion with some challenges and opportunities regarding data collection. Mr. 
Schachter affirmed the need for more migration data but emphasized that it was equally important to 
think about the validity of the available data. Only a clear research question could link data and 
policies and hence contribute to develop evidence-based policies. Further, the effectiveness of policies 
should constantly be measured and monitored.  
Following a reminder on definitions and classifications of international migrants, Mr. 
Schachter elaborated on the various sources of migration data. The census, although costly and 
conducted every 10 years, generated very detailed information on the entire population. The National 
Household Surveys in turn considers a smaller sample, it is more suited to measure the characteristics 
rather than the size of migration and data is collected more frequently and cost-effectively. The 
Population Registers —a register of legal residents or foreigners within a country— measures 
migration characteristics, as well as migrant stocks and migration flows. The identified disadvantages 
were linked to the costs and the difficulties of comparability because different countries might use 
varying criteria. Administrative sources such as residence and work permits, asylum applications and 
consular data are often used to measure migration flows, whereas border collection data could give 
information on irregular migration. However, the fact that they are not collected for migration 
purposes causes problems with regard to measurement and validity. 
Mr. Schachter then alluded to some challenges of the data collection process such as data 
comparability between and within countries, data harmonization or data validity. The availability of 
data was mentioned as another challenge. Accessibility and timeliness are important issues and often 
linked to them is the lack of resources to improve the data quality. A last shortcoming referred to the 
fact that not all migration-types are measured, for example difficulties were noted with measuring 
emigration, irregular migration or circular migration. Yet all these challenges, he reiterated, could 
become opportunities: terms and definitions among regions and countries could be harmonized, 
existing data sources and data could be better put to use, new data sources developed and 
methodologies for the production of migration statistics improved. Furthermore, detailed tabulations 
and data should increasingly be shared, disseminated and exchanged between country stakeholders 
and neighbouring countries.  
Upon conclusion, Mr. Schachter advanced an example of best practice: The Commission on 
International Migration Data for Development and Research Policy published a small publication 
titled “Migration Counts: 5 Steps Towards Better Migration Data”, that recommended to first, ask 
basic census questions and disseminate the results; second, compile and release existing administrative 
data sources; third, centralize labour force surveys; fourth, include standardized migration survey 
modules on existing household surveys; and fifth, open up public access to micro data. 
The second input was given by Ms. Nora Pérez Vichich, who commented on the 
MERCOSUR process for free movement of people as a holistic and integrated model of regional 
integration. She explained that the policies on migration and freedom of movement within this 
MERCOSUR process made progress but also experienced set backs depending on the political 
changes in the country. Given that the MERCOSUR specialised migration forum not only covered the 
four original and associated countries, but additionally involved countries such as Peru, Ecuador, 
Colombia and Venezuela, the forum had become a whole-of-South America process that induced 
policy changes incorporating a human rights perspective. Instead of reducing migration to migration 
management, the policies of the group took into account the structural causes of migration and the 
potential to change human mobility through social and economic pressure. She further explained the 
ECLAC – Project Document collection Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration… 
203 
different bodies specialised on migration within the MERCOSUR —the migration forum, the social 
and labour bodies and the MERCOSUR policies. These bodies each faced different challenges and 
had to work following the MERCOSUR guidelines in order to jointly develop and implement policies. 
Despite the different realities involved, social and political premises would be similar, which made 
MERCOSUR the ideal body to overcome challenges across the region. 
Amb. Goutali then commented on opportunities and challenges of regular and irregular 
migration. Tunisia, he reiterated, looked at migration from a positive perspective —as a win-win 
game— since particularly skilled labour migration contributed to the development of both, destination 
and origin country. It allowed for cultural cross-fertilisation and opened up the possibility for shared 
experiences and more solidarity. Amb. Goutali further endorsed that Europe would increasingly 
depend on foreign labour migration, which called for the streamlining of regular migration to reduce 
irregular migration. Also, national and regional efforts should concentrate on setting up a national 
strategy for migration management so as to make better use of it for social development schemes 
(through remittances, know-how transfer etc.). With respect to irregular migration, he appealed to 
policy makers to adopt a comprehensive rather than a security approach, while concurrently targeting 
networks of trafficking groups and facilitators. Root causes of irregular migration such as poverty and 
unemployment should be addressed and more opportunities for potential migrants in their country of 
origin developed to make it dispensable to cross the Mediterranean and risk lives.  
Ms. Susanne Melde from the ACP Observatory brought forward various challenges and 
opportunities of migration policies and migration flows between the three regions. Besides the 
difficulty analysing, publishing and sharing existing data rather than only collecting it, she called for 
more reality-adapted policies. For example, sub-Saharan policies would focus too much on emigration 
rather than on immigration and inter-regional migration had no corresponding institutional framework. 
Moreover, policies should focus more on younger people, shattered economies and informality in the 
labour market to account for reality. Further challenges identified by Ms. Melde were external shocks, 
migrants’ lack of information and the myths circulating on countries of destination.  
In terms of opportunities, Ms. Melde identified the potential of intra-regional migration for 
poverty reduction and the circulation of skills and human and social capital among the South. Hence, 
more research was needed thereon. Also, she highlighted informal remittances and well-developed 
informal remittances channels as an important opportunity that needed innovative measures to 
decrease costs (e.g. remittances through mobile phones in Kenya). Lastly, she considered existing 
development cooperation frameworks as opportunities, such as the African South American 
Cooperation Framework (ASACF). Yet, the integration of migration into development policy agendas 
should increasingly focus on evidence-based knowledge rather than on perceptions and be completed 
by impact analysis of migration on development.  
In the last thematic input of the first Roundtable, Ms. Mirela Shuteriqi, Expert on Child 
Migration at Terre des Hommes Switzerland gave an insight into child migration. Ms. Shuteriqi 
brought forward the complexity of child migration, including the various causes (such as escape from 
conflict, natural disasters, better opportunities, the contribution to family incomes etc.). The 
consequences of child migration are many: it can improve the child’s standard of living and prospects, 
but can also draw the child into exploitative situations. Ms. Shuteriqi gave insight into possible 
dangerous trajectories for children migrating from countries such as the Ivory Coast, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Iraq or Nigeria through Morocco to the European Union. During the risky 
trajectory, the children might be exposed to various forms of exploitation, particularly girls who are 
often sexually abused on the way. When these children get to Morocco, they are often confronted with 
the impossibility to move further and hence remain in a limbo situation where access to services and 
opportunities is lacking. Prostitution, she further explained, is often the only survival strategy for 
young migrant girls. In case the migrant child manages to continue further to Lampedusa, the 
precariousness continues with poor hygienic conditions and the lack of full protection. In the country 
of destination, the children often face xenophobia and discrimination, lack an initial social network 
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and have difficulties creating a new one. At worst, they end up being detained and deported without a 
proper risk-assessment or best-interest determination.  
The discussion started with an input by Ms. Christiane Kuptsch, Senior Specialist in 
Migration Policy at the International Labour Organization (ILO), who commented on the interventions 
by Ms. Melde and Amb. Goutali. She considered that although policies influence migration flows, one 
should not underestimate economic factors. The importance of economic fundamentals was clearly 
shown when migration flows halted in reaction to the financial and economic crisis in 2008, she 
argued. In such a way, new migration flows to emerging economies such as Brazil and Argentina 
could not solely be explained by restrictive policies elsewhere, but emerging economies were new 
global players that also attracted migrants because of the (economic) opportunities they offered. Ms. 
Kuptsch recommended new destination countries in various world regions to take this emerging 
phenomenon as an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of earlier immigration countries (for 
example as concerned guest workers and integration issues) and to put in place long-term integration 
programmes and policies.  
Additionally, Ms. Kuptsch suggested including social partners, i.e. workers’ and employers’ 
representatives into policy-making, considering the importance of labour migration and their 
knowledge on realities at the workplace. Furthermore, Labour Ministries should increasingly be 
integrated into migration policies. Lastly, she pointed towards two texts elaborated by the ILO 
constituents that should be revisited: the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration and the 
Model Bilateral Agreement in the Annex of ILO Recommendation 86 (on Migration for 
Employment). 
Ms. Malika Benradi remarked a deficiency in research on the impact and added-value 
migration has on destination countries. Furthermore, she considered that the fact that many countries 
had not ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families reflected a failure to see migrants in their holistic nature. Ms. Benradi 
also made reference to the readmission agreement between Morocco and Spain and remarked that the 
Moroccan civil society would under no circumstances accept the clause of the agreement that forced 
Morocco to also readmit sub-Saharan nationals who have previously travelled through Morocco. Ms. 
Benradi closed with an appeal to increased political will in order to organise co-development and 
solidarity for the management of migration flows.  
Prof. Oucho referred to the presentation given by Mr. Schachter and reiterated that data had to 
be improved, new research developed and results to be disseminated in order to feed into a good 
policy dialogue. Yet, useful data and policy suggestions of the past should be revisited in order to 
improve data rather than reinventing the wheel, e.g. the International Migration Statistics or the 
International Migration Review.  
Mr. Canales agreed on Ms. Benradi’s comment on the fact that the added-value of migration to 
countries of destination was only rarely revisited, which represented an ideological construction and 
called for a paradigm shift. Furthermore, destination countries tended to focus too much on remittances 
instead of insisting on the social and political rights of migrants. Mr. Canales further supported Prof. 
Oucho’s statement on the need for data improvement and elaborated that policy makers should foster 
data collection on the impact of migration on both country of origin and destination. 
J. Migration between Africa, Europe and Latin American and the 
Caribbean: Advances and gaps in institutional arrangements 
(Roundtable 2) 
Mr. Paul Tacon, Associate Social Affairs Officer at the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) reported on the workshop in June 2011 in Beirut. This 
workshop had been organised by ESCWA and the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). It discussed South-South migration flows and 
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policies between the two regions, the defining pattern being labour migration from Asia and the 
Pacific to West Asia. These flows had been valuable for both regions in terms of remittances and as 
sources of employment, he explained. However, the fact that most migration was of temporary 
nature, i.e. temporal contractual work, resulted in challenges and obstacles for possible development 
impacts, in particular high migration costs, a pronounced lack of social protection for the migrant 
workers abroad and divided families due to the impossibility of settlement and family reunification. 
The countries of West Asia equally faced challenges in terms of these migrant flows. Despite the 
high level of unemployment for local workers, the private sector would almost exclusively employ 
migrants due to a segmentation of the labour market. Against the common perception, these 
countries would share the concern about migrants’ rights and the banning of abusive recruitment 
practices and hence envisage taking measures thereupon.  
Apart from the discussion on key trends and challenges, the workshop aimed at sharing best 
practices and experiences between the countries. Moreover, national-level skills and capacities ought 
to be enhanced in order to design and implement relevant policies. It strongly focused on the 
protection of migrants and assessed migratory patterns from a gender perspective. The findings of the 
various sessions determined a considerable potential for development benefits that was hindered due 
to high economic, social and cultural vulnerabilities resulting from institutional gaps. Further 
shortcomings included the absence of integration policies since migrants were asked to leave upon 
expiry of their contract. Also, the situation of domestic workers was mentioned as being alarming: 
they are often employed in isolated contexts, cut off from social networks and their workplace is 
usually not being recognized as real. 
Mr. Tacon then summarized the most important recommendations of the workshop. Migration 
should be increasingly mainstreamed, with a focus on the possibility of return and reintegration. The 
existing labour migration governance system ought to be reformed and institutional gaps in the 
protection of migrant workers better examined and addressed. Also, migrants should be instructed on 
their rights. The participants of the workshop further identified the need to better share data and to 
continue cooperation between the two regions with multilateral and multi-stakeholder interaction and 
dialogue. One path to follow was the collaboration manifested in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue in 2008, 
where countries of origin and destination came together discussing follow-up activities and signing 
memoranda of understanding. Mr. Tacon added that future collaboration should increasingly include 
civil society.  
Ms. Anja Klug, Head of the Asylum/Migration Unit Division of International Protection at 
UNHCR, emphasized the importance of including forced migration into policy analysis, both as 
regards pure refugee outflows as well as in the context of mixed migration. The broader migratory 
movements are increasingly complex and it is unavoidable that migratory flows include people 
protected under the mandate of UNHCR (asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons). Also, 
migrants have increasingly diversified profiles and their status might alternate during the journey. Ms. 
Klug thus indicated that states’ response to these mixed migration flows could have a negative 
influence on forced migrants, since they did not take into account the special needs of those under the 
mandate of UNHCR. Hence, only through joint forces could these migratory flows be addressed, the 
protection of migrants enhanced, and threats such as xenophobic attacks or racism in the destination 
countries counteracted. Ms. Klug hence recommended enhanced cooperation among the different 
actors in the field and sophisticated responses to mixed migration. In this regard, UNHCR has already 
developed a plan of action for refugee protection in mixed situations, the 10-Point Plan, which calls 
for comprehensive approaches and is geared to enhance cooperation between different actors and 
organisations. Also, with regard to research and data, Ms. Klug recommended enhancing comparative 
analysis between the various components of migration.  
Following, Mr. Charles Kwenin, Senior Regional Advisor at the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), gave a short global outlook on migration, arguing that the 21st century was the 
“century of megatrends”: 215 Mio people lived abroad, movement was facilitated through new 
communication technologies, women migrated increasingly in their own capacity and internal 
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migrants outnumbered international migrants. He then reiterated some aspects of African migration to 
Europe and LAC, recalling the different migratory routes, emphasizing the misconception of huge 
inflows of West African migrants to Europe and endorsing that migration was often a conscious 
choice by relatively well-off individuals. For Mr. Kwenin, one of the gaps in institutional agreements 
was the need for multi-conceptual and multi-organizational policy making in order to deal with the 
complex phenomenon of international migration. Furthermore, he called for a reinforcement of the 
strategic partnership between the EU and Africa and increased data sharing between different 
countries and ministries. Capacity building in Africa could be strengthened —a good practice being 
the recently opened African Capacity Building Centre in Moshi that trained local professionals.  
Mr. Pablo de la Vega from the PIDHDD first suggested to be optimistic about the various 
treaties already in place, for example the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, which was reported to be signed by 20 countries. 
Nevertheless, he identified important gaps in institutional arrangements. Cooperation between 
member states and the UN agencies needed to be increased and institutionalised. He argued that 
technical assistance from the various experts might help to overcome the already discussed difficulties 
to harmonise domestic laws and international standards. This dialogue should be opened to include 
civil society organisations. Moreover, the decision-making process on migration should include the 
local economy with workers and trade unions, which had accumulated considerable knowledge to 
share. Lastly, Mr. de la Vega called for discussing and monitoring the paradigm of securitization that 
existed parallel to the paradigm of human rights and development. Also, he expressed concerns about 
the Global Forum on Migration and Development: despite its good intentions he doubted that the 
Second High Level Dialogue would be a success again. 
Mr. Pedro Marcelino concluded the second roundtable with a moving speech, reminding the 
audience of personal migrant stories and hence the invisibility of the more personal and human 
dimension of migration policies in a macro-analysis dominated discussion. He alerted the audience to 
the instrumentalization of individuals for the sake of politics, showed Europe as a continent with many 
detention centres and called into question whether existing frameworks and categories of migrants 
could cover for the complexity of migrants’ stories and their changing experiences.  
K. Conclusion 
A variety of aspects and diversity of perspectives were covered in this workshop. New global trends 
and regional specificities were discussed and policy options considered. Challenges and opportunities 
of migration and the relevant institutional frameworks had been analysed in order to find ways to 
better collect, use and analyse data necessary to develop evidence-based policies. In turn, this should 
allow to better manage migration and to maximise its potential for development.  
Four subjects constituted a common thread throughout the presentations: data collection and 
analysis; migrants’ contributions to development; immigration policies and restrictions; and human 
rights of migrants.  
The different interventions revealed the newest data on migrant stocks and flows, on migrant 
characteristics such as the distribution according to origin, sex and age, but also the motives and 
reasons for the migratory trajectory. Most of the 214 Mio international migrants live in Europe, yet 
intra-regional (rather than inter-regional migration) is the predominant pattern. Migrant stocks have 
increased in total and tend to be less feminized, with migration due to economic and social reasons 
being the predominant pattern. However, many are still forced to migrate in search for human 
security. In this regard, several participants called for more attention on the special needs of forced 
migrants and called to join forces to address mixed flows. Furthermore, cultural aspects such as 
language or colonial ties have been identified as motivations for choosing a particular destination.  
It was noted that the identified migrant characteristics should feed to a greater extent into 
reality-adapted policy-making. Policies should for instance take into account the impact of the 
economic crisis and target young migrants who are often most affected by unemployment. In the light 
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of current demographic trends, more focus should be put on the ageing migrant community and 
gender-sensitive policies developed.  
Further, the participants agreed on the necessity for improved data collection with detailed 
information and statistics to fill the gaps in research. Investigations on South-South migration were 
noted to be particularly deficient in this regard. Priority was given to the enhancement of the 
harmonization of data between different countries and regions —it was identified as a common field 
for UN organisations and countries. Expert organisations should contribute to targeted capacity-
building and collaboration and cooperation needed to be strengthened. Also, data should be 
increasingly shared and disseminated. Furthermore, comprehensive evaluation and monitoring of 
existing policies were identified as shortcomings, in particular with respect to the impact of migration 
on development. An important instrument to measure and manage migration flows was presented in 
the form of well-thought Labour Market Information Systems (LMIS), yet only sound collecting of 
the necessary information could guarantee an ongoing analysis and policy development.  
The second common thread of the inputs, the impact of migrants’ contributions to 
development, was found to be hindered through missing policies and deficient institutional 
frameworks on South-South migration of both inter-regional and intra-regional migration. In Africa 
for instance, the lack of policies on emigration and on South-South remittances undermines the 
development potential of these flows. As outlined by the participants, intra-regional flows have a 
promising development impact in terms of remittances and skills transfer through lower migration 
costs, limited risks and facilitated integration in the host society. The regional integration processes in 
Africa and LAC have been identified as possible points of departure to promote the benefits of intra-
regional migration for development. Participants further stressed that South-North migration dynamics 
and the potential for development in countries of origin was quite commonly discussed, the impact on 
the country of destination in turn, was found to be neglected and understudied. 
Existing immigration policies and restrictions were the third common thread. It was noted that 
although geopolitical shifts such as 9/11 and the economic crisis induced restrictive measures, policies 
on migration have generally become less restrictive, with the exception of Africa. However, those 
restrictions were characterised by an ever-elaborated system, often leading to limbo situations and 
informality. European immigration policies have turned many former emigration countries into transit 
countries or final destination by default. A particularly sensitive issue in this regard that came up 
related to irregular migration: participants emphasized that restrictions should not undermine the 
rights of these migrants through securitization and policies should focus on fostering regular migration 
and addressing root causes instead.  
Regardless of these restrictions, migrants tend to find creative and flexible ways to migrate. 
This gave rise to emerging trends and new migratory routes, for example migration from African 
countries to Brazil or Argentina. Those developments have been referred to as the result from a 
clash of the micro and macro level of migration, because the limited choices and the concurrent 
migration pressure in home countries had obliged migrants to choose alternative routes. Yet they 
still aspire to move further to the United States. Although a marginal event, presenters have called 
for increased research on the subject in order to determine whether these kinds of alternative 
migratory routes could become a bigger trend. It was noted that emerging countries with increased 
economic prosperity might also be targeted as future destinations and should hence focus on long-
term policies taking the trends into account.   
Despite the existing restrictions, the participants pointed out various new approaches, 
changing regulations and legal provisions that focus on human rights rather than on security. Many 
European countries have taken on the EU global approach on migration that fosters benefits of 
migration while limiting negative effects to encourage more human, integrated and comprehensive 
immigration policies. The principle of human dignity as basis of all policies in Tunisia was 
highlighted. New policies focusing on non-discrimination in Spain were mentioned as well as an 
explicit human right to migrate and equality of treatment in Argentina. In Brazil, a tripartite council 
that enhances immigration policies also involves social partners such as trade unions and employers 
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and the Ecuadorian representative established that it was the duty of countries of origin to counteract 
restrictive policies in European countries through fostering human values and the right to mobility.  
The participants agreed on the need to respect and promote the human rights of migrants, 
providing the right to legal protection and access to justice for migrants regardless of status. 
Moreover, the participants called on countries to ratify the Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and to increasingly realise the potential of 
international human rights instruments and bodies to advocate for the rights of migrants. 
The overall conclusion was that the effort to jointly reflect, debate and work on pending 
migration issues between UN agencies was exemplary and should be strengthened and repeated. It 
brought value to the research and allowed drawing on existing knowledge and resources. It opened 
the way for comparisons and gave the debate policy relevance, although considerable work was still 
to be done. 
In their closing remarks, Mr. Paulo Saad and Mr. Andres Viktat praised the interesting, 
stimulating and fruitful debates which made for a successful workshop. They assured that the findings 
and elements of discussion would feed into follow-up activities of the project. Finally, they recalled 
the coming challenges with the implementation of the project: a) the regional information systems had 
to be consolidated, b) the final report presented at a last interregional event, c) a strategy developed for 
the dissemination of the results, and d) networks promoted in order to continuously exchange 
information on regional and international policies. Lastly, they extended their sincerest thanks to the 
colleagues from the regional commissions, the presenters and all participants of the workshop. 
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